Nonwage Job Attributes: What They Cost Firms and Workers
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)
- Chair: Aaron Sojourner, University of Minnesota
Unequal Use of Social Insurance Benefits: The Role of Employers
Abstract
California's Disability Insurance (DI) and Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs have become important sources of social insurance, with benefit payments now exceeding those of the state's Unemployment Insurance program. However, there is considerable inequality in program take-up. While existing research shows that firm-specific factors explain a significant part of the growing earnings inequality in the U.S., little is known about the role of firms in determining the use of public leave-taking benefits. Using administrative data from California, we find strong evidence that DI and PFL program take-up is substantially higher in firms with high earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the firm premium is associated with a 57 percent higher claim rate incidence. Our results suggest that changes in firm behavior have the potential to impact social insurance use and thus reduce an important dimension of inequality in America.Complaint-Based Enforcement of Labor Regulations
Abstract
Regulatory agencies overseeing the labor market often rely on complaints by workers to target their enforcement resources. Such a system is effective if workers are more likely than centralized agencies to know where illegal working conditions are; however, if those workers most at risk also face higher barriers to complaining, then complaint-driven enforcement is unlikely to direct resources where they are most needed. We examine this tradeoff in the context of the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). On average, worker complaints to OSHA arise more frequently at workplaces where workplace hazards are higher. However, this relationship reverses for a particular group of workers likely to face high barriers: workplaces with larger shares of Latino workers have higher rates of workplace injuries, but have lower rates of complaints to OSHA. Furthermore, immigration enforcement reduces complaints to OSHA among workplaces with more Latino workers, but - if anything - leads them to experience more injuries.Inequality, Wages, and Labor-Rights Violations
Abstract
Wage inequality does not capture the full extent of differences in job quality. Jobs also differ along other key dimensions, including the prevalence of labor-rights violations. Yet, there is little systematic evidence on this non-wage dimension of job quality. We use a combination of systematic legal violations data and local industry employment data to investigate how labor violations by US employers contribute to overall inequality. Public enforcement agencies cite firms for labor-rights violations far more frequently than for consumer, investor, or environmental violations, with labor-rights violations representing 71\% of all violations. The most commonly-cited labor violations are health and safety (64\%) and wage and quality (29\%), but also include those related to organizing, discrimination in hiring and pay, and other kinds of rights. The prevalence of labor violations is positively correlated with worker reports of adverse working conditions and negatively correlated with unionization. In a panel regression, a 10\% increase in the average local industry wage decreases the number of violations per employee by 0.14%, and decreases fines per dollar of pay by 3%. The labor-violations wage ``tax'' is thus regressive and contributes to increasing inequality.Discussant(s)
Jason Sockin
,
University of Pennsylvania
Suresh Naidu
,
Columbia University
JEL Classifications
- J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor