

Investment When New Capital Is Hard to Find *

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Abstract

We examine how a fixed capital supply shortage affects firm investment. Using equipment transaction-level data, we find pandemic-driven production disruptions significantly altered capital reallocation patterns across firms. A surge in used capital trading activity softened the investment decline, as firms acquired used capital from distant and dissimilar counterparts. Younger firms were disproportionately affected even though they rarely purchase new capital: while in normal times older firms sell their capital to younger firms, following a supply shortage, older firms compete for used capital, pricing out younger firms. Our evidence highlights the crucial role of secondary markets and distributive externalities for corporate investment.

Keywords: Investment, capital reallocation, secondary markets, SMEs, supply chain, COVID-19

JEL codes: G31, G32, E22, E23, L26

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1 Introduction

Corporate investment is central to the macroeconomy and has implications for employment, productivity, and growth. Although standard investment models typically include only a single vintage of capital, there is evidence that capital reallocation is a key dimension of investment [Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006]. Some firms buy new capital from capital producers, but many others invest by purchasing used capital in *secondary markets* [Lanteri and Rampini, 2021, Lanteri, 2018]. Importantly, there are differences across firms: young firms tend to acquire used capital previously owned by older firms, consistent with cheaper used capital easing financial constraints [Ma et al., 2022, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007]. This suggests that the dynamics of secondary markets for used capital are central to understanding how shocks affect corporate investment in the cross-section of firms.

This paper studies a large-scale capital supply shortage: the global production disruptions for new physical capital that occurred in 2021–2022 during the COVID-19 pandemic at the onset of the economic recovery. We exploit rich micro-data on transactions for new and used equipment to study the equilibrium effects of this supply shortage on secondary markets, investment, and capital reallocation, with a specific focus on the differences across firms. We document a surge in secondary market activity, as some firms switched to used capital to mitigate the shortage of new capital. In turn, this implies that younger firms were disproportionately affected even though they rarely purchase new capital: they invested relatively less after facing increased competition from older firms for used capital. Our evidence is consistent with models of heterogeneous firms with new and used capital and highlights the crucial role of secondary markets and distributive externalities for corporate investment [Lanteri and Rampini, 2021].

The shock we study is a large macroeconomic event that emanated from the COVID-19 pandemic. Several ensuing developments coalesced to significantly disrupt the production and shipment of equipment, required parts, and microchips. Labor shortages at manufacturing plants, shipping ports, and trucking companies, as well as an increase in the demand for

consumer durable goods led to major supply chain disruptions. The head of Case New Holland, one of the world's largest equipment manufacturers, described the situation as "the worst supply chain [he has] seen in [his] career."¹ Supply chain disruptions had been ongoing since the onset of the pandemic, but were especially acute in late 2021. As some segments of the economy started to recover, there were many reports of fierce competition and sharp price increases for equipment during that period.

Our dataset consists of a sample of equipment transactions for U.S. firms, extracted from UCC filings. We observe the near universe of filings for agriculture, construction, logging, medical, office, and woodworking equipment plus forklifts and trucks. Our sample covers over 12 million unique assets securing ten million contracts originated between 1997 and March 2022. The contracts involve more than two million unique borrowers from every state and industry. For each transaction, we can observe the borrower and lender identity and location as well as detailed equipment information including the manufacturer, model, model year, and serial number. This granularity allows us to trace capital across time, location, and firms, providing an unprecedented glimpse into the dynamics of capital reallocation and investment after a large shock. For 5% of our sample, we can also observe prices. We match our transaction records with Dun & Bradstreet's data to study the effect of firm age, shown to be a key firm characteristic in prior investment work [Ma et al., 2022, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007, Hadlock and Pierce, 2010].

The first part of our paper documents a surge in secondary market activity for used capital in the fall of 2021. Transactions were significantly more likely to include old equipment relative to normal times, consistent with used capital serving as a "spare tire" when new capital becomes scarcer. Moreover, we find an increase in trading activity in secondary markets, with shorter times between consecutive sales of the same individual piece of equipment and greater geographic distance between successive buyers. There is also evidence of more trading of used equipment across buyers in different sectors, which indicates firms settling for second-

¹"'It's like Whack-a-Mole': tractors and trucks chief bemoans supply shortages," *Financial Times* July 7th, 2021.

best equipment for their needs or even harvesting equipment for electronics, chips, and parts. Together, this evidence is line with the idea that firms competed more aggressively for used capital during this time relative to normal times.

To sharpen identification, we exploit a labor strike at John Deere, the largest U.S. equipment manufacturer. John Deere is not only the largest agricultural equipment manufacturer in the United States, but also the second-largest construction equipment manufacturer (over 600,000 construction equipment contracts in our sample). Over 10,000 production and warehouse workers walked off the job in the biggest private sector labor disruption in the United States since the General Motors strike in 2019. Thus the strike served as a meaningful disruption to multiple sectors of the economy. We run a Bartik estimation using pre-pandemic differences in John Deere's market share across equipment types to measure the heterogeneous exposure of *other manufacturers* to the strike. Importantly, we can now augment our base specification with time fixed effects to account for other concurrent shocks to investment demand or credit conditions. Intuitively, our tests compare equipment transactions for manufacturers in markets where John Deere had a large market share (i.e., the supply shortage was more consequential) to equipment transactions for manufacturers in markets where John Deere had a small market share, while controlling for credit demand. In equipment types with higher John Deere market share, we find higher prices for both used and new equipment, less time between sales, and greater distance and lower sector overlap between consecutive users. This is consistent with supply shortages having meaningful effects on secondary market activity.

The second part of our paper studies the effects of the supply shortage on investment in the cross-section of firms. First, we identify a drastic change in the firm age–capital age gradient. In normal times, younger firms tend to invest in older capital, as shown in Ma et al. [2022]. During the supply shortage, we see a spike in equipment age for firms in the intermediate firm age group. This is in line with predictions from capital allocation models that emphasize firm heterogeneity, such as Lanteri and Rampini [2021]. Specifically, firms in the intermediate

group of financial constraints are the ones that switch most aggressively from new capital to used capital to dampen the supply shock.

Moreover, the youngest firms experienced the largest drop in total capital investment relative to other firms. The economic magnitudes are large: young firms' total investment volume dropped by 21 percentage points in relative terms. This is related to the “distributive externalities” through secondary markets emphasized in recent macroeconomic models [Dávila and Korinek, 2018, Lanteri and Rampini, 2021]. Our evidence supports the relevance of such distributive effects in explaining the cross-sectional investment response to this large macroeconomic shock. While the surge in secondary market activity dampened the shock for some firms, it priced out others. Interestingly, these spillover effects imply that the youngest firms are the ones most affected by a supply shortage, even if they do not purchase new capital.

We provide additional tests to support these inferences. First, we consider whether our findings are skewed by selection into the UCC data (we do not observe cash purchases). However, the young firms we focus on typically lack the cash to make such purchases. Additionally, our findings are similar if we add granular fixed effects controlling for various aspects of firm type or if we weight our regressions based on the distribution of equipment type and location of wholesalers' inventory. Second, consistent with our main mechanism, we find that the effects of the shock on young firms are generally stronger in segments with low secondary market liquidity. Third, capital demand did not appear to be lower for young firms during these times: like other firms, younger firms traveled further and acquired capital from less similar firms than in normal times. Likewise, eliminating states with low growth in the number of young firms in 2020 does not affect our inferences. Fourth, we find little evidence that a credit channel can explain our findings: the results do not vary with nonbank market share, and in placebo tests we do not find a similar capital reallocation during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

1.1 Related Literature

This paper relates to the literature on capital reallocation across the business cycle. The closest papers to ours are Eisefeldt and Rampini [2007], Lanteri and Rampini [2021], Lanteri [2018]; see Eisefeldt and Shi [2018] for an extensive survey.² Compared to these works, we study the effects of a capital supply shock as opposed to productivity shocks. We also use rich transaction-level data that allow us to track equipment over location and time, as opposed to more aggregate or firm-level data typically used in empirical research. Our evidence provides additional support for these models in a different setting, highlighting the central role of capital reallocation and secondary market dynamics for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks.

We also contribute to research on the drivers of small business investment. The market for equipment includes many small and private firms [Murfin and Pratt, 2019, Gopal and Schnabl, 2020, Darmouni and Sutherland, 2021, Minnis et al., 2023], and these firms often invest in the form of used capital [Ma et al., 2022]. Compared to these prior works, we provide new evidence on the dynamics of secondary markets and capital reallocation following a large-scale production shock. We also provide some of the first micro-evidence in support of distributive externalities highlighted in a growing macroeconomic theory literature [Lanteri and Rampini, 2021, Dávila and Korinek, 2018]. We show the empirical relevance of this view of pecuniary externalities in the context of a large recent macroeconomic shock.

²Important works that study different facets of capital reallocation include Eisefeldt [2004], Eisefeldt and Rampini [2006], Li and Whited [2015], Eberly and Wang [2009], Gavazza [2011], Midrigan and Xu [2014], Ottonello [2021], Giroud and Mueller [2015], Cui [2022], Fuchs et al. [2016], Gopinath et al. [2017], Kehrig and Vincent [2017], Wright et al. [2018].

2 Background and Data


2.1 The 2021–2022 Production Disruptions

The supply chain shock we study emanated from the COVID-19 pandemic. Several developments coalesced to significantly disrupt the production and shipment of equipment, necessary parts, and microchips. First, production worker illnesses and stay-at-home orders led to labor shortages that made it more difficult for manufacturers to meet demand. Second, similar labor shortages at major ports and among rail and trucking workers caused extended wait times. Delays in processing and moving cargo in turn caused a shortage in available shipping containers that exacerbated the problems. Third, over recent decades, suppliers embraced a "lean manufacturing" model focused on matching production to demand. Although such an approach promotes efficiency and productivity, it does so at the cost of slack that helps suppliers manage labor disruptions, shipping delays, and demand shocks. Finally, there was a national strike at John Deere, the largest U.S. equipment manufacturer. Between October and November 2021, about 10,000 employees went on strike across 14 U.S. plants. We describe the strike in more detail later, as we exploit it in our empirical tests. Meanwhile, during these developments, stay-at-home orders, sharp increases in remote meetings and learning, and government relief programs led to a demand surge for microchips, a key component in computers, automobiles, and equipment with electronic interfaces.


As a result, equipment manufacturers faced significant shortages of labor and key components including steel, plastics, rubber, and computer chips. The head of Case New Holland, one of the world's largest equipment manufacturers, described the situation as "the worst supply chain I've seen in my career... Dealers had to tell customers they had to wait, sometimes as long as 12 months, to get a new machine. Firms immediately turned to late-model machinery to meet their needs, but rapidly it began to disappear."³

The shock's impact is apparent in aggregate price data. The left panel of Figure 1 shows

³"What led to the machinery shortage of 2021 and what to expect for 2022," November 19, 2021, Agriculture.com.



Capital goods price index



Supply chain pressure index

Notes: Left panel: This figure plots the annual increase for four U.S. price indices: (1) construction machinery and equipment (series WPU112), (2) agricultural machinery and equipment including tractors (series WPUSI024011), (3) general purpose machinery and equipment (series WPU114), and (4) personal consumption expenditures (series PCEPI). Source: FRED. Right panel: This figure plots the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index available on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website.

Figure 1: The 2021–2022 Production Disruptions

that equipment prices increased dramatically starting in 2020, far outstripping inflation (the PCE index). While this price rise is notable on its own, manufacturers also often asked their clients to wait longer for a new machine. For our purposes, what matters is that new capital became less attractive; how much of that stemmed from price increases versus longer delivery times is less important.

Supply chain disruptions had been ongoing since the onset of the pandemic but were especially acute in late 2021. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the Global Supply Chain Pressure index climbed to almost four standard deviations over its average value during that episode. Our analysis examines multiple periods, including one spanning a specific labor strike affecting John Deere, the manufacturer that produced the most equipment in our sample. Most of our tests use November 2021 as a cutoff because by that date the equipment shortage was indisputably pervasive; nevertheless we show our results are robust to using other windows.

UCC-1 Form

FILER INFORMATION
Full name: LIEN SOLUTIONS
Email Contact at Filer: UCFFILINGRETURN@WOLTERSKLWUER.COM

SEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO
Contact name: LIEN SOLUTIONS
Mailing Address: P.O. BOX 29071
City, State Zip Country: GLENDALE, CA 91209-9071 USA

DEBTOR INFORMATION
Org. Name: SHAWMUT CORPORATION
Mailing Address: 208 MANLEY ST
City, State Zip Country: WEST BRIDGEWATER, MA 02379-1044 USA

SECURED PARTY INFORMATION
Org. Name: TOYOTA INDUSTRIES COMMERCIAL FINANCE, INC.
Mailing Address: P.O. BOX 9050
City, State Zip Country: DALLAS, TX 75019-9050 USA

TRANSACTION TYPE: STANDARD
ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION:
CUSTOMER REFERENCE: MA-0-67035011-56034684

COLLATERAL
ONE (1) TOYOTA FORKLIFT MODEL # 7FBEU18 SERIAL # 21898

Figure 2: Example UCC Filing

2.2 Data

We obtain a sample of public liens on business property (excluding real estate), also known as “UCC filings” or “UCC-1 filings.” For secured loans in the United States, lenders make UCC filings with the Secretary of State in the borrower’s state to legally establish their claim to the collateral pledged by the borrower. Filings typically identify the borrower, lender, filing date, and collateral information. For example, UCC filings detail the manufacturer, model, model year, and serial number to ensure correct identification of the asset in the event of default or dispute with another lender. Given these filings protect the lender’s claim to collateral in the event of default and are inexpensive (typically \$25 or less to file), UCC filing datasets provide comprehensive coverage of secured commercial lending in the United States. Figure 2 provides an example of a UCC filing.

Our UCC filing dataset comes from Randall Reilly, a data vendor focused on the equipment finance sector. Their EDA dataset compiles UCC filings dating back to the 1990s, covering lift trucks, machine tools, and agricultural, construction, office, logging, medical, trucking, and woodworking equipment. From each UCC filing it extracts the borrower and lender identity and location as well as collateral information. It cleans this collateral information by

standardizing equipment manufacturer and model information and assigning assets to one of 497 equipment codes. It also supplements UCC filing information with additional borrower information (including a Dun & Bradstreet (DNB) number, which allows us to measure firm age).

UCC filings do not require collateral prices to be recorded. However, some lenders include them and Randall Reilly has recorded these instances in the data, allowing us to observe actual prices for about 5% of our sample. For the remaining observations, we can often observe an estimated value from Randall Reilly based on list prices, auction values, trade publications, and survey information, which by design are noisier than actual prices.

Randall-Reilly sells versions of its EDA dataset as a marketing and market intelligence tool to over 4,400 equipment manufacturers and lenders. UCC filing data similar to that examined in our study (from EDA or other vendors) are used in Edgerton (2012); Thakor (2018); Murfin and Pratt (2019); Gopal (2021); Ma, Murfin, and Pratt (2022); and Gopal and Schnabl (2022), among others. Because the dataset does not contain loan sizes, just equipment values for some observations and estimated values for most others, we focus on the number of secured transactions, which has been shown to be highly correlated with loan volume in prior work. Supporting this, Gopal and Schnabl [2020] show the correlation between the volume of lending and the loan count at the county-year level is very high: 90% for Community Reinvestment Act data and 97% for EDA data.

Following Ma et al. [2022], we eliminate UCC filings in which the debtor is a wholesaler, equipment seller, rental or leasing company, auctioneer, or government because our tests focus on the end users of equipment. Our sample covers over 12 million assets securing ten million contracts originated between 1997 and March 2022. Because we are interested in aggregate investment, and UCC filings occasionally cover multiple pieces of equipment, we count each piece of equipment separately and refer to each as a "transaction" for parsimony. The contracts involve more than two million unique borrowers from every state and industry. Table 1 presents summary statistics. The average (median) equipment age is 4.77 (one) years

	p25	Median	p75	Av.	N
Eq. Age (Y)	0	1	6	4.77	12M
% New Eq.	-	-	-	60.5	18M
Used Eq. Estimated Value (USD)	12,482	31,772	74,250	55,422	7M
New Eq. Estimated Value (USD)	9,799	27,548	76,715	64,282	10M
Firm Age (Y)	4	13	29	21.0	16M

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for our transaction sample. We eliminate UCC filings in which the debtor is a wholesaler, equipment seller, rental or leasing company, auctioneer, or government. The time period includes contracts originated between January 1997 and March 2022. The estimated equipment values are provided by EDA. Firm age is from Dun & Bradstreet.

old. Sixty-one percent of contracts are secured by new equipment. The average (median) estimated value of used equipment is \$55k (\$32k), and for new equipment it is \$64k (\$27k) (newer assets commonly include less expensive categories such as computers).

Our primary measure of firm heterogeneity is age, following classical work on capital reallocation [Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007, Ma et al., 2022, Lanteri and Rampini, 2021]. A great advantage of the UCC data is that it covers a significant number of small private firms whose behavior is difficult to study with other datasets. One caveat is that the information we can observe about each firm is somewhat limited. In particular, we have no accounting or balance sheet information. We follow existing literature and use firm age from DNB as a proxy for financial constraints. Although this measure is imperfect, previous work has empirically shown that the effect of age is consistent with predictions of models of financial constraints in which younger firms are relatively more constrained.⁴ It is also widely observable in our sample, as firm age is available for over 80% of the observations.

Finally, it is worth repeating that another limitation of our sample is that by construction, it is restricted to equipment with a lien. It thus excludes transactions in which the buyer fully paid in cash. Our sample is thus tilted toward smaller firms that are more likely to use secured financing or leases to acquire fixed assets. Section 5.4 provides additional tests to verify that our main results are not driven by selection into the UCC dataset.

⁴For instance, see Hadlock and Pierce [2010].

