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The Science of Evidence Use: Policymaker & Practitioner Preferences and Responsiveness

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 4, 2025 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PST)

Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Franciscan D
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Stefano DellaVigna, University of California-Berkeley

The Distributional Preferences of Policy Practitioners

Eva Vivalt
,
University of Toronto

Abstract

This paper characterizes the distributional preferences of policy practitioners and researchers working at an international organization. In addition to surveying staff about their own beliefs, we ask them to predict the distributional preferences of people in other countries. We consider how well participants predict others’ (a) distributional preferences and (b) preferences over interventions that have different distributional implications. We consider whether ability to predict others' preferences varies by attributes of the participants, including familiarity with the target country.

Demand and Responsiveness to Evidence among Teachers and Parents

Noam Angrist
,
University of Oxford
Sharnic Djaker
,
University of Oxford
Shwetlena Sabarwal
,
World Bank

Abstract

To date, little experimental research has been done in low- and middle-income countries on evidence uptake by practitioners. We conduct a randomized trial to assess the uptake of evidence by those on the front lines of education — teachers and parents in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. Specifically, we examine responsiveness to different types of evidence: evidence on descriptive vs. causal results of educational solutions as well as evidence from global contexts vs. local contexts. The key outcomes we track are willingness to pay for additional evidence as well as actual behavior, such as whether parents provide additional educational instruction for their children when presented with evidence of the benefits of doing so. We set up a phone line with Viamo where parents can call in to enroll their child in additional instruction and collect objective outcomes from the phone company. Results indicate that teachers and parents are willing to invest time in conducting additional remedial classes when presented with scientific evidence.

Numbers Tell, Words Sell

Mattie Toma
,
University of Warwick
Michael Thaler
,
University College London
Victor Wang
,
University of Oxford

Abstract

When communicating numeric estimates with policymakers, journalists, or the general public, experts must choose between using numbers or natural language. We run two experiments to study whether experts strategically use language to communicate numeric estimates in order to persuade receivers. In Study 1, senders communicate probabilities of abstract events to receivers on Prolific, and in Study 2 academic researchers communicate the effect sizes in research papers to government policymakers. When experts face incentives to directionally persuade instead of incentives to accurately inform receivers, they are 25-29 percentage points more likely to communicate using language rather than numbers. Experts with incentives to persuade are more likely to slant language messages than numeric messages in the direction of their incentives, and this effect is driven by those who prefer to use language. Our findings suggest that experts are strategically leveraging the imprecision of language to excuse themselves for slanting more. Receivers are persuaded by experts with directional incentives, particularly when language is used.

Discussant(s)
Tahir Andrabi
,
Pomona College
JEL Classifications
  • D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
  • D0 - General