Gender Bias in Promotions:
Evidence from Financial Institutions

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Abstract

We test for gender bias in promotions at financial institutions using two central predictions of Becker's (1957, 1993) model: firms with bias will (1) raise the promotion bar for marginally promoted female workers, and (2) incur costs from forgoing efficient employment practices. We find support for both of these predictions using a new nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and their branch managers, encompassing approximately 72,000 workers from over 1,000 shadow banks from 2014 to 2019. Overall, our findings provide evidence that gender bias is an important factor in gender disparities at financial institutions.

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The U.S. financial sector employs over 9 million workers, often in high paying jobs that influence capital allocation in the economy. However, women hold less than a quarter of the industry's top leadership roles, despite making up the majority of its entry-level workforce.[1] If financial firms are biased against women because of tastes (Becker, 1957) or inaccurate stereotypes (Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016), female workers will have to clear a higher bar for promotion. Although the media, policymakers, and surveys all point to discrimination as a factor inhibiting women's climb up the corporate ladder, it is well known to researchers that omitted variable and infra-marginality problems make it difficult to find convincing evidence of bias using standard regression methods (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).

In this paper, we combine novel large-sample microdata on workers and their managers with recent advances in Becker's (1993) "outcome test" to provide new evidence on gender bias at U.S. financial institutions. We first test whether male workers are more likely to be promoted than their female counterparts, controlling for performance, experience, and other characteristics. Next, we use outcome tests to investigate whether gender disparities are the result of bias. We then study how gender bias in promotions is affected by the gender of the decision-maker ("in-group" tests) as well as past sales performance (the "Peter Principle"). Finally, we investigate Becker's (1957) prediction that biased employment practices are costly to firms.

A significant barrier to testing for bias in promotions is obtaining large-sample data on rank-and-file employees which include job positions, performance, and demographics. We overcome this challenge by using licensing and registration information from the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System (NMLS) to construct, to our knowledge, the first nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and branch managers at mortgage companies.[2] We then link these loan officers directly to the loans they originate in a national mortgage database provided by CoreLogic, and information on subsequent foreclosures from Zillow. Our sample covers approximately 72,000 workers from over 1,000 mortgage companies from 2014 to 2019.

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[1] For industry employment statistics, see data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics here: https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables.htm. For information on gender gaps in senior management, see for example, Deloitte's "Within Reach? Achieving gender equality in financial services leadership." Women hold less than 22% of top leadership roles, less than 25% of board seats, and it wasn't until the year 2020 that a woman was first appointed as CEO of a major U.S. bank.

[2] The NMLS is a registry of all residential mortgage loan originators in the United States that was created as part of the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (SAFE Act). For non-depository institutions (mortgage companies), the NMLS also contains the loan officers' supervisors, denoted as branch managers. Section 3.1 discusses the NMLS in more detail.

Financial institutions and their loan officers provide a natural laboratory to test for gender bias in promotions. First, the setting is economically important, with new mortgage originations totaling over $2 Trillion annually. Second, mortgage loan officers are attractive workers to study because their compensation is primarily based on loan origination volume, which gives the researcher a relatively complete measure of job performance. Finally, our setting allows us to study the bias that women face at the beginning of their careers, potentially revealing a "Broken Rung" of the corporate ladder which could perpetuate gender disparities in senior management.[3]

We start our analysis by documenting that only 27% of branch managers are women, despite the fact that women make up 35% of loan officers. We then conduct multivariate tests and find that male loan officers are 15% more likely to be promoted to manager than their female counterparts, controlling for sales performance (lending volume), experience, and other observable characteristics. These findings document a "gender promotion gap" in which female workers begin to lose out to male workers at the very first step of the corporate ladder.

While gender bias could indeed be the cause of this promotion gap, it is well known that disparities alone do not prove bias because they can also result from differences in preferences or innate characteristics that the researcher cannot observe. For example, women can be more averse to risk (Barber and Odean, 2001) and competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Women are also more likely to choose jobs with family-friendly hours, potentially forgoing some career advancement opportunities (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010). Given the difficulty of controlling for all such factors, standard regression methods cannot ensure that gender gaps are due to bias rather than unobserved heterogeneity (Guryan and Charles, 2013).

To circumvent this problem, Becker's (1993) Nobel Prize lecture proposed the "outcome test" as a direct approach to detect bias by comparing the success or failure of decisions at the margin.[4] For promotion decisions, the relevant outcome is how well the promoted manager performs. If firms are unbiased, they will equate expected manager performance at the margin,

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[3] The term "Broken Rung" was coined by McKinsey & Company and Sheryl Sandberg through LeanIn.Org. They argue that because it determines the pipeline of women available to promote, discrimination that begins at the first promotion is even more detrimental to women than the well-known "glass ceiling" at the top of the corporate ladder.

[4] We use the term "gender bias" to refer to biased decisions, whether they are driven by preferences (Becker, 1957), or by inaccurate beliefs such as exaggerated stereotypes (Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016). An important strength of outcome tests is that they can clearly distinguish bias from statistical discrimination (Hull, 2021), which does not lead to differences at the margin. In our setting, statistical discrimination would occur if employers with imperfect information were rational and non-prejudiced, yet optimized promotion decisions by using gender to proxy for aspects of managerial potential that were unobservable to them (Phelps, 1972, and Arrow, 1973).

creating the testable prediction that managerial performance will be identical for marginally promoted men and women. Unfortunately, Becker's outcome test has been challenging to bring to the data because of the difficulty in identifying marginal cases, which introduces the infra-marginality problem when researchers use averages instead: one can observe gender differences in *average* outcomes even if firms equate expected outcomes at the *margin* (Ayres, 2002). In other words, gender differences in average managerial performance may say very little about gender bias in promotions.

Several recent studies, however, have made important advances in implementing Becker's outcome test (see Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018) for bail decisions and Dobbie, Liberman, Paravisini, and Pathania (2021) for consumer lending). These studies utilize the fact that instrumental variables (IV) tests estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) on compliers to the instrument in order to estimate outcomes that are local to (at) the margin. Most relevant to our setting is Benson, Li, and Shue (2019), who use this IV approach to implement a Becker outcome test for the "Peter Principle" in promotions of sales workers to managerial roles—finding that firms are biased toward promoting high sales workers with lower managerial potential relative to low sales workers with higher managerial potential. We use an IV approach similar to Benson, Li, and Shue (2019) to circumvent the infra-marginality problem and test for gender bias based on the performance of marginally promoted male and female managers.

Our outcome tests require both a measure of managers' performance and a valid instrument for promotions. We measure managerial performance by taking our loan officer-year panel and calculating managers' impact on their subordinate officers' lending volume via manager fixed effects. These specifications include subordinate fixed effects to ensure that our measure of manager performance is not influenced by the matching of managers to subordinates, and firm-year fixed effects to control for firm or industry trends. Our method closely follows advances in computing "value added" by workers (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), teachers (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014a, 2014b), and sales managers (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019).

We instrument for each worker's promotion using the firm-level average promotion rate in each year, leaving out the focal worker and her teammates (following the approach in Benson, Li, and Shue (2019)). We find that this instrument has a strong positive effect on promotions for both male and female loan officers. Yet, as we discuss in more detail in Section 5, the instrument remains plausibly exogenous to managers' ex post performance due in large part to the inclusion

of firm-year fixed effects when computing performance. The compliers to this instrument can be thought of as marginal managers because they are promoted only if overall promotion rates are high, and not if promotion rates were slightly lower. Therefore, by estimating the LATE of promotion on managerial performance for these compliers, we are able to estimate the performance of marginally promoted male/female managers.

Our main IV results show that marginally promoted male managers reduce the productivity of their subordinates by 3% compared to an average manager. In contrast, marginally promoted female managers increase subordinates' productivity by 2% compared to an average manager. These outcomes at the margin are significantly different from zero, and from each other, showing that female workers need to have roughly 5% greater managerial ability to receive the same promotion as their male counterparts. Taken together with the gender gap in promotions, these findings provide strong evidence of gender bias at the financial institutions we study.

We extend our analysis to examine "in-group" favoritism by testing whether women face more bias when they work for male managers (e.g., Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2020). These tests can offer insight into whether biased preferences or inaccurate stereotypes are more likely to be driving our results. If preferences are the root cause, women should face greater bias under male decision-makers, whose preferences likely tilt in favor of in-group members (men). Instead, we find that female workers face similar levels of bias under male and female decision-makers, consistent with inaccurate gender stereotypes about managerial potential being held by both men and women.[5] An important implication of these results is that policies focused solely on increasing female representation in upper management will likely not be sufficient to create equal opportunity for the next generation of women in finance.

Our next tests explore whether an interplay between gender and the Peter Principle contributes to the gender bias we find. We are motivated by the incongruity between the notion that high-performers are promoted past their level of competence, and recent studies showing positive effects of having women in top leadership roles.[6] For men, we find evidence consistent with the Peter Principle—marginally promoted high volume loan officers make worse managers

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[5] Studies find similar evidence of biased stereotypes holding within groups in other settings. For example, estimates of racial bias against black defendants are similar under white and black judges (see, e.g., Anwar and Fang, 2006).

[6] For example, studies show that firms benefit from female leadership in the context of investment decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013), corporate governance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and avoiding corporate litigation (Adhikari, Agrawal and Malm, 2019).

than their low volume counterparts. In contrast, we find that marginally promoted high volume female loan officers make, if anything, *better* managers than their low volume counterparts. Hence, the Peter Principle appears to be gender specific: firms exhibit a bias toward promoting the best salesmen, but do not extend this promotion advantage to top saleswomen. This difference contributes to the overall level of gender bias, and makes the marginally promoted high-performing saleswoman a better-than-average manager (a finding we denote as the "Penelope Principle").

We next rule out alternative explanations for the differences we document at the margin. First, we show that the superior sales performance of marginally promoted female managers is not offset by lower performance in their non-sales contributions. These include managers' impact on subordinates' loan quality (rather than volume), and aspects of workforce management, such as reducing costly turnover or recruiting new employees. We then rule out less likely alternatives such as a lack of overlap in the distributions of male and female managerial potential, or certain types of female workers systematically turning down promotions. Our battery of robustness tests confirm that gender bias is indeed the most compelling explanation for our findings.

Our final set of tests examine a second central prediction of Becker's (1957, 1993) model: biased preferences/beliefs unrelated to productivity will be costly to firms. We present results from four tests of this hypothesis. First, at the worker-level we find using a difference-in-differences analysis that female loan officers' productivity increases under female managers, offering additional evidence on the opportunity cost of overpromoting men. Second, at the firm-level we find that less female representation among management (fewer female managers relative to the share of female workers) is associated with reduced lending volume. Third, we find that firms with more female representation among management experience greater employment growth. Fourth, we find that these firms are also more likely to survive. Although these firm-performance tests document correlations rather than causal effects, the patterns hold across firms and within firms over time, and are consistent with Becker's (1957) prediction that biased employment practices are costly to firms.

Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. Prior research documents gender gaps in a variety of economic outcomes such as wages (e.g., Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010), access to credit (Alesina, Lotti, and Mistrulli, 2013), and career trajectories in academic finance

(Sherman and Tookes, 2021, and Adams and Lowry, 2021).[7] Studies of the gender gap in promotions are relatively rare and typically focus on a single firm due to the scarcity of detailed data on rank-and-file employees. Most recently, studies document that subjective performance evaluations (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2021) and gender targets (Hospido, Laeven, and Lamo, 2021) help explain the promotion gap at a large retail chain and the European Central Bank, respectively. We contribute to this literature by documenting a significant gender gap in promotions at over 1,000 financial institutions, where "hard" measures of worker performance are available (loan volume), and the women we study have chosen a commission-based job in a predominantly-male industry, likely reducing gender differences in risk aversion and competitive behavior (Adams, Barber, and Odean, 2016, Fang and Huang, 2017, and Kumar, 2010).

Our primary contribution is to then provide direct evidence on the role of bias in the gender promotion gap using Becker's marginal outcome test.[8] Our tests show that women are held to a roughly 5% higher promotion standard, and point to biased stereotypes (rather than tastes) as the primary mechanism. These findings add to the nascent literature identifying bias using marginal outcome tests (e.g., Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, 2018), and to recent work showing inaccurate beliefs can perpetuate long-standing inequities.[9] We also document a new link between the Peter Principle and gender bias. Recent studies have found empirical support for the Peter Principle among sales managers (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019) and in experimental settings (Chan, 2018). We extend this literature by providing novel evidence that the Peter Principle is stronger for men, which contributes to gender bias in promotions.

Our study also adds to the literature testing Becker's (1957) prediction that biased employment practices are costly to firms. Although prior evidence is mixed, our tests suggest that a bias toward promoting men can be costly in terms of total sales (lending volume), employment

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[7] The recent literature has also studied gender differences in the pricing of arts (Adams, Kraussl, Navone, and Verwijmeren, 2021), the value of connections (Fang and Huang, 2017), the choice of finance career (Adams, Barber, and Odean, 2019), the likelihood of exiting the mutual fund industry (Adams and Kim, 2020), and the differences in finance research productivity during the pandemic (Barber, Jiang, Morse, Puri, Tookes, and Werner, 2021).

[8] The difficulty of distinguishing between gender gaps (disparities) and gender bias (discrimination) has led researchers to use field experiments to uncover evidence of gender bias, such as "blind" orchestra auditions (Goldin and Rouse, 2000) and trained undercover actors (Bhattacharya, Kumar, Visaria, and Zhao, 2021). See Bertrand and Duflo (2017) for a review of the literature.

[9] Several studies document biased stereotypes in experimental settings (e.g., Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2016, 2019), and Coffman, Exley, and Niederle (2020)). Our results add to the "real-world" empirical evidence on the importance of biased stereotypes (see, e.g., Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, 2018).

growth, and survival.[10] Our findings also support the hypothesis that having fewer women in managerial roles can be costly because it reduces incentives for women who aspire to these positions (Blau and Kahn, 2017, and Pikulina and Ferreira, 2021).

Finally, our analysis provides some of the first evidence on the bias women face in promotions at the very beginning of their career. In contrast to the large literature examining gender differences at the top of the corporate hierarchy, early-career promotion decisions have largely evaded researchers' analysis. Our results reveal that women face a "Broken Rung" long before the "Glass-Ceiling" at the top of the corporate ladder.

2. Institutional setting

The mortgage companies we study, often referred to as "shadow banks," range from small and medium sized lenders with both in-person and online operations, to large FinTech lenders.[11] These financial institutions are playing an increasingly important role in the U.S. mortgage market (e.g., Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru, 2018). The top panel of Figure 1 shows that mortgage companies originated over $1.3 Trillion in new mortgages in 2019, outpacing all depository institutions combined (banks, credit unions, etc.). The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows that mortgage companies now account for roughly 53% of mortgage lending in the U.S., and that they employ 38% of all mortgage loan officers.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

Loan officers serve as the primary point of contact for customers looking to take out a mortgage. An officer's duties include presenting information about mortgage products and pricing to prospective applicants, answering their questions, aiding applicants in filling out applications, and following up with applicants regarding documentation. Loan officers can likely increase their lending volume by developing skills and/or exerting effort along several dimensions. Similar to a salesperson, loan officers can potentially increase their volume through referrals, either via

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[10] For example, evidence on CEO gender and firm performance is mixed (see Farrell and Hersch, 2005, Adams and Ferreira, 2009, and Post and Byron, 2015). A notable exception is Huber, Lindenthal, and Waldinger (2021) who show that firms that lost Jewish managers during the rise of Nazi Germany experienced reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets.

[11] Our results are robust to removing loan officers working at FinTech lenders, which represent less than 10% of the sample.

satisfied customers or through connections to intermediaries like real estate agents and brokers. After the first contact with a prospective applicant, loan officers can likely increase the share of deals they convert by improving their customer service, their diligence in following up with applicants, their aid to marginal applicants, and their application processing speed.

An important advantage of this setting is that loan volume is a straightforward, yet convincing measure of loan officers' productivity. Three factors support this view. First, most mortgage approval and pricing decisions at the companies we study are made by underwriting algorithms, leaving loan officers with a limited role in setting prices, and placing their focus on generating volume. Second, the mortgage companies we study sell close to 100% of the loans they originate on the secondary market, leaving them with minimal exposure to defaults, and reducing the impact of loan quality on their profitability.[12] Finally, industry practices for compensating loan officers support the view, because pay is typically linked to loan volume but not to other factors.[13] Loan officers' incentive pay is usually either a percentage of their dollar volume, or a fixed amount per transaction. Therefore, our main analyses use loan volume in terms of number or dollar amount as our measures of loan officer productivity.

Branch managers at the mortgage companies we study are tasked with monitoring their subordinate loan officers' effort, productivity, and compliance with company policies. Discussions with industry experts confirm that managers earn more than their subordinate loan officers, typically have incentive pay linked to their team's loan volume, and have opportunities to be considered for regional and national management positions. The most successful managers likely increase the productivity of their subordinates by creating a culture conducive to success, offering advice, or directly aiding their loan officers in generating business. Fortunately, our data linking managers to their subordinates allow us to compute ex post measures of managers' performance based on their impact on subordinates' productivity (measured via changes in subordinates'

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[12] We collect HMDA data on all mortgages originated by mortgage companies during our 2014-2019 sample period and find that they sell 93.4% of loans by the end of the calendar year of origination (when HMDA reporting on loan sales ends). This statistic understates the true percentage of loans sold, because loans can be sold after this point in time, especially for loans originated toward the end of the calendar year.

[13] In fact, since April 2011, loan officers have been prohibited by law from receiving compensation based on loan terms such as the interest rate or fees charged at origination. The law makes an exception in order to allow compensation based on the loan amount. These restrictions were first put in place by the Loan Originator Final Rule (75 FR 58509) issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve as part of their historical responsibility to implement the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The Dodd-Frank Act has since codified the restrictions into law, and transferred authority to implement the TILA to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, who has continued to enforce the restrictions.

productivity under the manager in question relative to other managers). We can then use this measure of manager performance to conduct outcome tests for gender bias in promotions.

3. Data

We combine data from several sources to conduct our empirical tests. We start by building the first nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and branch managers at mortgage companies based on licensing and registration information from the NMLS. Next, we merge on data from CoreLogic with the loans originated by the loan officers, and information on foreclosures from Zillow. We then put extensive effort into identifying the gender of loan officers and managers. We discuss the primary data sources, key merges, and methods in more detail below.

3.1 NMLS loan officer data

The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (SAFE Act) was designed to enhance consumer protection and reduce fraud in the mortgage market. The law requires that all residential mortgage loan originators (i.e., loan officers) who are employed by federally insured depository institutions, credit unions, or their subsidiaries must be federally registered. All other loan officers, e.g., those working at mortgage companies, must be state-licensed. Importantly, the SAFE Act requires that all loan officer licenses and registrations must be recorded in the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System.[14] By 2012, all state and federal regulators implemented licensing/registration regimes that met national standards and integrated into the NMLS, making it a comprehensive registry of mortgage lenders and their loan officers.[15]

We obtain access to data from NMLS Consumer Access[SM] through an agreement with the State Regulatory Registry, a subsidiary of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) tasked with operating the NMLS.[16] Specifically, we obtain historical snapshots of the files with information on licenses, registrations, and other fields for individual loan officers. These snapshots are taken at the end of each calendar year from 2012 to 2019. NMLS assigns each loan officer a

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[14] The NMLS was created in 2008 by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR), see: https://nationwidelicensingsystem.org.
[15] We verify the comprehensiveness of the NMLS database by taking all of the lenders in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and matching them to NMLS based on company names and addresses—we are able to match over 97% of HMDA lenders to NMLS.
[16] For additional information on NMLS Consumer Access[SM], see: https://nmlsconsumeraccess.org/.

unique NMLS ID that stays with them over time and across employment spells, allowing researchers to accurately track people throughout their career in the mortgage industry.

Most important for this study is the information on loan officers' employment histories and the managers at each branch. Whereas banks and credit unions only register their loan officers, state-licensed institutions (i.e., mortgage companies) report the names and NMLS IDs of both their loan officers and the managers at each branch. From these files, we are able to construct a national panel of mortgage loan officers and branch managers at mortgage companies, with information on their employment history, current employer, specific worksite, and subordinate-manager links.

3.2 Loan-level data

We obtain a national database of mortgage transactions from CoreLogic, a premier provider of real estate and mortgage transaction data. The database covers nearly all residential mortgages in the U.S. starting in the early 2000s. The data include borrower information, property information, basic mortgage characteristics, and most importantly, an identifier for the loan officer (NMLS ID) associated with each transaction starting in 2014.

In order to assess loan officers' productivity, we aggregate their mortgage transactions to the yearly level to match the frequency of our NMLS panel. Specifically, we count the total number of loans made and calculate the total dollar volume for each loan officer-year. We then merge the CoreLogic information onto our NMLS loan officer panel by NMLS ID and year. The merged dataset includes each loan officer's employment history and sales performance from 2014 to 2019.

We also obtain foreclosure information from Zillow's Transaction and Assessment Database (ZTRAX). ZTRAX collects transaction level data on foreclosures, including property identifiers, delinquency date, unpaid loan balances, etc. We merge ZTRAX to the CoreLogic data using property identifiers, i.e., state and county FIPS codes and parcel IDs. This procedure allows us to link the mortgage transactions for each loan officer to foreclosures from ZTRAX. We again aggregate the foreclosure information to the yearly level by loan officer. Specifically, we calculate the number of foreclosures and the total dollar value of unpaid balance that eventually result from the mortgages originated during a given loan officer-year.

3.3 Loan officer and manager demographics

The next piece of information essential to our study is the gender of loan officers and branch managers. Although the NMLS data do not provide gender, they do include worker names. Therefore, we identify gender using a combination of name-based methods and extensive hand-searching.

We start by identifying loan officer and manager gender based on first names. We standardize and clean the first names and then match them with a list of the most popular first names by gender between 1950 and 2010 published by the Social Security Administration, following Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019).[17] This procedure allows us to code gender for around 80% of the people in our data. We then have multiple researchers and research assistants look at each of the most popular first names that have not yet been assigned a gender. If each researcher/assistant agrees the name can unambiguously be associated with a gender, we code gender accordingly, following Aggarwal and Boyson (2016) and Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019). At this point, we have identified gender for roughly 90% of the people in our sample. For the remaining loan officers and managers, we carry out an extensive web searching effort to determine their gender based on LinkedIn profiles, company websites, and other material available on the Internet, following Barber, Scherbina, and Schulusche (2017). In total, we are able to identify the gender of over 99% of the loan officers and managers in our data.

In order to hold other demographics constant while studying gender, we also identify loan officers' and managers' race and ethnicity. Following Ambrose, Conklin, and Lopez (2021), we assign race and ethnicity using the Bayesian Improved First Name Surname Geocoding (BIFSG) method, which is based on each individual's first name, last name, and location. Throughout our analyses we control for *White*, an indicator for the person being non-Hispanic and white.

3.4 Summary statistics

Our final dataset covers roughly 72,000 unique loan officers at over 1,000 lending institutions between 2014 and 2019. Table 1 Panel A shows the gender distribution by year. For loan officers, the fraction of women increases from 34.4% in 2014 to 36.4% in 2019. For managers, the fraction of women increases from 26.3% to 28.7% during the same period. Two points stand out from these statistics. First, women are underrepresented among loan officers compared to their

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[17] For the list of names, see https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/index.html

50.8% share of the population (2010 Census). And second, there is a non-trivial difference (approximately eight percentage points) between the fraction of female loan officers and female managers. These statistics show that gender disparities appear even in the first tier of management at financial firms.

Our sample includes 2,037 promotions from loan officer to branch manager at mortgage companies between 2014 and 2019.[18] Table 1 Panel B presents the summary statistics for our main loan officer-year panel dataset. The average promotion rate is around 1.2% per year. The average loan officer has worked at their firm for just over 2 years, and originates 37 loans totaling 8.5 million dollars in a year. See Appendix A for the definition of each variable used in the analysis.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

4. The gender gap in promotions

Our univariate results show an eight percentage point difference in the fraction of female loan officers compared to managers, suggesting that female workers begin to lose out to male workers at the very first step of the corporate ladder. However, this finding does not control for observable differences in workers that are likely to influence promotion decisions, such as experience and performance. Therefore, in our first test, we examine how the gender of mortgage loan officers affects their likelihood of being promoted, using our loan officer-year panel dataset and the specification in equation (1):

$$Promoted_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Female_i + \beta_2 \times X_{i,t} + \eta_{j,t} + \eta_k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

We estimate equation (1) using OLS regressions, in which i indexes individual loan officers, t indexes year, j indexes firm, and k indexes branch. The dependent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator variable for the loan officer being promoted in the following year. The independent variable of interest, *Female*, is an indicator for the loan officer being a woman. We include controls for loan officer performance using both overall and relative measures. The overall performance

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[18] We follow the literature (e.g., Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019) and define promotions as within-firm advancements to manager. This approach ensures that the candidate pool is well defined, and that we can associate candidates with their firm-level promotion rate, which is necessary for the IV estimation. Focusing on within-firm advancements also avoids uncertainty about the costs and benefits of moves across firms that differ in size, prestige, or compensation schemes.

measure is the loan officer's total number of loans originated (*Log(number of loans)*), which reflects how loan officers are compensated. The relative performance measure (*Top LO at branch*) is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is ranked number one in the number of loans originated at their branch, which controls for the possibility that promotions are a tournament between loan officers.[19] We control for worker tenure using the number of years the loan officer has worked at the firm and control for worker race/ethnicity using an indicator variable that takes the value one if the loan officer is non-Hispanic and white. We also include combinations of firm-year and branch fixed effects.

Table 2 presents the results from three estimations of equation (1) that vary by the number of included control variables and fixed effects. Column 1 includes the *Female* indicator and firm-year fixed effects, while column 2 adds controls for performance, experience, and race/ethnicity, and column 3 further adds branch fixed effects. Across all three specifications, we find that mortgage companies are less likely to promote female loan officers, revealing an economically significant gender gap in promotions. For example, column 3, which includes our full set of controls and fixed effects, shows that female loan officers are 0.17 percentage points less likely to be promoted each year than comparable male officers. This gap represents a 15% decrease relative to the base rate of promotion.

Inspection of the control variables shows that the coefficients on both relative and absolute performance are positive and significant, indicating that more productive loan officers are more likely to be promoted.[20] We also find some evidence that longer tenure is negatively related to promotion, though the coefficient is only significant in column 2. The coefficient on *White* is positive and significant in each specification. Taken together, the results in Table 2 provide new large sample evidence of a significant gender gap in promotions at financial institutions.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

5. Gender bias in promotions

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[19] We obtain similar results if we use total loan volume to compute performance measures, but we do not include them together as the correlation between the number of loans and loan volume is 0.96.

[20] The coefficient on *Top LO at branch* switches to being negative in column 3 when branch fixed effects are included. However, this is due to the fact that *Log(number of loans)* captures relative performance in a continuous fashion once branch fixed effects are included.

Our results so far show that women face a significant gender disparity in promotions. However, disparities alone do not prove bias. Even with a rich set of controls, standard OLS regressions cannot completely rule out omitted variables or statistical discrimination as explanations for the gender gap—female loan officers could tend to possess a characteristic the researcher cannot observe that would lead them to perform worse if promoted to manager, thereby justifying the disparity in promotions. In order to isolate biased decision-making from this alternative, we examine the *outcomes* of promotions.

The major advantage of outcome tests is that they circumvent the aforementioned omitted variable concerns (Becker, 1993, and Ayres, 2002). The econometrician does not need to perfectly control for all of the variables the firm considers when deciding who to promote, if they can instead observe the outcomes of promotions and assess whether men and women are being held to the same promotion standard in terms of expected managerial performance. Intuitively, if firms are unbiased and set a single promotion standard, then the observed performance of marginally promoted managers should not vary systematically based on gender or other characteristics.

In this section, we conduct Becker (1993) outcome tests for gender bias in promotions by comparing the performance of newly promoted male and female managers. Yet, with outcome tests, the infra-marginality problem arises: if the underlying distributions of male and female loan officers' managerial potential are different, then gender differences in *average* managerial performance may not reflect differences in where the promotion bar (i.e., *margin)* is being set, but rather gender differences among infra-marginal managers who easily cleared the bar for promotion. An important strength of our empirical design is that we are able to circumvent the infra-marginality problem by utilizing methods developed in Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018) to estimate male/female managerial performance at the margin, offering a direct test for gender bias in promotions.

The section proceeds as follows. First, we outline our empirical approach for measuring managerial performance and estimating outcomes at the margin. Next, we present the results of our main Becker outcome test for gender bias in promotions. We then investigate the mechanisms behind gender bias by examining the cross-sectional variation in the bias we document. Finally, we discuss whether any salient alternatives to bias could explain our results, and conduct robustness tests which rule them out.

5.1 Empirical approach

To implement Becker's outcome test for gender bias in promotions, we need to be able to (1) accurately measure managers' performance, and (2) estimate performance for marginally promoted male and female managers. To measure managerial performance, we employ a method similar to those used to compute "value added" by workers, teachers, and sales managers. We then take advantage of a new approach that utilizes the local nature of instrumental variables estimators to estimate outcomes at the margin. We discuss each of these aspects of our empirical design in more detail below.

5.1.1 Measuring the performance of newly promoted managers

To create the relevant outcome measure of managerial performance, we need a measure that reflects the responsibility that branch managers face to increase their subordinates' loan originations. It is, however, important to recognize that managerial performance measures can be affected by the non-random assignment of subordinates. For example, if a manager supervises a particularly weak (strong) team of subordinates, then the weak (strong) performance of the team could be incorrectly credited to the manager's performance measure. Fortunately, significant progress has been made in "value added" measures of the performance of workers (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), teachers (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014a, 2014b), and sales managers (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019). Following these studies, we compute our measure, *Managerial effect*, by explaining each subordinate's loan volume (i.e., their *Log(number of loans)* or *Log(loan volume)*) using the following regression:

$$Loan\ volume_{i,m,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times X_{i,t} + \eta_i + \eta_m + \eta_{j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (2)$$

where the dependent variable is the loan volume of loan officer i under manager m at firm j in year t. We regress loan officers' volume on their tenure ($X_{i,t}$), loan officer fixed effects (η_i), manager fixed effects (η_m), and firm-year fixed effects ($\eta_{j,t}$) using the full sample of loan officer-years and managers.

This specification estimates *Managerial effect* via the manager fixed effects, η_m. These manager fixed effects represent the mean change in loan originations across all loan officers who either join or leave the manager's supervision, and are determined by these subordinates'

15

deviations from their average loan originations under all managers. These subordinates are not difficult to find: whenever a new manager takes over a branch, the existing loan officers "join" the manager's supervision. The manager fixed effects we estimate represent the average, time-invariant component of a manager's performance, and have a mean of zero by construction (in the full sample of managers).

We then collect the estimated manager effects for the 2,037 newly promoted managers during our sample period. Taking managers' effect on their subordinates' *Log(number of loans)* as an example, the 25th percentile is -0.58, implying that when a loan officer is assigned to a 25th percentile manager, her output is 56% ($e^{-0.58} = 0.56$) of what it would have been if assigned to an average manager. Similarly, the 75th percentile is 0.47, implying that the output of a loan officer assigned to a 75th percentile manager is 160% ($e^{0.47} = 1.60$) of their output under an average manager.

This approach to measuring managerial performance has several important advantages. First, the inclusion of loan officer fixed effects mitigates concerns about non-random assignment of managers and loan officers, because managers are only evaluated based on the changes they induce in the performance of their subordinates (not which subordinates they are assigned). Second, including loan officer *Tenure* in the specification controls for any returns to experience among loan officers. Finally, the inclusion of firm-year fixed effects controls for firm-time specific effects such as firm growth or consolidation plans, as well as industry and macroeconomic conditions.

Yet, we recognize the measure of managerial performance is not immune to all potential concerns. For instance, if there is *time-varying* non-random assignment, where certain managers are assigned to subordinates whose productivity is *about to* increase/decrease (absent the manager's effect) it could cause the performance metric to overstate/understate the managers' true effect. Benson, Li, and Shue (2019) suggest this could occur if certain managers tend to be assigned to subordinates with higher prior sales and therefore less room for improvement. We examine this possibility directly and find no evidence that either manager gender or managerial performance is related to subordinates' prior sales.[21]

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[21] The correlation between the female manager indicator and subordinates' sales in the year prior to the new manager taking over is -0.013 (p-value = 0.41). Similarly, the correlation between a manager's effect and their subordinates' prior sales is -0.011 (p-value = 0.45).

Another potential concern is that our measure of managerial performance may be incomplete, that is, managers may contribute in ways other than increasing subordinate sales. To address this concern, in section 5.5.1, we expand our analysis to investigate several potential alternative contributions. These include managers' impact on their subordinates' loan quality (rather than volume) as well as managers' impact on workforce management, such as reductions in costly turnover or the recruitment of new sales employees.

5.1.2 Instrumental Variables approach to implement Becker's outcome test

To implement Becker's outcome test, we need to estimate the performance of marginally promoted male and female managers. Recent work by Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018) demonstrates how the local nature of instrumental variables estimates can be used to estimate outcomes at the margin. The approach takes advantage of work by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) showing that IV estimates represent the local average treatment effect for a subgroup of units—the compliers—who are only treated due to the instrument. In our setting, we instrument for loan officers being promoted to manager and use the LATE property of instrumental variables to directly estimate outcomes for marginally promoted managers.

Our instrumental variables design closely follows the setup in Benson, Li, and Shue (2019), who identify marginally promoted sales managers and show that companies are biased toward promoting salespeople with high prepromotion sales but low managerial ability (the Peter Principle). Although our study focuses on a different research question, in a different industry, the direct parallels between our data structure and measure of managerial performance and theirs make it natural to utilize their IV design. As in Benson, Li, and Shue (2019), we use the "leave-out" average promotion rate at the firm, which excludes the focal worker and her teammates, to instrument for whether the worker is promoted to manager. Intuitively, the compliers to this instrument can be thought of as marginal managers because they were promoted due to the firm's promotion rate being high, but would not have been if it were lower.

The approach from Benson, Li, and Shue (2019) has several important strengths. First, as we discuss in more detail below, the specific form of variation that the instrument exploits (firm-by-time level variation) pairs well with the methodology used to compute managers' value-added, making the exclusion restriction plausible. For instance, one might be concerned that high promotion rates at a firm coincide with positive demand shocks, which could affect all workers'

productivity and thus be correlated with managerial performance. However, the methodology used to compute managers' value-added controls directly for firm-by-time fixed effects, eliminating this concern. Second, the instrument can induce variation in promotion decisions within decision-makers (decisions during high versus low promotion rate years). This type of variation parallels the experimental ideal for testing for biased decision-making (Hull, 2021), and obviates the need for additional assumptions about homogeneity/consistency in decision-makers' behavior that are required in settings like Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018), where the IV design uses only across-decision-maker variation and the quasi-random assignment of decision-makers.[22]

We implement our instrumental variables tests using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach with the following specifications:

$$\text{Stage 1:} \quad Promoted_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leave-out\ measure_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Stage 2:} \quad Managerial\ effect_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{Promoted}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

where i indexes individual loan officers, t indexes time, and $X_{i,t}$ includes all of the controls from our gender gap regressions. The tests are run using the sample of loan officer-years (which excludes manager-years). For loan-officer years that are not immediately followed by a promotion to manager, the *Managerial effect* is set to zero. For loan officer-years where the person is promoted to manager the following year, *Managerial effect* takes the value of their manager fixed effect estimate from equation (2). Therefore, our estimate of β_1 in the second stage is an estimate of the effect of promoting the loan officer in question to manager on their *Managerial effect*, relative to not promoting them and having it remain at zero. Given that IV estimates represent the LATE for compliers, β_1 can be interpreted as the local average *Managerial effect* of the marginally promoted managers during our sample period. With this approach, we estimate the quality of marginally promoted male and female managers, and test for differences at the margin.

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[22] The ideal experiment in our setting would compel a firm to increase or decrease promotions from a random set of male and female loan officers, therefore enabling a comparison of managerial ability for treated versus control within gender. For small changes in the promotion rate, finding a larger managerial effect for women would indicate bias in favor of male loan officers. Similar to this idealized experiment, our instrument also exploits within-firm treatment rate variation based on the firm's current promotion rate for loan officers.

To provide a valid Becker outcome test, our IV design needs to satisfy the standard requirements. The instrument must be significantly correlated with the endogenous variable, and the exclusion restriction must hold.

In our setting, the first requirement is that the instrument (the leave-out firm promotion rate) is correlated with the endogenous variable we are instrumenting for (the individual's promotion). To interpret IV estimates as the LATE, we also require instrument monotonicity (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996): increases in the firm promotion rate can either encourage promotion, or have no effect at all, but cannot discourage an officer's promotion relative to years with lower promotion rates. Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix reports our first-stage regressions of promotion on the leave-out firm promotion rate. The results show that the instrument strongly predicts promotion in the full sample, as well as when we split the sample by gender. Furthermore, the first-stage F-statistics (reported in our second-stage tables for convenience) are well above 10, showing that we are not working with weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997).

The second requirement for our IV design is the exclusion restriction, which states that the instrument cannot be correlated with unobserved determinants of the outcome variable. In other words, the instrument must affect the outcome only through the channel of the endogenous variable. In our setting, the leave-out firm promotion rate must affect the manager's value-added (*Managerial effect)* only through the channel of getting the person promoted (*Promoted).* As in all IV designs, this exclusion restriction cannot be tested directly. However, we outline the key factors that make this identifying assumption plausible in our setting (which parallel those in Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019), and we offer indirect evidence supporting the assumption.

Much of the strength of our IV design stems from the relationship between the specific variation that the instrument uses, and the methodology used to compute managers' value-added. First, we note that we compute managerial performance using firm-year fixed effects. This controls for the most obvious challenge to the exclusion restriction: firm-level factors that lead to changes in the performance of newly promoted managers. For example, if mortgage loan demand is high and the firm responds by promoting more managers, these managers could get credit for high managerial performance, although it was caused by the time trend. Including firm-year fixed effects in calculating managerial performance prevents this issue. Second, the inclusion of loan officer fixed effects when computing managerial performance prevents any correlation between the instrument and outcomes from arising based on variation in the fixed quality/talent of

managers' subordinates. Third, we note that by employing a "leave out" approach that omits a loan officer's own promotion status and her teammates', our instrument is not affected by reverse causality, where firms might raise their promotion rate in order to promote a particularly strong worker. Thus, the methodology used to compute our outcome variable, *Managerial effect,* mitigates the most salient challenges to the exclusion restriction.

We also provide evidence, to the extent possible, suggesting the exclusion restriction is valid in Table IA2 in the Internet Appendix. These tests show that *Managerial effect* is not correlated with the instrument, or with factors that may influence managerial opportunities, such as the firm's number of employees or total loan volume, making it unlikely that shared correlations with unobserved factors contribute to our results.

5.2 Becker's outcome test for gender bias in promotions

If firms do not exhibit gender bias, they will equate expected manager performance at the margin, creating the testable prediction that managerial performance will be identical for marginally promoted male and female managers. We report the IV estimation results of equation (4) using our loan officer-year panel in Table 3. The dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 are the person's subsequent managerial effect on subordinates' number of loans and total loan volume, respectively. The key independent variable is *Promoted*, which we instrument for in the first stage (equation 3) with the leave-out measure of the firm's promotion rate. The tests also include the same controls as our gender gap regressions.

The point estimate in Column 1 of Table 3 (-0.0308) shows that marginally promoted male managers end up decreasing the number of loans their subordinates originate by 3% relative to the average manager operating in the industry.[23] In contrast, Column 2 shows that marginally promoted female managers increase their subordinates' loan originations by 2% relative to an average manager. Looking at columns 1 and 2 together, the difference in performance between marginally promoted male and female managers is approximately 5%, which is economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level (the p-value for this difference is computed from a pooled test and reported at the bottom of Table 3). Columns 3 and 4 show that we find similar

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[23] This economic interpretation stems from the fact that a *Managerial effect* equal to zero represents the average manager in the industry, because the manager fixed effects are mean-zero by construction.

results when we measure managerial performance based on subordinates' total loan volume instead of their number of loans.[24]

[Insert Table 3 Here]

Overall, the findings in Table 3 provide evidence that marginally promoted men perform significantly worse as managers than their female counterparts. In Becker's (1957, 1993) framework, this test shows that firms set a higher bar in terms of managerial ability when deciding whether to promote female workers. Taken together with the gender promotion gap, these results provide strong evidence of gender bias in promotions at the financial institutions we study.

5.3 In-group tests: The role of managers' gender in promotion equity

Our findings so far are consistent with Becker's (1957, 1993) model of discrimination, that financial firms either knowingly or unknowingly exhibit bias against female workers at the margin of promotion. Yet, this bias could be the result of either tastes (e.g., animus against female workers), or inaccurate gender stereotypes about managerial potential. To provide evidence on the underlying mechanism, we conduct "in-group" tests following studies such as Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2020) who argue that if bias is due to tastes, it should be reduced when decision-makers and subjects share in-group status.[25] In our setting, if tastes are to blame we should expect less bias in promotions under female decision-makers. In contrast, if we find similar bias under male and female decision-makers, it suggests that the bias may be rooted in inaccurate stereotypes about women's managerial ability that are held by both men and women (e.g., Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016).

Understanding the mechanisms behind bias may also have important policy implications. Given the relative lack of women in leadership roles at financial firms, female workers will be

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[24] Table IA3 in the Internet Appendix presents OLS results on the *average* managerial performance of newly promoted men and women, conditional on observables. The results show that the average newly promoted male manager performs worse than the average manager in the industry. In contrast, the average newly promoted female manager's performance is insignificantly different than the average manager in the industry. Yet, the gender differences in *average* performance remain insignificant (similar to the insignificant average differences in Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, 2018), highlighting the importance of circumventing the infra-marginality problem by testing for bias at the margin.

[25] In-group tests are also used in many racial bias studies, including settings within a Kenyan flower packing firm (Hjort, 2014), and a French grocery chain (Glover, Pallais, and Pariente, 2017).

increasingly likely to be supervised by male managers as they move up the corporate ladder. Therefore, it is not surprising that policies often attempt to alleviate gender discrimination by increasing female representation in upper management. However, it is important to note that such policies will be most effective if female managers are less biased against female subordinates, which is not obvious, especially if biased stereotypes are widely held.

To perform our in-group analysis, we further partition our outcome test by the gender of the manager whom the marginally promoted loan officer worked under prior to being promoted to manager themself. Discussions with industry experts suggest that a loan officer's manager plays an important role in the promotion process, either as a decision-maker, or by providing feedback on subordinates through performance reviews or informal channels. These tests allow us to evaluate whether male managers are more biased against female subordinates than female managers. Table 4 reports the results of these IV regressions. Panel A reports results based on promoted managers' effect on subordinates' number of loans, while Panel B uses dollar volume.

Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A report in-group tests for marginally promoted managers who previously worked under male managers. The point estimate in column 1 shows that marginally promoted male managers who previously worked under a male manager decrease the number of loans their subordinates originate by almost 4% compared to the average manager, which is economically large and statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, column 2 of Panel A shows that the managerial effect of marginally promoted female managers who previously worked under a male manager is non-negative. Taken together, the managerial effect for marginally promoted managers who work for male managers is 4% lower for men than women, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This provides evidence that male managers hold female workers to a higher promotion standard than their male counterparts.

Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A report in-group tests for marginally promoted managers who previously worked under female managers. Here, we again find that marginally promoted male managers perform roughly 6% worse than marginally promoted female managers, with this difference being statistically significant at the 5% level. This provides evidence that female managers also hold female workers to a higher promotion standard than their male counterparts. Panel B of Table 4 replicates Panel A using managerial performance based on loan volume and shows similar results.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

The results in Table 4 show similar levels of gender bias under male and female managers, which is generally inconsistent with models of taste-based discrimination. Several prominent studies of racial bias have also found similar bias for in-group and out-group decision-makers, and argue that this finding provides evidence of biased beliefs/stereotypes rather than tastes (e.g., Anwar and Fang, 2006, and Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, 2018). [26] An important implication of our findings is that policies intended to reduce gender bias by increasing the number of women in upper management are unlikely to be sufficient to eliminate the bias women face at financial institutions.

5.4 Gender and the Peter Principle

A nascent literature shows that firms lower the promotion bar for high-performing sales workers, revealing a bias in favor of promoting workers with high current performance relative to their managerial ability (e.g., Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019, and Chan, 2018). However, these findings are drawn from pooled samples of male and female workers. Given that a consistent finding throughout our tests is that firms require female workers to clear a higher bar for promotion, our next tests explore whether the promotion advantage given to high sales workers extends equally to male and female employees. That is, does the Peter Principle extend to Penelope?

Table 5 reports outcome tests that examine by gender, the managerial performance of marginally promoted managers with high versus low pre-promotion sales (loan volume). Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A examine male loan officers, and show that when high sales male employees (above median number of loan originations) are marginally promoted to manager, they perform roughly 5% worse than marginally promoted low sales male employees. In other words, firms are biased toward promoting high volume male loan officers, relative to their managerial potential. These differences at the margin are also statistically significant (see the p-values for the differences in the last row of each panel of Table 5). This finding provides evidence that the Peter Principle

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[26] Our findings are also consistent with studies suggesting that women who have risen to management in a male-dominated work environment may oppose women's promotions in order to maintain the organizational structure in which they have been successful (e.g., Staines, Travis, and Jayaratne, 1973, and Derks, Van Laar, and Ellemers, 2016).

applies to male workers at mortgage companies, extending to financial institutions the limited outcome test-based evidence of the Peter Principle.

In sharp contrast, columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 Panel A show that when high sales female loan officers are marginally promoted to manager, they do not perform worse than their low sales counterparts. In fact, the point estimate in column 4 shows that the marginally promoted high sales female loan officer makes a better-than-average manager (the Penelope Principle). Comparing the estimates in columns 3 and 4 even suggests that marginally promoted high sales female loan officers are required to be *better* managers than their low sales counterparts, though we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal (p-value=0.2148). In Panel B of Table 5, we replace the number of loans outcome measure with loan volume and find consistent, if not stronger, results that the promotion advantage inherent in the Peter Principle does not extend to female workers in our sample.

[Insert Table 5 Here]

Further examination of the results in Table 5 shows that the largest gender differences arise among high sales officers (column 2 versus 4) rather than low sales officers (column 1 versus 3), showing that high performing female workers face the most bias in promotions. In fact, firms' bias toward overpromoting high performing men relative to their managerial potential (but not women) appears to be a key driver of the overall level of gender bias. These findings provide novel evidence that gender differences in the Peter Principle are an important mechanism contributing to gender bias in promotions.

5.5 Discussion of alternative explanations and robustness tests

In this subsection, we discuss the most salient remaining alternatives to gender bias—those alternatives which, if true, could generate the differences in marginal male/female manager performance we document. We then empirically investigate the merits of these alternative explanations in robustness tests. We focus on three alternatives to bias: that female managers perform worse on non-sales dimensions of the job offsetting their better sales performance at the margin, that the distribution of female managerial potential strictly dominates the male distribution, or that women with lower managerial potential systematically turn down promotions that their male counterparts accept.

5.5.1 Do female managers underperform on non-sales dimensions of the job?

Our main findings show that marginally promoted female managers outperform their male counterparts in terms of their impact on subordinates' lending volume. While this measure accounts for the most important channel through which managers contribute to the firm, it is possible that our measure is incomplete and that male managers contribute in other ways. We examine several potential alternative contributions. First, we examine managers' impact on their subordinates' loan quality. Then, we examine managers' impact on aspects of workforce management, such as reductions in costly turnover or the recruitment of new employees.

Does loan quality decrease under female managers?

We expect loan quality (i.e., default rates) to be a second order concern compared to loan volume because the firms we study typically focus solely on mortgage origination and sell nearly all of their loans on the secondary market, making volume the primary driver of profitability.[27] However, if loans made under marginal female managers were of substantially worse quality than those under their male counterparts, it could be costly to the firm either through its reputation on the secondary market or other channels such as disputes with borrowers. Fortunately, we can directly test for differences in loan quality under marginal male and female managers.

Table 6 presents IV tests similar to those in Table 3, except that the outcome variables are measures of managers' impact on their subordinate officers' loan quality (rather than quantity). Columns 1 and 2 report results where managerial performance is computed based on subordinates' foreclosure ratio, defined as the percentage of loans originated during the year that ultimately end in foreclosure. Columns 3 and 4 report results where managerial performance is calculated using the foreclosure amount, defined as the ratio of the total dollar amount of loans ending in foreclosure over the total dollar amount of loans originated in the year. The results in Table 6 show that loan quality is not significantly different under marginally promoted male versus female managers.

[Insert Table 6 Here]

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[27] Loan quality is not a metric that is typically used to compensate the loan officers we study. Moreover, in untabulated tests, we find that loan quality is not significantly related to promotion when included in our Table 2 specifications, providing additional evidence that it is not a point of emphasis at mortgage companies.

Are male managers better at workforce management?

We next consider whether marginal male managers offer superior performance in aspects of the job aside from loan volume and quality. Benson, Li, and Shue (2019) identify workforce management activities as key alternative ways in which sales managers may contribute to firms. Therefore, we test for gender differences in marginally promoted managers' workforce management using four metrics in Table 7. First, we examine whether managers increase the size of their loan officer team, measured by the annual change in team size averaged over the manager's tenure (columns 1 and 2). Second, we examine whether managers recruit new loan officers to the firm, measured by the fraction of the team that is new (columns 3 and 4). Third, we investigate whether managers reduce turnover, measured by the fraction of loan officers leaving the team (columns 5 and 6). Lastly, we investigate whether managers turnover poorly performing loan officers while keeping strong performers, measured by the sales ranks of the loan officers leaving the team (columns 7 and 8).

Across all four metrics, the tests in Table 7 show insignificant differences in workforce management for marginally promoted male versus female managers. Taken together, the results in Tables 6 and 7 simply do not support the hypothesis that female managers underperform on non-sales dimensions of the job, such as monitoring loan quality or recruiting and retaining employees. Hence, gender bias remains the clearest explanation for our findings.

[Insert Table 7 Here]

5.5.2 Are there large gender differences in the talent pool?

With a properly defined outcome and a valid IV approach, Becker's outcome test will convincingly isolate bias from alternatives by directly estimating outcomes at the margin. However, an implicit assumption here is that the margin, or in our case the "promotion bar," is truly being set by firms. The two remaining alternatives to bias that we discuss represent scenarios where this assumption could be violated.

We first investigate an extreme case where the margin is not set by the firm, but by the unconditional talent distributions of male and female workers. Consider the possibility that the distributions of managerial potential are non-overlapping for male versus female loan officers, with women having strictly more potential. Facing these talent distributions, even if firms

26

promoted every woman, the last (marginal) woman promoted would outperform all male managers (and especially the marginal male manager). This could lead to the marginal female manager outperforming her male counterpart, even absent bias. While this extreme case could generate differences at the margin like we find, it is clearly an unlikely scenario, and it is strongly at odds with the gender gap in promotions we document in Table 2. Furthermore, we observe heavy overlap in the distributions of male and female managers' ex post performance, essentially ruling out such drastic differences in the underlying distributions of managerial potential as an explanation for our results.[28]

5.5.3 Are certain types of women systematically turning down promotions?

Finally, we consider a slightly less extreme case where the margin is set not by the unconditional talent distributions (as above), but by the talent distributions for the subset of workers willing to accept a promotion if offered one. Here we recognize the limitation that, similar to nearly all studies of promotions, we only observe accepted promotions, rather than all offers. However, an important advantage of our outcome tests is that so long as there are women (men) throughout the female (male) talent distribution that are willing to accept a promotion if offered one, then the marginal outcomes that we estimate will still be determined by the bar that firms set for making promotion offers. In order for the difference we document at the margin to be generated by worker preferences (rather than firms' biases), women with lower managerial potential would have to systematically decline any promotion offers, until the lowest-potential woman willing to accept a promotion was above the firm's hypothetical gender neutral promotion bar.

We have not found any empirical or anecdotal evidence to suggest that women in finance are turning down promotions on a massive scale, or in the specific pattern outlined above. In fact, prior work suggests that women in finance tend to be more career-oriented and less averse to competition than women in the broader population, greatly reducing gender differences along these dimensions (e.g., Adams, Barber, and Odean, 2016, Fang and Huang, 2017, and Kumar, 2010). Therefore, a more plausible story is that a small percentage of women throughout the talent distribution may turn down a promotion (presumably due to family considerations) that a male counterpart would have taken. This pattern would leave the distribution of female talent for those

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[28] For example, the interquartile range of *Managerial effect on number of loans* is from -0.58 to 0.49 for recently promoted male managers, and is from -0.55 to 0.41 for recently promoted female managers.

willing to take promotions well populated throughout its support—leaving the margin to be set by firms' bar for making offers. Moreover, if firms face any pressure to maintain female representation in management, this pattern could push them to lower the bar for female promotions (e.g., to promote their second choice if their first turns it down). This would work directly against our results showing that women are held to a higher promotion standard.

In addition to these arguments, we can offer indirect evidence from our data. In Table IA4 in the Internet Appendix, we report regressions examining variation in the gender gap in promotions based on whether the promotion might have been more likely to be turned down due to family considerations. We do not find any evidence that the gender gap in promotions varies with geographic distance to a new worksite or with the loan officer's age (proxied for using experience in the industry). These results suggest that any gender differences in loan officers' willingness to accept promotions are likely small.

6. The economic consequences of firms' gender practices

In Becker's (1957) seminal theory, firms that forgo efficient employment practices due to biases incur costs that can destroy value.

If an individual has a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay something either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or forfeit income for this privilege (Becker 1957:14).

However, it has been challenging for empirical researchers to document the costs resulting from gender bias at firms.[29] Our prior tests estimate these costs directly at the margin: Table 3 shows that marginally promoted male managers have approximately 5% lower value-add than their female counterparts, which for the average team of five in our sample, destroys one quarter of a worker worth of productivity. In this section, we extend our analysis of the costs of gender bias at firms by examining its effect on individual workers' incentives, and on broader firm-level outcomes.

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[29]Although estimating the overall costs of gender bias to firms can be difficult, recent studies have shown positive effects of policies which encourage workforce gender diversity, such as maternity benefits and paid family leave (e.g., Bennett, Erel, Stern, and Wang, 2021, and Liu, Makridis, Ouimet, and Simintzi, 2021).

6.1 Manager gender and loan officers' performance

Our findings suggest that firms incur a significant opportunity cost when they overpromote male workers. We now investigate a potential channel through which female managers increase their subordinates' productivity. Prior research has argued that having more women in managerial roles improves incentives for women who aspire to these positions (Blau and Kahn, 2017). If working under a female manager enhances female loan officers' incentives, we would expect female loan officers' productivity to increase under female managers. Therefore, we test whether a loan officer's productivity depends on their gender and the gender of their manager. Our analysis is motivated by studies that examine such manager-subordinate gender effects on promotion (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2018), termination (Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2020), and performance evaluations (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2021).

In Table 8, we conduct difference-in-differences tests at the loan officer-year level. Panel A reports tests examining the effect of having a female manager on subordinate loan officers' volume. Columns 1 and 3 show that the average effect of female managers on all subordinates is positive but statistically insignificant. Columns 2 and 4 show that this average effect masks significant heterogeneity based on subordinates' gender: male loan officers are slightly less productive under female managers (statistically insignificant), but female officers are considerably more productive. Taking into account both the base effect and interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 shows that female loan officers are roughly 4% to 6% more productive when working under female managers. The tests in Panel B examining foreclosure rates show that the increase in female loan officers' volume does not come at the expense of loan quality. Overall, the results in Table 8 show that female loan officers' productivity increases under female managers, consistent with equity in promotion policies improving incentives for female workers.

[Insert Table 8 Here]

In additional tests, we examine whether female managers affect the composition of their subordinate loan officers' lending portfolios in terms of the fraction of loans made to women or low-income borrowers. Table IA5 in the Internet Appendix presents these results. The point estimates suggest that female managers increase lending to women, particularly from their male subordinates, but these effects are statistically insignificant. We also find a positive overall effect

of female managers on lending to low-income borrowers, but this effect is statistically insignificant except among female loan officers, who increase their lending to low-income borrowers by around 2% under female managers. Overall, these results suggest that greater gender equity in promotions at financial institutions would likely benefit their female and low-income customers the most, but that these distributional effects would be modest, at least in the context of mortgage lending.

6.2 Manager gender and firm performance, growth, and survival

Our next set of tests investigate whether firms that promote relatively more women to management perform better. Our firm-level proxy for promoting women to management, *% female manager/% female loan officer*, is the ratio of the percentage of female managers to the percentage of female loan officers at the firm. We assess firm-level performance using the firm's aggregate number of loans and aggregate dollar volume of loans. Although we estimate specifications that include year and firm fixed effects, it is important to note that these firm-level tests are not designed to distinguish between treatment and selection effects.

Panel A of Table 9 shows that across specifications and performance measures, firms that have a higher percentage of female representation in management perform better.[30] Further, comparing models that include firm fixed effects to those without, this pattern holds both across firms, and within firms over time. The results are also economically important: taking column 2 as an example, we find that a one standard deviation increase in female representation is associated with a 14% increase in the firm's number of loans. Panel B of Table 9 shows that this increase in performance does not come at the expense of loan quality. Overall, these results are consistent with Becker's (1957) prediction that firms exhibiting bias will incur costs: in this case, in terms of fewer loan originations, the primary way mortgage companies generate cash flows.

[Insert Table 9 Here]

Our final tests examine whether firms with relatively fewer female branch managers have a lower growth rate and lower probability of survival. We are motivated by prior studies such as Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016) who show that firms with female CEOs are more likely to survive than those with male CEOs. We proxy for firms' growth using the *Log(number of*

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[30] We cluster the standard errors in these tests at the firm level to account for any potential serial correlation in the error terms arising from persistence in firm-level variables (see Petersen, 2009).

employees), and measure survival using an indicator for whether the firm exits the data the following year, *Firm exit next year*.

Table 9 Panel C presents the results. The tests in columns 1 and 2 show a positive relationship between female representation in management and firms' employment growth. This pattern holds both across firms (column 1) and within firms over time (column 2). Taking into account the variation in the data, the point estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in female representation translates to a 10% increase in employment.

The test in column 3 shows that firms with greater female representation in management are also more likely to survive. In column 4, which includes firm fixed effects, the results are insignificant, which is unsurprising given the limited within-firm time-series variation in the outcome variable. Overall, Panel C of Table 9 shows that firms with a greater propensity to promote female workers to manager not only grow faster, but are more likely to survive.

7. Conclusion

Because female leaders in financial firms are relatively rare, a strong presumption exists that women face discrimination that limits their climb up the corporate ladder. However, it is well-known that data limitations coupled with omitted variables and infra-marginality problems make it difficult to find convincing evidence of gender bias in promotion policies. We build a nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and branch managers covering 72,000 workers from over 1,000 firms, and document a significant gender gap in promotions: female loan officers are 15% less likely to be promoted than their male counterparts with similar experience and performance. We then use two central predictions of Becker's (1957, 1993) model to test for gender bias at financial institutions: biased firms will (1) set a higher promotion standard for women, and (2) incur costs from forgoing efficient employment practices.

We find strong evidence that gender bias is an important driver of the gender promotion gap. First, outcome tests show that financial institutions require approximately 5% greater managerial ability in order to promote women to management positions. Second, "in-group" tests show that female workers face bias from both male and female managers, consistent with inaccurate gender stereotypes (rather than animus). Third, firms' bias toward overpromoting high performing salespeople relative to their managerial potential (the Peter Principle) is much stronger among men than women, which contributes to gender bias in promotions. Finally, we find evidence

consistent with Becker's (1957) prediction that biases are costly to firms. At the worker level, female loan officers' productivity decreases under male supervisors. At the firm level, mortgage companies that promote fewer women see a decrease in loan volume, slower employment growth, and are less likely to survive.

Our findings provide several new insights into gender bias in promotion policies. We provide direct evidence of bias in an industry that has received relatively little attention in the academic literature, even though the financial sector employs millions of workers in highly compensated jobs that influence capital allocation in the economy. Our findings also speak directly to the biases women encounter at the very beginning of their career, a stage that has largely eluded researchers' study. Overall, we show that gender bias leads to a "Broken Rung" for women at the first step of the corporate ladder, long before women confront the better-known "Glass-Ceiling."

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
Figure 1: The importance of mortgage companies in the U.S. mortgage market
This figure shows the importance of mortgage companies in the U.S. mortgage market during our sample period (2014 to 2019). The top plot presents the total mortgage origination volume across all loan types by mortgage companies (black line) and depository institutions (dashed line). The bottom plot presents mortgage companies' share of the market based on loan volume (blue line) and number of loan officers (dashed line).

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports female representation among loan officers and managers. Columns 1 shows the total number of loan officers in our sample each year, Column 2 shows the percentage with gender identified, and Column 3 shows the percentage of female officers. Columns 4-6 present the same statistics for managers in our sample. Panel B reports summary statistics from our loan officer-year panel dataset for the variables used in the analysis. Columns 1-6 present the sample size (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 25th percentile (P25), 50th percentile (P50), and 75th percentile (P75), respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Female representation						
	Total number of loan officers	% with gender identified	% Female	Total number of managers	% with gender identified	% Female
2014	20,634	99.32%	34.40%	4,380	99.89%	26.33%
2015	25,995	99.40%	34.17%	5,189	99.90%	26.37%
2016	29,833	99.48%	34.04%	5,818	99.90%	27.06%
2017	32,587	99.45%	34.44%	6,378	99.91%	27.51%
2018	32,615	99.45%	35.60%	6,594	99.89%	28.37%
2019	33,669	99.25%	36.38%	6,879	99.93%	28.69%

Panel B: Summary statistics						
	N	Mean	SD	P25	P50	P75
Promoted	174,272	0.0115	0.1066	0	0	0
Number of loans	174,272	36.5262	47.9252	6	18	47
Log(number of loans)	174,272	2.8910	1.2801	1.9459	2.9444	3.8712
Loan volume (million $)	174,272	8.5121	11.4459	1.2291	4.1125	10.8284
Log(loan volume)	174,272	15.0676	1.4974	14.0218	15.2296	16.1977
Foreclosure ratio	174,272	0.0079	0.0293	0	0	0
Foreclosure amount	174,272	0.0009	0.0053	0	0	0
Female	174,272	0.3491	0.4767	0	0	1
White	174,272	0.7422	0.4374	0	1	1
Tenure	174,272	2.3245	1.8195	1	2	3
Top LO at branch	174,272	0.2010	0.4007	0	0	0

Table 2: The gender gap in promotions

This table reports OLS regressions testing whether loan officers' gender affects the likelihood of being promoted to manager. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variable is an indicator for the loan officer being promoted in the next year, and the key independent variable is the *Female* indicator. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Promoted	
Female	-0.0014**	-0.0010*	-0.0017***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Tenure		-0.0007***	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Top LO at branch		0.0035***	-0.0036***
		(0.0008)	(0.0009)
Log(number of loans)		0.0040***	0.0044***
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)
White		0.0022***	0.0014**
		(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Firm x year FE	Y	Y	Y
Branch FE	N	N	Y
Observations	174,015	174,015	171,182
R-squared	0.0283	0.0299	0.1422

Table 3: Gender bias in promotions

This table presents IV regressions testing for differences in managerial effectiveness between marginally promoted male and female managers. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the managerial effect on subordinates' number of loans, and on total loan volume, respectively. We extract these managerial effects from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's loan volume on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. We instrument for *Promoted* with a leave-out measure of the average promotion rate of loan officers at the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other officers working at the same branch. The sample is split on gender in order to identify differences between the marginally promoted male manager (Columns 1 and 3) and the marginally promoted female manager (Columns 2 and 4). The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality at the margin, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the male/female tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Managerial effect on number of loans		Managerial effect on loan volume	
Subsample:	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0308**	0.0202**	-0.0400***	0.0206*
	(0.0126)	(0.0092)	(0.0153)	(0.0113)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847
First stage F-stat	95.7811	45.5624	95.7811	45.5624
P-value	0.0011***		0.0014***	

Table 4: In-group tests—the previous manager's gender and promotion equity

This table presents IV regressions testing for differences in managerial effectiveness between marginally promoted male and female managers, split based on whether the previous manager (a likely participant in promotion decisions) was male versus female. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are the managerial effect on subordinates' number of loans, and on total loan volume, respectively. We extract these managerial effects from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's loan volume on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. We instrument for *Promoted* with a leave-out measure of the average promotion rate of loan officers at the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other officers working at the same branch. The sample is split first based on whether the previous manager was male (Columns 1 and 2) or female (Columns 3 and 4), and then based on loan officers' own gender to test for gender differences at the margin. The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality at the margin, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the male/female loan officer tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Managerial effect on number of loans				
Subsample:	Male previous manager		Female previous manager	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0372**	0.0004	-0.0096	0.0515**
	(0.0159)	(0.0004)	(0.0098)	(0.0248)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	95,725	45,240	17,630	15,536
First stage F-stat	99.7674	23.6490	8.7005	22.2344
P-value	0.0184**		0.0218**	
Panel B: Managerial effect on loan volume				
Subsample:	Male previous manager		Female previous manager	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0505***	-0.0003	-0.0050	0.0566*
	(0.0195)	(0.0003)	(0.0051)	(0.0309)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	95,725	45,240	17,630	15,536
First stage F-stat	99.7674	23.6490	8.7005	22.2344
P-value	0.0101**		0.0488**	

42

Table 5: Gender bias and the Peter Principle
This table presents IV regressions testing for differences in managerial effectiveness between marginally promoted managers with low versus high pre-promotion sales volume, split based on whether the person is male versus female. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are the managerial effect on subordinates' number of loans, and on total loan volume, respectively. We extract these managerial effects from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's loan volume on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. We instrument for *Promoted* with a leave-out measure of the average promotion rate of loan officers at the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other officers working at the same branch. The sample is split first based on whether the loan officer is male (Columns 1 and 2) or female (Columns 3 and 4), and then based on whether they have low versus high prepromotion sales volume. The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality at the margin, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the low versus high sales tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Managerial effect on number of loans				
	Male		Female	
Subsample:	Low sales	High sales	Low sales	High sales
Promoted	-0.0048	-0.0437**	0.0068	0.0274**
	(0.0068)	(0.0188)	(0.0098)	(0.0134)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	56,952	56,473	32,704	28,143
First stage F-stat	34.7210	73.1238	19.0632	28.8031
P-value	0.0517*		0.2148	
Panel B: Managerial effect on loan volume				
	Male		Female	
Subsample:	Low sales	High sales	Low sales	High sales
Promoted	-0.0075	-0.0558**	0.0017	0.0310**
	(0.0073)	(0.0227)	(0.0147)	(0.0156)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	56,952	56,473	32,704	28,143
First stage F-stat	34.7210	73.1238	19.0632	28.8031
P-value	0.0430**		0.1723	

Table 6: Robustness test ruling out differences in loan quality under female managers
This table reports robustness tests based on loan quality measures. We use IV regressions to test for differences between the marginally promoted male versus female manager's impact on the loan quality of their subordinates. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the managerial effect on subordinates' foreclosure ratio, and on their foreclosure amount, respectively. We extract these managerial effects from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's foreclosure statistics on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. We instrument for *Promoted* with a leave-out measure of the average promotion rate of loan officers at the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other officers working at the same branch. The sample is split on gender in order to identify differences between the marginally promoted male manager (Columns 1 and 3) and the marginally promoted female manager (Columns 2 and 4). The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality at the margin, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the male/female tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Managerial effect on foreclosure ratio		Managerial effect on foreclosure amount	
Subsample:	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0090	0.0014	-0.0282	0.0025
	(0.0063)	(0.0026)	(0.0265)	(0.0377)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847
First stage F-stat	95.7811	45.5624	95.7811	45.5624
P-value	0.1268		0.5055	

Table 7: Robustness test ruling out gender differences in workforce management
This table reports robustness tests examining managers' workforce management practices. We use IV regressions to test for differences between the marginally promoted male versus female manager's impact on four aspects of workforce management. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the average change in team size during a promoted manager's tenure; the dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the fraction of loan officers joining their team; the dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6 is the fraction of loan officers leaving their team; and the dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is the sales rank of the loan officers who leave the team. All the dependent variables are demeaned at the firm-year level and averaged over a manager's tenure. The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. We instrument for *Promoted* with a leave-out measure of the average promotion rate of loan officers at the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other officers working at the same branch. The sample is split on gender in order to identify differences between the marginally promoted male manager (Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and the marginally promoted female manager (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality at the margin, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the male/female tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable:	Change in team size		Fraction joining team		Fraction leaving team		Sales rank of leavers	
Subsample:	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0123	0.0019	0.0020	0.0014	-0.0006	-0.0022	-0.3509	-0.0174
	(0.0089)	(0.0021)	(0.0036)	(0.0032)	(0.0037)	(0.0025)	(0.3251)	(0.2266)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847
First stage F-stat	95.7811	45.5624	95.7811	45.5624	95.7811	45.5624	95.7811	45.5624
P-value	0.1208		0.9066		0.7118		0.3898	

Table 8: Manager gender and loan officers' performance
This table reports OLS differences-in-differences regressions examining the average effect of having a female manager on subordinate loan officers' performance. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. Panel A focuses on loan volume measures. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are *Log(number of loans)* and *Log(loan volume)*, respectively. Panel B focuses on loan quality measures. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are *Foreclosure ratio* and *Foreclosure amount*, respectively. The key independent variables are *Female manager*, which indicates the loan officer's current manager is female, and its interaction with *Female LO*, which indicates the loan officer herself is female. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Loan volume				
Dependent variable:	Log(number of loans)		Log(loan volume)	
Female manager	0.0039	-0.0226	0.0144	-0.0190
	(0.0198)	(0.0233)	(0.0232)	(0.0274)
Female manager x female LO		0.0630**		0.0794**
		(0.0274)		(0.0325)
LO tenure control	Y	Y	Y	Y
LO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144,254	144,254	144,254	144,254
R-squared	0.6513	0.6513	0.6355	0.6356
Panel B: Loan quality				
Dependent variable:	Foreclosure ratio		Foreclosure amount	
Female manager	-0.0006	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Female manager x female LO		-0.0018		-0.0002
		(0.0011)		(0.0002)
LO tenure control	Y	Y	Y	Y
LO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144,254	144,254	144,254	144,254
R-squared	0.4825	0.4825	0.4244	0.4244

Table 9: Firms' gender promotion practices and firm-level outcomes

This table reports OLS regressions of firm outcomes on a firm-level measure of gender equity in promotions. The unit of observation is at the firm-year level. Panel A focuses on loan volume measures. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the firm's *Log(number of loans)* and *Log(loan volume)*, respectively. Panel B focuses on loan quality measures. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the firm's *Foreclosure ratio* and *Foreclosure amount*, respectively. Panel C focuses on firm employment and exits. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the firm's *Log(number of employees)* and *Firm exit next year*, respectively. The key independent variable, *% female manager/% female LO*, is the ratio of the percentage of managers who are female over the percentage of loan officers who are female at the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Loan volume				
Dependent variable:	Log(number of loans)		Log (loan volume)	
% female manager/% female LO	0.7231***	0.2198***	0.7733***	0.2410***
	(0.0877)	(0.0405)	(0.0890)	(0.0434)
Firm FE	N	Y	N	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,807	2,675	2,807	2,675
R-squared	0.0656	0.8716	0.0714	0.8648
Panel B: Loan quality				
Dependent variable:	Foreclosure ratio		Foreclosure amount	
% female manager /% female LO	-0.0001	0.0004	-0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Firm FE	N	Y	N	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,807	2,675	2,807	2,675
R-squared	0.0946	0.3108	0.0513	0.2611
Panel C: Firm employment and exits				
Dependent variable:	Log(number of employees)		Firm exit next year	
% female manager /% female LO	0.5247***	0.1554***	-0.0137*	0.0010
	(0.0692)	(0.0283)	(0.0081)	(0.0102)
Firm FE	N	Y	N	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,807	2,675	2,300	2,195
R-squared	0.0457	0.8982	0.0084	0.1462

Appendix A—Variable Definitions

Variables	Definition
Promoted	Equals one if the loan officer is promoted to manager and zero otherwise
Log(number of loans)	Natural logarithm of the number of loans originated
Log(loan volume)	Natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of loans originated
Foreclosure ratio	The ratio of number of foreclosures over number of loans originated
Foreclosure amount	The ratio of total dollar amount of foreclosures over total dollar amount of loans originated
Female	Equals one if the loan officer is female and zero otherwise
White	Equals one if the loan officer is white, and zero otherwise
Tenure	Number of years working at the firm
Top LO at branch	Equals one if the loan officer is ranked number one in number of loans originated at the branch
Change in team size	Change in the number of loan officers in the team each year, averaged over each manager's tenure
Fraction joining team	Fraction of the team that is new each year, averaged over each manager's tenure
Fraction leaving team	Fraction of the team that is leaving each year, averaged over each manager's tenure
Sales rank of leavers	Average sales percentiles of loan officers who leave the manager's team
Log(number of employees)	Natural logarithm of the total number of employees
Firm exit next year	Equals one if the firm exits the data in the next year and zero otherwise

Internet Appendix

Table IA1: First-stage regressions using the leave-out measure as an instrument
This table reports the first-stage regressions for our IV analysis. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variable, *Promoted,* is an indicator for the loan officer being promoted in the next year. The key independent variable (the instrument) is the *Leave-out measure*, which is the fraction of loan officers promoted within the same firm in the same year, excluding the focal loan officer and other loan officers working at the same branch. Columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 present the results for the full sample, the male loan officer sample, and the female loan officer sample, respectively. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:			Promoted			
Subsample:	All loan officers		Male loan officers		Female loan officers	
Leave-out measure	0.3417***	0.3322***	0.3131***	0.3035***	0.3924***	0.3790***
	(0.0303)	(0.0302)	(0.0329)	(0.0327)	(0.0589)	(0.0587)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	174,272	174,272	113,425	113,425	60,847	60,847
R-squared	0.0019	0.0019	0.0016	0.0033	0.0027	0.0051

Table IA2: Managerial effects and the leave-out measure
This table reports OLS regressions examining how firm characteristics affect manager's managerial effect at promotion. The sample is based on all newly promoted managers during our sample period (2014 to 2019). The dependent variables in columns 1 and 3 and columns 4 and 6 are the managerial effect on the number of loans, and on the total loan volume, respectively. These managerial effects are extracted from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's loan volume on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the manager level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Managerial effect on number of loans			Managerial effect on loan volume		
Leave-out measure	0.0115			0.0187		
	(0.1807)			(0.2132)		
Log(number of loans)		0.0013			0.0015	
		(0.0022)			(0.0026)	
Log(number of employees)			0.0018			0.0018
			(0.0026)			(0.0030)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,005	2,005	2,005	2,005	2,005	2,005
R-squared	0.0015	0.0017	0.0017	0.0025	0.0026	0.0026

Table IA3: The relationship between gender and average managerial effect

This table reports OLS regressions testing for differences in managerial effectiveness between the average promoted male and female managers. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 3 and 4 are the managerial effect on subordinates' number of loans, and on total loan volume, respectively. We extract these managerial effects from the manager fixed effects estimation for each manager by regressing each subordinate's loan volume on loan officer fixed effects, manager fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and a control for loan officer tenure (see equation (2)). The key independent variable, *Promoted*, is an indicator that equals one if the loan officer is promoted in the next year and zero otherwise. The sample is split on gender in order to identify differences between the marginally promoted male manager (Columns 1 and 3) and the marginally promoted female manager (Columns 2 and 4). The final row reports p-values from a Wald test of equality, i.e., between the *Promoted* coefficients in the male/female tests. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	Managerial effect on number of loans		Managerial effect on loan volume	
Subsample:	Male	Female	Male	Female
Promoted	-0.0115***	-0.0041	-0.0148***	-0.0089
	(0.0044)	(0.0060)	(0.0054)	(0.0066)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	113,425	60,847	113,425	60,847
R squared	0.0051	0.0007	0.0057	0.0028
P-value	0.3157		0.4905	

Table IA4: Family considerations and the gender promotion gap
This table reports OLS regressions testing whether loan officers' gender affects the likelihood of being promoted to manager with different levels of experience and distance between jobs. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. The dependent variable, *Promoted,* is an indicator for the loan officer being promoted in the next year. *Far* is an indicator variable that equals one if the distance between the new and previous jobs is greater than 50 miles. *Experienced* is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan officer's work experience is greater than 10 years. The key independent variables are the interaction terms between *Female* and *Far* in Column 1, and between *Female* and *Experienced* in Column 2. The controls include *Tenure*, *Top LO at branch*, *Log(number of loans)*, and *White*. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable:	Promoted	
Female	-0.0017***	-0.0016***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Far	-0.0135***	
	(0.0018)	
Female x far	0.0036	
	(0.0035)	
Experienced		0.0027*
		(0.0015)
Female x experienced		-0.0004
		(0.0022)
Tenure	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Top LO at branch	-0.0036***	-0.0036***
	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Log(number of loans)	0.0044***	0.0043***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
White	0.0014**	0.0014**
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Firm x year FE	Y	Y
Branch FE	Y	Y
Observations	171,182	171,182
R-squared	0.1424	0.1422

Table IA5: Manager gender and subordinate loan officers' lending
This table reports OLS differences-in-differences regressions examining the average effect of having a female manager on subordinate loan officers' lending. The unit of observation is at the loan officer-year level. Panel A focuses on the percentage of loans made to female borrowers (defined as having a woman as the first-signer). The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the *Fraction of loans* made to women (we focus on only home purchase mortgages by non-fintech lenders where loan officers may have discretion). The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the *Fraction of loan volume*. Panel B focuses on the percentage of loans made to low-income borrowers (people living in ZIP codes in the bottom quartile of personal income per capita). The key independent variables are *Female manager*, which indicates the loan officer's current manager is female, and its interaction with *Female LO*, which indicates the loan officer herself is female. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, and statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Loans to female borrowers				
Dependent variable:	Fraction of loans		Fraction of loan volume	
Female manager	0.0018	0.0061	0.0025	0.0065
	(0.0050)	(0.0061)	(0.0051)	(0.0061)
Female manager x female LO		-0.0100		-0.0095
		(0.0074)		(0.0076)
LO tenure control	Y	Y	Y	Y
LO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144,254	144,254	144,254	144,254
R-squared	0.3693	0.3693	0.3232	0.3232
Panel B: Loans to low-income borrowers				
Dependent variable:	Fraction of loans		Fraction of loan volume	
Female manager	0.0054	-0.0040	0.0047	-0.0050
	(0.0080)	(0.0090)	(0.0088)	(0.0099)
Female manager x female LO		0.0224*		0.0228*
		(0.0119)		(0.0131)
LO tenure control	Y	Y	Y	Y
LO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144,254	144,254	144,254	144,254
R-squared	0.5773	0.5773	0.4945	0.4945