
Authors: Hakan Özyılmaz (Toulouse School of Economics), Guangli Zhang (Saint Louis University)

## THIS PAPER

- We study people's debt repayment decisions in a controlled lab environment with clearly defined optimal rules and real incentives.
- We find about 20% of the payments are made optimally, and subjects rely on Balance information as much as Interest Rates. We then ask the following questions:
- Can standard explanations such as Financial Literacy, Limited Attention on Prices, or Incentives explain this failure? No.
- Do people rely on balance information in **Investment setting**? No.
- Can Mental Accounting (i.e., preference for separate evaluation) explain our findings? Yes.


## EXPERIMENT DESIGN

Figure 1: Experiment Timeline



Notes: The balance reallocation decision asks subjects to transfer their balances between two accounts at the end of stages 5 and 6.

Figure 2: Experiment Interface



Notes: Apart from Debt Balance, only one sets of information (e.g., Interest Rate) can be displayed at the same time. Subjects have to use up the entire 500 every period.

## **RESULTS OVERVIEW**

- Standard Explanations do not fully explain the puzzle.
- Investment Frame removes balance dependence.
- Mental Accounting can explain 50% of the behavior

> Mental Accountant: has a well-defined preference over debt levels on each card (i.e., allocations pass a strict GARP test), but treats debt on each card as non-fungible (i.e., how the total debt is distributed over two cards matters)

## The Debt Payment Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation


People still make mistakes and rely on debt balance information when making repayments in our simplified setting.

However, this reliance on irrelevant balance information does not exist in **invest-ment decisions**.

We find mental accounting rationalizes balance dependence in the debt domain.




Figure 3: The Roles of Attention and Financial Literacy




Notes: A combination of Financial Literacy and Limited Attention on Prices do not fully explain this failure.

Figure 4: Optimality Rate Across Treatments



Notes: Although both Higher Perceived Incentive and Investment improve allocation decisions, subjects still heavily rely on balance information under Higher Perceived Incentive.

Figure 5: Average Click Counts Across Frames



*Notes:* From our choice processing data, we find consistent evidence that subjects on average click balance information more frequently under the Debt Frame (Panel A, our Baseline Treatment).