Monopsony in the Labor Market
Paper Session
Friday, Jan. 7, 2022 12:15 PM - 2:15 PM (EST)
- Chair: Patrick Kline, University of California-Berkeley
Experimental Evidence on Male and Female Labor Supply
Abstract
We use field experiments to study labor supply to the market and the firm. Market-level Frisch elasticities govern how labor supply and therefore output responds to temporary shocks in productivity. Firm substitution elasticities determine wage markdowns and wage gaps in markets with frictions. We find that women are twice as elastic as men to the market, increasing hours worked by eight percent in response to a ten percent wage increase. This is true even among high hours individuals. However, we find no evidence that women are less likely to switch between firms in response to changes in relative wages. Our results suggest that in environments without differences in firm location or amenities, firms have little incentive to pay equally productive women lower wages.Perpetuating Wage Inequality: Evidence from Salary History Bans
Abstract
Pay gaps for women and minorities have persisted after accounting for observable differences. Why? If employers can access applicants’ salary histories while bargaining over wages, they can take advantage of past inequities, perpetuating inequality. Recently, a dozen US states have banned employer access to salary histories. We analyze the effects of these salary history bans (SHBs) on employer wage posting and pay in a difference-in-differences design. Following SHBs, employers posted wages more often and increased pay for job changers, particularly for women (6.4%) and non-whites (7.7%). Bargaining behavior appears to account for much of the persistence of residual wage gaps.Alternative Work Arrangements and Worker Outcomes: Evidence from Payrolling
Abstract
The rising incidence of alternative work arrangements raises questions about worker outcomes in non-standard labor contracts. We study this question in the Netherlands, a country which has seen a rapid rise in flexible labor contracts, using administrative employer-employee data over 2006--2019. To identify the impact of alternative work arrangements, we exploit a legal work arrangement called ``payrolling'', whereby workers hired by one firm can be put on the payroll of another firm while continuing their job duties at the original firm. We find that workers on payrolling contracts experience worsening labor market outcomes compared to a matched control group following their switch to a payrolling contract, including lower hourly wages, lower hours worked, and lower pension contributions. This suggests alternative work arrangements reduce employment protection and job quality for workers.Discussant(s)
Ioana Marinescu
,
University of Pennsylvania
Ellora Derenoncourt
,
Princeton University
Kory Kroft
,
University of Toronto
Emilie Rademakers
,
Utrecht University
JEL Classifications
- J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
- J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs