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  5. Evolution of Religion, Culture, and Beliefs
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Evolution of Religion, Culture, and Beliefs

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 5, 2024 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (CST)

Convention Center, 225D
Hosted By: Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture
  • Chair: Vasiliki Fouka, Stanford University

Zero-Sum Thinking, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development

Jean-Paul Carvalho
,
University of Oxford
Augustin Bergeron
,
University of Southern California
Joseph Henrich
,
Harvard University
Nathan Nunn
,
University of British Columbia
Jonathan Weigel
,
University of California-Berkeley

Abstract

We study the evolution of belief systems that suppress productive effort. These include concerns about the envy of others, beliefs in the importance of luck for success, disdain for competitive effort, and traditional supernatural beliefs in witchcraft or the evil eye. We show that such demotivating beliefs evolve when interactions are zero-sum in nature, i.e., the gains for one individual tend to come at the expense of another. Within a population, our model predicts a divergence between material and subjective payoffs, with material welfare being hump-shaped and subjective well-being being strictly decreasing in demotivating beliefs. Across societies, our model predicts a positive relationship between zero-sum thinking and demotivating beliefs) and a negative relationship between zero-sum thinking (or demotivating beliefs and both material welfare and subjective well-being. We test the predictions of the model using data from two samples in the Democratic Republic of Congo and from the World Values Survey. In the DRC, we find a positive relationship between zero-sum thinking and the presence of demotivating beliefs, such as concerns about envy and beliefs in witchcraft. Globally, zero sum thinking is associated with skepticism about the importance of hard work for success, lower income, less educational attainment, less financial security, and lower life satisfaction. Comparing individuals in the same zero-sum environment, we observe the divergence between material outcomes and subjective well-being predicted by our model.

Social Tipping Our Way - Or Maybe Not - To Some Kind of Future

Charles Efferson
,
University of Lausanne
Sönke Ehret
,
University of Lausanne
Sara Constantino
,
Northeastern University
Elke Weber
,
Princeton University
Ernst Fehr
,
University of Zurich
Sonja Vogt
,
University of Lausanne

Abstract

How can a social planner use an intervention to disrupt the status quo and recruit cultural evolutionary processes to activate sweeping social change? When conformity and coordination incentives hold, such an intervention can operate through at least two channels. It has a direct effect if some people exposed to the intervention change behavior as a result. It also has an indirect effect if some people change behavior because they observe others doing so. If the indirect effect is large, it dramatically amplifies the direct effect, a possibility that has generated considerable enthusiasm in policy discussions. That said, mundane forms of heterogeneity introduce a number of challenges. Using a mix of models, observational studies, and experimental results, I argue three points. First, some forms of heterogeneity strongly interfere with social change because group identities are active and favor chronic disagreement. Second, even when sweeping social change is feasible, the social planner should often expect a trade-off between the direct and indirect effects of the intervention. Increasing one effect means decreasing the other, and social planners may often lack the information they need to resolve the trade-off effectively. Finally, the link between behavior change and social welfare can be varied and counterintuitive. Intervention strategies that generate persistent disagreement and miscoordination can actually be better than alternative strategies that initiate a complete shift from one norm to another.

Evolutionary Foundations of Morality and Other-regard — Recent Advances

Ingela Alger
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Jörgen Weibull
,
Stockholm School of Economics
Laurent Lehmann
,
University of Lausanne

Abstract

“Survival of the fittest” is often taken to imply that human life must be the Hobbesian “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” However, recent theoretical analyses of the evolution of preferences guiding behaviors of individuals show, on the contrary, that natural selection promotes a particular form of preferences, which may be interpreted as implying both a Kantian moral concern and an other-regarding concern. This line of work also shows that we should expect variation in the strength of family ties across different parts of the world.
JEL Classifications
  • Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
  • D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making