3 Theoretical Predictions

This section describes the candidate theoretical predictions for how a supply shortage will be transmitted to capital goods markets and firms' investment. We begin by contrasting two broad classes of investment models with financing frictions. The first is a classical view that abstracts from differences between new and used capital and assumes a single vintage of capital (depreciating at an homogeneous rate). It therefore focuses on the level of investment as opposed to its composition. The second is a capital reallocation view that emphasizes the distinction between primary markets for new capital and secondary markets for used capital (see Eisefeldt and Shi [2018] for a survey). In equilibrium, the choice of which market to access for investment varies in the cross-section of firms: financially constrained firms tend to invest in used capital previously owned by richer firms. However, models in both veins tend to assume centralized (Walrasian) markets for capital goods. A smaller literature emphasizes the decentralized nature of these markets and the presence of search frictions or related transaction costs [Wright et al., 2018, Ottonello, 2017, Gavazza, 2011].

The first part of our analysis studies the effects of the shock on secondary market activity for used capital. The theoretical predictions are intuitive. First, if firms face a meaningful choice between primary and secondary markets, we should observe a substitution toward used capital when new capital becomes harder to find. We should observe more firms willing to acquire used capital and higher prices. Moreover, if secondary markets are decentralized we should also observe firms searching more intensively for used capital when new capital is harder to find.

The second part of the paper investigates investment in the cross-section of firms after the shock. These predictions are more subtle. The starting point is that capital reallocation models are useful for understanding investment composition differences across firms. In particular, they can explain the patterns of "young firms, old capital" with a plausible correlation between firm age and financial constraints [Eisefeldt and Rampini, 2007, Ma et al., 2022, Lanteri and

Rampini, 2021].⁵

We start by asking which type of firm substitutes most aggressively toward used capital after the shock. Capital reallocation models such as Lanteri and Rampini [2021] predict that it should be firms in the middle of the age distribution. Intuitively, the youngest firms are so constrained that they invest very little in new capital in the first place, while the oldest firms are the ones investing in the smaller amount of new capital available.

The second question is what kind of firms suffer the largest (relative) drop in investment: Do young firms face a greater decrease in investment than older firms after the shock? In theory, the answer is not so obvious. On the one hand, young firms are less directly exposed to the shock because they are less likely to invest in new capital relative to older firms. However, there is an indirect effect potentially working in the opposite direction: when older firms substitute toward used capital, the increased competition leads to a secondary market boom. This might have differential effects on firms, in line with the idea of distributive externalities through secondary markets recently popularized in macroeconomic theory [Lanteri and Rampini, 2021, Dávila and Korinek, 2018].

Firms' investment response to this secondary market boom is also not obvious. There are two countervailing effects. On the one hand, in theory, constrained firms are generally less price elastic relative to unconstrained firms, that is, their investment is less sensitive to a price increase of capital goods.⁶ That effect would make young firms invest relatively more than older firms. On the other hand, constrained (young) firms are less sensitive to an improvement in economic conditions. That effect would make them invest relatively less than older firms.

⁵The equilibrium characterization is described in more detail in Lanteri and Rampini [2021]. Only firms with sufficient net worth invest in new capital. Intuitively, new capital has a lower user cost but is more expensive: it requires a higher down payment. Firms that are more financially constrained thus prefer to invest in cheaper used capital. Firms with enough net worth are unconstrained and invest in the first-best level of capital, using new capital only. Firms with an intermediate net worth in equilibrium invest in both new and used capital. The mix is tilted more toward new capital the higher their net worth.

⁶In a standard model like Rampini [2013], unconstrained firms U choose capital k^U according to the first-order condition $q = \beta f'(k^U)$, where q is the price of capital and β is their discount rate. Assuming for instance that $f(k) = k^\alpha$, the elasticity of unconstrained firms is thus $\frac{d \log k^U}{d \log q} = -\frac{1}{1-\alpha} < -1$. The elasticity of constrained firms however, is smaller (less negative): $\frac{d \log k^U}{d \log q} = -1$. We thank Priit Jeenas and Adriano Rampini for independently providing simple proofs of this fact.

Which effect dominates is thus an empirical question.

4 Secondary Market Activity

In this section, we provide micro-evidence on changes in secondary market activity in the fall of 2021. We first document time-series variation around November 2021. We then exploit a large strike at John Deere to identify the effects of a supply shortage.

4.1 Time Series Variation around November 2021

Higher Share of Transactions for Used Capital: We first investigate whether transactions are more likely to include used capital as opposed to new capital following the production shock. We estimate the following regression specification:

$$NewCapital_{i,e,t} = \mathbf{1}\{\text{Post Nov 21 Crunch}\} + \nu^c + u^{e,t} + \zeta^m + \xi^i + \varepsilon^{i,e,t}$$

The dependent variable is either an indicator for the equipment being new or the log equipment age (in years). The variable of interest is an indicator for the period beginning in November 2021 and ending in March 2022 (the last month of our sample).⁷ We include county fixed effects ν^c to control for persistent differences across local markets as well as equipment code-by-calendar month fixed effects $u^{e,t}$. These are important to control for seasonality, which can be an important driver of investment demand. We also include manufacturer-model fixed effects ζ^m to account for time-invariant differences across the same equipment offering. The most stringent specifications include firm fixed effects ξ^i to estimate the change *within a particular firm*. The sample includes all contracts from January 2019 to March 2022. We cluster our standard errors by month-year; clustering instead by equipment code does not affect our inferences.

⁷To the extent that the timing of the shock was diffused, this would likely attenuate our results. In Table IA.1 and Table IA.2 of the Internet Appendix, we show our results are robust to using alternative windows.

	(1) New	(2) Log (1+Equipment Age)	(3) New	(4) Log (1+Equipment Age)
Post Nov 21 Crunch	-0.077*** [-9.02]	0.163*** [6.68]	-0.055*** [-7.80]	0.098*** [6.90]
Observations	2211339	1548352	1887180	1280454
Adjusted R^2	0.532	0.694	0.685	0.813

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: New vs. Used Capital Transactions

Notes: This table models equipment age as a function of time. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the equipment is new, and 0 if used; in Columns 2 and 4 the dependent variable is the log of equipment age. Columns 1 and 2 include county, manufacturer-model, and equipment code \times calendar month fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 4 add firm fixed effects. The sample includes all contracts from January 2019 to March 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

Table 2 presents the results. Column 1 shows that during the supply chain disruption period, transactions are significantly less likely to include new equipment. Column 2 confirms this result by showing that the average equipment age is also higher. Conducting the analysis within-firm in Columns 3 and 4 produces a similar inference. This evidence is consistent with firms switching to used capital when new capital becomes scarcer.

Trading Activity for Used Capital: To provide more direct evidence of an increase in demand for used capital, we leverage the fact that we can track individual pieces of equipment over time and location using granular data that allow us to develop a measure of trading activity in secondary markets that would be difficult to construct using more aggregated data.

In particular, we aim to capture the idea that firms competed more aggressively for used capital during the supply chain disruption relative to normal times. The following quote from November 2021 illustrates this competition:

There was this John Deere tractor up for sale at the auction in Keymar, **Maryland**. It was **old** – built in 1998 – but lightly used, having clocked fewer than 1,000 hours, and in pristine condition. The bidding started at \$100,000 and quickly shot up to a final sale price of \$170,000. **That’s \$25,000 over the previous record**

for that specific model. (Brand-new versions start at \$205,000.) The buyer was so desperate to get his hands on a tractor that **he drove all the way in from Illinois** to bid on this one. When he won, he loaded it onto a trailer hitched to his truck and hauled it 12 hours back home.⁸

This suggests that used equipment would sell faster and across more-distant locations during the supply chain disruption. We run the following regression to test this prediction:

$$TradingActivity_{e,t} = \mathbf{1}\{\text{Year } 2021/22\} + \xi^e + a^{e,t} + \nu^c + u^t + \varepsilon^{e,t}$$

The dependent variable measures different aspects of trading activity: the time between the last two sales and geographic distance measures between the last two buyers. Our variable of interest is an indicator for 2021 and 2022: in this regression we use a yearly indicator over a monthly indicator as trading activity is difficult to measure precisely at a high frequency. The sample includes all equipment that transacted at least twice. This allows us to include serial number fixed effects, to identify the change in trading intensity in this period keeping the specific piece of equipment and its specification (manufacturer, model, vintage, and features) fixed. We also include dummies for each yearly equipment age level as well as county and calendar month fixed effects to account for the persistent effects of local markets or seasonality.

Table 3 presents the results. We find evidence of an increase in trading market intensity after the shock. Column 1 shows that the time between sales significantly decreased during this episode relative to normal times. This suggests that used equipment took less time than normal to find a buyer, consistent with heightened demand. Economically, the decline represents a six-month reduction relative to a mean time between sales of 3.5 years.

We also find greater geographic distance between consecutive buyers. Columns 2 and 3 show that consecutive users of equipment were further apart. The distance between the past and current user increased by 5% and they were 2 percentage points less likely to be located

⁸"Wild bidding wars erupt at used-tractor auctions across the U.S." Bloomberg, Nov. 13, 2021. Emphasis added.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log Time Since Last Contract	Log Distance	Same County	Same SIC2	Same Modal Equipment Code
Year 2021/2	-0.148*** [-11.99]	0.051** [2.33]	-0.018*** [-3.86]	-0.018*** [-3.00]	-0.011** [-2.06]
Observations	288517	329559	345244	345244	345244
Adjusted R^2	0.443	0.445	0.324	0.275	0.352

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Trading Activity in Used Capital

Notes: This table models secondary market activity as a function of time. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the log number of days between the last two transactions for that equipment; in Column 2 it is the log number of miles between the counties of the last two users of that equipment; in Column 3 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment being in the same county; in Column 4 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment being in the same two-digit SIC code; in Column 5 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment sharing the same modal equipment code defined over their previous transactions. All specifications include equipment serial number, county and calendar month fixed effects, as well as indicators for each year of equipment age. The sample includes all equipment that transacted at least twice. Standard errors are clustered by serial number.

in the same county. For context, past and current users are in the same county about 20% of the time. These distance findings are consequential because many equipment types are heavy and therefore costly to disassemble, transport, and reassemble.

We also find evidence of more used equipment trading across buyers in different sectors. Column 4 shows that in 2021 and 2022, there was a lower probability that the last two buyers were in same industry. Column 5 shows a similar pattern for indicators of whether the last two buyers shared the same modal equipment code (there are nearly 500 codes). To illustrate this finding, consider a piece of equipment that was previously operated by a firm that predominantly invests in a certain type of loader. In 2021 and 2022, this equipment was more likely to be subsequently used by a firm that does *not* predominantly invest in the same type of loader, relative to previous years. One interpretation is that buyers are more likely to purchase capital that is further from their ideal type, revealing an additional willingness to substitute after the shock. A more extreme possibility is that some firms acquired different equipment to access parts that were otherwise difficult to acquire. In other words, the firm acquired the asset intending to harvest it for parts or repurpose it in some way.⁹

⁹For example, firms report acquiring washing machines for the sole purpose of stripping out their electronics:

To interpret these results, it is worthwhile to examine the supply of used capital during this episode. A first potential concern is that higher transaction volume was not driven by higher demand for used capital but instead by higher supply coming from firms scaling down their operations and selling assets. However, additional evidence suggests that demand seemed to have significantly outstripped supply. Prices for capital goods increased significantly during this episode, as one would expect during a supply shortage. Recall that Figure 1 shows that the price of capital goods increased at a far greater rate than inflation, consistent with many industry media reports of price increases amidst a shortage of equipment.¹⁰ In addition, the next section exploits a large strike at John Deere to isolate the effect of such a supply shortage.

Moreover, there is striking evidence that dealers' inventory fell significantly during this episode. For example, one report described how "the run on late-model, large equipment in good condition wiped out available inventory in 2021."¹¹ Survey evidence reveals the dramatic run-down. Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix shows just how few dealers reported high levels of inventory during this episode. The fall in dealer inventory is revealing. In normal times, dealers maintain some level of inventory that fluctuates as different firms purchase (which increases demand, and runs down inventories) while others stop using their equipment (which increases supply, and replenishes inventories). Therefore, a large decrease in inventories points to demand for used equipment exceeding supply (from firms getting rid of their machines) by a significant margin.

The fall in dealers' inventory is also helpful to address the opposite concern: that the supply of used capital might have been extremely low as firms were likely reluctant to part with their equipment during this time, given how hard it was to find a replacement. In the presence of dealers' inventory, while eventually every firm selling has to be matched to a firm

"The chip shortage is so bad companies are ripping them out of washing machines," Protocol April 20, 2022.

¹⁰For example, see "Wild bidding wars erupt at used-tractor auctions across the U.S." Bloomberg, Nov. 13, 2021.

¹¹Source: "Dealer and auction lots remain empty" Nov 15th 2022; Link. See also the article "What led to the machinery shortage of 2021 and what to expect for 2022" which described how "Dealers had to tell customers they had to wait, sometimes as long as 12 months, to get a new machine. Firms immediately turned to late-model machinery to meet their needs, but rapidly it began to disappear." Source: November 19, 2021, Agriculture.com.

buying, the timing of demand and supply (of end users) do not have to coincide. A fall in dealer inventory can explain how transaction volumes could have increased even in the absence an contemporaneous increase in supply. Nevertheless, Section 6 below attempts to better understand the dynamic allocation pattern by studying the characteristics of previous end users of used capital acquired in 2021–2022.

4.2 Isolating a Supply Shortage: John Deere Strike

The evidence from the previous section is consistent with the pandemic production disruptions leading to a demand shock for used capital. Nevertheless, from an identification perspective, the previous empirical analysis relied on *time series variation*, comparing the recent months to normal times. A concern is that the supply shortage was not the only aggregate shock to hit the economy during this time, and that equipment markets might have fluctuated for different reasons during this episode. For example, there might have been a change in investment demand or credit conditions due to the macroeconomic recovery or government interventions to alleviate the effects of the pandemic.

In this section, to address these concerns, we exploit a labor strike at John Deere to isolate additional *cross-sectional variation* in the exposure to a supply shortage. John Deere, which is the largest U.S. equipment manufacturer, specializes in agricultural and construction equipment. Between October and November 2021, about 10,000 production and warehouse employees went on strike across 14 U.S. plants. This was the largest strike ever at John Deere and the largest private sector strike in the United States since the 2019 General Motors strike. The strike raised concern among end users of capital, as it happened in a period in which global production disruptions were already in full force.¹² Because John Deere is the largest agricultural equipment manufacturer in the United States and the second-largest construction equipment manufacturer (next to Caterpillar, Inc.), the strike served as a major disruption that affected multiple sectors in all parts of the country. The strike led to a severe production

¹²"Farmers and John Deere suppliers worry about strike's impact," Associated Press, October 17, 2021.

	(1)	(2)
	New Equipment	New Equipment
Deere x Strike	-0.081** [-2.64]	-0.077** [-2.64]
Observations	3055351	3055344
Adjusted R^2	0.263	0.279

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: This table models equipment age as a function of time and manufacturer. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the equipment is new, and 0 if used. Deere is an indicator for equipment manufactured by John Deere. Strike is an indicator variable for transactions occurring between December 2021 and January 2022. Column 1 fixed effects: county, equipment code-month-year, manufacturer; Column 2 fixed effects: county, equipment code-month-year, manufacturer, state-month-year. The sample is limited to the 2018-2022 period. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

Table 4: John Deere Strike: Share of New Equipment

backlog. Investment bank William Blair & Company estimated that the strike reduced John Deere’s output by 10% to 15% for 2021Q4 and 2022Q1.

Consistent with this, we observe a distinct decline in new equipment from John Deere compared to its competitors following the strike, as shown by Table 4. This had a negative effect on an already tight secondary market: “With the four-week-old strike at Deere factories exacerbating an already acute shortage of new tractors, the used market is the only place for many desperate farmers to turn.”¹³

Our identification strategy in this section exploits the heterogeneous exposure of *other manufacturers* to the strike. Intuitively, market segments in which John Deere has a larger presence are more likely to experience supply shortages and see firms turn to other manufacturers relative to other market segments. Specifically, we run a Bartik-like specification. We exploit 2019 pre-pandemic differences in John Deere’s market share across equipment types. To illustrate, in 2019, John Deere had over a 50% market share in the crawler dozers market versus a 12% share in the skid steer loaders market. In the sample of equipment transactions not involving John Deere equipment, we introduce a Strike \times 2019 Deere Market Share interaction, where the strike period is defined as December 2021 through January 2022 (the strike

¹³“Deere’s Strike Is Over, but Order Backlog, Higher Costs Remain,” *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 22, 2021.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log Time Since Last Contract	Log Distance	Same County	Same SIC2	Same Modal Equipment Code
Strike \times Deere Share 2019	-0.712*** [-4.62]	0.743*** [3.28]	-0.163*** [-3.15]	-0.060 [-0.96]	-0.149** [-2.48]
Observations	165492	197228	209986	209986	209986
Adjusted R^2	0.447	0.526	0.408	0.298	0.401

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: John Deere Strike: Trading Activity in Used Capital

Notes: This table models secondary market activity as a function of time and John Deere’s market share in the equipment code. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the log number of days between the last two transactions for that equipment; in Column 2 it is the log number of miles between the counties of the last two users of that equipment; in Column 3 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment being in the same county; in Column 4 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment being in the same two-digit SIC code; in Column 5 it is an indicator variable for the last two users of that equipment sharing the same modal equipment code defined over their previous transactions. Strike is an indicator variable for transactions occurring between December 2021 and January 2022. Deere Share 2019 is the share of contracts in that equipment code that involve equipment manufactured by John Deere, measured in 2019. All specifications include equipment serial number, county and calendar month fixed effects, and indicators for each year of equipment age. The sample includes all equipment that transacted at least twice. Standard errors are clustered by serial number.

ran from October to November 2021, and given production and shipping time, it typically takes a month or two for equipment to appear in a UCC filing). Importantly, we can include granular time fixed effects (in addition to others) to account for other concurrent shocks to investment demand or credit conditions because we now have a supply shock that varies in the cross-section of market segments. Specifically, we include serial number, county and month \times year fixed effects, and equipment age (in year) indicators. The sample includes all equipment that transacted at least twice.

We find the effects of this particular supply shortage are in line with the previous time series evidence. Table 5 shows that in segments with higher John Deere market share, we observe less time between sales, larger distance between consecutive users, and more dissimilar consecutive users.

Table 6 also provides evidence consistent with larger price increases for capital goods in segments with higher John Deere market share. Columns 1 and 2 examine used equipment, while Columns 3 and 4 examine new equipment; all are restricted to transactions for which actual prices are available. For both used and new equipment, we find larger price increases in segments in which John Deere had the largest market share. The effects are sizeable: for instance the estimate of Column 2 of Table 6 implies that a one standard deviation increase in

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Price-Used	Log Price-Used	Log Price-New	Log Price-New
Strike x Deere Share 2019	0.953** [2.19]	1.015*** [3.11]	3.105*** [6.10]	3.145*** [4.67]
Deere Share 2019	1.054 [1.42]	1.832* [1.96]	1.170 [1.71]	2.061** [2.40]
Log (1+ Equipment Age)	-0.602*** [-8.04]	-0.639*** [-10.20]	-0.000 [-0.00]	0.009 [0.12]
Observations	33666	33666	7037	7037
Adjusted R^2	0.325	0.404	0.479	0.562

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: John Deere Strike: Prices for Other Manufacturers' Equipment

Notes: This table studies equipment prices as a function of time and John Deere's market share in the equipment code. Strike is an indicator variable for December 2021 to January 2022. Deere Share 2019 is the share of contracts in that equipment code that involve equipment manufactured by John Deere, measured in 2019. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. Fixed effects in each column: month \times year, state, and sector (odd columns); month \times year, state, sector, and equipment family (even columns). The sample omits equipment manufactured by John Deere itself and includes only equipment for which the actual price is reported. Columns 1 and 2 study used equipment prices, whereas Columns 3 and 4 study new equipment prices. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

John Deere's 2019 market share (≈ 0.25) increases other manufacturers' used capital prices by 25% during the strike. The effects are even larger for new capital goods. These results are consistent with our earlier evidence on secondary markets, confirming that supply shortages were a key driver of the surge in secondary market activity in the fall of 2021.

5 Investment in the Cross-Section of Firms

5.1 Change in the Firm Age–Capital Age Gradient

We first examine the correlation between firm age and capital age before and during the supply shortage. Figure 3 displays scatterplots of the log of firm age against log equipment age in our sample, controlling for county-by-equipment family fixed effects. The left panel focuses on normal times (pre-2020). During this time, we see a clear monotonic relationship: younger firms invest in older capital. This replicates the results of Ma et al. [2022], which uses an




Figure 3: Firm Age–Capital Age Gradient

Notes: This figure displays binned scatterplots of log firm age against log equipment age. The values are residualized after controlling for county-by-equipment family fixed effects. Panel (a) includes all contracts up to December 2019, and Panel (b) includes all contracts after October 2021.

earlier version of the EDA data.

The right panel Figure 3 shows a drastically different picture starting in November 2021. The firms in the intermediate age group experienced the largest change in the age of their equipment. This is in line with the first prediction of models of capital reallocation: intermediate-age firms are the ones that switch the most aggressively from new capital to used capital after the shock.

5.2 Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution

The previous test focused on changes in equipment age conditional on investing. In this section and the next, we study changes in the dynamics of investment *volume* across the firm distribution. To this end, we aggregate our micro-data to a monthly time series of investment volume for different market segments. In this subsection, we focus on used capital investment. Specifically, we aggregate the number of transactions at the equipment code \times firm age group \times state \times month \times year level. We include three age groups based on the previous scatterplots:

(1) firms between one and three years old;¹⁴ (2) firms between four and 29 years old; and (3) firms 30 or more years old. For example, we construct a monthly time series of the number of used trucks of a specific type purchased by firms three years old or younger in Maryland. We then combine these different monthly time series into a more aggregate sample to study the dynamics of investment volume after the shock for different firm groups.

We run the following regression:

$$UsedCapital_{e,a,s,t} = \Sigma_g \beta_g \mathbf{1}\{\text{Post Nov 21}\} \times AgeGroup(g) + \nu^e + u^t + \varepsilon^{e,a,s,t}$$

The coefficients of interest are the interactions $\{\beta_g\}_g$ between an indicator equal to one starting in November 2021 with age group indicators. These interactions measure how much used capital investment changed for a specific group of firms. Note that the third age category is subsumed by our fixed effects. The $\{\beta_g\}_g$ coefficients thus represent the change in used investment for an age group *relative* to the oldest firms, which we take as the closest to an unconstrained investment benchmark. The sample includes all contracts for used equipment from January 2019 to February 2022.

Table 7 presents the results. Column 1 includes equipment code and month \times year fixed effects, while Column 2 adds state \times month \times year and firm age fixed effects. The first row shows that the youngest firms experienced the largest drop in used capital investment. The economic magnitudes are large: according to Column 1, young firms' used investment volume dropped by 10 percentage points more than for the oldest firms. In line with the previous result, the second row shows that firms in the intermediate group actually *increased* their investment in used capital relative to the oldest firms (although the effect gets statistically weaker with more fixed effects). These contrasting dynamics are in line with the distributive effects highlighted in Section 3.

¹⁴We exclude brand new firms (less than one year old) because our dataset ends in March 2022 and therefore we cannot observe a full year's worth of new firms for 2022.

	(1) Log Used Capital	(2) Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.104** [-2.69]	-0.128*** [-3.29]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.016** [2.08]	0.014 [1.50]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.162*** [-14.02]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.294*** [77.56]	
Observations	318765	318757
Adjusted R^2	0.311	0.375

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution

Notes: This table models the log number of transactions for used equipment as a function of time and borrower age. Post Nov 21 is an indicator for months starting in November 2021. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Fixed effects in each column: (1) equipment code and month \times year; (2) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. The sample includes all contracts for used equipment from January 2019 to February 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

5.3 Total Investment Across Firm Age Distribution

Next, we run an analysis similar to the above but now consider total investment, defined as the sum of used plus new capital investment in each segment. We run the same regression specification:

$$TotalCapital_{e,a,s,t} = \Sigma_g \mathbf{1}\{\text{Post Nov 21}\} \times AgeGroup(g) + \nu^e + u^t + \varepsilon^{e,a,s,t}$$

Table 8 presents the results. We find that the youngest firms were in fact the most affected by the supply shortage. The first row shows that the youngest firms experienced the largest drop in total capital investment relative to other firms. The economic magnitudes are again large: their total investment volume dropped by 17 to 21 percentage points relative to others. On the other hand, the second row shows that firms in the intermediate group actually did not experience a similar decline in total investment. Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix

	(1) Log Total Capital	(2) Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.170*** [-4.54]	-0.205*** [-4.99]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.008 [1.54]	0.004 [0.70]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.356*** [-26.43]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.277*** [72.10]	
Observations	318765	318757
Adjusted R^2	0.389	0.470

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions as a function of time and borrower age. Post Nov 21 is an indicator for months starting in November 2021. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Fixed effects in each column: (1) equipment code and month \times year; (2) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. The sample includes all contracts from January 2019 to February 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

shows that the results are similar if we use August 2021 as a cutoff instead of November, with slightly smaller coefficients as expected.

To complement the panel regressions, Figure IA.2 in the Internet Appendix plots the aggregate investment volume by firm age group. Although by design this aggregate analysis cannot control for differential composition across equipment types and geography, it does reveal similar dynamics. Young firms experienced a greater fall in capital investment than other firms in 2021. The young firm investment decline is particularly pronounced in used capital investment, while the decline in new capital investment is relatively homogeneous across firm age categories.

This pattern is consistent with some firms using secondary markets to dampen the shock, eventually crowding out other firms. Our evidence provides empirical support for the distributive externalities emphasized in recent macroeconomic theory work [Lanteri and Rampini, 2021] in the context of a recent large macroeconomic event. Note however that conceptually the indirect effects of shocks in the presence of pecuniary externalities can be subtle. Our

empirical estimates suggest that young firms were most affected, even if they were not the most directly exposed to the shock to primary markets for new capital.

5.4 Robustness

Sample selection: One limitation of our sample is that by construction it is restricted to equipment with a lien and thus excludes transactions in which the buyer paid fully in cash. A potential concern is this sample selection drives our results. For instance, it might exclude young firms that actually invested during the supply chain disruptions but paid in cash.

Several factors alleviate this concern. First, at a general level, Ma et al. [2022] provide multiple forms of evidence that the UCC data are representative of the distribution of U.S. firms in their sample period of 1990–2017, which largely overlaps with ours. Second, if anything, the UCC sample selection likely overweights younger firms, as it is well-known that they are more likely to finance capital investment. Similarly, secured financing tends to become more common during economic downturns [Benmelech et al., 2020]. *A priori*, this would reduce the concern that young firms that actually invested in the fall of 2021 are excluded from our sample because they disproportionately paid in cash.

Third, we conduct additional tests assessing the sensitivity of our results to different specification choices that consider selection in different ways. To start, we find that the results are robust to adding progressively tighter fixed effects, which we do in an attempt to control for the borrower’s decision to finance equipment. Tables IA.4 and IA.5 in the Internet Appendix show that if anything, our results strengthen as we begin controlling for time and equipment effects, suggesting that our results are not driven by borrower unobservables correlated with selection into secured financing.

Fourth, we run weighted least squares tests to reweight observations in a way that mitigates sample selection. Tables IA.6 and IA.7 reweight observations based on the distribution of equipment at wholesalers each year, following the idea of Ma et al. [2022].¹⁵ Intuitively, by

¹⁵These wholesale acquisitions are primarily floor-plan financing for dealer inventory. Recall that these

observing the nature and location of inventory that wholesalers obtain financing for in a given year, we can develop a proxy for the population of equipment entering the market, regardless of whether the ultimate user financed the purchase or paid cash. Regardless of whether we use weights based on location, equipment code, or both, we find a significant investment drop for the youngest firms during the supply chain disruption.

Young firms' demand for capital: A related concern is that our results simply reflect a decline in capital demand by young firms instead of the spillover effects of the supply chain disruption.¹⁶ To test this directly, we revisit our secondary market tests and introduce an interaction term for the youngest firms. Intuitively, if young firms reduced their demand for capital, then we should not observe the same search behavior as we found for the full sample: young firms would not go to the effort to travel farther or increasingly acquire capital from fundamentally different firms. However, Table IA.8 shows a similar pattern for young firms: the interaction term for young firms is insignificant in all columns. Together, this evidence contradicts interpretations based on young firms experiencing a disproportionate demand decrease for capital.

Other evidence from outside our setting also contradicts explanations based on young firms experiencing a decline in capital demand. For instance, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Small Business Lending Survey shows that loan demand was high in 2021–2022 after dropping throughout 2020, in part due to supply chain disruptions.¹⁷ In addition, the 2020 Paycheck Protection Program boosted small firms' finances.¹⁸ More than \$950 billion of loans were provided over three rounds from April 2020 to May 2021. Although the program focused

wholesale buyers are excluded from our main sample as our focus is on end users of equipment.

¹⁶Possible explanations for this demand reduction include a lack of cash flow from operations pauses or labor-capital complementarity if young firms had trouble hiring during this period [Bernstein et al., 2020].

¹⁷See Chart 9 of the 2022Q1 issue: <https://www.kansascityfed.org/Research/documents/8864/Kansas-City-Fed-Small-Business-Lending-Survey-Quarter-1-2022.pdf>.

¹⁸The Paycheck Protection Program, initiated over a year before our supply chain disruption period, provided small businesses with loans to cover up to eight weeks of payroll costs during the pandemic. The loans were fully forgivable, so long as the firm maintained headcount and salary levels. The program targeted firms with 500 or fewer employees, though there were some exceptions for larger firms in specific industries. Participating firms had to be established before February 15, 2020 (i.e., one could not incorporate and legally receive a loan from the program).

on payroll relief, if anything, the additional liquidity should have lifted firms' investment demand when the recovery arrived. This extra liquidity, combined with the program's focus on small firms, makes it unlikely that young firms experienced a large decline in their demand for capital that would explain our findings.

Slower firm creation in 2020: One related possibility is that the 2021–2022 young firm investment decline was due to a lack of firm creation in 2020. The concern is that many potential entrepreneurs might have postponed launching in the highly uncertain environment of 2020. If that was the case, aggregate young firm investment could mechanically decline in 2021–2022 because there were fewer young firms in these years. However, Dinlersoz et al. [2021] find that, if anything, overall employer business creation increased in 2020. Nevertheless, to examine this more directly, we use the DNB data measuring firm creation and exclude states with the lowest growth in the number of young firms in 2020.¹⁹ We implement this test in a variety of ways. Tables IA.9 and IA.10 repeat the main analysis after excluding states with a negative growth rate of young firms in 2020 (Columns 1–2), states in the bottom quartile of young firm growth in 2020 (Columns 3–4), and states where the growth in the number of young firms was smaller than the growth of old and medium firms in 2020 (Columns 5–6). The results are largely unaffected.

Heterogeneous effects of market liquidity: As additional support for the mechanism, we conduct a further cross-sectional test. We split the sample based on secondary market liquidity. We use the time between transactions as a measure of liquidity and classify equipment codes with a median time between repeat sales above one year as low-liquidity segments and the others being high-liquidity segments. Tables IA.11 and IA.12 in the Internet Appendix show the results for this sample split. As expected given our mechanism, the results are generally stronger in the low-liquidity segments.

Financing channel: We conduct two additional tests to gauge whether a financing chan-

¹⁹Note that we do not want to exclude segments in which new firm creation was low in 2021 or 2022, as that can be part of our mechanism. In fact, Ma et al. [2022] document that a lack of used capital available for young firms leads to less firm creation.

nel might explain our main results. First, we split the sample by lender type to compare banks and nonbanks. It is well understood that nonbanks have a large presence in the equipment market, but they respond differently to economic shocks and face little regulation [Murfin and Pratt, 2019, Gopal and Schnabl, 2020]. If the capital reallocation we document is driven by a financing channel as opposed to supply chain disruptions, then one might expect different patterns for transactions financed by banks and nonbanks.²⁰ To examine this, we split lenders into bank and nonbank categories using Gopal and Schnabl (2022)’s algorithm. Tables IA.13 and IA.14 in the Internet Appendix show our results are similar across the two lender types, suggesting that this financing channel cannot explain our results.

Moreover, we investigate whether similar results hold for the 2008–2009 crisis, when financing was severely disrupted but supply chains were not. Tables IA.15 and IA.16 in the Internet Appendix show that this is not the case. This is consistent with the 2008–2009 crisis being dominated by financing and productivity shocks rather than a large supply shortage like the one observed during the pandemic.

6 Discussion

Our analysis focuses on investment and capital reallocation dynamics following the large-scale production disruptions of 2021. The results of Ma et al. [2022] suggest that the drop in investment we document for small firms might have significant real effects. Specifically, they document that a reduction in the availability of used capital leads to less start-up entry, less job creation, and less growth for small firms. Relatedly, there might be some effects on labor markets via capital-labor substitution.²¹ Moreover, the supply shortage effects are likely to be persistent if they permanently lowered the stock of used capital. On the other hand, the faster the catch-up in production, the more temporary the consequences will be. Although our current sample ends in early 2022 and is thus too short to investigate these effects directly,

²⁰For instance, banks received large deposit inflows in 2020.

²¹See, for example Lewis [2011].

understanding the potential recovery in capital supply is thus an important question for future research.²²

Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we sketch some potential aggregate and welfare implications. Theoretical analysis of pecuniary externalities is an active area of research. While Dávila and Korinek [2018] argue that there can be over- or under-investment, Lanteri and Rampini [2021] show that financial frictions can lead to inefficient capital reallocation: the price of used capital is higher than the socially optimal level. Another important consideration is how productivity varies in the cross-section of firms. There can also be a host of additional equilibrium effects: the fear of a supply shortage might also discourage firm entry (related to Ma et al. [2022]), or there could be windfall wealth effects for firms with machines that they might not need.

As a first step to uncover implications for misallocation, we provide some evidence on which firms previously operated the used capital sold in 2021–2022. Specifically, for every used machine acquired in 2021–2022, we track the last end user. In this way, we can compare the “buyers” acquiring capital during the crunch with the “sellers,” defined as the last end user. We compare them along three characteristics: age, sector productivity growth, and sector COVID exposure.²³ We include all transactions starting in 2013 to remove any influence of the financial crisis. For each transaction involving a specific piece of used equipment, we calculate the difference between the buyer’s and seller’s characteristics.

In Table 9, we regress this difference on a “Year 2021/22” dummy that flags used equipment traded in 2021 or 2022, including county and equipment code fixed effects. We find that, relative to normal times, capital was flowing to firms that (1) were older, (2) had smaller

²²Quantitative output data are typically not disclosed by equipment producers. However, in its 2021 annual report, John Deere stated that there was a loss of production in 2021 following the strike: “The company’s operations during the remainder of the fourth quarter were adversely affected by the work stoppage, which reduced production and shipments.” (Deere 2021 Annual Report, p.17). It is also unclear whether there was a large production increase in 2022: their 2022 annual reported that the vast majority of sales growth came from price increases rather than volume increases.

²³Sector productivity growth is from the BLS. Sector COVID exposure is measured as the abnormal employment decline in 2020Q1 following Chodorow-Reich et al. (2021). COVID exposure is another potential proxy for reallocation needs across sectors, but one that might be more pandemic-specific.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ Log Age	Δ COVID Exposure	Δ Productivity Growth
Year 2021/22	0.131*** [27.82]	-0.008** [-1.96]	3.330*** [16.96]
Observations	499069	197868	43553
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.048	0.114

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Prior Users of Used Capital: 2021/22 vs. Normal Times

Notes: This table models characteristic differences between the last two users of a specific piece of equipment as a function of time. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the difference between the current and most recent user’s log age; in Column 2 it is the difference between the current and most recent user’s sector COVID exposure (measured as abnormal employment decline in 2020Q1 [Chodorow-Reich et al., 2022]); in Column 3 it is the difference between the current and most recent user’s sector productivity growth rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Fixed effects include equipment code and county. The sample includes all contracts from January 2013 to February 2022. Standard errors are clustered by serial number.

COVID exposure, and (3) had higher productivity growth. The first result is consistent with our finding of older firms buying used equipment during this time. However, the interpretation of the second and third results requires care. On the one hand, this is the intuitive direction that capital should flow. This is thus relatively good news if one is worried about misallocation: frictions were not large enough to prevent capital from flowing to more productive users. On the other hand, this does not mean that frictions did not impede reallocation to some degree. In fact, the high productivity gap (3.3 percentage points) relative to normal times might actually suggest that only very productive firms were able to acquire capital during the crunch. It is thus possible that firms with lower productivity growth (but with gains from reallocation nevertheless) were excluded due to frictions. Note also that there are important data limitations inherent to this exercise.²⁴

Another open question relates to public intervention. Lanteri and Rampini [2021] show

²⁴First, we have an incomplete picture of the timing of “trades.” We can only observe the dates when a new user finances a piece of equipment, but not when they give it up. Moreover, there can be some time between end users, as machines often sit in the dealer’s inventory before being used again, in a way that we cannot track (unless the dealer financed the acquisition of the used capital themselves). Therefore it is possible that a “seller” had in fact stopped using their equipment earlier than 2021–2022. Second, assessing productivity differences is challenging. We can only measure productivity at the sector level using BLS data. That means that we cannot measure productivity differences within sectors (for example between young and old firms). Moreover, BLS productivity data are normalized and thus we cannot compare levels across sectors, only growth rates.

that subsidies for new investment can increase welfare when there are distributive externalities in capital reallocation. Investment subsidies are commonly used in practice although their optimal design is not yet well understood. In the context of the 2021 production shock, it is unclear whether special subsidies for investment in *new* capital would have been effective in alleviating the shock in the short-term: the demand for new equipment greatly exceeded available supply. A potential alternative might have introduced exceptional subsidies for investment in *used* capital. On its face, this seems like it could have helped smaller and younger firms facing high prices in secondary markets. However, these subsidies need to be properly targeted: if they are too broad they might actually exacerbate crowding out by increasing competition in secondary markets even further. Our evidence sheds light on the challenges associated with designing interventions and the need to think about their implications for equilibrium capital reallocation to avoid perverse effects.

Finally, another interesting aspect of this episode is the role that financial contracting might have played in amplifying the shock. Specifically, the capital transactions we study are at least in part financed by lenders either as collateralized loans or leases. Interestingly, this contracting feature can lead to financial frictions in asset *sales* given that capital users do not (or, do not fully) own the assets [Donaldson et al., 2021]. The incentives to sell in the face of high prices are then muted, potentially exacerbating a secondary market price surge. Future research can explore the strength of this mechanism.

7 Conclusion

This paper uses rich micro-data on capital transactions to study the equilibrium effects of a fixed capital supply shortage on firms' investment. We document that a surge in secondary market activity dampened the shock for some firms but priced out others. Investment declined the most for the youngest firms, even though they rarely purchase new capital. These results highlight the key role of secondary markets and distributive effects for small business

investment. Our results motivate further research on how fixed capital supply shocks, such as supply chain disruptions, are transmitted through the economy.

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Internet Appendix - Additional Figures and Tables







Figure IA.1: Survey data on used equipment inventory levels. Source: <https://www.farm-equipment.com/articles/20946-inventory-in-short-supply-but-dealers-report-improvements>



All capital



New capital



Used capital

Notes: This figure plots aggregate investment by firm age. The first panel includes all transactions, while the second and third panels include only those involving new and used capital, respectively. Volume is calculated as the number of equipment transactions in that year. All values are deviations from the number of transactions in 2019. (Volume in 2019 for all transactions: 70,897 (young), 438,465 (middle-aged), and 194,331 (old).)

Figure IA.2: Aggregate Investment by Firm Age Groups

	(1) New	(2) Log (1+Equipment Age)
Post Nov 21 Crunch	-0.106*** [-13.62]	0.277*** [17.43]
Observations	17179709	10895395
Adjusted R^2	0.588	0.691

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.1: New vs. Used Capital Transactions: Including all years

Notes: This table models equipment age as a function of time. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the equipment is new, and 0 if used; in Column 2 the dependent variable is the log of equipment age. All columns include county, equipment code \times calendar month, firm, and manufacturer-model fixed effects. The sample includes all contracts from January 1997 to March 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1) New	(2) Log (1+Equipment Age)
Post Aug 21 Crunch	-0.048*** [-10.50]	0.092*** [9.71]
Observations	1887180	1280454
Adjusted R^2	0.685	0.813

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.2: New vs. Used Capital Transactions: August 2021 Cutoff

Notes: This table models equipment age as a function of time. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the equipment is new, and 0 if used; in Column 2 the dependent variable is the log of equipment age. All columns include county, equipment code \times calendar month, firm, and manufacturer-model fixed effects. The sample includes all contracts from January 2019 to March 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1) Log Used Capital	(2) Log Used Capital	(3) Log Total Capital	(4) Log Total Capital
Post Aug 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.094*** [-4.44]	-0.111*** [-5.05]	-0.148*** [-6.47]	-0.176*** [-6.93]
Post Aug 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.018** [2.18]	0.016* [1.98]	0.010* [1.73]	0.007 [1.13]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.157*** [-13.10]		-0.348*** [-25.76]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.292*** [77.56]		0.276*** [68.67]	
Observations	318765	318757	318765	318757
Adjusted R^2	0.311	0.375	0.389	0.470

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.3: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution: August 2021 Cutoff

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions as a function of time and borrower age. Post August 21 is an indicator for months starting in August 2021. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Fixed effects in each column: (1) and (3) equipment code and month \times year; (2) and (4) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. The sample includes all contracts from January 2019 to February 2022. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.055* [-1.79]	-0.050 [-1.67]	-0.102** [-2.69]	-0.104** [-2.69]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.004 [0.45]	0.003 [0.32]	0.014 [1.65]	0.016** [2.08]
Post Nov 21	0.024* [1.83]	0.023 [1.66]	0.024 [1.60]	
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.072*** [-7.52]	-0.103*** [-10.90]	-0.161*** [-14.01]	-0.162*** [-14.02]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.235*** [62.65]	0.233*** [62.27]	0.293*** [77.56]	0.294*** [77.56]
Observations	318778	318777	318765	318765
Adjusted R^2	0.026	0.088	0.309	0.311

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.4: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution: Alternative FEs

Notes: This table models the log number of used equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Fixed effects: Column 1: year and month; Column 2: year, month, and equipment family; Column 3: year, month, and equipment code; Column 4: month \times year and equipment code. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.065*** [-2.93]	-0.062*** [-2.89]	-0.168*** [-4.56]	-0.170*** [-4.54]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.001 [0.13]	-0.001 [-0.15]	0.006 [0.88]	0.008 [1.54]
Post Nov 21	-0.011 [-0.96]	-0.011 [-0.93]	0.006 [0.41]	
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.213*** [-27.91]	-0.221*** [-27.78]	-0.355*** [-26.48]	-0.356*** [-26.43]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.179*** [54.45]	0.195*** [55.62]	0.277*** [72.16]	0.277*** [72.10]
Observations	318778	318777	318765	318765
Adjusted R^2	0.026	0.087	0.387	0.389

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.5: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution: Alternative FEs

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Fixed effects: Column 1: year and month; Column 2: year, month, and equipment family; Column 3: year, month, and equipment code; Column 4: month \times year and equipment code. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.104** [-2.69]	-0.128*** [-3.29]	-0.045 [-0.51]	-0.209*** [-2.74]	-0.133** [-2.37]	-0.215*** [-3.34]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.016** [2.08]	0.014 [1.50]	0.100 [1.65]	0.081 [1.55]	0.060** [2.10]	0.072** [2.42]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.162*** [-14.02]		-0.283*** [-10.85]		-0.257*** [-12.06]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.294*** [77.56]		0.589*** [38.91]		0.632*** [75.19]	
Observations	318765	318757	67145	67092	67145	67092
Adjusted R^2	0.311	0.375	0.334	0.554	0.375	0.516

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.6: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution: Reweighting with Wholesaler weights

Notes: This table models the log number of used equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Columns 1 and 2 are the baseline specification; Columns 3 and 4 are weighted least squares regressions using equipment code x state x year weights for wholesalers' used equipment; Columns 5 and 6 are weighted least squares regressions using equipment family x state x year weights for wholesalers' used equipment. Fixed effects in each column: (1, 3, and 5) equipment code and month \times year; (2, 4, and 6) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.170*** [-4.54]	-0.205*** [-4.99]	-0.214*** [-3.01]	-0.347*** [-4.85]	-0.228*** [-4.05]	-0.317*** [-4.84]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.008 [1.54]	0.004 [0.70]	-0.005 [-0.08]	0.006 [0.13]	0.014 [0.64]	0.037 [1.66]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.356*** [-26.43]		-0.536*** [-20.16]		-0.472*** [-23.13]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.277*** [72.10]		0.541*** [38.87]		0.594*** [95.95]	
Observations	318765	318757	67145	67092	67145	67092
Adjusted R^2	0.389	0.470	0.363	0.624	0.443	0.616

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.7: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution: Reweighting with Wholesaler weights

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Columns 1-2 are the baseline specification; Columns 3-4 are WLS using equipment code x state x year weights for wholesalers' used equipment; Columns 5-6 are WLS using equipment family x state x year weights for wholesalers' used equipment. Fixed effects in each column: (1, 3, and 5) equipment code and month \times year; (2, 4, and 6) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log Time Since Last Contract	Log Distance	Same County	Same SIC2	Same Modal Equipment Code
Year 2021/2	-0.156*** [-11.36]	0.030 [1.27]	-0.014*** [-2.75]	-0.015** [-2.33]	-0.010* [-1.65]
Firm Age Below 4y	0.027** [2.47]	-0.063*** [-4.22]	0.016*** [5.22]	0.013*** [3.17]	0.009** [2.47]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	-0.004 [-0.50]	-0.026*** [-2.69]	0.013*** [6.05]	0.005* [1.81]	0.003 [1.01]
Year 2021/2 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.075 [-0.72]	-0.094 [-0.74]	0.002 [0.09]	0.014 [0.46]	-0.044 [-1.55]
Observations	205794	239503	250713	250713	250713
Adjusted R^2	0.457	0.464	0.337	0.265	0.346

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.8: Trading Activity in Used Capital: Young Firm Interactions

Notes: This table models secondary market activity as a function of time and an indicator for the age of the acquiring firm. The unit of observation is a transaction for a particular piece of equipment. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the log of days between the last two transactions for that equipment; in Column 2 it is the log number of miles between the counties of the last two users of that equipment; Column 3 use an indicator variable for the same county instead of log distance. Column 4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the last two users of that equipment are in the same two-digit SIC code; in Column 5 it is an indicator equal to 1 if the last two users of that equipment share the same modal equipment code (defined over their previous transactions). We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. All specifications include serial number, county and calendar month fixed effects, as well as equipment age (in year) indicators. The sample includes all equipment that transacted at least twice. Standard errors are clustered by serial number.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.106** [-2.60]	-0.128*** [-3.01]	-0.109** [-2.70]	-0.130*** [-3.13]	-0.111** [-2.68]	-0.131*** [-3.09]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.015 [1.57]	0.014 [1.27]	0.022* [1.90]	0.023* [1.71]	0.018* [1.85]	0.017 [1.59]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.167*** [-14.03]		-0.152*** [-12.40]		-0.168*** [-13.82]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.303*** [70.65]		0.305*** [63.46]		0.304*** [69.01]	
Observations	293276	293269	253099	253093	282431	282424
Adjusted R^2	0.319	0.382	0.311	0.378	0.321	0.383

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.9: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution Accounting for 2020 firm creation

Notes: This table models the log number of transactions for used equipment as a function of time and borrower age. Post Nov 21 is an indicator for months starting in November 2021. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Columns 1 and 2 exclude states with negative growth in the number of young firms in 2020. Columns 3 and 4 exclude states in the bottom quartile of growth in the number of young firms in 2020. Columns 5 and 6 exclude states where the growth in the number of young firms was smaller than the growth in the number of both old and medium-aged firms in 2020. Fixed effects in each column: equipment code and month \times year (odd columns); equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year (even columns). Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.175*** [-4.54]	-0.208*** [-4.88]	-0.184*** [-4.76]	-0.216*** [-5.07]	-0.181*** [-4.51]	-0.212*** [-4.86]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.007 [1.08]	0.004 [0.60]	0.012 [1.54]	0.010 [1.08]	0.010 [1.55]	0.008 [1.01]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.362*** [-26.14]		-0.344*** [-24.74]		-0.364*** [-25.73]	
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.285*** [68.45]		0.294*** [65.36]		0.287*** [69.06]	
Observations	293276	293269	253099	253093	282431	282424
Adjusted R^2	0.397	0.477	0.399	0.484	0.403	0.481

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.10: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution: Accounting for 2020 firm creation

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions as a function of time and borrower age. Post Nov 21 is an indicator for months starting in November 2021. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Columns 1 and 2 exclude states with negative growth in the number of young firms in 2020. Columns 3 and 4 exclude states in the bottom quartile of growth in the number of young firms in 2020. Columns 5 and 6 exclude states where the growth in the number of young firms was smaller than the growth in the number of both old and medium-aged firms in 2020. Fixed effects in each column: equipment code and month \times year (odd columns); equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year (even columns). Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)
	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.125** [-2.62]	-0.017 [-0.66]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.025* [1.73]	-0.000 [-0.02]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.195*** [-15.63]	-0.053*** [-5.56]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.368*** [86.04]	0.148*** [27.82]
Observations	215257	103508
Adjusted R^2	0.356	0.142

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.11: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution by Secondary Market Liquidity

Notes: This table models the log number of used equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 includes only equipment codes with low secondary market liquidity, defined as having a median time between repeat sales above one year; while Column 2 includes the rest of the sample. Fixed effects in each column: (1) equipment code and month \times year; (2) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1) Log Total Capital	(2) Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.193*** [-4.22]	-0.094*** [-2.77]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.012 [1.49]	0.003 [0.23]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.395*** [-26.78]	-0.230*** [-21.85]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.352*** [76.34]	0.131*** [31.22]
Observations	215257	103508
Adjusted R^2	0.402	0.346

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.12: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution by Secondary Market Liquidity

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 includes only equipment codes with low secondary market liquidity, defined as having a median time between repeat sales above one year; while Column 2 includes the rest of the sample. Fixed effects in each column: (1) equipment code and month \times year ; (2) equipment code, age, and state \times month \times year. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1) Log Used Capital	(2) Log Used Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.096* [-1.91]	-0.103*** [-3.51]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.021* [1.88]	0.012 [1.06]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.125*** [-9.95]	-0.180*** [-14.90]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.214*** [30.04]	0.361*** [71.36]
Observations	138131	180625
Adjusted R^2	0.246	0.367

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.13: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution by Lender Type

Notes: This table models the log number of used equipment transactions on the interaction between a post November 2021 indicator and firm age group dummies. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 (2) includes only contracts from markets where banks originate more (less) than half of contracts. All specifications include month \times year and equipment code fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)
	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Below 4y	-0.114*** [-3.18]	-0.194*** [-5.49]
Post Nov 21 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.031** [2.46]	-0.011 [-1.19]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.297*** [-23.86]	-0.373*** [-25.25]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.173*** [27.84]	0.358*** [60.82]
Observations	138131	180625
Adjusted R^2	0.354	0.404

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.14: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution by Lender Type

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions on the interaction of a post November 2021 indicator with firm age group dummies. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 (2) includes only contracts from markets where banks originate more (less) than half of contracts. All specifications include month \times year and equipment code fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)
	Log Used Capital	Log Used Capital
2008-09 x Firm Age Below 4y	0.074*** [5.53]	0.002 [0.09]
2008-09 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	-0.011* [-1.79]	0.010 [1.31]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.051*** [-10.53]	0.013 [0.58]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.289*** [156.27]	0.270*** [54.19]
Observations	2296325	392714
Adjusted R^2	0.306	0.358

t statistics in brackets
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.15: Investment in Used Capital Across Firm Age Distribution: the 2008–2009 Crisis

Notes: This table models the log number of used equipment transactions on the interaction between a 2008–2009 indicator and firm age group dummies. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 (2) includes all years (only contracts from 2007–2010) All specifications include month \times year and equipment code fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.

	(1)	(2)
	Log Total Capital	Log Total Capital
2008-09 x Firm Age Below 4y	0.056***	-0.015
	[3.76]	[-0.54]
2008-09 x Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	-0.005	0.002
	[-1.12]	[0.34]
Firm Age Below 4y	-0.214***	-0.137***
	[-33.17]	[-5.71]
Firm Age Btw 4 and 29y	0.258***	0.253***
	[154.40]	[41.32]
Observations	2296325	392714
Adjusted R^2	0.357	0.366

t statistics in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IA.16: Total Capital Investment Across Firm Age Distribution: the 2008–2009 Crisis

Notes: This table models the log number of equipment transactions on the interaction between a 2008–2009 indicator and firm age group dummies. We measure borrower age using indicator variables for borrowers 3 years or younger, 4–29 years old, or at least 30 years old. The unit of observation is state-equipment code-firm age group-month-year. Column 1 (2) includes all years (only contracts from 2007–2010). All specifications include month \times year and equipment code fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by month-year.