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  5. Issues in Access to Education
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Issues in Access to Education

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 5, 2024 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)

Convention Center, 221D
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University

The Impact of Mentoring on College Access and Retention

Caterina Calsamiglia
,
Institute of Political Economy and Governance
Javier Garcia-Brazales
,
University of Exeter

Abstract

The objective of the project is to evaluate the impact of a mentoring program for young people at risk of social exclusion on their access to and permanence in university. Educational achievement is key to social inclusion, economic mobility and the ability to develop a life project free of poverty. However, both access and educational success in post-compulsory studies tend to reproduce the educational capital of young people's homes. Barriers to university education are greater if, in addition to income and family educational capital, factors such as ethnic origin, nationality or single-parent families are taken into account. Scientific evidence based on international university transition support activities and programs suggests that individual support and guidance have a significant impact on preventing dropout and promoting success.

Auditability in School Choice

Aram Grigoryan
,
University of California-San Diego
Markus Möller
,
University of Bonn

Abstract

In centralized allocation platforms participants may not fully observe other participants' type reports. Hence, the designer may deviate from the promised allocation mechanism without the participants being able to detect these deviations. In this paper, we develop a theory of auditability for the school choice problem. We measure a mechanism's auditability by the smallest number of participants that can jointly detect deviations from the mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditability of prominent school choice mechanisms. On one extreme, the Serial Dictatorship and Immediate Acceptance mechanisms are maximally auditable, in a sense that any deviation can always be detected by just two participants. On the other extreme, the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms are minimally auditable, in a sense that some deviations may never be detected unless some participants possess full information about everyone's types. The findings may provide an alternative justification for the widespread usage of Immediate Acceptance mechanism for school choice, despite its potentially inferior theoretical properties compared to Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles.

Diversity Balance in Centralized Public School Admissions

Atila Abdulkadiroglu
,
Duke University
Aram Grigoryan
,
University of California-San Diego

Abstract

Parental school choice over K-12 public schools has emerged as an integral education reform tool. Most school districts impose diversity measures in admissions of students to schools. Recent literature focuses on implementing such measures. However, the work is limited to the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm despite the prominence of other admissions solutions. This work extends the theory to the immediate acceptance algorithm and top trading cycles. The former is adopted for regular admissions in various school districts, the latter has been applied both for regular admissions and appeals.

Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice

Atila Abdulkadiroglu
,
Duke University
Inkoo Back
,
Duke University

Abstract

Weighted lotteries are used in school admissions to favor applicant from disadvantageous populations. Such lotteries introduce selection bias. We study the commonly adopted deferred acceptance algorithm with weighted lotteries and develop a research design for program evaluation that fully exploits quasi-experimental variation in student assignment.
JEL Classifications
  • D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
  • I2 - Education and Research Institutions