Improving Social Welfare Programs
Paper Session
Friday, Jan. 6, 2023 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (CST)
- Chair: Anthony Underwood, Dickinson College
Administrative Burden and Procedural Denials: Experimental Evidence from SNAP
Abstract
Many safety net program applications result in procedural denials due to the administrative burden associated with applying. We study the effect of an alternative application process for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program designed to alleviate barriers to program access associated with the intake interview. Using a field experiment involving over 60,000 applicants in Los Angeles, we find that access to on-demand interviews expedites approvals and increases overall participation rates: early approvals nearly double and approval rates increase by six percentage points. Our findings highlight the importance of incorporating flexibility into the design of program integrity policies to minimize procedural denials.Firm Responses to State Hiring Subsidies: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from a Tax Credit Formula
Abstract
We examine firm responses to location-based hiring subsidies. We leverage institutional features of the California Competes Tax Credit (CCTC), a large-scale business incentive program that incorporates best practices from prior job creation policies. The CCTC award selection procedure combines formula-based and discretionary components. Leveraging applicant score eligibility cutoffs in a regression discontinuity design and taking advantage of rich longitudinal microdata on establishments and their parent firms, we find that firms expand activity in California in response to CCTC awards, particularly in disadvantaged parts of the state. Moreover, we find little evidence of spillovers to other states. Our results suggest that targeted and audited hiring subsidies can be effective in promoting local business expansions without significant cross-state displacement effects.Labor Market Design Can Improve Match Outcomes: Evidence from Matching Teach For America Teachers to Schools
Abstract
I worked with Teach For America (TFA) to match high school teachers to schools in Chicago using the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA), while keeping its original mechanism unchanged for elementary teachers. I report direct estimates of teachers' and schools' preferences using the preference reports required for DA. 88 percent of teachers prefer their matches under DA. This improved matching yields longer-run benefits: matching with DA increased teachers' retention through their two-year commitment to TFA by between 6 and 12 percentage points. This provides empirical support for the hypothesis that economic design can improve outcomes in labor markets without negotiable wages.Choice, Welfare, and Market Design: An Empirical Investigation of Feeding America's Choice System
Abstract
Feeding America, an organisation responsible for feeding 130,000 Americans every day, distributes donated food among a network of participating food banks. The efficient and equitable allocation of food to food banks is of first-order importance for the welfare of many of America's most vulnerable. Feeding America's allocation mechanism, the `Choice System', allow foods banks to precisely signal their needs for various types of food, ensuring a large degree of choice in what food they receive.In this paper I examine the welfare and distributional consequences of enabling choice. I use a dynamic auction model to estimate food banks’ needs from detailed Choice System bidding data. I allow food banks to have heterogenous needs, and allow these needs to vary (unobservably) over time as food banks receive different types of food from their local donors. I then use these estimates to compare the Choice System to the previous allocation mechanism employed by Feeding America which gave food banks very limited choice. I estimate that the Choice System increased welfare by the equivalent of a 17% increase in the quantity of food allocated. Finally, I use additional simulations to consider which attributes of the Choice System are most important for achieving an efficient and equitable allocation.
JEL Classifications
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods