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Automation and Policy

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 7, 2023 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)

Hilton Riverside, Fulton
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chairs:
    Martin Beraja, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
  • Nathan Zorzi, Dartmouth College

New Frontiers: The Origins and Content of New Work, 1940–2018

David Autor
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Caroline M. Chin
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Anna Salomons
,
Utrecht University
Bryan Seegmiller
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

Recent theory stresses the role of new job types (‘new work’) in counterbalancing the
erosive effect of task-displacing automation on labor demand. Drawing on a novel
inventory of eight decades of new job titles linked to United States Census microdata, we estimate that the majority of contemporary employment is found in new
job tasks added since 1940 but that the locus of new task creation has shifted—from
middle-paid production and clerical occupations in the first four post-WWII decades,
to high-paid professional and, secondarily, low-paid services since 1980. We hypothesize
that new tasks emerge in occupations where new innovations complement their outputs (‘augmentation’) or market size expands, while conversely, employment contracts
in occupations where innovations substitute for labor inputs (‘automation’) or market
size contracts. Leveraging proxies for output-augmenting and task-automating innovations built from a century of patent data and harnessing occupational demand shifts
stemming from trade and demographic shocks, we show that new occupational tasks
emerge in response to both positive demand shifts and augmenting innovations, but
not in response to negative demand shifts or automation innovations. We document
that the flow of both augmentation and automation innovations is positively correlated across occupations, yet these two faces of innovation have strongly countervailing
relationships with occupational labor demand.

TBA

Daron Acemoglu
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Pascual Restrepo
,
Boston University

Abstract

TBA

Inefficient Automation

Martin Beraja
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Nathan Zorzi
,
Dartmouth College

Abstract

How should the government respond to automation? We study this question
in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We
recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation
is slow and borrowing is limited. We first show that these frictions result in
inefficient automation. Firms are effectively too patient when they automate,
and (partly) overlook the time it takes for workers to reallocate and for the
benefits of automation to materialize. We then analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully overcome borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient — automation and reallocation impose pecuniary externalities on workers. The government finds it optimal to tax automation while labor reallocates,even when it has no preference for redistribution. Using a quantitative version of our model, we find that the speed of automation at the second best is considerably lower than at the laissez-faire. By slowing down automation, the optimal policy improves aggregate efficiency and achieves welfare gains of around 4%.

Discussant(s)
Lukasz Rachel
,
London School of Economics
JEL Classifications
  • E0 - General
  • J0 - General