« Back to Results

Global Value Chains, Trade and Productivity

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 7, 2022 3:45 PM - 5:45 PM (EST)

Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: John Van Reenen, London School of Economics

FDI and Superstar Spillovers: Evidence from Firm-to-Firm Transactions

Mary Amiti
,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Cedric Duprez
,
National Bank of Belgium
Jozef Konings
,
Nazarbayev University
John Van Reenen
,
London School of Economics

Abstract

A large literature finds productivity spillovers from multinational enterprises (MNE) to domestic firms. We use firm-to-firm transaction data to examine the causal impact of forming a relationship with a MNE, finding an increase in TFP of about 10% after five years. However, we also document that starting to sell to a heavily exporting firm or indeed, to any very large firm (e.g. in the top 0.1% of the size distribution) creates a spillover benefits, even if the superstar firm has no global engagement. Selling to a superstar firm also increases a firm's future sales, jobs, input use (capital and labor) and trade. The growth in sales is particularly strong within the superstar firm's existing customers, suggesting that one spillover mechanism is through obtaining access to a wider network. But we show that there is also a sales increase with buyers who are outside of the superstar's network. Hence, we show that another spillover mechanism is via the transfer of better technologies, finding that the productivity impact of a new relationship is particularly strong when the superstar firm is intensive in R&D and/or the use of information and communication technologies. These results suggest an important role for raising productivity is through the supply chains of “anchor” superstar firms whether or not they are multinationals or exporters.

Global Value Chain Tariffs: Implications for Trade Elasticities

Rebecca Freeman
,
Bank of England
Mario Larch
,
University of Bayreuth
Angelos Theodorakopoulos
,
University of Oxford
Yoto Yotov
,
Drexel University

Abstract

Today’s trade landscape is characterized by global value chain (GVC) transactions, whereby intermediate inputs cross borders multiple times. As such, trade partners exchange goods and services not only directly, but also indirectly when a given import contains embedded inputs from a range of destinations. In this context, even small tariffs accumulate through GVC trade networks, because firms face tariffs on the gross value of their exports to downstream partners, including on their imported inputs and tariffs previously paid. This paper uses input-output techniques to compute the indirect tariff implied by GVC trade and exploits this information to re-examine the most crucial parameter needed to calibrate quantitative trade and macro models: the trade elasticity. We show that (1) indirect tariffs are higher in sectors which are more integrated into GVCs; and (2) such tariffs apply to a non-trivial share of trade which faces no tariffs, including services and domestic transactions. Capitalizing on the structural foundation of the gravity model, we derive an estimating equation which allows us to empirically identify and decompose the trade elasticity into channels for final versus intermediates trade. Adding further structure, we demonstrate

Language Barriers in Multinationals and Knowledge Transfers

Louise Guillouët
,
Columbia University
Amit Khandelwal
,
Columbia University
Rocco Macchiavello
,
London School of Economics
Matthieu Teachout
,
London School of Economics

Abstract

A distinctive feature of MNCs is a three-tier organizational structure: foreign managers (FMs) supervise domestic managers (DMs) who supervise production workers. Language barriers between FMs and DMs could impede transfers of management knowledge. We develop a model in which DMs learn general management by communicating with FMs, but communication effort is non-contractible. These conditions generate sub-optimal communication within the MNC. If communication is complementary with language skills, the planner could raise welfare by subsidizing foreign language acquisition. We experimentally assess the validity of the general skills and the complementarity assumptions in Myanmar, a setting where FMs and DMs communicate in English despite DMs’ low English proficiency. The first experiment examines the general skills assumption by hiring human-resource managers at domestic firms to rate hypothetical job candidates. They value candidates with both higher English proficiency and MNC experience, a premium is driven, in part, by the frequency of interactions with FMs. The second experiment examines the complementarity assumption by providing English training to a random sample of DMs working at MNCs. At end line, treated DMs have higher English proficiency, communicate more frequently with their FMs, are more involved in firm management, and perform better in simulated management tasks. Organizational barriers within MNCs can thus hinder knowledge transfers.

Management in Mexico: Market Size, Frictions and Misallocation

Nicholas Bloom
,
Stanford University
Leonardo Iacovone
,
World Bank
Mariana Pereira-López
,
World Bank
John Van Reenen
,
London School of Economics

Abstract

We present evidence comparing management practices within Mexico, and between Mexico and the US. These management practices are associated with higher productivity, growth, trade, and innovation, and are worse in Mexico than in the US. One driver is greater misallocation in Mexico, which we evaluate using the covariance between firm size and managerial quality. We show three piece of evidence this misallocation is greater when market frictions are higher. First, the size-management relationship is stronger in the US than in Mexico, and within Mexico is stronger in the more open Manufacturing sector than in the Service sector. Second, the size-management relationship is stronger in larger markets, measured by distance to the US for manufacturing firms and population density for service firms. Third, municipalities with weaker institutions, measured by contract enforcement, crime, and corruption, have a weaker size-management relation. These results are consistent with frictions lowering aggregate management quality and productivity.
JEL Classifications
  • F1 - Trade
  • O3 - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights