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COVID-19 and the Economy

Paper Session

Monday, Jan. 4, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)

Hosted By: Korea-America Economic Association & American Economic Association
  • Chair: Yongseok Shin, Washington University in St. Louis

Optimal Management of an Epidemic: Lockdown, Vaccine and Value of Life

Carlos Garriga
,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Rody Manuelli
,
Washington University in St. Louis
Siddhartha Sanghi
,
Washington University in St. Louis

Abstract

We study a dynamic macro model to capture the trade-off between policies that simultaneously decrease output and the rate of infection transmission. We find that, in many cases, optimal policies require sharp initial decreases in employment followed by a partial liberalization that occurs before the peak of the epidemic. The arrival of a vaccine (even if only a small fraction of the population is initially vaccinated) requires a significant relaxation of stay-at-home policies and, in some cases, results in an increase in the speed of infection. The model implies that the monetary value of producing a vaccine is high at the beginning of the epidemic but it decreases rapidly as time passes. We find that the value that society assigns to averting deaths is a major determinant of the optimal policy.

The Hammer and the Dance: Equilibrium and Optimal Policy during a Pandemic Crisis

Fabrice Collard
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Christian Hellwig
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Tiziana Assenza
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Sumudu Kankanamge
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Martial Dupaigne
,
Toulouse School of Economics

Abstract

We develop a comprehensive framework for analyzing optimal economic policy during a pandemic crisis in a dynamic economic model that trades off pandemic-induced mortality costs against the adverse economic impact of policy interventions. We use the comparison between the planner problem and the dynamic decentralized equilibrium to highlight the margins of policy intervention and describe optimal policy actions. As our main conclusion, we provide a strong and novel economic justification for the current approach to dealing with the pandemic, which is different from the existing health policy rationales. This justification is based on a simple economic concept, the shadow price of infection risks, which succinctly captures the static and dynamic trade-offs and externalities between economic prosperity and mortality risk as the pandemic unfolds.

The Cost of Privacy: Welfare Effects of the Disclosure of COVID-19 Cases

David Argente
,
Pennsylvania State University
Chang-Tai Hsieh
,
University of Chicago
Munseob Lee
,
University of California-San Diego

Abstract

South Korea publicly disclosed detailed location information of individuals that tested positive for COVID-19. We quantify the effect of public disclosure on the transmission of the virus and economic losses in Seoul. The change in commuting patterns due to public disclosure lowers the number of cases by 60 thousand and the number of deaths by 2 thousand in Seoul over two years. Compared to a city-wide lock-down that results in the same number of cases over two years as the disclosure scenario, the economic cost of such a lockdown is almost four times higher.

Inequality of Fear and Self-Quarantine: Is There a Trade-off between GDP and Public Health?

Samgmin Aum
,
Myongji University
Sang Yoon (Tim) Lee
,
Queen Mary University of London
Yongseok Shin
,
Washington University in St. Louis

Abstract

We construct a quantitative model of an economy hit by an epidemic. People differ by age and
skill, and choose occupations and whether to commute to work or work from home, to maximize
their income and minimize their fear of infection. Occupations differ by wage, infection risk, and
the productivity loss when working from home. By setting the model parameters to replicate the
progression of COVID-19 in South Korea and the United Kingdom, we obtain three key results.
First, government-imposed lock-downs may not present a clear trade-off between GDP and
public health, as commonly believed, even though its immediate effect is to reduce GDP and
infections by forcing people to work from home. A premature lifting of the lock-down raises
GDP temporarily, but infections rise over the next months to a level at which many people choose
to work from home, where they are less productive, driven by the fear of infection. A longer lockdown eventually mitigates the GDP loss as well as flattens the infection curve. Second, if the UK
had adopted South Korean policies, its GDP loss and infections would have been substantially
smaller both in the short and the long run. This is not because Korea implemented policies
sooner, but because aggressive testing and tracking more effectively reduce infections and disrupt
the economy less than a blanket lock-down. Finally, low-skill workers and self-employed lose the
most from the epidemic and also from the government policies. However, the policy of issuing
“visas” to those who have antibodies will disproportionately benefit the low-skilled, by relieving
them of the fear of infection and also by allowing them to get back to work.

Searching, Recalls, and Tightness: An Interim Report on the COVID Labor Market

Eliza Forsythe
,
University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
Lisa B. Kahn
,
University of Rochester
Fabian Lange
,
McGill University
David Wiczer
,
Stony Brook University

Abstract

We measure tightness during the COVID recession, combining job seeker information from the CPS and vacancy postings from Burning Glass Technologies. To parse the former, we develop a taxonomy splitting job seekers from those waiting to be recalled. Tightness halved since the onset of the epidemic and, as shown in our model, should steer policy to increase employer profitability. Disaggregating markets, we find mismatch has declined, driven by a decline in professional occupations' tightness. Further, while markets are tight relative to other recessions, that would flip if the large group of job losers not currently searching reenter the market.

Which Workers Bear the Burden of Social Distancing Policy?

Simon Mongey
,
University of Chicago
Laura Pilossoph
,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Alex Weinberg
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

TBD
JEL Classifications
  • A1 - General Economics
  • E7 - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics