Urban Development and Economics
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 4, 2025 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PST)
- Chair: Rui Du, Oklahoma State University
Priced-out: Rent Control, Wages, and Inequality
Abstract
Employing a quasi-natural experiment, we show that after losing rent control, low-income workers’ earnings decline significantly, while high-income workers remain unaffected, even as both are equally likely to relocate to city outskirts, and pay higher rents. The wage decline stems from transition to worse quality jobs in firms located in the city outskirts. New occupants of formerly rent-controlled apartments have higher income and experience wage shocks prior, but not after relocation. Our evidence suggests that, after losing rent control, low-income workers cannot afford commuting costs to higher-paying jobs. More efficient public transportation may accomplish similar labor outcomes than rent control.Roads to Development? Examining the Zambian Context Using AI-Sat
Abstract
We create a novel road surface condition dataset by applying artificial intelligence to high-resolution satellite images. Combining a range of remote sensing data and ground surveys, we study the effect of road improvement on economic and environmental outcomes in Zambia. We find that market access increases the size of urbanized areas measured by built-up, at the cost of increasing air pollution and deforestation. Improvements in market access do not improve income and even reduce average income in large cities, in line with the "urbanization without growth" phenomenon commonly observed in the African context.Regulation, Market Structure, and Housing Affordability: An Investigation of Airbnb’s Decline in San Francisco
Abstract
A primary objective of government regulation in the short-term rental market is to improve housing affordability for local renters by incentivizing a shift of properties from the STR market to traditional rental markets. I study how the composition of host types in the STR market and the method of enforcing regulations are both first-order determinants for policy success. I build on theoretical work of firm behavior under regulations to explain why increased regulatory costs may disproportionately cause exit by small suppliers. Using a difference-in-differences analysis of San Francisco’s 2018 enforcement of short-term rental regulations after settling with Airbnb, I present four main findings: (i) I find that all Airbnb hosts have dramatically increased rates of exit under the new regulatory regime that emphasizes licensing, but that small providers are disproportionately effected, (ii) Even when larger property managers do exit, they tend to shift supply to the regulation-exempt, medium-term Airbnb market (30+ night stays), (iii) properties that remain active in the regulated market do not reduce availability or nightly stays suggesting that annual renting limits are not effectively enforced, and (iv) I find no evidence of reduced rental rates, home prices, or increased housing inventory following increased enforcement of local rules.Discussant(s)
Yuta Suzuki
,
Shanghai Jiaotong University Antai
Marco Giacoletti
,
University of Southern California
Jingting Fan
,
Pennsylvania State University
Brian Asquith
,
W. E. Upjohn Institute
JEL Classifications
- R0 - General