

# Output-Inflation Trade-offs and the Optimal Inflation Rate

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

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## OUTPUT-INFLATION TRADE-OFFS IN STAGGERED PRICE MODELS

In a staggered price model with trend inflation, a **Kimball-type non-CES aggregator** generates relationships between the slope of the Phillips curve and trend inflation (left panel) and the average markup and trend inflation (right panel) consistent with empirical evidence.







Sources: Trend inflation of Chang, Clark and Koop (2018); average markup of De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020).

To examine the implications of the Kimball-type aggregator for the optimal inflation rate, we derive the **welfare function** as a second-order approximation to the representative household's utility function in the model.

## THREE WELFARE COSTS

- 1 Steady-state cost ( $\Gamma_{ss}$ )
- 2 Cost of inflation-related variability ( $-\Gamma_{\pi} \text{var}_{\pi}/2$ )
- 3 Cost of output variability ( $-\text{var}_y$ )

The Kimball-type aggregator substantially alters how higher trend inflation affects the first two of the welfare costs.



# IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OPTIMAL INFLATION RATE

- 1 The optimal inflation rate is **moderately positive** under a Taylor-type monetary policy rule, even without considering the ZLB.
  - Optimal inflation is 2.4% under a baseline calibration.
  - Rises mildly to 3.3% once taking the ZLB into account.
  - Contrasts with the CES aggregator, which implies optimal inflation is zero without ZLB and 1.5% with ZLB.
- 2 There is **no substantial welfare difference** between a 2 percent and a 4 percent inflation target.
  - The welfare loss of raising the inflation target is close to zero, even for a calibration that induces a large welfare loss in the CES case.