AI on the Workplace: The Role of Workers' Participation in Decision Making

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Abstract

AI technologies are predicted to have a large effect on the world of work not only in the future but already today. The potential for automation to displace workers is being taken seriously in recent labor market models where technology changes the comparative advantage of workers across job tasks (Autor et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018, 2022; Benzell et al.2016; Susskind 2017). In these theories, worker displacement is a possible outcome of automation as machines take over tasks previously performed by humans. Automation can also lead to worker displacement if the new technologies require workers with different skills than those of the incumbent workforce. As digitization advances rapidly, the issue of knowledge and skills obsolescence among the workforce becomes more pronounced (Charles et al., 2022) but not so welcomed among working age population as expected. However, the successful integration of new technologies within organisations will heavily depend on the firms' absorptive capacity of individuals, which is linked to their digital competencies (OECD, 2023). The risk of being left behind in global value chains due to inability to embrace these new technologies is becoming increasingly tangible and it is important to understand why some organizations and their workers face difficulties in embracing new technologies.

The aim of this study is to present empirical evidence of workers' perception on current and future impact of AI technologies on the workplace in different OECD economies with a special focus on the role of different workers' participation models. Worker level surveys with more than 3,800 observations in nine different OECD countries with different models of industrial relations enable us to study the moderating role of workers' participation on their perception of AI use in working process, mental and physical health issues and willingness to participated in life-long learning.

******Very preliminary. Please don't cite. ******

Introduction

The introduction of AI technologies into workplaces has ignited significant debates, characterised by polarized perspectives on its effects on workers and organisational dynamics. Some predict widespread job displacement (Frey & Osborne, 2017), while others emphasize AI's potential to enhance productivity and job quality (Jarrahi, 2018; Spencer,2018). This divide is further exacerbated by popular narratives that depict AI through the lens of speculative fiction, often distorting the reality of current AI capabilities (Cave et al., 2018).

Given the polarized discourse, there is a pressing need for a balanced, comprehensive exploration of AI's implications for individuals, teams, and organizations (von Krogh, 2018). Neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic viewpoints fully capture the nuanced impact of AI, which varies depending on implementation contexts, worker perceptions, and socio-technical environments. Notably, there remains a gap in integrative discussions addressing how AI reshapes work routines, processes, and skills, as well as how employees experience and respond to these shifts (Meijer et al., 2021; Bucher et al., 2021). Advocates for ethical AI development argue that technology should be designed to empower users, remain transparent, and be rigorously tested to mitigate risks and biases (Roberts et al., 2021a).

Industrial relations stakeholders diverge in their perspectives on AI regulation. For trade unions, ensuring ethical AI deployment is a pivotal yet challenging issue, given the technology's nascent state, limited user experience, and uncertain trajectory (Krzywdzinski et al., 2022b; Matuschek & Kleemann, 2018). While unions leverage past experiences with technological change to address AI, there are growing calls for them to fundamentally rethink their strategies to effectively shape AI design and implementation (Gerst, 2020b). Conversely, employers are eager to adopt AI, anticipating productivity gains across administrative and cognitive domains, particularly in human-AI collaboration. Governments, meanwhile, are grappling with defining the role of labor market institutions in guiding technological change.

The aim of this study is to present empirical evidence of workers' perception on current and future impact of AI technologies on the workplace in different OECD economies with a special focus on the role of different workers' participation models. Worker level surveys with more than 5,700 observations in eight OECD countries with different models of industrial relations enable us to study the moderating role of workers' participation on their perception of AI use in working process, mental and physical health issues and willingness to participated in life-long learning. Besides that we indirectly test the hypotheses about labor reinstatement effects caused by AI technology implementation and the role of labor market institutions on the direction of technological change. Our paper contributes to the literature by studying the effect of introducing AI technologies on work tasks in different industries.

Our contribution to the burgeoning literature on AI and the future of work is threefold. First, we analyze how AI transforms work by automating routine tasks, augmenting complex activities, and shifting the balance between manual and cognitive labor. This reshaping often results in redefined job roles, prompting workers to engage in new forms of collaboration with AI systems. By studying these changes, we provide insights into how AI enhances both organizational efficiency and employee performance. Second, we delve into employee perceptions and attitudes towards AI adoption. Drawing from established technology acceptance models (Lee et al., 2009), our analysis highlights the pivotal role of worker sentiment in shaping AI integration outcomes. Workers with positive attitudes are more likely to pursue upskilling opportunities and harness AI's capabilities, fostering innovation and adaptability. Conversely, negative attitudes may impede AI adoption, contributing to stagnation and operational inefficiencies (Suseno et al., 2022). Notably, many employees simultaneously harbor

both optimism and skepticism about AI, reflecting complex assessments of potential benefits and perceived risks (Lichtenthaler, 2019). Third, by broadening the empirical foundation, we emphasize the need for proactive organizational strategies to mitigate AI's disruptive effects. As generative AI and related technologies continue to evolve, there is increasing pressure on organizations to adopt frameworks that promote fairness, inclusivity, and resilience. Our research underscores the importance of participatory governance models, highlighting how inclusive decision-making processes involving unions and workers' councils can facilitate smoother AI transitions. This focus contributes to ongoing debates on how to shape AI deployment in ways that align with broader societal and ethical goals (Vallance, 2023).

The subsequent sections provide a literature review focusing on the role of social dialogue in technology adoption, delineate the survey methodology and empirical modelling approach, and present findings and interpretations. The study concludes with reflections on prospective research avenues and presenting actionable recommendations for stakeholders committed to aligning AI deployment with principles of social dialogue and industrial democracy.

Literature review and research questions

Social dialogue, particularly through collective bargaining systems, plays a critical role in shaping labor market outcomes by influencing wages, reducing wage inequality, promoting employment, and enhancing the quality of the working environment (OECD, 2019). Workplaces with representative worker voices often foster richer job roles and less routinized tasks, making them harder to monitor and control. Existing studies provide mixed and largely descriptive insights into how the presence of worker representation affects the pace of technological adoption at the workplace (Onorato, 2018; Genz, Bellmann & Matthes, 2018).

Empirical research examining the intersection of social dialogue and AI adoption remains sparse, often limited to a narrow set of imperfect indicators (Georgieff & Hyee, 2021). AI-related investments in environments that support worker voices are more likely to focus on improving working conditions rather than purely enhancing productivity (Belloc et al., 2022). The two key questions on AI adoption explored in the empirical literature so far are the following: (1) Does the presence of workers' voice accelerate or slow the adoption of AI technologies in the workplace? (2) Does AI adoption produce different effects when workers' voice mechanisms, such as unions or work councils, are present?

Regarding the first question, findings are inconclusive and may reflect reverse causality—where AI adoption could diminish workers' voice rather than the other way around. Onorato (2018) highlights a negative association between union density and robot adoption at the national level across OECD countries, suggesting that higher union presence may deter technological change. At the firm level, Genz, Bellmann, and Matthes (2018) report similar patterns in Germany, where the presence of work councils correlates with lower automation and digital technology adoption. However, the same study finds that work councils can encourage AI adoption in sectors with physically demanding labor, where technology serves to alleviate worker strain and enhance productivity. Contrastingly, Belloc, Burdin, and Landini (2022) present evidence that worker representation positively correlates with AI adoption in Europe, particularly when AI tools are integrated into management practices, such as data analytics and robotics, suggesting a more nuanced relationship depending on industry and national context.

Turning to the second question, the literature points to a moderating role for workers' voice in shaping the downstream effects of AI adoption on wages and employment. Parolin (2019) finds that declining collective bargaining coverage is linked to stagnating wage growth in automation-vulnerable occupations. Similarly, Dauth et al. (2021) show that robot adoption in Germany led to workforce reskilling rather than unemployment, diverging from U.S. patterns, where automation more frequently resulted in job displacement (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018). This divergence underscores the potential of strong labor institutions, such as collective bargaining frameworks, to cushion the disruptive impacts of AI by promoting skill development and job retention. Further supporting this notion, Haapanala, Marx, and Parolin (2022) reveal that union density mitigates job losses in automation-exposed industries, particularly benefiting older, highly educated workers. These findings emphasize the importance of labor institutions in safeguarding employment and facilitating smoother technological transitions.

While participation was traditionally viewed as a collective action quality characteristic of trade unions, works councils, or other employee representatives, it is now recognized as an independent component of labor relations. Today, participation involves having a meaningful influence over the specific conditions under which work is performed and organized within the labor process. This direct involvement is fundamental to what is often referred to as “democracy at work,” relying on certain status rights that workers hold beyond the contractual terms of their employment. These rights can be established either legally or through collective agreements (Dukes and Streeck, 2023). Participation can take various forms, ranging from information-sharing to consultation and codetermination. Information involves ensuring that workers or their representatives are kept aware of managerial decisions. Consultation allows workers to express their views and interests regarding these decisions, though their input may or may not influence the final outcome. Codetermination, on the other hand, grants workers a decisive role, requiring their consent before any decision can be finalized. In most European countries where statutory participation rights exist, they are typically limited to information and consultation (Haipeter, 2019). A notable exception is Germany, where participation rights extend to codetermination, at least in relation to certain issues, such as the implementation of new technologies (Haipeter et al, 2024).

Research shows that employee participation in matters of autonomy, control, and qualifications depends largely on the power resources available to workers in the labor process (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014). The most important power resources are structural power, derived from employees' market and organizational positions, granting influence individually or through collective bodies, organizational power, reflected in union density or the ability to mobilize workers during conflicts over participation, and institutional power, grounded in legal rights of employee representation, covering information, consultation, and higher forms of participation. Additionally, with digitalization, discursive power has emerged as crucial, shaping how digital technologies are perceived – either as tools for autonomy and improved working conditions or as means of control and rationalization (Kuhlmann and Rüb, 2020).

Based on literature review three research questions have been developed. The first one is related to propensity of AI usage: “Are there any firm-level or individual characteristics that drive the difference in type of AI usage?”. The second research question refers to labour market outcomes: “Are workers who already use AI technologies better-off if compared with the others?” The third one questions the moderating role of social dialogue: “Are labour market outcomes (work performance, job satisfaction, health and management fairness) perceived differently in AI-adopting firms with union representatives or other forms of workers participation?”

Methodology and empirical model

The analysis is based on 2022 Microdata from the OECD worker survey on the impact of AI on the workplace (OECD, 2022). It includes 5,334 workers in the manufacturing and financial sectors across Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Males represented 58 percent, while females accounted for 42 percent of all participants. A little more than half of the respondents, precisely 54 percent, had at least a university degree. From every country, there were between 700 and 850 respondents, except for Ireland, which had less than 450 respondents. They managed to achieve a balanced mix of people from the financial and insurance sector (48 percent) and the manufacturing sector (52 percent). Most respondents (44 percent) work in companies with 500 workers or more, regardless of the country they came from. Unsurprisingly, the majority (94 percent) had heard of AI before and at least roughly knew what it meant (91 percent). Table A1 in the Appendix provides additional sample details.

Building on this foundational questionnaire from the OECD survey, we develop a survey instrument, tailoring to reflect Slovenian contexts. Designed in 1ka, the survey was administered between 25 May and 25 August 2023, targeting workers aged 18 years and older employed in the private or public sector in Slovenia. The socio-demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table A1. Respondents came from five broadly defined industries (Eurostat, n.d.): (1) knowledge-intensive services (KIS) (i.e. Financial and insurance activities; Telecommunications; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Professional, scientific and technical activities; Other miscellaneous business activities), (2) less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) (i. e. Construction; Real estate; Trading; Transport and storage; Food service), (3) manufacturing, (4) public services (i. e. Health and social work; Education; Public administration and defence) and (5) other (i. e. Farming; Mining; Electricity, gas and steam supply; Water supply, sewerage and waste management).

Both surveys are rich with questions describing job and workplace characteristics as well as with variables assessing different impact of AI technologies on labour outcome at the individual level. There are three-sets of main equations estimated in this paper. The first set of equations estimated are presented in Table 1. In this table AI adoption at the level of the firm in different countries (dependent variable) is related to the variables measuring different types of workers' participation in decision making, attitudes of individual respondent regarding AI (general impact of AI, the possibility of job loss in 2 or 10 years) and a set of control variables. In the second set of estimations (presented in Table 2) AI users at the individual level is related to the set of variables measuring employee participating in decision making and a set of individual controls. All these equations are probit equations and estimated by maximum likelihood method. The third set of equations estimated are presented in Tables 3 – 6. In these tables various measures of labour outcomes (which are the dependent variables with two categories) are related to AI usage, employee participation measures, their multiplications, and various control variables which include employee characteristics, firm characteristics and industry characteristics.

Results and discussion

Empirical estimation of AI adoption probability reported in Table 1 indicates that firms with union representatives are significantly more likely to adopt AI technologies in their business processes in Austria, Canada, France, Germany and Ireland. Moreover, consultation with employees on issues related to AI implementation also increase likelihood to do it in all studied countries except Ireland and France, in which unions play an important role in technology adoptions.

An important role in Ai adoption is obviously also played by attitudes as employees with somewhat positive or very positive impact of AI in general reports significantly more likely that AI technology is used in their companies. Moreover, large firms in all analysed countries and medium sized in UK are more likely to adopt AI technologies, especially ones in finance sector (with exception of Austria).

Table 1: AI adoption firm-level characteristics

Variables	**Austria**	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
Worker representatives	0.123 (0.135)	0.205 (0.149)	0.156 (0.126)	0.172 (0.146)	0.159 (0.202)	0.126 (0.159)	0.475*** (0.170)
Union representatives	0.232** (0.115)	0.452*** (0.163)	0.500*** (0.160)	0.300** (0.129)	0.497** (0.195)	0.082 (0.156)	0.296 (0.188)
Consultation	0.239** (0.109)	0.455*** (0.117)	0.166 (0.117)	0.733*** (0.111)	-0.006 (0.174)	0.357*** (0.130)	0.267** (0.121)
Impact of AI (in general): Somewhat negative	0.067 (0.268)	-0.040 (0.274)	0.153 (0.280)	0.803** (0.319)	0.101 (0.337)	0.470* (0.268)	0.122 (0.272)
Impact of AI (in general): No impact	0.337 (0.284)	-0.310 (0.309)	-0.119 (0.314)	0.748** (0.351)	0.206 (0.394)	0.225 (0.293)	0.108 (0.293)
Impact of AI (in general): Somewhat positive	0.492* (0.266)	0.271 0.267	0.200 (0.271)	0.984*** (0.319)	0.626* (0.320)	0.681*** (0.260)	0.292 (0.253)
Impact of AI (in general): Very positive	0.837*** (0.311)	0.801*** (0.298)	0.736** (0.312)	1.644*** (0.382)	0.873** (0.371)	1.107*** (0.313)	0.876*** (0.274)
Impact of AI on wages: No impact	0.103 (0.135)	0.214 (0.155)	0.265** (0.133)	0.162 (0.134)	0.262 (0.220)	0.262* (0.153)	-0.042 (0.155)
Impact of AI on wages: positive	0.219 (0.165)	0.229 (0.163)	0.269 (0.184)	0.448*** (0.171)	1.004*** (0.248)	0.855*** (0.215)	0.253* (0.150)
Job loss in 2 years: Very worried	0.163 (0.225)	-0.312 (0.268)	-0.183 (0.282)	0.506* (0.301)	0.918** (0.386)	0.0641 (0.339)	0.0581 (0.244)
Job loss in 2 years: Moderately worried	-0.154 (0.230)	-0.143 (0.274)	-0.0743 (0.289)	0.266 (0.304)	0.299 (0.357)	-0.396 (0.348)	0.073 (0.239)
Job loss in 2 years: Slightly worried	-0.0733 (0.258)	-0.132 (0.287)	0.062 (0.310)	0.632* (0.328)	0.605 (0.397)	-0.450 (0.361)	0.006 (0.267)
Job loss in 2 years: Not worried	0.122 (0.267)s	-0.168 (0.314)	0.271 (0.308)	0.277 (0.323)	0.341 (0.411)	-0.635* (0.361)	-0.059 0.269
Job loss in 10 years: Very worried	-0.005 (0.240)	-0.154 (0.265)	-0.092 (0.272)	-0.187 (0.263)	-0.156 (0.367)	0.680** (0.328)	-0.174 (0.219)
Job loss in 10 years: Moderately worried	-0.108 (0.245)	-0.0191 (0.266)	-0.234 (0.268)	-0.237 (0.278)	-0.517 (0.397)	0.331 (0.332)	0.236 (0.223)

Job loss in 10 years: Slightly worried	-0.351 (0.274)	0.0376 (0.311)	-0.398 (0.286)	-0.219 (0.302)	-0.259 (0.431)	0.353 (0.349)	0.139 (0.247)
Job loss in 10 years: Not worried	-0.329 (0.296)	-0.169 (0.333)	-0.499* (0.300)	-0.363 (0.313)	-0.380 (0.472)	0.282 (0.362)	-0.063 (0.258)
Medium firms	0.036 (0.145)	0.277* (0.166)	0.119 (0.175)	0.219 (0.207)	0.340 0.222	0.672*** (0.189)	0.226 (0.170)
Large firms	0.405*** 0.144	0.715*** 0.143	0.467*** 0.162	0.363* 0.2	0.906*** 0.214	1.121*** 0.178	0.528*** 0.158
Manufacturing	0.0214 0.107	-0.319*** 0.118	-0.498*** 0.114	-0.469*** 0.113	-0.235 0.164	-0.358*** 0.126	-0.0755 0.114
Constant	-0.835*** (0.310)	-0.457 (0.321)	-0.0602 (0.344)	-1.747*** (0.432)	-0.970** (0.442)	-1.339*** (0.370)	-0.701** (0.330)
Observations	629	605	627	678	366	567	645

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the empirical model that estimated the probability of working with AI technologies at the level of individual in AI adopting firms (Table 2) reveal that in four countries male are significantly more likely to work with AI with respect to women. There is no significant distinction in using AI between workers born in the country or migrants or those who are employed for full time or part time. Individuals who work remotely less likely work with AI in all countries expect France. Among occupational groups managers are the ones who more likely use AI in their organisation if compared to professional workers, clerical support workers and control group. Also, workers with university degree and lower tenure are more likely to use AI technologies. While attitudes and perception about the impact of AI technologies in general, on wages and employment don't play any difference, high correlation is found between training and AI usage at the level of individuals. Individual workers in organisations that adopted AI are more likely to use AI themselves if the special training has been organised.

Firm-level covariates (size of the company, sector) don't impact probability of using AI at the level of individual workers. Workers' participation in decision-making positively influence the probability to use AI technology. In most countries having either worker or union representation significantly positively affect the probability to use AI with exception of France and Germany, where the voice of employees in decision-making is the highest among all analysed OECD countries. Consultation practices with workers about introducing new technologies increase odds for using AI technology at individual level although results are not statistically significant.

Table 2: Propensity of using AI at the level of the worker

Variables	**Austria**	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
Male	-0.076	0.403**	0.339*	0.391**	0.579**	0.351	0.256
	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.288)	(0.227)	(0.197)
Not born in the country	0.222	-0.217	-0.0287	0.530*	0.186	-0.046	0.131
	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.314)	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.309)	(0.261)
Part-time employment	-0.003	1.335**	0.552	0.607*	0.579	0.276	-0.0793
	(0.256)	(0.615)	(0.382)	(0.345)	(0.418)	(0.323)	(0.403)
Remote work	0.0972	-0.032	0.415**	0.276	-0.139	-0.116	-0.542**
	(0.217)	(0.228)	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.300)	(0.241)	(0.243)
Manager	0.470*	0.623**	0.0098	0.630**	0.625	0.619**	0.671***
	(0.263)	(0.254)	(0.249)	(0.282)	(0.414)	(0.276)	(0.244)
Professional worker	0.005	0.376	0.087	0.232	-0.0624	-0.047	0.502*
	(0.233)	(0.267)	(0.301)	(0.234)	(0.333)	(0.324)	(0.287)
Clerical support worker	0.096	0.007	-0.192	0.118	0.018	-0.343	-0.226
	(0.251)	(0.343)	(0.227)	(0.271)	(0.478)	(0.307)	(0.311)
Initial feeling about technology	0.101	0.139	0.298***	-0.093	0.067	0.216*	-0.065
	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.085)
Trust in AI	-0.081	0.005	-0.128	0.0691	0.097	0.012	-0.013
	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.078)
General impact of AI	0.181*	0.0982	-0.001	0.303***	-0.008	0.018	0.039
	(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.107)	(0.143)	(0.121)	(0.085)
Impact of AI on wages	-0.080	-0.126	-0.072	-0.163	0.440**	-0.086	-0.040
	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.201)	(0.163)	(0.113)
Impact of AI on job loss in 2 years	0.018	0.046	0.097	-0.092	0.0803	-0.097	0.067
	(0.097)	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.159)	(0.117)	(0.096)
Impact of AI on job loss in 10 years	-0.128	0.007	-0.079	-0.164	-0.293*	-0.105	-0.036
	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.102)	(0.113)	(0.172)	(0.119)	(0.094)
Tenure	-0.015	-0.013	-0.038***	-0.007	-0.017	-0.017*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)
University degree	0.129	0.457**	0.416**	0.386**	-0.458	0.514**	0.254
	(0.181)	(0.220)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.372)	(0.250)	(0.215)
Training	0.709***	0.444**	1.058***	0.714***	0.900***	1.065***	0.915***
	(0.196)	(0.189)	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.297)	(0.251)	(0.210)
Medium sized firms	0.384	0.553*	0.00259	-0.285	0.460	0.185	0.096
	(0.262)	(0.334)	(0.308)	(0.487)	(0.472)	(0.411)	(0.306)
Large firms	0.043	0.012	-0.128	-0.586	-0.0445	-0.202	0.107
	(0.244)	(0.257)	(0.271)	(0.470)	(0.411)	(0.383)	(0.282)
Worker representatives	0.078	0.649***	0.127	-0.130	0.785**	-0.166	0.527*
	(0.237)	(0.244)	(0.195)	(0.284)	(0.371)	(0.265)	(0.291)
Union representatives	0.298*	0.549**	0.338	0.259	-0.391	0.722**	0.049
	(0.179)	(0.256)	(0.219)	(0.208)	(0.288)	(0.290)	(0.308)
Consultation	0.115	0.132	0.177	0.0074	0.236	0.315	0.203
	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.176)	(0.202	(0.295)	(0.235)	(0.187)
Manufacturing	-0.087	-0.245	-0.222	-0.022	0.077	0.012	-0.512**
	(0.204)	(0.234)	(0.198)	(0.213)	(0.291)	(0.237)	(0.253)

Constant	-0.613	-1.537**	-0.933	0.473	0.118	-0.694	0.469
	(0.547)	(0.691	(0.620)	(0.785)	(0.954)	(0.766)	(0.636)
Observations	290	347	401	358	247	317	409

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The third set of estimations test the AI impact of labor outcomes: work performance, enjoyment at work, health and safety, mental health and management fairness. AI users are reporting slightly or significantly improved level of work performance in all tested countries. In firms with different types of workers' participation in decision making model the impact of AI on work performance is perceived much more positive if compared with firms that are introducing new AI technologies without any consultation with workers. Workers' participation obviously serves as an important moderator in the case of AI implementation and its effect on work performance for AI users and non-users (Table 3). Full table is listed in appendix (Table A2). Interestingly, remote workers assess positive AI impact on work performance less likely.

Table 3: The probability of positive AI impact on work performance

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	0.401	1.130***	0.815***	0.254	1.557***	1.139***	0.915***
	(0.256)	(0.159)	(0.214)	(0.249)	(0.246)	(0.163)	(0.146)
Union representatives	-0.004	0.153	0.204	0.060	0.055	0.123	-0.475*
	(0.129)	(0.198)	(0.209)	(0.144)	(0.239)	(0.174)	(0.272)
Worker representatives	0.029	0.308*	0.079	0.039	0.271	0.064	0.206
	(0.143)	(0.184)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.251)	(0.175)	(0.267)
Consultation	0.081	0.135	0.418***	0.242**	0.509***	0.511***	0.492***
	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.196)	(0.129)	(0.143)
Aiuser*union	0.052	-0.463	-0.510*	0.057	-0.448	-0.341	0.253
	(0.237)	(0.287)	(0.283)	(0.232)	(0.355)	(0.260)	(0.369)
Aiuser*workrep	0.142	0.014	0.540**	0.181	-0.356	0.334	0.073
	(0.264)	(0.277)	(0.229)	(0.259)	(0.368)	(0.279)	(0.349)
Aiuser*consultation	0.388*	0.307	0.073	0.374*	0.004	-0.219	0.127
	(0.226)	(0.220)	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.318)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.330*	-0.583***	-0.483**	-0.411*	-0.738**	-0.649***	-0.468**
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.287)	(0.197)	(0.191)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

AI users also significantly more likely assessed that using AI technologies bring more enjoyment at work. While in general presence of union or worker representatives don't bring more enjoyment, consultations with employees on the use of AI technologies is significantly positively related in most analysed countries (Table 4). However, we don't see any significant positive moderation effect of different type of workers' participation with USA being the exemption in the case of workers' representatives. Full results are presented in appendix (Table A3).

Table 4: Probability of positive AI impact on enjoyment of work

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	0.293	0.639***	0.640***	0.625**	1.154***	1.085***	0.612***
	(0.247)	(0.149)	(0.208)	(0.248)	(0.231)	(0.163)	(0.143)
Union representatives	0.051	0.095	-0.033	0.119	0.075	0.430**	-0.312
	(0.134)	(0.205)	(0.221)	(0.156)	(0.261)	(0.180)	(0.282)
Worker representatives	0.112	0.086	-0.005	-0.067	0.193	0.380**	0.127
	(0.148)	(0.187)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.266)	(0.183)	(0.270)
Consultation	0.037	0.199	0.418***	0.267**	0.494**	0.467***	0.342**
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.211)	(0.137)	(0.147)
Aiuser*union	0.076	-0.047	0.136	0.294	-0.173	-0.501**	0.144
	(0.230)	(0.275)	(0.279)	(0.227)	(0.339)	(0.252)	(0.363)
Aiuser*workrep	0.331	0.373	-0.039	-0.040	0.105	-0.0064	0.647*
	(0.251)	(0.255)	(0.221)	(0.253)	(0.345)	(0.258)	(0.342)
Aiuser*consultation	0.363	0.0812	0.110	0.002	-0.018	-0.175	0.127
	(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.215)	(0.292)	(0.216)	(0.214)
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.662***	-0.883***	-0.424**	-0.538**	-1.227***	-1.088***	-0.976***
	(0.192)	(0.185)	(0.204)	(0.218)	(0.295)	(0.204)	(0.193)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

AI users more likely report positive AI impact on health and safety (Table 5) or mental health (Table 6). The coefficients are very significant. For health and safety, the positive moderation effects are detected in the case of union representatives in Canada and Germany, for worker representatives in USA and consultation with workers in Austria and Ireland. Interestingly, in France, the existence of workers' representatives in the companies significantly decrease the assessment of AI users on positive AI impact on health and safety. Full table 5 is presented in appendix.

In the case of AI impact on mental health respondents in Austria, France, Canada and Germany are significantly more likely to report on positive impact. Presence of union representatives in the company moderates the positive effect in Austria and Germany, while the presence of workers representatives in Ireland and USA. Consultation with employees on AI adoption moderate positive impact on mental health in most countries, being significantly positive in France and Ireland. Full table is presented in appendix.

Table 5: Probability of positive AI impact on health and safety

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.241***	0.970***	1.480***	1.626***	0.753***	1.457***	1.136***
	(0.276)	(0.165)	(0.236)	(0.288)	(0.233)	(0.192)	(0.155)
Union representatives	-0.080	-0.289	0.312	-0.254	0.121	-0.011	0.349
	(0.174)	(0.281)	(0.238)	(0.225)	(0.287)	(0.274)	(0.294)
Worker representatives	0.353*	0.133	0.289	0.162	-0.015	0.502**	-0.317
	(0.193)	(0.232)	(0.181)	(0.213)	(0.310)	(0.222)	(0.341)

Consultation	0.202	0.170	0.330**	0.667***	-0.0531	0.324*	0.269
	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.155)	(0.176)	(0.245)	(0.189)	(0.171)
Aiuser*union	0.117	0.743**	-0.166	1.071***	-0.055	0.255	0.117
	(0.256)	(0.336)	(0.293)	(0.282)	(0.353)	(0.325)	(0.362)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.368	0.367	-0.506**	-0.430	0.395	-0.273	1.093***
	(0.281)	(0.290)	(0.247)	(0.292)	(0.373)	(0.288)	(0.387)
Aiuser*consultation	0.521**	0.316	0.264	-0.313	0.682**	0.147	-0.043
	(0.243)	(0.228)	(0.218)	(0.250)	(0.316)	(0.251)	(0.227)
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.787***	-1.723***	-1.533***	-2.211***	-1.965***	-2.668***	-1.898***
	(0.247)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.309	(0.322	(0.283	(0.224
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Probability of positive AI impact on mental health

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.505***	1.196***	1.272***	1.341***	0.598**	1.399***	1.181***
	(0.290)	(0.168)	(0.249)	(0.291)	(0.234)	(0.183)	(0.154)
Union representatives	-0.436**	-0.327	0.389	-0.094	0.065	0.094	0.168
	(0.211)	(0.312)	(0.248)	(0.216)	(0.295)	(0.241)	(0.297)
Worker representatives	0.353	-0.001	0.259	0.144	-0.144	0.134	0.129
	(0.221)	(0.246)	(0.196)	(0.219)	(0.334)	(0.237)	(0.300)
Consultation	0.341*	0.425**	0.369**	0.664***	-0.057	0.253	0.302*
	(0.182)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.247)	(0.186)	(0.172)
Aiuser*union	0.581**	0.491	-0.113	0.815***	-0.157	0.046	-0.036
	(0.279)	(0.360)	(0.301)	(0.272)	(0.359)	(0.297)	(0.361)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.383	0.412	-0.453*	-0.292	0.717*	0.225	0.656*
	(0.295)	(0.298)	(0.259)	(0.291)	(0.393)	(0.299)	(0.352)
Aiuser*consultation	0.073	0.053	0.415*	-0.185	0.668**	0.117	-0.027
	(0.257)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.248)	(0.317)	(0.248)	(0.226)
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.811***	-1.919***	-1.675***	-2.055***	-1.402***	-2.167***	-1.452***
	(0.275)	(0.235)	(0.268)	(0.311)	(0.307)	(0.268)	(0.216)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

AI users more likely report positive AI impact on management fairness (Table 7). The coefficients are very significant. Interestingly, the workers who were not born in the country of work in all analysed

OECD countries are more likely to perceive positive AI impact on management fairness. Also, having the possibility to consult AI adoption with management increase the perception of positive AI impact. Moderation effect is surprisingly strong in the case of worker representatives being positive in Canada and USA and negative in the case of Austria and Germany. Full table is presented in appendix.

Table 7: Probability of positive AI impact on management fairness

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.353***	0.990***	1.389***	1.511***	0.964***	1.043***	1.374***
	(0.297)	(0.174)	(0.254)	(0.345)	(0.271)	(0.195)	(0.178)
Union representatives	-0.135	-0.027	0.378	0.008	0.540*	0.113	-0.097
	(0.196)	(0.317)	(0.259)	(0.269)	(0.301)	(0.271)	(0.415)
Worker representatives	0.427*	-0.132	0.010	0.371	0.185	-0.392	-0.319
	(0.222)	(0.280)	(0.206)	(0.296)	(0.339)	(0.343)	(0.418)
Consultation	0.244	0.232	0.422**	0.311	0.125	0.225	0.677***
	(0.181)	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.222)	(0.286)	(0.208)	(0.198)
Aiuser*union	0.164	0.512	-0.293	0.704**	-0.327	0.284	0.673
	(0.273)	(0.363)	(0.306)	(0.316)	(0.363)	(0.321)	(0.462)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.591**	0.641**	-0.313	-0.687*	0.276	0.619	0.906**
	(0.298)	(0.325)	(0.263)	(0.353)	(0.398)	(0.387)	(0.452)
Aiuser*consultation	0.351	-0.161	0.0538	-0.008	0.478	0.224	-0.593**
	(0.264)	(0.243)	(0.240)	(0.288)	(0.350)	(0.266)	(0.249)
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.131***	-2.049***	-1.678***	-2.143***	-2.341***	-2.307***	-1.835***
	(0.285)	(0.250)	(0.283)	(0.383)	(0.360)	(0.281)	(0.243)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion

The findings of this study underscore the transformative yet nuanced impact of AI technologies on workplace dynamics across OECD economies. While AI adoption is shown to significantly enhance work performance and enjoyment, this effect is notably stronger in organizations that actively engage workers in decision-making processes. The presence of worker and union representatives, as well as consultation practices in the process of technology implementation, emerges as a crucial moderating factor, mitigating potential negative outcomes and amplifying the positive impacts of AI on labor conditions. This highlights the importance of fostering inclusive governance models to ensure that AI-driven innovation aligns with employee well-being and organizational resilience.

Furthermore, the research reveals significant variations in AI adoption and usage based on firm size, sector, and worker characteristics. Larger firms, particularly in the financial sector, exhibit higher AI adoption rates, while individual AI use correlates strongly with managerial roles, higher educational attainment, and specific training initiatives. Interestingly, remote workers appear less likely to engage with AI, pointing to potential disparities in access and utilization that warrant further investigation.

These insights emphasize the need for targeted policies that promote equitable AI adoption and skill development across diverse workforce segments.

Ultimately, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on AI and the future of work by highlighting the pivotal role of different participatory frameworks. As AI technologies continue to reshape labor markets, the findings suggest that proactive collaboration between management and labor representatives can facilitate smoother transitions, fostering environments where technological advancements enhance productivity without compromising worker rights or job satisfaction. Future research should delve deeper into sector-specific dynamics and explore longitudinal data to capture the evolving relationship between AI integration and labor market outcomes.

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Appendix

Table A1. OECD basic characteristics for gender, education, sector, and familiarity with AI

Respondents		Austria	Canada	France	Germany	Ireland	UK	USA	Slovenia
Gender	Female	42%	43%	36%	40%	52%	43%	44%	55%
	Male	58%	57%	64%	60%	48%	57%	56%	45%
Education	Less than graduate	50%	39%	37%	53%	27%	53%	56%	30%
	Graduate or higher	50%	61%	63%	47%	73%	47%	44%	70%
Sector	Finance and insurance	43%	50%	49%	49%	47%	49%	49%	30%
	Manufacturing	57%	50%	51%	51%	53%	52%	51%	9%
Familiarity with AI	No	6%	5%	8%	3%	4%	5%	8%	6%
	Yes	94%	95%	92%	97%	96%	95%	92%	94%
Business size	Up to 19 workers	12%	9%	6%	3%	10%	9%	6%	
	20 to 49 workers	13%	10%	9%	9%	9%	8%	7%	
	50 to 99 workers	14%	11%	10%	12%	11%	12%	11%	
	100 to 249 workers	16%	13%	15%	13%	20%	17%	16%	
	250 to 499 workers	11%	12%	12%	15%	14%	12%	16%	
	500 workers or more	35%	45%	49%	48%	37%	43%	44%	
Observations		700	791	783	830	429	800	787	430

Source: OECD (2022), Microdata from the OECD AI surveys of employers and workers. Available via: https://www.oecd.org/future-of-work/reports-anddata/data-infographics.htm.

Table A2: The probability of positive AI impact on work performance (full table)

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	0.401	1.130***	0.815***	0.254	1.557***	1.139***	0.915***
	(0.256)	(0.159)	(0.214)	(0.249)	(0.246)	(0.163)	(0.146)
Union representatives	-0.004	0.153	0.204	0.060	0.055	0.123	-0.475*
	(0.129)	(0.198)	(0.209)	(0.144)	(0.239)	(0.174)	(0.272)
Work representatives	0.029	0.308*	0.079	0.039	0.271	0.064	0.206
	(0.143)	(0.184)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.251)	(0.175)	(0.267)
Consultation	0.081	0.135	0.418***	0.242**	0.509***	0.511***	0.492***
	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.196)	(0.129)	(0.143)
Aiuser*union	0.052	-0.463	-0.510*	0.057	-0.448	-0.341	0.253
	(0.237)	(0.287)	(0.283)	(0.232)	(0.355)	(0.260)	(0.369)
Aiuser*workrep	0.142	0.014	0.540**	0.181	-0.356	0.334	0.073
	(0.264)	(0.277)	(0.229)	(0.259)	(0.368)	(0.279)	(0.349)
Aiuser*consultation	0.388*	0.307	0.073	0.374*	0.004	-0.219	0.127
	(0.226)	(0.220)	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.318)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Male	0.112	0.033	0.160	0.239**	0.424***	0.062	0.223**
	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.160)	(0.109)	(0.114)
Not born in the country	0.101	0.071	-0.213	0.334**	0.0392	0.275*	0.273*
	(0.127)	(0.114)	(0.192)	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.141)	(0.158)
Part-time employment	-0.269*	0.191	-0.251	0.0514	-0.0482	-0.279*	-0.165
	(0.150)	(0.206)	(0.201)	(0.148)	(0.223)	(0.160)	(0.221)
Remote work	0.024	-0.057	-0.212*	-0.218*	-0.397**	-0.191	-0.374***
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.170)	(0.122)	(0.137)
Manager	0.180	0.053	0.0772	0.146	-0.058	0.303**	0.198
	(0.159)	(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.159)	(0.226)	(0.136)	(0.142)
Professional worker	0.293**	0.052	-0.208	-0.022	0.001	0.017	0.036
	(0.135)	(0.151)	(0.184)	(0.124)	(0.201)	(0.169)	(0.165)
Clerical support worker	0.0491	0.145	-0.018	-0.075	0.222	-0.157	-0.014
	(0.139)	(0.162)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.239)	(0.147)	(0.197)
Tenure	-0.009	-0.008	-0.006	-0.008**	0.000	-0.008	-0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
University degree	0.160	0.342***	0.362***	0.157	0.332*	0.320***	0.157
	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.179)	(0.117)	(0.133)
Medium sized firms	0.133	0.096	0.098	0.172	0.133	0.068	0.237
	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.159)	(0.171)	(0.216)	(0.149)	(0.157)
Large firms	-0.151	-0.124	-0.233	0.038	-0.046	-0.213	0.307**
	(0.137)	(0.128)	(0.146)	(0.173)	(0.199)	(0.141)	(0.143)
Manufacturing	0.0601	0.124	-0.103	0.087	-0.0665	0.049	-0.251*
	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.168)	(0.119)	(0.137)
Constant	-0.330*	-0.583***	-0.483**	-0.411*	-0.738**	-0.649***	-0.468**
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.287)	(0.197)	(0.191)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3: Probability of positive AI impact on enjoyment of work (full table)

