Immigration and Trade: Skilled versus Unskilled Migration and Corruption
Abstract
Pro-trade effect of immigration on bilateral trade between the immigrants’ host and homecountries is well established in the literature (Gould 1994, Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999, Mundra
2005, Rauch and Trindade 2002, Ottaviano et al. 2018). There is also increasing work showing
that pro trade effect of immigrants on trade varies with type of goods as well as with immigrant
occupation and education (Mundra 2014 and Felbermayr and Toubal, 2012). In this paper we
focus on the effect of skilled versus unskilled immigrants on the host country exports and
particularly focus on how this effect varies with the level of corruption in the immigrants’ home
country. This paper will add to the literature by examining that immigrants not only will have
differential effect on trade based on their skill but also the level of corruption in their home country
which signifies weak institution in their home country. This is important to examine not only for
the rich immigrant receiving countries but also for developing big immigrant sending countries
like India, China and countries in Latin America. Skilled Immigrants are considered brain drain
from the sending country, but they significantly promote trade for their home country as well as
for their host country.