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  5. Experiments on Polarization
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Experiments on Polarization

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 7, 2022 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)

Hosted By: Economic Science Association
  • Chair: Andrea Robbett, Middlebury College

Social Identity and Belief Polarization

Kevin Bauer
,
Goethe University-Frankfurt
Yan Chen
,
University of Michigan
Florian Hett
,
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Michael Kosfeld
,
Goethe University-Frankfurt

Abstract

We study the role of social identity and `groupiness' for the polarization of
political beliefs using an online experiment with a representative sample of the US population,
deployed the week before the 2020 US presidential election. In our experiment, approximately
1,000 participants were incentivized to predict policy-sensitive statistics a year after the election
conditional on its outcome. To update their initial predictions, individuals can select or
exogenously receive articles on the respective topics curated from different news sources. We find
that groupiness, i.e. the behavioral sensitivity to group contexts, is systematically associated with
belief polarization. While participants generally display a partisan bias in both the demand for and
processing of information, this bias is significantly amplified for groupy subjects. Hence, the
susceptibility to adopt polarized political opinions seems related to the instinct to understand the
environment through intergroup distinctions. Finally, we test the effectiveness of reducing the
salience of intergroup distinctions to alleviate biases in opinion formation by de-labeling
information sources. We find that de-labeling is effective in reducing bias for information demand
but not for information processing.

Strategic Behavior with Tight, Loose, and Polarized Norms

Eugen Dimant
,
University of Pennsylvania
Michele Gelfand
,
Stanford University
Anna Hochleitner
,
University of Nottingham
Silvia Sonderegger
,
University of Nottingham

Abstract

A large body of literature has shown that social norms can be a powerful driver of human actions, and norm interventions often focus on shifting beliefs about average or majoritarian behavior. This work addresses a less studied aspect of norms, namely the role that their strength, tightness, and degree of polarization play. In the context of strategic decision-making, we investigate both theoretically and empirically how behavior responds to different distributions of one's peers' behavior. We focus on the difference between tight (i.e., characterized by low behavioral variance), loose (i.e., characterized by high behavioral variance) and polarized (i.e., characterized by U-shaped behavior) norm environments. Our results show that in addition to the mean, the variance, and shape of the observed behavior matters. In particular, we find that variance in observed behavior begets variance in one's own behavior. Tight, loose, and polarized norms are thus self-sustaining. In addition, we find that personal values matter more for behavior in loose and polarized norm environments.

Polarization and Group Cooperation

Andrea Robbett
,
Middlebury College
Peter Hans Matthews
,
Middlebury College

Abstract

Does increased partisanship undermine the ability of politically heterogeneous groups to function and cooperate in apolitical settings? On the eve of the 2020 U.S. elections, we conducted an online experiment in which Democrats and Republicans played repeated public goods games, both with and without punishment. Absent punishment, mixed party groups are less cooperative and efficient than homogeneous groups. However, polarized groups fare no worse than those in which political affiliations are unknown. We find no differences in cooperation across groups that are able to punish free-riding behavior. Thus, knowing that one is in a group with likeminded individuals can serve as a substitute for an enforcement mechanism, but polarized groups can, at some efficiency cost, achieve similar contributions when sanctions are possible.

The Supply of Motivated Beliefs

Michael Thaler
,
Princeton University

Abstract

When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. In many environments, particularly in politics, people are motivated to hold particular beliefs and distort how they process information in directions that favor their motivated beliefs. This paper uses two experiments to study how message senders are affected by receivers' motivated beliefs. Experiment 1, conducted using an online sample of social media users, analyzes the effect of incentivizing senders to be perceived as truthful. These incentives cause senders to send less truthful messages. When incentivized, senders send more false information when it aligns with receivers' politically-motivated beliefs, controlling for receivers' current beliefs. However, receivers do not anticipate the adverse effects of senders' incentives. Experiment 2 further isolates the role that information processing plays by analyzing an environment in which receivers assess the truthfulness of messages from a computer and senders choose one of the computer's messages to determine their earnings. Senders predict that receivers distort information processing in the direction of their politics, demand information about receivers' political preferences, and condition on the receivers' politics to strategically choose less truthful computer messages.

Discussant(s)
Ro'ee Levy
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Laura Gee
,
Tufts University
Catherine Eckel
,
Texas A&M University
Cesar Martinelli
,
George Mason University
JEL Classifications
  • C9 - Design of Experiments