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	0.293	0.639***	0.640***	0.625**	1.154***	1.085***	0.612***
	(0.247)	(0.149)	(0.208)	(0.248)	(0.231)	(0.163)	(0.143)
Union representatives	0.051	0.095	-0.033	0.119	0.075	0.430**	-0.312
	(0.134)	(0.205)	(0.221)	(0.156)	(0.261)	(0.180)	(0.282)
Work representatives	0.112	0.086	-0.005	-0.067	0.193	0.380**	0.127
	(0.148)	(0.187)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.266)	(0.183)	(0.270)
Consultation	0.037	0.199	0.418***	0.267**	0.494**	0.467***	0.342**
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.211)	(0.137)	(0.147)
Aiuser*union	0.076	-0.047	0.136	0.294	-0.173	-0.501**	0.144
	(0.230)	(0.275)	(0.279)	(0.227)	(0.339)	(0.252)	(0.363)
Aiuser*workrep	0.331	0.373	-0.039	-0.040	0.105	-0.0064	0.647*
	(0.251)	(0.255)	(0.221)	(0.253)	(0.345)	(0.258)	(0.342)
Aiuser*consultation	0.363	0.0812	0.110	0.002	-0.018	-0.175	0.127
	(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.215)	(0.292)	(0.216)	(0.214)
Male	-0.017)	0.186*	-0.0475	0.176	0.537***	0.209*	0.118
	(0.111)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.151)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Not born in the country	0.179	0.123	0.150	0.293*	-0.0024	0.284**	0.278*
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.185)	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.138)	(0.150)
Part-time employment	-0.273*	0.181	-0.279	0.0302	-0.047	-0.0234	0.231
	(0.156)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.160)	(0.219)	(0.166)	(0.224)
Remote work	0.056	-0.006	-0.038	0.0573	0.029	-0.106	-0.255*
	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.166)	(0.122)	(0.135)
Manager	0.146	0.0976	0.173	0.152	0.210	0.243*	0.457***
	(0.160)	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.211)	(0.137)	(0.135)
Professional worker	0.171	-0.100	-0.155	-0.211*	-0.046	0.119	0.407**
	(0.138)	(0.145)	(0.178)	(0.127)	(0.191)	(0.172)	(0.162)
Clerical support worker	-0.033	0.115	-0.184	-0.268*	0.199	-0.009	-0.038
	(0.143)	(0.158)	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.241)	(0.157)	(0.202)
Tenure	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	-0.012***	-0.009	-0.014***	-0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)
University degree	0.260**	0.334***	0.241**	0.167	0.370**	0.159	0.337***
	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.179)	(0.120)	(0.129)
Medium sized firms	0.179	0.183	-0.046	0.139	-0.105	0.0346	0.255
	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.212)	(0.152)	(0.157)
Large firms	-0.141	-0.059	-0.407***	-0.242	-0.415**	-0.281*	0.087
	(0.138)	(0.125)	(0.142)	(0.174)	(0.201)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Manufacturing	-0.0443	-0.031	0.043	0.015	0.155	0.039	0.082
	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.161)	(0.120)	(0.133)
Constant	-0.662***	-0.883***	-0.424**	-0.538**	-1.227***	-1.088***	-0.976***
	(0.192)	(0.185)	(0.204)	(0.218)	(0.295)	(0.204)	(0.193)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Probability of positive AI impact on health and safety (full table)

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.241***	0.970***	1.480***	1.626***	0.753***	1.457***	1.136***
	(0.276)	(0.165)	(0.236)	(0.288)	(0.233)	(0.192)	(0.155)
Union representatives	-0.080	-0.289	0.312	-0.254	0.121	-0.011	0.349
	(0.174)	(0.281)	(0.238)	(0.225)	(0.287)	(0.274)	(0.294)
Work representatives	0.353*	0.133	0.289	0.162	-0.015	0.502**	-0.317
	(0.193)	(0.232)	(0.181)	(0.213)	(0.310)	(0.222)	(0.341)
Consultation	0.202	0.170	0.330**	0.667***	-0.0531	0.324*	0.269
	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.155)	(0.176)	(0.245)	(0.189)	(0.171)
Aiuser*union	0.117	0.743**	-0.166	1.071***	-0.055	0.255	0.117
	(0.256)	(0.336)	(0.293)	(0.282)	(0.353)	(0.325)	(0.362)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.368	0.367	-0.506**	-0.430	0.395	-0.273	1.093***
	(0.281)	(0.290)	(0.247)	(0.292)	(0.373)	(0.288)	(0.387)
Aiuser*consultation	0.521**	0.316	0.264	-0.313	0.682**	0.147	-0.043
	(0.243)	(0.228)	(0.218)	(0.250)	(0.316)	(0.251)	(0.227)
Male	-0.086	0.158	-0.00465	-0.0232	0.273*	0.110	0.134
	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.156)	(0.133)	(0.116)
Not born in the country	0.474***	0.323***	0.401**	0.435**	0.137	0.312**	0.111
	(0.141)	(0.121)	(0.194)	(0.172)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.159)
Part-time employment	-0.046	0.0701	0.076	-0.019	0.0172	0.050	-0.382
	(0.182)	(0.229)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.230)	(0.208)	(0.261)
Remote work	-0.317**	-0.207	-0.186	-0.324**	0.007	0.176	-0.111
	(0.151)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.170)	(0.142)	(0.141)
Manager	0.270	-0.081	-0.170	0.298*	0.204	0.0214	0.048
	(0.181)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.176)	(0.215)	(0.164)	(0.144)
Professional worker	0.066	0.105	-0.346*	-0.159	0.348*	0.0778	-0.011
	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.195)	(0.157)	(0.193)	(0.202)	(0.171)
Clerical support worker	0.227	-0.179	-0.413***	-0.079	0.141	-0.138	0.288
	(0.167)	(0.202)	(0.148)	(0.175)	(0.271)	(0.205)	(0.211)
Tenure	-0.004	0.001	-0.008	0.001	-0.015*	-0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)
University degree	-0.042	0.055	0.235*	-0.059	0.491**	0.417***	0.196
	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.196)	(0.144)	(0.136)
Medium sized firms	-0.024	0.183	0.016	0.390*	0.287	0.308	0.135
	(0.168)	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.208)	(0.178)
Large firms	-0.006	0.398***	-0.003	0.181	0.166	0.345*	0.376**
	(0.162)	(0.153)	(0.164)	(0.222)	(0.206)	(0.199)	(0.162)
Manufacturing	0.323**	0.035	0.276**	0.404***	0.388**	0.563***	0.427***
	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.125)	(0.135)	(0.162)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Constant	-1.787***	-1.723***	-1.533***	-2.211***	-1.965***	-2.668***	-1.898***
	(0.247)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.309	(0.322	(0.283	(0.224
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Probability of positive AI impact on mental health (full table)

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.505***	1.196***	1.272***	1.341***	0.598**	1.399***	1.181***
	(0.290)	(0.168)	(0.249)	(0.291)	(0.234)	(0.183)	(0.154)
Union representatives	-0.436**	-0.327	0.389	-0.094	0.065	0.094	0.168
	(0.211)	(0.312)	(0.248)	(0.216)	(0.295)	(0.241)	(0.297)
Worker representatives	0.353	-0.001	0.259	0.144	-0.144	0.134	0.129
	(0.221)	(0.246)	(0.196)	(0.219)	(0.334)	(0.237)	(0.300)
Consultation	0.341*	0.425**	0.369**	0.664***	-0.057	0.253	0.302*
	(0.182)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.247)	(0.186)	(0.172)
Aiuser*union	0.581**	0.491	-0.113	0.815***	-0.157	0.046	-0.036
	(0.279)	(0.360)	(0.301)	(0.272)	(0.359)	(0.297)	(0.361)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.383	0.412	-0.453*	-0.292	0.717*	0.225	0.656*
	(0.295)	(0.298)	(0.259)	(0.291)	(0.393)	(0.299)	(0.352)
Aiuser*consultation	0.073	0.053	0.415*	-0.185	0.668**	0.117	-0.027
	(0.257)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.248)	(0.317)	(0.248)	(0.226)
Male	-0.231*	0.259**	0.186	-0.090	0.207	0.130	0.131
	(0.137)	(0.116)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.154)	(0.129)	(0.116)
Not born in the country	0.348**	0.115	0.288	0.382**	0.043	0.427***	-0.153
	(0.148)	(0.122)	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.155)	(0.1569	(0.158)
Part-time employment	-0.162	0.046	0.111	-0.270	0.014	-0.259	0.108
	(0.195)	(0.226)	(0.224)	(0.211)	(0.235)	(0.207)	(0.243)
Remote work	-0.011	-0.022	-0.109	-0.122	0.090	0.036	-0.152
	(0.155)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.170)	(0.136)	(0.137)
Manager	0.043	-0.026	-0.023	0.283	0.182	-0.020	0.096
	(0.193)	(0.152)	(0.159)	(0.176)	(0.212)	(0.161)	(0.143)
Professional worker	0.014	0.342**	-0.219	-0.111	0.225	-0.073	-0.175
	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.199)	(0.157)	(0.188)	(0.197	(0.171)
Clerical support worker	-0.044	0.232	-0.313**	0.048	-0.394	-0.079	0.029
	(0.176)	(0.198)	(0.155)	(0.172)	(0.302)	(0.191)	(0.207)
Tenure	0.009	0.002	-0.007	0.005	-0.010	0.002	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
University degree	-0.132	0.206	0.154	-0.126	0.504***	0.199	0.153
	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.194)	(0.141)	(0.134)
Medium sized firms	-0.082	0.117	-0.054	0.412*	0.0403	0.262	0.064
	(0.179)	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.210)	(0.176)
Large firms	0.002	0.183	-0.055	0.059	-0.0978	0.432**	0.170
	(0.174)	(0.151)	(0.171)	(0.227)	(0.205)	(0.198)	(0.159)
Manufacturing	0.205	-0.084	0.053	0.156	-0.124	0.038	-0.004
	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.159)	(0.134)	(0.137)
Constant	-1.811***	-1.919***	-1.675***	-2.055***	-1.402***	-2.167***	-1.452***
	(0.275)	(0.235)	(0.268)	(0.311)	(0.307)	(0.268)	(0.216)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Probability of positive AI impact on management fairness

	Austria	**Canada**	**France**	**Germany**	**Ireland**	**UK**	**USA**
AI user	1.353***	0.990***	1.389***	1.511***	0.964***	1.043***	1.374***
	(0.297)	(0.174)	(0.254)	(0.345)	(0.271)	(0.195)	(0.178)
Union representatives	-0.135	-0.027	0.378	0.008	0.540*	0.113	-0.097
	(0.196)	(0.317)	(0.259)	(0.269)	(0.301)	(0.271)	(0.415)
Worker representatives	0.427*	-0.132	0.010	0.371	0.185	-0.392	-0.319
	(0.222)	(0.280)	(0.206)	(0.296)	(0.339)	(0.343)	(0.418)
Consultation	0.244	0.232	0.422**	0.311	0.125	0.225	0.677***
	(0.181)	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.222)	(0.286)	(0.208)	(0.198)
Aiuser*union	0.164	0.512	-0.293	0.704**	-0.327	0.284	0.673
	(0.273)	(0.363)	(0.306)	(0.316)	(0.363)	(0.321)	(0.462)
Aiuser*workrep	-0.591**	0.641**	-0.313	-0.687*	0.276	0.619	0.906**
	(0.298)	(0.325)	(0.263)	(0.353)	(0.398)	(0.387)	(0.452)
Aiuser*consultation	0.351	-0.161	0.0538	-0.008	0.478	0.224	-0.593**
	(0.264)	(0.243)	(0.240)	(0.288)	(0.350)	(0.266)	(0.249)
Male	-0.032	0.261**	-0.041	0.137	0.203	0.208	0.198
	(0.139)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.162)	(0.136)	(0.124)
Not born in the country	0.530***	0.364***	0.601***	0.649***	0.320*	0.533***	0.062
	(0.146)	(0.124)	(0.189)	(0.177)	(0.164)	(0.156)	(0.162)
Part-time employment	-0.310	0.051	-0.134	-0.294	0.154	0.049	-0.061
	(0.209)	(0.249)	(0.240)	(0.254)	(0.243)	(0.205)	(0.270)
Remote work	0.213	0.078	-0.105	-0.092	-0.066	-0.080	-0.090
	(0.156)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.180)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Manager	0.147	0.019	0.090	0.074	0.289	0.007	0.199
	(0.191)	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.193)	(0.222)	(0.170)	(0.148)
Professional worker	0.076	-0.005	-0.167	-0.197	0.455**	-0.114	0.050
	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.204)	(0.174)	(0.203)	(0.210)	(0.178)
Clerical support worker	-0.047	-0.357	-0.225	-0.292	-0.380	-0.044	0.019
	(0.184)	(0.234)	(0.157)	(0.204)	(0.365)	(0.207)	(0.232)
Tenure	0.005	0.008	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.003	-0.006
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
University degree	-0.008	0.353**	0.108	0.004	0.325	0.423***	0.176
	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.136)	(0.146)	(0.213)	(0.150)	(0.140)
Medium sized firms	-0.060	0.158	0.039	0.279	0.299	0.287	0.211
	(0.173)	(0.181)	(0.199)	(0.262)	(0.232)	(0.212)	(0.189)
Large firms	-0.352**	0.058	0.131	0.000	0.079	0.221	0.104
	(0.175)	(0.160)	(0.181)	(0.264)	(0.222)	(0.204)	(0.174)
Manufacturing	0.415***	-0.181	-0.138	-0.249*	-0.020	0.002	-0.215
	(0.152)	(0.144)	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.170)	(0.142)	(0.144)
Constant	-2.131***	-2.049***	-1.678***	-2.143***	-2.341***	-2.307***	-1.835***
	(0.285)	(0.250)	(0.283)	(0.383)	(0.360)	(0.281)	(0.243)
Observations	711	817	783	833	438	818	801

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1