

# Price and Volume Dynamics in Bubbles

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
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
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# Prices and volume in historical bubbles


(a) US Housing Market (2000–2012)




(b) US Equities, Tech (1995–2005)



(c) Experimental Markets, SSW (1988)



(d) Japan Equities (1985–1995)



(DeFusco et al. 2018)

# Research questions

## *Questions*

1. *prices*: what is the underlying mechanism behind the run-up and crash?
2. *volume*: why do investors trade so much during a bubble?

## *This paper*

1. propose a simple model of bubbles→a novel mechanism for trading volume
2. test its predictions about volume using detailed, account-level data
3. empirically establish the role of extrapolators in driving the run-up and crash

# The model

- ▶ start with the concept of *extrapolation*
  - ▶ forming beliefs about future price changes based on past price changes
  - ▶ generate price run-up and crash
- ▶ but extrapolation *alone* may not be able to generate sufficiently high volume
  - ▶ extrapolators share similar beliefs (Barberis et al. 2018; DeFusco et al. 2018)
  - ▶ ownership makes them even more optimistic (Hartzmark et al. 2019)
- ▶ couple extrapolation with *the disposition effect*
  - ▶ the tendency to sell winners and hold on to losers
  - ▶ this combination generates high volume
    - ▶ “disposition extrapolators” *buy* after price initially rises, but *sell* if price rises more
  - ▶ interaction between beliefs (extrapolation) and preferences (disposition)
- ▶ make new predictions about the sources of volume
  - ▶ through the interaction of extrapolation and the disposition effect
  - ▶ on the extensive-margin (liquidations and initiations)
  - ▶ trading of assets investors have never traded before

# Empirical set-up

- ▶ *data*: detailed, account-level transaction data from a large Chinese brokerage firm
  - ▶ around 2 million investors
  - ▶ complete trading history since the first day of trading
  - ▶ other data: demographics, survey responses, prior trading experience, etc.
- ▶ *setting*: the 14-15 Chinese stock market bubble
  - ▶ price rose by 100%; volume by 500% → rich dynamics of prices and volume
- ▶ *strategy*: *ex-ante* estimation of extrapolation and disposition from transaction data

# Main findings

## *Sources of volume*

- ▶ as a group, disposition extrapolators increase volume by almost 800%
  - ▶ e.g., pure extrapolators: 500%→300% difference
- ▶ mechanism
  - ▶ extrapolation: large holdings throughout the run-up
  - ▶ disposition: quick reshuffling of portfolio composition
- ▶ additional evidence at the investor and stock levels
  - ▶ e.g., stocks traded more by disposition extrapolators→higher turnover
- ▶ decomposition of aggregate volume
  - ▶ 55% from extensive-margin; 68% from trading of new stocks

## *Extrapolators and prices*


- ▶ predictive and IV regressions using panel data
  - ▶ address reverse causality concerns
- ▶ one s.d. variation in the degree of extrapolation→1% in weekly returns

## *Overall*

- ▶ document new, stylized facts about the sources of volume
- ▶ support the bubble framework we propose

# **Intuition**

## The model's intuition





# Predictions about volume

- ▶ **Prediction 1**

During a bubble, disposition extrapolators increase their volume more than other investors do

- ▶ **Prediction 2**


During a bubble, a greater fraction of total volume comes from extensive-margin trading (as opposed to intensive-margin trading)

- ▶ **Prediction 3**

During a bubble, a greater fraction of total volume comes from trading stocks investors have not traded before

# Background

# Background of the bubble



**Data**

# Data and sample

## *Data*

- ▶ provided by a one of the largest Chinese brokerage firms
  - ▶ branches in almost all of China's provincial-districts
- ▶ three main datasets
  1. *transactions*: all transactions since the first day of trading
  2. *demographics*: age, gender, education, etc.
  3. *surveys*: wealth, income, risk tolerance, investment horizon and objective, etc.

## *Sample selection*

- ▶ retail investors as opposed to institutions
  - ▶ retail accounts: 45% of stock ownership and 90% of total volume
- ▶ *regular* accounts with balance between 0.01 to 1 million RMB, excluding
  - ▶ *leverage* accounts
  - ▶ large accounts *de facto* managed by institutions and take shadow leverage
- ▶ final sample size: ~600,000 retail accounts

# Measuring extrapolation and disposition

- ▶ time frame: 2005-2013; *prior to* the bubble

## *Degree of extrapolation (DOX)*

- ▶ volume-weighted average past returns based on all initial buys

$$DOX = \frac{\sum (Buy * PastRet)}{\sum Buy}$$

- ▶ *PastRet*: past one-month return → robust to alternative horizons
- ▶ no momentum in Chinese markets → not rational trading
- ▶ *initial* buys (not *additional* buys) → cleaner source of beliefs
- ▶ consistent with survey-based measures of extrapolative beliefs (Liu et al. 2019)

## *Degree of disposition (DOD)*

- ▶  $DOD = PGR/PLR$  or  $PGR - PLR$ , where

- ▶ Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) =  $\frac{\text{Realized Gains}}{\text{Realized Gains} + \text{Paper Gains}}$
- ▶ PLR is similarly defined

# **Evidence on Volume**

# Evidence I: Group-level

- ▶ disposition extrapolators: *DOX* and *DOD* above the median
  - ▶ pure extrapolators: only *DOX* above the median






Figure: Total volume



# Evidence I: Group-level, cont'd



(a) Holdings



(b) Turnover

Figure: Decomposition of total volume

## Evidence II: Investor-level

	$\Delta$ Volume	$\Delta$ Turnover	$\Delta$ Balance
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>DOX</i>	<b>2.64***</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	<b>0.32***</b>
	(5.56)	(-0.10)	(17.33)
<i>DOD</i>	<b>3.65***</b>	<b>1.96***</b>	<b>-0.05***</b>
	(7.84)	(11.24)	(-4.04)
<i>DOX*DOD</i>	<b>0.76**</b>	<b>0.27**</b>	<b>-0.04***</b>
	(2.15)	(1.99)	(-4.61)
<i>BAL</i>	-14.96***	-0.60	-1.39***
	(-13.61)	(-1.45)	(-32.24)
<i>EXP</i>	3.25***	1.33***	0.04***
	(30.55)	(34.34)	(9.14)
<i>HHI</i>	2.70**	-3.67***	1.03***
	(2.08)	(-7.74)	(20.71)
<i>VOL</i>	-80.00***	-69.62***	6.15***
	(-3.91)	(-10.10)	(7.09)
<i>SKEW</i>	1.14*	0.63***	-0.02
	(1.70)	(2.96)	(-0.56)
<i>RET</i>	4.75	6.69***	-2.18***
	(1.11)	(4.45)	(-7.07)
Demographics	YES	YES	YES
Margin account, dummy	YES	YES	YES
Traded warrants before, dummy	YES	YES	YES
Survey-based characteristics	YES	YES	YES
$R^2$	0.010	0.013	0.016

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## Evidence III: Stock-level

- ▶ stock-level degree of extrapolation is defined by

$$\overline{DOX}_{j,t} = \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \frac{Buy_{i,j,t}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Buy_{i,j,t}} \right) DOX_i$$

- ▶  $Buy_{i,j,t}$ : number of  $j$  shares *bought* by investor  $i$  in week  $t$
- ▶ stock-level degree of disposition is defined by

$$\overline{DOD}_{j,t} = \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \frac{Sell_{i,j,t}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Sell_{i,j,t}} \right) DOD_i$$

- ▶  $Sell_{i,j,t}$ : number of  $j$  shares *sold* by investor  $i$  in week  $t$
- ▶ run the following panel regression

$$\text{Turnover}_{j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \overline{DOX}_{j,t} + \beta_2 \overline{DOD}_{j,t} + \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_{j,t}$$

- ▶ stock fixed effects (robust to time fixed effects)
- ▶ time-clustered standard errors (robust to double-clustered S.E.)

## Evidence III: Stock-level, cont'd

$$\text{Turnover}_{j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \overline{DOX}_{j,t} + \beta_2 \overline{DOD}_{j,t} + \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_{j,t}$$

	Turnover ( $t$ )		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\overline{DOX}(t)$	0.04*** (14.30)	0.04*** (9.34)	0.01*** (2.92)
$\overline{DOD}(t)$	0.02*** (7.76)	0.01*** (6.32)	0.01*** (5.53)
Return ( $t$ )		0.28*** (3.97)	0.40*** (7.31)
Return ( $t-1$ ) to ( $t-12$ )	NO	NO	YES
Turnover ( $t-1$ ) to ( $t-12$ )	NO	NO	YES
Stock FE	YES	YES	YES
Time-clustered SE	YES	YES	YES
$R^2$	0.50	0.52	0.70

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## Evidence IV: Prediction 2 and 3

	Volume (in RMB)		
	Run-up	Crash	Quiet
Fraction of extensive-margin trades	55.0%	46.0%	52.2%
<i>disposition extrapolators</i>	58.9%	48.3%	55.6%
<i>pure extrapolators</i>	56.3%	49.2%	54.5%
<i>others</i>	52.9%	43.8%	49.9%
Fraction of trading of “new” stocks	68.3%	52.9%	54.9%

# **Evidence on Prices**

# Empirical strategy

- ▶ models of extrapolation suggest that extrapolators are responsible for the rising prices
  - ▶ e.g., Barberis et al. 2018, DeFusco et al. 2018, and this paper
  - ▶ little direct empirical evidence → partially driven by reverse causality concerns
- ▶ suppose we run

$$\text{Return}_{j,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \overline{DOX}_{j,t+1} + \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_{j,t}$$

- ▶  $\beta_1 > 0$ : prices go up → attract trading from extrapolators → higher  $\overline{DOX}$

## *Empirical strategy*

- ▶ two specifications
  1. predictive regressions:  $\text{Return}_{j,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \overline{DOX}_{j,t} + \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_{j,t}$
  2. IV regressions: instrument  $\overline{DOX}_{j,t+1}$  using  $\overline{DOX}_{j,t}$
- ▶ key assumption:  $\overline{DOX}_{j,t}$  is positively autocorrelated
  - ▶ AR(1) efficient of 0.45 at the weekly frequency

# Extrapolation and prices

	Return ( $t + 1$ ), run-up (%)			Return ( $t + 1$ ), crash (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
$\overline{DOX}(t + 1)$	3.09***		0.98**	3.94***		-4.12**
	(7.65)		(2.09)	(3.87)		(-2.89)
$\overline{DOX}(t)$		0.48**			-1.68**	
		(2.29)			(-2.60)	
Return ( $t$ )	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.07	0.03	0.05	0.06
	(-1.75)	(-0.87)	(-1.05)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.36)
BETA ( $t$ )	0.08	-0.16	-0.07	-0.10	-1.03	-1.08
	(0.29)	(-0.51)	(-0.20)	(-0.11)	(-1.16)	(-0.98)
Turnover ( $t$ )	-2.16	1.19	0.58	-11.63	-5.92	-5.38
	(-1.03)	(0.51)	(0.24)	(-1.63)	(-0.78)	(-0.61)
FLOAT ( $t$ )	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.96)	(1.40)	(0.15)	(-0.05)	(0.13)	(-0.09)
VOL ( $t$ )	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(-0.30)	(-0.43)	(0.33)	(0.48)	(0.24)	(0.55)
SIZE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
B/M	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time-clustered SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
$R^2$	0.11	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.03

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



# Conclusion

- ▶ propose a framework of bubbles based on extrapolation and the disposition effect
  - ▶ a new channel for volume
- ▶ examine the model's predictions about the sources of volume using detailed, account-level data
  - ▶ interaction of extrapolation and disposition
  - ▶ extensive-margin
  - ▶ the trading of “new” stocks
- ▶ empirically confirm the role of extrapolators in driving up prices
  - ▶ address reverse causality concerns
- ▶ support the model's explanation for the joint dynamics of prices of volume
  - ▶ extrapolation drives up prices
  - ▶ extrapolation and the disposition effect together generate large volume