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Search, Bargaining, and Experimentation

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)

Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Can Urgun, Princeton University

Arrow Meets Hotelling: Innovation in the Product Space

Steven Callander
,
Stanford University
Niko Matouschek
,
Northwestern University
Nicolas Lambert
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

TBD

Search and Efficient Bargaining Dynamics

Andrew McClellan
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

TBD

Learning and Corruptive Bargaining along Monitoring Chains

Bruno Strulovici
,
Northwestern University

Abstract

“But Who Will Guard the Guardians?” I revisit this age-old question under the following assumptions: (i) guardians are devoid of ethical motives and have quasilinear preferences, (ii) guardians monitor one another through a monitoring chain, (iii) any two consecutive guardians in the chain can bargain away “inefficient” punishments through corruptive arrangements. Under these assumptions, monitoring is impossible unless rewards or punishments are unbounded. When material incentives are bounded and local corruption is feasible, the answer to the initial question is: “No one.”

Constrained Retrospective Search

Can Urgun
,
Princeton University
Leeat Yariv
,
Princeton University

Abstract

The search for good outcomes---be it government policies, technological breakthroughs, or a lasting purchase---takes time and effort. At times, the decision process is unconstrained: an individual seeking a well-priced product determines her search scope and time as she wishes. At times, search is constrained, either through institutions or through cognitive limitations. We consider retrospective search in both settings: an agent chooses the search scope and time, selecting the best observed outcome upon stopping. We analyze the impacts of constraints when observed samples are independent and correlated over time.
JEL Classifications
  • D3 - Distribution