

# Did dividend tax policy changes increase Chinese financial market stability?

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# Outline

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- Stock Market: U.S. v.s. China
- Institution Investors v.s. Individual Investors
- Individual investors contributed to almost 60% of the trading volumes in 2005 (short-term, education level)
- → Financial turbulence; harm firms' growth (turnover rates in the U.S. around 100%, China around 300-400%)
- Government tries to encourage long-term investment, increase financial market stability

# Background - Policy Changes

- Before 2005, dividend tax rate fixed at 20%
- June 13, 2005, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation jointly issued a document (*Caishui 2005 No.102*) to lower the dividend tax rate from 20% to 10% for all investors
- In November 2012, another joint document (*Caishui 2012 No. 85*) was released, changing the single tax rate to differentiated rates system starting in 2013 Payout Method

# Background - Tax Rates with Policy Changes

Dividend tax rates change with China policies' variation:

	Before 2005	After 2005 No.102	After 2012 No.85
1mon	20%	10%	20%
1mon to 1yr	20%	10%	10%
1 yr	20%	10%	5%

## Related Literature: Research in the U.S.


- Dividend tax has been well studied in the United States
- 'Old View': Dividend tax reduce net return/investment; dividend tax↓, save and invest↑, spur business activities  
Poterba and Summers (1985), Poterba (2004)
- 'New View': Dividend tax is irrelevant with either firms' decisions or future profitability, dividend payments not changed  
Auerbach (1979), Auerbach and Hassett (2003)
- Taxation is one of the most prevalent market frictions in financial markets. It affects investors' decisions and valuation of assets  
Dai et al. (2008), Zhang et al. (2008), Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)
- Dividend tax reduces the equities' value; tax-cut leads to the increase of firms' value  
Miller and Scholes(1978), Poterba and Summers(1984), Auerbach and Hassett (2005,2006)

- Wang and Guo (2011) (logit model)(05' reform), Yang and Liu (2015) (tobit model)(12' reform): Firms with higher portions of investment fund shares/no investment restriction distribute more cash dividend
- Yang and Yuan (2013)(05' reform), Ruan and Zhai (2015)(12' reform): After reform, fluctuation of stock prices increased, trading behaviors increased around firms' ex-dividend day
- Dividend distribution did not increase the value of firms  
Chen and Yao(2000), Yu and Cheng(2001), He and Chen(2002), Xiong and Hu(2003) (05' reform)

- Main data source : China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CS-MAR), Consolidated Financial Statements
- China Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (Huang et al. (2018))
- Whole sample time ranges from 2001 to 2015
  - Phrase I: 2005 policy change (2001 to 2009 )
  - Phrase II: 2012 policy change (2010 to 2015)
- 20,315 obs; Mean trading volumes 142 million (yearly); Mean Turnover Rate 335% (yearly)



# Sampling



## Dividend Tax and Trading Volumes/Turnover Rates

- Diff-in-Diff method is utilized to analyze

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{policy_t} + \beta_2 I_{dividend_i} + \beta_3 I_{policy_t} \times I_{dividend_i} + X'_{it} \delta + \mu_i + \kappa_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- $y_{it}$ : Trading Volumes, Turnover Rate, Return Rate;
- $I_{policy_t}$ : Time dummy;  $I_{dividend_i}$ : Treatment Effect Dummy
- $X'_{it}$  nests all the controls: Market Cap, Assets, Debt, Financial Leverage, Tobin's Q, Price earning ratio and China Economic Policy Uncertainty Index [Huang et al. 2018] / Political Uncertainty Index [Baker et al. (2016)]
- Further split the sample by share percentage held by top executives and state

- Policy change is nationwide
- Comparing to a natural experiment, the treatment and control groups are not fully randomized
- Firms' self characteristics can affect decisions even behaviors were tax driven
- Hurt the accuracy of the estimations

- Matching Methods (1:1, kNN, Radius, Kernel/Local Linear, Mahalanobis) matching methods
- DID w/ matched group (Heckman (1997,1998))
- Shrink the sample to 1year after policy change
- Eliminating firms that started to distribute 1 year before policy change; might have inside information on dividend tax change

# Baseline DID - 2005 Policy Change

	Trading Volumes	Turnover Rates	Return Rates
$I_{policy}$	3.130*** (3.06)	101.722*** (5.40)	0.670*** (3.82)
$I_{dividend}$	3.098*** (3.29)	326.038*** (10.15)	-2.810*** (-17.10)
$I_{policy} * I_{dividend}$	-0.117** (-2.36)	-18.881** (-2.29)	0.084 (1.04)

## 2005 Policy Change, Executive/Government Share

- Coefficients for Interaction Term ( $I_{politic} * I_{dividend}$ )

	Trading Volumes	Turnover Rates	Return Rates
More Ex Holding	-0.115** (-2.60)	-20.022* (-1.85)	0.056 (0.57)
Less Ex Holding	-0.133 (-0.37)	-18.345 (-0.80)	-0.250 (-1.33)
More State Holding	-0.093* (-1.95)	-5.614* (-1.87)	0.017 (0.19)
Less State Holding	-0.179 (-1.53)	-9.934 (-0.52)	-0.111 (-1.07)

# Characteristics Comparison (Before Matching)

Firms' Characteristics	Comparison		
	T	C	%bias
MktCap	21.86	21.7	6.4
Assets	21.55	21.41	10.9
Cash	19.58	19.4	12.0
FinLev	1.38	1.96	-2.3
Tobin's Q	1.85	2.43	-8.2
P/E	48.74	63.8	-9.7

The standardized % bias is the % difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).



# Characteristics Comparison (After Matching)

Firms' Characteristics	One-to-One			k-Nearest			Radius		
	T	C	%bias	T	C	%bias	T	C	%bias
MktCap	22.13	22.21	-6.6	22.13	22.18	-3.8	22.13	22.05	7.0
Assets	21.83	21.92	-6.8	21.83	21.88	-4.0	21.83	21.70	10.4
Cash	19.77	19.91	-11.0	19.77	19.891	-9.1	19.77	19.66	8.4
FinLev	1.457	1.45	0	1.457	1.4303	0.1	1.457	2.57	-4.5
Tobin's Q	1.618	1.63	-0.3	1.618	1.625	-0.1	1.618	2.22	-8.5
P/E	48.9	50.15	-0.8	48.90	51.79	-1.9	48.90	58.95	-6.5

Firms' Characteristics	Kernel			Local linear			Mahalanobis		
	T	C	%bias	T	C	%bias	T	C	%bias
MktCap	22.13	22.1	3.2	22.13	22.23	-8.1	22.13	22.13	0.0
Assets	21.83	21.79	3.4	21.8	21.92	-6.6	21.83	21.83	0.2
Cash	19.77	19.73	2.8	19.7	19.82	-3.8	19.77	19.77	-0.2
FinLev	1.457	1.63	-0.7	1.45	1.45	0	1.45	1.314	0.6
Tobin's Q	1.618	1.66	-0.7	1.61	1.63	-0.2	1.618	1.678	-0.8
P/E	48.90	52.17	-2.1	48.901	53.62	-3.0	48.90	46.98	1.2

matching methods

# Matching Results - 2005 Policy Change

- Coefficients for Interaction Term ( $I_{polic} * I_{dividend}$ )

Method	Trading Volumes	Turnover Rates	Return Rates
Without Matching	-0.117** (-2.36)	-18.881** (-2.29)	0.084 (1.04)
One-to-One	-0.132* (-2.32)	-39.050** (-3.28)	-0.405*** (-7.44)
Mahalanobis	-0.204* (-2.01)	-36.166 (-1.58)	-0.252** (-2.55)

Consistent results/ Negative returns

- Coefficients for Interaction Term ( $I_{politic} * I_{dividend}$ )

	Trading Volumes	Turnover Rates	Return Rates
Keep 1 yr post	-0.117* (-1.77)	-38.762*** (-3.69)	-0.431*** (-6.32)
Eliminate 1 yr before	-0.117 * (-1.98)	-19.468** (-2.31)	-0.055 (-0.67)

- Coefficients for Interaction Term ( $I_{politic} * I_{dividend}$ )

	Trading Volumes	Turnover Rates	Return Rates
Full Sample	0.098 (0.61)	52.246 (0.61)	-0.032 (-0.85)
More Ex	0.095 (0.11)	134.601 (0.74)	0.032 (0.43)
More State	0.141 (0.06)	113.52 (1.38)	0.007 (0.18)

# Summary of Finding

- The dividend tax cut in 2005 lowered the turnover rates/trading volumes by 18% and nearly 12% respectively; the differentiated tax system in 2012 had opposite results;
- The findings in these essays generally support the "Old View" of dividend taxation in the literature that dividend tax reduces the net return of investments and reduce the supply of savings; Dividend tax cut leads to the increase of saving, investment, firms' value and profitability.

# Background - Payout Methods in China

There are mainly three ways that a firm distributes dividends to its shareholders:

- Cash dividend: money paid to stockholders
- Bonus share: A dividend payment made in the form of additional share
- Gift dividend: Using capital reserves in the firm to distribute


In this research, I focus on cash dividend distributions. [Background](#)

# Heterogeneity analysis: What kind of firms distributes

- Shares held by top executives: tax-incentive
- State controlled firms: reaction follow policy change
- Cutoff: Median Percentage


Beta Plotting

# By Ex holdings



Note: sddiv is the total cash value of dividend distribution; tdivnum is the cash dividends activities counts

Figure: Higher



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Figure: Lower

Share percentage held by top executives ↑, cash amount distributed and distribution activities ↑ [Beta Plotting](#)



# By State holdings




Figure: Higher




Figure: Lower

Share percentage held by state ↑, cash amount distributed and distribution activities ↑ [Beta Plotting](#)

# Propensity Score Matching

