Accountability, Elections, and Frictions: The Effects of Institutional Constraints on the Provision and Efficacy of School Resources
Paper Session
Monday, Jan. 4, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)
- Chair: Sandra Black, Columbia University
School Capital Expenditure Rules, Student Outcomes, and Real Estate Capitalization
Abstract
School capital expenditures comprise a major component of public spending in the US, but there is substantial disagreement among economists and policymakers whether these investments efficiently raise student achievement. This paper exploits cross-state differences in fiscal rules such as tax limits and supermajority requirements for school bonds to estimate the effects of school capital expenditures on student outcomes and the real estate market. While most of the existing evidence relies on case studies from individual districts or states, we provide the first nation-wide study of these effects, using data from more than 10,000 school districts across forty states. To this end, we assembled a new database containing a) the mechanisms governing capital funding in each state, b) school district bond elections, and c) student scores on state tests for a 15-years national panel of school districts, compiled from several public data sources and standardized across states and years. We then use a regression discontinuity approach across bond election thresholds as well as a state border district design to identify the causal effect of capital expenditures on student outcomes and real estate capitalization. In this way, we characterize both the mean effects across states and the distribution of effects across fiscal regimes. Results inform whether fiscal constraints are too restrictive or too loose. Finally, we document the correlation of student achievement effects and house price effects across settings to estimate the share of valuation due to student achievement as opposed to local amenities.Test-Based Accountability and the Effectiveness of School Finance Reforms
Abstract
A recent literature provides new evidence that school resources are important for student outcomes. In this paper, we show that school finance reform-induced increases in student performance are driven by those states that had test-based accountability policies in place at the time. By incentivizing school improvement, accountability systems (such as the federal No Child Left Behind act) may raise the efficiency with which additional school funding gets spent. Our empirical approach leverages the timing of school finance reforms to compare funding impacts on student test scores between states that had accountability in place at the time of the reform with states that did not. The results indicate that finance reforms are three times more productive in low-income school districts when also accompanied by test-based accountability. These findings shed new light on the role of accountability incentives in education production and the mechanisms supporting the effectiveness of school resources.Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application
Abstract
College admissions in the U.S. is decentralized, creating frictions that limit student choice.We study the Common Application (CA) platform, under which students submit a single application to member schools, potentially reducing frictions and increasing student choice. The
CA increases the number of applications received by schools, reflecting a reduction in frictions,
and reduces the yield on accepted students, reflecting increased choice. The CA increases outof-state enrollment, especially from other CA states, consistent with network effects. CA entry
changes the composition of students, with evidence of more racial diversity, more high-income
students, and imprecise evidence of increases in SAT scores.
Discussant(s)
Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach
,
Northwestern University
Jesse Rothstein
,
University of California-Berkeley
JEL Classifications
- I2 - Education and Research Institutions
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods