

# Religious Leaders and Rule of Law

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
# Motivation

- History is replete with instances where religious leaders shaped the trajectories of societies
  - Pope Urban II
  - Imam Al-Ghazali
- At least since the Enlightenment, scholars have believed that religious leaders influence institutions (Spinoza, 1670; Smith, 1776; Marx, 1844).
- Scholars have now begun to disentangle how religious authorities may impact institutions (North et al, 2009; Kuran, 2011; Chaney, 2013; Platteau, 2017; Rubin, 2017; Barro and McCreary, 2019)
- Yet despite these efforts, we lack systematic empirical evidence on how religious leaders influence institutions, in particular how religious leaders impact Rule of Law?

# Research Questions

- In particular, we ask how historical religious institutions impact Rule of Law?
  - Mechanism: how the impact of these historical religious institutions is explained by the rise of religious leaders to political power

# The Shrine



# The Religious Leader



# The Politician



# The Foreign Minister



# The Argument

- Throughout Pakistan's political history local politics was dominated by large landowning "feudal" politicians
- However, in 1999, Pakistan transitioned to a military dictatorship
- This disrupted the balance of power of traditional elites
- The military regime, through a local government reform, weakened the relatively secular traditional elite and ushered the rise of a new breed of politicians: **the dynastic shrine leaders**
- These religious leaders, known as the *sajjada nasheen* or the "wearers of the holy turban" derived their legitimacy from religion
- These religious leaders enjoyed higher **legitimacy** and hence faced smaller electoral costs of deteriorating Rule of Law than secular politicians



## Preview of the Theory

- All else equal, voters in shrine districts prefer to vote for politicians with religious credentials (legitimacy)
- These religious politicians pay a smaller electoral price for exerting influence on the Judiciary
- Secular and religious politicians choose whether or not to run for office
- Judges respond to political influence by ruling in favor of the government more often

We solve the equilibrium and derive the endogenous structure of political competition.

## Preview of the Empirical Results

- We find that districts with high historical shrine density have more pro-government rulings and lower quality judicial decisions
  - This is explained by the rise of shrine leaders to political power
- Identification:
  - Timing of the military coup in 1999 as an exogenous shock that brings shrine leaders to political office
  - We compare Rule of Law outcomes before and after the 1999 military coup across Pakistani districts with higher versus lower historical shrine density.
- Religious leaders expropriate *additional* land worth 0.06 percent of GDP or USD 180 million every year

## Related Literature

- **Leaders and political dynasties** (Jones and Olken, 2005; Dal Bó et al., 2009; Besley et al., 2011; Chaney, 2013; and Yao and Zhang, 2015, Querubin, 2016; Ferraz et al., 2020)
- **Conditions for establishment of Rule of Law** (North and Weingast, 1989; La Porta et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019; Behrer et al., 2020)
- **Political economy of religion** (Kuran, 2011; Chaney, 2013; Rubin, 2017; Auriol and Platteau, 2017; Barro and McCleary, 2019; Saleh and Tirole, 2020)
- **Long-term consequences of culture and institutions** (e.g. Kuran, 2011; Nunn, 2016; Lowes et al., 2017; Bisin and Verdier, 2019; Giuliano and Nunn, 2020)

# Contributions

- The key contributions of this paper are:
  - 1 Deep roots of Rule of Law
  - 2 Role of historical religious institutions in shaping legal institutions
  - 3 Rise of religious leaders to political power
  - 4 Focus on a large developing country

# Roadmap

- 1 Data
- 2 Empirical Methodology
- 3 Identification
- 4 Results
- 5 Mechanisms
- 6 Conclusions
- 7 Appendix: Robustness Checks

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# The Data

- Judgment Texts
- British Colonial Gazettes
- Auqaf Department, Ministry of Religious Affairs
- Election Data (Shrine leaders' honorific titles)
- Census records

# A Typical Data Point

## Land Expropriation Case

2005 C L C 745

[Karachi]

Before Sabihuddin Ahmed and Khilji Arif Hussain, JJ

KHALID MOHSIN---Petitioner

versus

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.59 of 1988, decided on 23rd November, 2004.

West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---

---S. 45---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Disputed question of fact---Mutation, a document of title ---Petitioner claimed to be owner of the land which had been mutated in favour of his predecessor-in-interest on the basis of allotment by Settlement authorities---Question for determination was whether the petitioner had acquired any title to the land so as to entitle him to the relief of possession or whether he had locus standi to seek declaration in respect of existence or otherwise of requisition---Validity---No allotment order by a competent officer in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was available on record---Petitioner had relied upon an order of Assistant Rehabilitation Mukhtiarkar directing that the land be mutated in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner---Nothing was available to show that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had applied for allotment of evacuee land against units available with him---Predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was entitled to 159 units but was allotted land comprising of 453 units---Mutation entries did not confer title but could at the best be considered evidence of title which was rebuttable---Such disputed questions requiring detailed scrutiny of facts and production of evidence could not be undertaken in the proceedings under Art.199 of the Constitution---Petition was dismissed if circumstances.

Hassan Akbar for Petitioner.



Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, D.A.-G. and S. Tariq Ali, Federal Counsel for Respondents.

Ahmed Pirzada, Addl. A.-G.

Date of hearing: 29th August, 2004.




# British Colonial Gazettes



# Sample Description

- We randomly sample 7500 cases from 1986-2016
- This is about 0.2% of population of cases decided in this period
- About 500 judges deciding these cases
- 16 district high courts (covers all of Pakistan)
- Descriptive Statistics: 59

# Map of shrine density across Jurisdictions



# How to measure Rule of Law?

- The State vs the Citizen
- The key outcome variable is State Wins which takes the value of 1 if government obtains a victory and 0 if the citizen obtains a victory
  - The State here is the local, provincial and federal government
  - These are instances where elected politicians have highest stakes to influence Courts
- According to the conceptualization of the State as an executive organ in Montesquieu (1748)
- State Wins is measured in two ways:
  - We ask a law firm to code state victories as 1 and state losses as 0
  - Cross check result with “Petition against the State dismissed” and “Petition against the State accepted” markers

# Rule of Law - Variables

- State Wins
- Case Delay
- Decisions on Evidence

- 1 Data
- 2 Empirical Methodology
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- 4 Results
- 5 Mechanisms
- 6 Conclusion

# Empirical Specification

$$Y_{cjd t} = \theta + \kappa \text{Military Coup } 1999_t \times \text{Shrine Density at } 1911_d + \mathbf{W}_{cjd t} \psi + \beta_d + \gamma_t + \delta_c + \epsilon_{cjd t} \quad (1)$$

- Subscripts c, j, d and t indexes cases, judges, district and years, respectively
- Y represents State Wins at the case level
- $\beta_d$ ,  $\gamma_t$  and  $\delta_c$  are district, year and case-type fixed effects, respectively
- $\mathbf{W}$  are case, judge and district controls
- $\kappa$  is the DiD estimator for the impact of shrine density on State Wins


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
# Identification Assumptions

- Identification:
  - ➡ Timing of the military coup
  - ➡ Military coup was unexpected and unrelated to the dynamics of specific district courts
- Main identifying assumptions:
  - ➡ There are no systematic differences in the trends of State Wins among high and low shrine density districts before and after the coup
  - ➡ There are no time-variant unobservable factors that coincide temporally with the military coup and differentially affect rule of law.

# Evidence in favor of the Identification Assumption - I




# Evidence in favor of the Identification Assumption - I




# Evidence in favor of the Identification Assumption - II

## Confounding interactions with the coup

(a) Case Characteristics (Constitutional and Criminal Cases)



(b) Judge Characteristics (House Accepted and Judge Experience)



# Evidence in favor of the Identification Assumption - II

## Confounding interactions with the coup

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Shrine Density 1911 X Coup 1999	9.654** [3.398]	10.46*** [3.173]	10.66*** [3.176]	10.79*** [2.620]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Characteristics X Coup 1999	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Characteristics X Coup 1999	No	No	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics X Coup 1999	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.055	0.061	0.062	0.063
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502

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# Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Shrine Density 1911 X Coup 1999	9.318*** [2.859]	9.693** [3.550]	9.566** [3.450]	9.654** [3.398]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.045	0.045	0.052	0.055
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502

- 1 s.d. increase in shrine density increases State Wins by about 5 percentage points following the coup (10% increase over the mean dependent variable)

# Judicial Quality Falls - Rule of Law Deteriorates

Panel A: Case Delay				
	<i>Case Delay</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	56.87**	39.58**	41.52**	41.06**
	[19.87]	[15.78]	[15.59]	[15.47]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.082	0.084	0.086	0.086
Mean Dep. Variable	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.33
Panel B: Decisions on Merit				
	<i>Decisions on Merit</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	-9.587***	-12.10***	-12.42***	-12.28***
	[1.980]	[1.534]	[1.522]	[1.485]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.079	0.080	0.085	0.086
Mean Dep. Variable	0.625	0.625	0.625	0.625




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# Mechanisms

- 1 Is the effect of shrine density explained by the rise of religious leaders to political power?
- 2 How do religious leaders impact Courts?
- 3 What are the types of cases driving the results?
- 4 Why can religious leaders impact the Courts?

# Religious Leaders and the Military Coup



# Religious Leaders and Government Victories

	(1) <i>State Wins</i>	(2) <i>Shrine Elite Wins Case</i>	(3) <i>State Wins + Shrine Elite is State</i>	(4) <i>Out Transfers</i>
Shrines Density X Shine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	0.517** [0.203]	1.005** [0.396]	4.590** [1.459]	2.125* [1.180]
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	1.471 [5.100]	-7.253 [12.66]	-0.518 [47.25]	12.12 [30.90]
Shrine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	-0.00165 [0.00104]	-0.00407 [0.00294]	-0.00919 [0.00640]	-0.00258 [0.00517]
Shrine Elites Elected	-0.00317 [0.00349]	0.00638 [0.00513]	-0.00817 [0.0193]	-0.0338 [0.0213]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,439	811	163	7,439
R-squared	0.056	0.084	0.392	0.641
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.776	0.472	4.29

- Effect entirely explained by shrine leaders rising to political power
- 1 s.d. increase in shrine density increases State Wins by about 1 p.p.  
when 4 more shrine leaders win elections

## Cases squarely involving the Shrine Elites

	(1) <i>State Wins</i>	(2) <i>Shrine Elite Wins Case</i>	(3) <i>State Wins + Shrine Elite is State</i>	(4) <i>Out Transfers</i>
Shrines Density X Shine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	0.517** [0.203]	1.005** [0.396]	4.590** [1.459]	2.125* [1.180]
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	1.471 [5.100]	-7.253 [12.66]	-0.518 [47.25]	12.12 [30.90]
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District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,439	811	163	7,439
R-squared	0.056	0.084	0.392	0.641
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.776	0.472	4.29

- 1 s.d. increase in shrine density increases Shrine Elite Wins by about 1 p.p. when 2 more shrine leaders win elections

## Cases involving the Shrine Elites and Shrine Elite have Executive Power

	(1) <i>State Wins</i>	(2) <i>Shrine Elite Wins Case</i>	(3) <i>State Wins + Shrine Elite is State</i>	(4) <i>Out Transfers</i>
Shrines Density X Shrine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	0.517** [0.203]	1.005** [0.396]	4.590** [1.459]	2.125* [1.180]
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	1.471 [5.100]	-7.253 [12.66]	-0.518 [47.25]	12.12 [30.90]
Shrine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	-0.00165 [0.00104]	-0.00407 [0.00294]	-0.00919 [0.00640]	-0.00258 [0.00517]
Shrine Elites Elected	-0.00317 [0.00349]	0.00638 [0.00513]	-0.00817 [0.0193]	-0.0338 [0.0213]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,439	811	163	7,439
R-squared	0.056	0.084	0.392	0.641
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.776	0.472	4.29

- 1) involve shrine elite as a litigant 2) shrine elite holds political office
- 1 s.d. increase in shrine density ↑ State Wins in cases involving the shrine elite by about 2.25 p.p. when 1 more shrine leader wins election

## How do shrine leaders influence the courts?

- We build on historical accounts in Siddique (2013)
- He suggests that religious political leaders in Pakistan influence the courts through an “actual or threat of a transfer” i.e. reassignment of judges to alternate districts
- Why? Because they face smaller electoral costs of transferring judges
- This is consistent with evidence on bureaucrats where politicians are able to control the behavior of bureaucrats by reassigning them to posts of varying importance (Iyer and Mani, 2012; Khan, Khwaja and Olken, 2019).

# Transfers of Judges

	(1) <i>State Wins</i>	(2) <i>Shrine Elite Wins Case</i>	(3) <i>State Wins + Shrine Elite is State</i>	(4) <i>Out Transfers</i>
Shrines Density X Shrine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	0.517** [0.203]	1.005** [0.396]	4.590** [1.459]	2.125* [1.180]
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	1.471 [5.100]	-7.253 [12.66]	-0.518 [47.25]	12.12 [30.90]
Shrine Elites Elected X Coup 1999	-0.00165 [0.00104]	-0.00407 [0.00294]	-0.00919 [0.00640]	-0.00258 [0.00517]
Shrine Elites Elected	-0.00317 [0.00349]	0.00638 [0.00513]	-0.00817 [0.0193]	-0.0338 [0.0213]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,439	811	163	7,439
R-squared	0.056	0.084	0.392	0.641
Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.776	0.472	4.29

- 1 s.d. increase in shrine density increases judge transfers by 1/10th when 10 more shrine leaders win political office.
- This is equivalent to a 2.33% increase over the sample mean.



# Religious Leaders and Judicial Decisions - Alternate Specification

	OLS		2SLS, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>State Wins</i>				
Shrine Elite	0.0032* [0.0015]	0.0036** [0.0013]	0.0101*** [0.0027]	0.0091*** [0.0032]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge, Case and District Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.043	0.054	0.040	0.052
Mean of dependent variable	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Panel B: First-Stage Results				
	<i>Shrine Elite</i>			
Shrines Density 1911 X Coup 1999			922.62*** [167.31]	1054.28*** [194.05]
District and Year Fixed Effects			Yes	Yes
Judge, Case and District Controls			No	Yes
Observations			7,439	7,439
R-squared			0.939	0.953
Mean of dependent variable			13.04	13.04
F- Statistics			32.442	31.498

# State and its Constituent Parts

## Type of Government Driving the Results

	Disputes with Local Government (1)	Disputes with Provincial Government (2)	Disputes with Federal Government (3)
		<i>State Wins</i>	
Shrine Density 1911 X Coup 1999	15.10** [6.045]	10.96 [7.522]	-3.875 [14.97]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,780	1,982	1,602
R-squared	0.068	0.101	0.077
Mean of dependent variable	0.47	0.48	0.45

# Type of Cases Driving the Results

## Politically Salient Cases

	Land Cases <i>State Wins</i>		Human Rights Cases	
Shrine Density 1911 X Coup 1999	13.49*** [3.485]	17.31*** [4.999]	14.45*** [3.718]	13.72*** [4.243]
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Case Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Judge Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,041	3,041	2,323	2,323
R-squared	0.082	0.088	0.051	0.057
Mean of dependent variable	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46

# What is a Land Case?

The New York Times

Opinion

## Your House Is My House, Pakistan's Rich Say to Its Poor

Property scams start from the top here, and cut across political divides.



By Mohammed Hanif

Mr. Hanif is a Pakistani novelist.

May 28, 2019



To Pakistanis struggling to keep a roof over their heads, the **government and the courts can be positively hostile.** In October, residents of [Pakistan Quarters](#), a 70-year-old residential development in Karachi, were given [just 10 days to leave their homes](#). (After protesters clashed with police, the deadline was extended. The matter is still in court.)

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# Placebo - Political Salience Channel

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Shrine Density 1911 X Coup 1999	-2.534 [5.340]	0.0267 [6.169]	-1.722 [5.662]	-1.828 [5.514]
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	2,075	2,075	2,075	2,075
R-squared	0.072	0.072	0.079	0.086
Mean of dependent variable	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58

# Why can religious leaders influence Courts?

- Historians have two broad views on why religious leaders can influence institutions and politics:
  - Religious leaders coerce through their wealth and **large landholdings** (Coulson, 1964; Gilmartin, 1988; Aziz, 2001)
  - Religious leaders' high **legitimacy** allow them to get away with more than a secular leader can (Rubin, 2017; Platteau, 2017)

# Placebo - Cotton Barons

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Shrines Density	-1.185	-1.172	-0.559	-0.400
X Large Landowners X Coup 1999	[3.119]	[3.105]	[3.220]	[3.255]
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	9.765**	9.873**	9.658**	9.674**
	[3.332]	[3.967]	[3.914]	[3.847]
Large Landowners x Coup 1999	0.0208	0.0207	0.0174	0.0159
	[0.0226]	[0.0229]	[0.0236]	[0.0225]
Cotton Barons	-0.00851	-0.00902	-0.0108	-0.00871
	[0.0206]	[0.0213]	[0.0208]	[0.0193]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
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Mean Dep. Variable	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502



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# Conclusion

- Districts with higher historical shrine density have higher State Wins, longer Case Delay and lesser decisions on evidence
- These results are entirely explained by the rise of shrine leaders to political power
  - No effect in districts where shrine leaders did not win election
  - No effect in cases that are not politically salient
  - Largest effect in cases that squarely involve the religious leaders
- Economic value of additional land expropriated by religious leaders is about 0.06 percent of GDP or USD 180 million every year

# Conclusion

*"They came with religion but no land, and left with land but no religion"*

# Thank you

**Thank you for your attention!**

Twitter: @mrsultan713 & @SerorAvner

# Strategic Filing of Cases?

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total Filed	Constitutional Filed	Criminal Filed
Shrine Density 1931 X Coup 1999	4,808 [34,919]	-2,487 [23,393]	7,295 [12,034]
District and Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Case and Judge Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.099	0.095	0.099

# Placebo - No Local Government Formed - I

- Following 9/11 Attacks and consequent US invasion of Afghanistan, local government reform could not be implemented in districts along the Afghan border
- No elections held in some districts
- We conduct a placebo test examining what happens in districts where religious leaders could not have possibly rise to power

# Placebo - No Local Government Formed - II

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Shrine Density 1911 x Coup 1999 x LG Enforced District	10.98*** [2.863]	10.69** [4.005]	8.086* [4.412]	7.853* [4.456]
Shrine Density 1911 x Coup 1999	-1.603 [2.787]	-1.241 [5.448]	1.297 [5.825]	1.624 [5.916]
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Judge Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.045	0.045	0.052	0.055
Mean of dependent variable	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

## 7 Appendix



## Economic Value of Land Expropriated due to Shrines

- Hard to evaluate the value of the expropriation of political rights
- But, we can estimate potential economic value of the *additional* land expropriations due to shrines
- 20% of our randomly sampled 7500 cases State Won the land expropriation case = 0.2% of the total population = land expropriation in 750,000 cases
- Judgement texts has value of 57 properties expropriated: Average value USD 51,280
- Total Value of land expropriations =  $750,000 \times 51,280 = \text{USD } 384 \text{ million}$
- 0.06 % of GDP
- It is a bit more than the whole health care budget the federal government earmarked in 2016

## Robustness

Variables	17th Amendment		Outliers Excluded <i>State Wins</i>		Colonial Gazette Data	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Shrine Density 1911 x Coup 1999	9.160*** [2.931]	9.585** [3.345]	9.448** [3.319]	9.712** [3.654]	7.315** [3.204]	8.749** [3.764]
Shrine Density 1911 x 17th Amendment	0.436 [2.998]	0.196 [2.742]				
Shrine Density 1911 x Outliers Excluded X Coup 1999			-0.749 [3.288]	-0.649 [3.536]		
Shrine Density 1911 x Colonial Gazette					2.075 [3.239]	0.898 [3.088]
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Case Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Judge Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439	7,439
R-squared	0.045	0.055	0.045	0.055	0.045	0.055
Mean of dependent variable	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

# Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Case Characteristics					
Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
State Wins	7,439	0.50	0.50	0	1
Case Delay	7,439	3.33	2.47	0	23
Merit	7,439	0.62	0.48	0	1
Year Filed	7,439	1999.69	9.53	1970	2016
Year Decision	7,439	2003.03	8.88	1986	2016
Constitutional Cases	7,439	0.72	0.44	0	1
Land Cases	7,439	0.41	0.49	0	1
Human Rights Cases	7,439	0.31	0.46	0	1
Criminal Cases	7,439	0.28	0.44	0	1
Pages of Judgement Order	7,439	8.88	7.71	1	81
Number of Lawyers	7,439	4.04	3.62	1	32
Number of Judges on a case	7,439	1.81	0.84	1	5
Chief Justice on Bench	7,439	0.06	0.24	0	1
Panel A: Judge Characteristics					
Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Tenure at Decision	482	4.10	3.64	8.46	22
Gender	482	0.95	0.19	0	1
PM Assistance Package	482	0.33	0.47	0	1
Promoted to SC	482	0.05	0.23	0	1
Former Judge	482	0.11	0.31	0	1
For. Office-Holder Bar. Asso.	482	0.63	0.48	0	1
Former Lawyer	482	0.89	0.31	0	1
After Reform Judge	482	0.14	0.34	0	1
Panel C: District Characteristics					
Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
No. of shrines per 1000 people	496	0.005	0.005	0	0.016
Military Coup	496	0.669	0.470	0	1
Total Judges in district	496	14.16	5.84	6	30
Area (sq. km)	496	4321.81	3287.76	906	13297
Population	496	2150270	2428460	22454.11	1.14E+07
Density (per sq. km)	496	1094.32	1764.62	8.46	9023.83

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# What is a Land Case?

The New York Times

Opinion

## Your House Is My House, Pakistan's Rich Say to Its Poor

Property scams start from the top here, and cut across political divides.



By Mohammed Hanif

Mr. Hanif is a Pakistani novelist.

May 28, 2019



To Pakistanis struggling to keep a roof over their heads, the **government and the courts can be positively hostile.** In October, residents of [Pakistan Quarters](#), a 70-year-old residential development in Karachi, were given [just 10 days to leave their homes](#). (After protesters clashed with police, the deadline was extended. The matter is still in court.)

# What is a Human Rights Case?

DAWN

TODAY'S PAPER | JUNE 02, 2020

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## Nadra cancels ex-senator Hamdullah's citizenship

Kalbe Ali | Ihtikhar A. Khan | October 27, 2019

f t p e 60

**ISLAMABAD: In a significant development, the National Database and Registration Authority (Nadra) has declared opposition leader, ex-minister and former senator Hafiz Hamdullah an alien, alleging that he had 'fraudulently obtained' his computerised national identity card (CNIC) that has now been cancelled.**

"He is a confirmed Afghan and had used fraudulent means to get Pakistan's citizenship," said a senior official while speaking to Dawn on Saturday. In his reaction, the JUI-F leader blamed state institutions for his 'political victimisation' and said no one in his family, including his father, had ever been accused of being an alien.



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## Court reserves verdict on Hafiz Hamdullah's citizenship

