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  5. Populism, Nationalism, and Immigration
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Populism, Nationalism, and Immigration

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 3:45 PM - 5:45 PM (EST)

Hosted By: Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics
  • Chair: Torsten Persson, Institute for International Economic Studies

Immigration and Redistribution

Alberto Alesina
,
Harvard University
Armando Miano
,
Harvard University
Stefanie Stantcheva
,
Harvard University

Abstract

We design and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in six countries to investigate how natives perceive immigrants and how these perceptions influence their preferences for redistribution. We find strikingly large misperceptions about the number and characteristics of immigrants: in all countries, respondents greatly overestimate the total number of immigrants, think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them, and are economically weaker -- less educated, more unemployed, and more reliant on and favored by government transfers -- than is the case. Given the very negative baseline views that respondents have of immigrants, simply making them think about immigration before asking questions about redistribution, in a randomized manner, makes them support less redistribution, including actual donations to charities. Information about the true shares and origins of immigrants is ineffective, and mainly acts as a prime that makes people think about immigrants and reduces their support for redistribution. An anecdote about a "hard working'' immigrant is somewhat more effective, suggesting that when it comes to immigration, salience and narratives shape people's views more deeply than hard facts.

Economic Shocks and Populism

Fausto Panunzi
,
Bocconi University
Nicola Pavoni
,
Bocconi University
Guido Tabellini
,
Bocconi University

Abstract

This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. As in prospect theory, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are intrinsically attracted by the more risky candidate.We show that, after a large adverse economic shock, the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why new populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on economic policy platforms of low redistribution. We show that survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior.

The Rise of Identity Politics Part 1: The Decline of the Left

Timothy Besley
,
London School of Economics
Torsten Persson
,
Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract

This paper develops a model of two-dimensional politics: one economics-based redistribution-cleavage, and one identity-based immigration cleavage. In our basic model, people identify either as nationalists or cosmopolitans and we ask how a rise in nationalism reshapes electoral politics and equiliibrium policies, especially the circumstances under which it triggers a weakening of the left. We also study three forms of endogenous political reorganization: party-leadership takeovers, formation of social movements, or entry of new nationalist parties.
JEL Classifications
  • D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making