Risk and Allocation in Lending
Paper Session
Friday, Jan. 7, 2022 3:45 PM - 5:45 PM (EST)
- Chair: John C. Driscoll, Federal Reserve Board
Changes in Ownership and Performance of Deteriorating Syndicated Loans
Abstract
We show that after regulatory downgrades loan syndicates shrink in size, and holdings become more concentrated. Banks and CLOs sell downgraded loans to mutual funds and hedge funds. Using potential buyers' financing constraints as instrument for syndicate size, we show that loans with larger syndicates are less likely to be amended and more likely to be downgraded further. Our findings indicate that lenders anticipate debt restructuring well before default and that the resulting lender concentration within syndicates mitigates frictions in restructuring negotiations.Fighting Failure: The Persistent Real Effects of Resolving Distressed Banks
Abstract
We study the real effects of resolving distressed banks using quasi-experimental variation in resolutions introduced by a threshold-based rule of the FDIC Improvement Act. Our fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates indicate that resolutions lead to reductions in employment and establishments growth of up to six percentage points. These effects are concentrated in small, less urban counties, and translate to large declines in SME lending and increases in corporate bankruptcies. These results imply that large acquiring banks restrict lending to the small business borrowers of distressed target banks. Overall, current bank resolution policy may have costly externalities for local economic activity.Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Abstract
We study the relationship between credit expansions, macroeconomic fluctuations, and financial crises using a novel database on the sectoral distribution of private credit for 116 countries starting in 1940. Theory predicts that the sectoral allocation of credit matters for distinguishing between “good” and “bad” credit booms. We test the prediction that lending to households and the non-tradable sector, relative to the tradable sector, contributes to macroeconomic boom-bust cycles by (i) fueling unsustainable demand booms, (ii) increasing financial fragility, and (iii) misallocating resources across sectors. We show that credit to non-tradable sectors, including construction and real estate, is associated with a boom-bust pattern in output, similar to household credit booms. Such lending booms also predict elevated financial crisis risk and productivity slowdowns. In contrast, tradable-sector credit expansions are followed by stable output and productivity growth without a higher risk of a financial crisis. Our findings highlight that what credit is used for is important for understanding macro-financial linkages.Discussant(s)
Katheryn N. Russ
,
University of California-Davis
Tim Eisert
,
Erasmus University
Nirupama Kulkarni
,
Reserve Bank of India
Juan Herreno
,
Columbia University
JEL Classifications
- G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
- G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance