Suspended from Work and School: Impacts of Layoff Events and Unemployment Insurance on Disciplinary Incidence

Riley Acton[1]   Jo Alkhafaji-King[2]   Austin Smith[3]

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[1] Miami University and IZA
[2] New York University
[3] Bates College and IZA

School discipline

- Increasing concern about student exposure to exclusionary discipline (e.g., suspensions & expulsions) in schools

- Linked to negative long-run outcomes, including:
  - ▶ Reduced academic achievement (Sorensen et al., 2022)
  - ▶ Increased rates of incarceration (Bacher-Hicks et al., 2019)
  - ▶ Worse labor market outcomes (Davison et al., 2021)

- Potential to exacerbate racial inequality
  - ▶ Black students are suspended and expelled from schools at more than 2x the rate of white students (CRDC, 2021)
  - ▶ Black boys make up 7.7% of national enrollment, but account for 20-25% of suspensions (CRDC, 2021)

Labor market shocks as potential determinant

- Growing evidence on **<u>in-school</u>** determinants of discipline
  - ▶ Ex: police in schools ↑ discipline rates (Weisburst, 2019)
  - ▶ Ex: free meals ↓ suspensions (Gordon and Ruffini, 2021)

- But what about **<u>out-of-school</u>** factors?
  - ▶ Specifically, local economic conditions & policies

- Know that family economic stability is important for children's development (Hardy et al., 2019)
  - ▶ Need for empirical evidence, since theoretical predictions ambiguous (↓ family resources vs. ↑ parental time investment)

This paper

- Estimate how local labor market shocks affect discipline outcomes in U.S. public schools, with variation by UI generosity

- Find that, on average, layoffs have little effect on discipline
  - ▶ But important heterogeneity!
  - ▶ When UI benefits are low: layoffs ↑ discipline
  - ▶ When UI benefits are high: layoffs (slightly) ↓ discipline

- Further heterogeneity by race → generous UI policies can decrease racial gap in discipline outcomes after shocks

Data sources & summary statistics

School discipline data

- Annual, school-level data on suspensions & expulsions from U.S. Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC)

- Survey of schools and school districts required by Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
  - ▶ Administered every other year —2011, 2013, 2015, 2017

- Outcomes of interest in middle & high schools **(means)**:
  - ▶ In-school suspensions —student temporarily removed from classroom, but supervised by school personnel **(10.3%)**
  - ▶ Out-of-school suspensions —student temporarily removed from school supervision **(6.7%)**
  - ▶ Expulsions —student permanently removed from school **(0.2%)**
  - ▶ Summary Stats

Mass layoff data

- Records of all mass layoffs & plant closures reported under the Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification (WARN) Act

  - ▶ Requires employers with 100+ employees to provide 60+ days' notice prior to layoff of 50+ workers

  - ▶ States can pass "mini-WARN" acts that require more reporting (e.g., of smaller employers or smaller events)

- Attempt to collect WARN notices for 2010-2017 from all states

  - ▶ LayoffData.com

  - ▶ Emails to state employment agencies

  - ▶ **Final sample**: 23 states with complete information on layoffs, locations, and dates Example

    - 596 unique cities with layoffs from WARN notices Map

Matching schools & layoffs

- Observe city and state of all schools
- Observe city and state of all layoff events

- Match layoffs to schools at city level
  - ▶ Define cities with U.S. Census Bureau place codes
  - ▶ Include all notices filed in academic year *t* (July 1 to June 30)
  - ▶ Sum affected jobs over year and divide by working-age population for per-capita measure
    - Average, conditional on 1 layoff: 137 jobs lost, 45.3 per 10,000 adults

- Consider alternative geographic measures
  - ▶ Similar results using school district level
  - ▶ Less precise results using county level

Empirical Approach

- Interested in specifications of the following form:

$$Y_{ist} = \beta \text{Layoff}_{it} + \lambda_i + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

$$Y_{ist} = \beta \text{Layoff}_{it} + \gamma(\text{Layoff}_{it} \times \text{UI}_{st}) + \lambda_i + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

  ▶ i denotes school, s denotes state, t denotes year
  ▶ $\text{Layoff}_{it} = 1$ if school i is exposed to layoff in year t
  ▶ UI_{st} is max. weekly UI benefits (\$100s) in state i and year 5

- TWFE does not produce ATE if effects are heterogeneous

  ▶ Implement Gardner (2022) two-stage approach
  ▶ First stage: estimate school and year FEs on untreated sample
  ▶ Second stage: regress residuals on layoff & UI variables
  ▶ Bayesian bootstrap standard errors

Interpretation & identification

- β is effect of layoff exposure in given year on discipline outcomes

  ▶ Primarily use layoff dummy variable, due to additional TWFE
    concerns with continuous treatments (Callaway et al., 2021)

- In interacted specifications, β is effect with no UI benefits & γ is
  change in effect due to \$100 $\uparrow$ in generosity

  ▶ Sample variation in max. weekly benefits from \$265 to \$707

- **Assumption:** no school-level changes in unobserved determinants
  of student discipline that are correlated with layoffs

  ▶ Add state-by-year or CZ-by-year FEs

  ▶ Test for or control for changes in student composition Table

Results

Effects of layoff exposure on discipline

	(1)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions (per 100)	
Exposed to layoff	-0.077
	(0.105)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	
Observations	21,152
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions (per 100)	
Exposed to layoff	0.010
	(0.010)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	
Observations	21,152
Panel C. Expulsions (per 100)	
Exposed to layoff	0.010
	(0.010)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	
Observations	21,152
School FEs	X
Year FEs	X
State-Year FEs	

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$.

Effects of layoff exposure on discipline

	(1)	(2)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions (per 100)		
Exposed to layoff	-0.077	0.069
	(0.105)	(0.107)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)		
Observations	21,152	21,152
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions (per 100)		
Exposed to layoff	0.010	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)		
Observations	21,152	21,152
Panel C. Expulsions (per 100)		
Exposed to layoff	0.010	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)		
Observations	21,152	21,152
School FEs	X	X
Year FEs	X	
State-Year FEs		X

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Effects of layoff exposure on discipline

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions (per 100)			
Exposed to layoff	-0.077	0.069	0.884*
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.465)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			-0.178*
			(0.102)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions (per 100)			
Exposed to layoff	0.010	0.015	0.067**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.029)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			-0.011**
			(0.006)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel C. Expulsions (per 100)			
Exposed to layoff	0.010	0.015	0.067**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.029)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			-0.011*
			(0.006)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152
School FEs	X	X	X
Year FEs	X		
State-Year FEs		X	X

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Interpretation of main results

- On average, layoff exposure has little effect on school discipline

- But average effects mask important heterogeneity across states with high vs. low UI levels
  - ▶ Further demonstrate with Figures and Sample Splits

- At lowest UI benefits ($265), layoff exposure increases:
  - ▶ In-school suspensions by 0.42 per 100 (4% of mean)
  - ▶ Out-of-school suspensions by 0.31 per 100 (4.5% of mean)
  - ▶ Expulsions by 0.037 per 100 (17% of mean)

- Effects dissipate when UI benefits reach $480-$600
  - ▶ Approx. top quartile of benefits in sample

Effects across subgroups

	All (1)	By Race		By Gender	
Panel A. In-School Suspensions					
Exposed to layoff	0.884*				
	(0.465)				
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*				
	(0.102)				
Observations	21,152				
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions					
Exposed to layoff	0.684**				
	(0.293)				
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**				
	(0.062)				
Observations	21,152				
Panel C. Expulsions					
Exposed to layoff	0.067**				
	(0.029)				
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**				
	(0.006)				
Observations	21,152				

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Effects across subgroups

	All (1)	By Race: Black (2)	By Gender
Panel A. In-School Suspensions			
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	1.020	
	(0.465)	(1.003)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.261	
	(0.102)	(0.214)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions			
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	2.345***	
	(0.293)	(0.782)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.516***	
	(0.062)	(0.161)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	
Panel C. Expulsions			
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.303***	
	(0.029)	(0.084)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**	-0.054***	
	(0.006)	(0.016)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Effects across subgroups

	All (1)	By Race		By Gender
		Black (2)	White (3)	
Panel A. In-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	1.020	0.550	
	(0.465)	(1.003)	(0.448)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.261	-0.065	
	(0.102)	(0.214)	(0.098)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	2.345***	0.499*	
	(0.293)	(0.782)	(0.276)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.516***	-0.095	
	(0.062)	(0.161)	(0.062)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	
Panel C. Expulsions				
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.303***	0.014	
	(0.029)	(0.084)	(0.026)	
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**	-0.054***	-0.004	
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.005)	
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Effects across subgroups

	All (1)	By Race		By Gender
		Black (2)	White (3)	Male (4)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	1.020	0.550	1.443**
	(0.465)	(1.003)	(0.448)	(0.596)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.261	-0.065	-0.288**
	(0.102)	(0.214)	(0.098)	(0.129)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	2.345***	0.499*	1.017**
	(0.293)	(0.782)	(0.276)	(0.417)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.516***	-0.095	-0.225**
	(0.062)	(0.161)	(0.062)	(0.090)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel C. Expulsions				
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.303***	0.014	0.064
	(0.029)	(0.084)	(0.026)	(0.043)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**	-0.054***	-0.004	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Effects across subgroups

	All	By Race		By Gender	
		Black	White	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions					
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	1.020	0.550	1.443**	0.621*
	(0.465)	(1.003)	(0.448)	(0.596)	(0.358)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.261	-0.065	-0.288**	-0.128*
	(0.102)	(0.214)	(0.098)	(0.129)	(0.077)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions					
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	2.345***	0.499*	1.017**	0.598***
	(0.293)	(0.782)	(0.276)	(0.417)	(0.218)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.516***	-0.095	-0.225**	-0.111**
	(0.062)	(0.161)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.046)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel C. Expulsions					
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.303***	0.014	0.064	0.075***
	(0.029)	(0.084)	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.022)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**	-0.054***	-0.004	-0.010	-0.013***
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

11

- Effects are generally larger for Black students and, to some extent, for male students

- At lowest benefits, layoff exposure increases OOS suspensions by:
  - ▶ 0.98 per 100 students (7.3% of mean) for Black students
  - ▶ 0.25 per 100 students (4.5% of mean) for white students

  - ▶ 0.42 per 100 students (4.6% of mean) for male students
  - ▶ 0.30 per 100 students (7.2% of mean) for female students

- Further estimate how layoffs affect racial disparities in discipline **within** schools `Table`
  - ▶ Absolute Risk Ratio (ARR) = $\text{Discipline}_{Black} - \text{Discipline}_{White}$
  - ▶ Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) = $\text{Discipline}_{Black} / \text{Discipline}_{White}$

Alternative specifications & robustness checks

1. Estimate effects using binary & continuous layoff measures at city, school district, and county levels `Table`

2. Add time-varying controls and/or CZ-by-year FEs to capture other economic/demographic changes `Table`

3. Find that effects are driven by students with multiple suspensions & expulsions with educational services `Table`

Conclusion

Current results & next steps

- Current finding: when UI benefits are low, exposure to mass layoffs increases suspensions & expulsions in public schools
  - ▶ But effects dissipate with sufficiently generous UI benefits ($480-$600/week)

- Recently obtained incident-level data from Wisconsin to answer additional questions:
  - ▶ Do changes in discipline outcomes occur *after* layoff events?
    - Event studies within a school year, by week of layoff
  - ▶ Are effects different when layoffs occur in predominantly female vs. predominantly male industries?
    - Prior work showing that gender of parental layoff matters
    - Wisconsin WARN notices consistently provide industry

Thank you!

**www.rileyacton.com**
actonr@miamioh.edu

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School summary statistics

	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	Min. (3)	Max. (4)
Panel A. School Characteristics				
Enrollment	825.4	584.3	41.00	4885
% FRPL	0.418	0.211	0.000	1.004
% Non-White	0.338	0.249	0.002	1.000
City	0.088	0.283	0.000	1.000
Suburb	0.354	0.478	0.000	1.000
Town	0.202	0.401	0.000	1.000
Rural	0.356	0.479	0.000	1.000
Panel B. Discipline Outcomes				
In-school suspensions per 100	10.29	9.760	0.000	63.89
Out-of-school suspensions per 100	6.731	5.715	0.000	43.81
Expulsions per 100	0.213	0.541	0.000	7.110
Unique Schools		5,288		
School-Year Obs.		21,152		

Notes: Sample consists of all traditional middle and high schools with complete panels of discipline data for Black, white, male, and female students.

Back

Number of cities with WARN notices

Legend:
- 51 – 83
- 26 – 51
- 13 – 26
- 11 – 13
- 4 – 11
- 1 – 4
- No data

Back

Example of WARN notice data (Michigan)

- Across states, typically observe name of company, date notice received, location of layoffs, and of jobs affected

Company Name	City	Date Received	Incident Type	Number of Layoffs
Henry Ford Macomb Campus	Warren	1/18/2012	Plant Closing	30
Americare Convalescent Center	Detroit	1/23/2012	Plant Closing	86
Sodexo	Mount Clemens	1/30/2012	Plant Closing	20
Schneider Logisitics	Statewide	1/31/2012	Mass Layoff	114
Republic Airways	Grand Rapids	2/13/2012	Mass Layoff	52
Acord Leasing, LLC	Auburn Hills	2/15/2012	Plant Closing	187
Pamida	Ontonagon	3/2/2012	Plant Closing	14
Pamida	Sparta	3/2/2012	Plant Closing	10
Verizon Wireless	Southfield	3/9/2012	Plant Closing	499
Starcom	Detroit	3/12/2012	Plant Closing	75
Marble and Granite Works, LLC	Canton	4/2/2012	Plant Closing	43
The Great Indoors - Store #1910	Novi	4/19/2012	Plant Closing	81
Sodexo	Detroit	4/20/2012	Plant Closing	150

Effect of layoffs on student composition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. Log(Enrollment)			
Exposed to layoff	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			0.000
			(0.002)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152
Panel B. % FRPL			
Exposed to layoff	-0.004***	-0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			-0.001
			(0.001)
Observations	21,072	21,072	21,072
Panel C. % Non-White			
Exposed to layoff	0.001	0.000	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)			0.000
			(0.001)
	21,152	21,152	21,152
Year FEs	X	X	X
State-Year FEs		X	X

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Relationship between layoff effects & state UI benefits

Notes: This figure plots the relationship between state-specific layoff effects and mean state UI benefits across the 23 states in the sample.

Back

Results splitting sample by mean UI benefits

	All (1)	All Low UI (2)	High UI (3)	All (4)	Black Low UI (5)	High UI (6)	Main (7)	White Low UI (8)	High UI (9)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions									
Exposed to layoff	0.069	0.224	-0.081	-0.171	-0.070	-0.270	0.254**	0.279**	0.229
	(0.107)	(0.145)	(0.163)	(0.252)	(0.314)	(0.351)	(0.102)	(0.133)	(0.144)
Observations	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions									
Exposed to layoff	0.032	0.175**	-0.106	-0.014	0.465*	-0.479**	0.066	0.178**	-0.044
	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.162)	(0.265)	(0.218)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.104)
Observations	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824
Panel C. Expulsions									
Exposed to layoff	0.015	0.026**	0.005	0.055**	0.064**	0.045	-0.002	0.001	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Observations	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824	21,152	11,328	9,824

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$.

Back

Effects on racial disproportionality in discipline

	ARR (1)	RRR (2)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions		
Exposed to layoff	0.469	0.258
	(0.908)	(0.350)
Exposed to layoff X UI	-0.196	-0.116
	(0.197)	(0.079)
Observations	21,152	17,602
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions		
Exposed to layoff	1.846***	0.229
	(0.708)	(0.407)
Exposed to layoff X UI	-0.421***	-0.111
	(0.151)	(0.097)
Observations	21,152	19,287
Panel C. Expulsions		
Exposed to layoff	0.289***	2.900*
	(0.076)	(1.626)
Exposed to layoff X UI	-0.051***	-0.636*
	(0.015)	(0.379)
Observations	21,152	2,841

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Back

Results using alternative layoff measures

	City (1)	Binary District (2)	County (3)	Continuous (Standard Deviations) City (4)	District (5)	County (6)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions						
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	1.466***	0.114	0.028	-0.183	-0.208
	(0.452)	(0.521)	(0.672)	(0.115)	(0.126)	(0.439)
Exposed to layoff X UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.247**	0.072	-0.016	0.031	0.113
	(0.099)	(0.117)	(0.162)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.105)
Observations	21,152	18,960	12,220	21,152	18,960	12,220
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions						
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	0.722**	0.455	0.245***	0.287***	0.483
	(0.293)	(0.323)	(0.440)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.316)
Exposed to layoff X UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.133*	-0.107	-0.051***	-0.056***	-0.100
	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.108)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.080)
Observations	21,152	18,960	12,220	21,152	18,960	12,220
Panel C. Expulsions						
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.116***	0.206***	0.004	0.000	0.071*
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.036)
Exposed to layoff X UI ($100s)	-0.011*	-0.021***	-0.041***	-0.001	0.001	-0.014
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Observations	21,152	18,960	12,220	21,152	18,960	12,220

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Back

Results with controls & CZ-year FEs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. In-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.884*	0.750	0.303	0.195
	(0.442)	(0.461)	(0.508)	(0.531)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.178*	-0.153	-0.063	-0.042
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Observations	21,152	21,072	20,905	20,826
Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions				
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	0.570**	0.778**	0.643*
	(0.296)	(0.290)	(0.353)	(0.341)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.122**	-0.151**	-0.125*
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Observations	21,152	21,072	20,905	20,826
Panel C. Expulsions				
Exposed to layoff	0.067**	0.067**	0.039	0.044
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.011**	-0.011*	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	21,152	21,072	20,905	20,826
State-Year FEs	X	X		
CZ-Year FEs			X	X
Controls		X		X

Notes: Bayesian-bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Back

More detailed outcomes for suspensions & expulsions

| | Out-of-School Suspensions | | | | Expulsions | |
	All (1)	One (2)	Multiple (3)	All (4)	W/ Services (5)	W/O Services (6)
Exposed to layoff	0.684**	0.166	0.518***	0.067**	0.055**	0.012
	(0.299)	(0.195)	(0.174)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.014)
Exposed to layoff x UI ($100s)	-0.143**	-0.043	-0.100***	-0.011*	-0.010**	-0.001
	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Observations	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152	21,152

Notes: Bayesian–bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) presented in parentheses. $^* p < 0.10$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$.

Back