The Political Economy of State Building in Latin America
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)
- Chair: Juan F. Vargas, Del Rosario University
How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities
Abstract
This paper investigates if research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and cause policy change. Collaborating with the National Confederation of Municipalities in Brazil, we work with 2,150 municipalities and the mayors who control their policies. We use experiments to measure mayors’ demand for research information and their response to learning research findings. In one experiment, we find that mayors and other municipal officials are willing to pay to learn the results of impact evaluations, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing on average between studies conducted in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy (reminder letters for taxpayers) increases the probability that their municipality implements the policy by 10 percentage points. In sum, we provide direct evidence that providing research information to political leaders can lead to policy change. Information frictions may thus help explain failures to adopt effective policies.Do Ghosts Exist? Clientelistic Networks and Corruption in Public Education
Abstract
We study the effect of political alignment between local (municipal) and regional (departmental) politicians on false or "ghost" students, fabricated by local politicians and bureaucrats to obtain more transfers from the national government. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we show that the proportion of ghost students is larger in municipalities where the candidate from the governor's party is elected. Effects are larger in "autonomous municipalities" that have more discretion over resource spending, where there are weaker institutions, and where teachers and other school staff are less qualified. Also, the quality and quantity of education are not higher in aligned areas. Instead, in these places there is more subsequent electoral fraud and more complaints about disciplinary violations by public functionaries, especially in the education sector. We also find some suggestive (though less conclusive) evidence that incumbent parties and politicians have better future electoral and employment prospects in aligned areas. The findings are consistent with the interpretation that resource extraction is particularly valuable to politicians whose political network is connected to higher echelons of power, and that areas with weaker accountability and more discretion for diversion of resources for the reproduction of the clientelistic network engage more in this form of corruption, in which a substantial part of the money is being diverted for political and economic gain rather than to improve the quantity or quality of the service.Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Unintended Effects of Enfranchisement
Abstract
We empirically examine the political and economic effects of a nation-wide public policy in El Salvador that brought voting centers to communities previously de facto disenfranchised by large voting costs. We exploit the longitudinal roll out of the ”Voto Residencial” (Residencial Voting) program from 2006 to 2015, as well as plausible exogenous variation on gang presence and find that turnout increased only in areas not controlled by gangs. In contrast, gang-controlled areas experienced a large decrease in turnout as voters were automatically registered in the nearest voting post, irregardless of security concerns. Consistent with the decrease in electoral participation, we document that public goods provision differentially decreases in gang-controlled areas after the implementation of the Residential Voting program. These patterns are reversed when the left-wing political party (FMNL) was elected and reached a truce with the main gangs in 2012. We document that, after the truce, turnout differentially increased in gang-controlled areas, and the vote share of the FMNL increased proportionally.Discussant(s)
María Micaela Sviatschi
,
Princeton University
Claudio Ferraz
,
University of British Columbia
Cesi Cruz
,
University of British Columbia
Emilio Depetris-Chauvin
,
PUC-Chile
JEL Classifications
- N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations