

Optimal Allocation with Ex-post Verification and Limited Penalties

Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnuk

Online Appendix

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Consider an allocation  $g(x)$  that satisfies (IC) and (F). We construct a monotonic  $\tilde{g}(x)$  that preserves constraints (IC) and (F), but increases the principal's payoff.

We have assumed that  $F$  has almost everywhere positive density, so  $F^{-1}$  exists. Define

$$S(t) = |\{y : g(F^{-1}(y)) \leq t\}|, \quad t \in \mathbb{R}_+.$$

Note that  $S$  is weakly increasing and satisfies  $S(t) \in [0, 1]$  for all  $t$ . Define

$$\tilde{g}(x) = S^{-1}(F(x))$$

for all  $x$  where  $S^{-1}(F(x))$  exists, and extend  $\tilde{g}$  to  $[a, b]$  by right continuity. Observe that  $\tilde{g}$  satisfies (F) by construction. In addition,

$$\sup_{x \in [a, b]} g(x) = \sup_{y \in [0, 1]} g(F^{-1}(y)) = S^{-1}(1) = \sup_{y \in [0, 1]} \tilde{g}(F^{-1}(y)) = \sup_{x \in [a, b]} \tilde{g}(x),$$

thus  $\tilde{g}$  satisfies (IC). Finally, we show that  $\tilde{g}$  yields a weakly greater payoff to the principal. By construction,

$$\int_a^z \tilde{g}(x) dF(x) \leq \int_a^z g(x) dF(x) \quad \text{for all } z \in [a, b],$$

and it holds with equality for  $z = b$ . Hence, using integration by parts, the expression

$$\int_a^b x(\tilde{g}(x) - g(x)) dF(x) = b \int_a^b (\tilde{g}(x) - g(x)) dF(x) - \int_a^b \left( \int_a^z (\tilde{g}(x) - g(x)) dF(x) \right) dz$$

is nonnegative. ■

**Proof of Corollary 3.** Let  $Q = \int_a^{z^*} q dF(x) + \int_{z^*}^b dF(x)$  be the ex-ante probability to be short-listed, and let  $A$  and  $B$  be the expected probabilities to be chosen conditional on being shortlisted and conditional on not being short-listed, respectively:

$$A = \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{1}{k} \binom{n-1}{k-1} Q^{k-1} (1-Q)^{n-k} \quad \text{and} \quad B = \frac{1}{n} (1-Q)^{n-1}.$$

The associated reduced-form rule is as follows. An agent's probability  $g_i(x)$  to be chosen conditional on  $x_i \geq z^*$  and  $x_i < z^*$  is given by  $A$  and  $qA + (1-q)B$ ,

respectively. Hence,

$$(B1) \quad g(x) \equiv \sum_i g_i(x) = \begin{cases} n(qA + (1-q)B), & x < z^*, \\ nA, & x \geq z^*. \end{cases}$$

We now prove that  $g$  is identical to  $g^*$  whenever  $q$  satisfies (15). We have

$$(B2) \quad \begin{aligned} Q &= \int_a^{z^*} q dF(x) + \int_{z^*}^b dF(x) = \int_a^{z^*} \left(1 - \frac{c}{s}\right) dF(x) + \int_{z^*}^b dF(x) \\ &= \left( \int_a^{z^*} \left( \frac{1-c}{s} - \frac{1-s}{s} \right) dF(x) + \int_{z^*}^b \left( \frac{1}{s} - \frac{1-s}{s} \right) dF(x) \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{s} \left( \int_a^{z^*} (1-c) dF(x) + \int_{z^*}^b dF(x) \right) - \frac{1-s}{s} \\ &= \frac{1/r^*}{s} - \frac{1-s}{s} = \frac{1-r^*+r^*s}{r^*s}, \end{aligned}$$

where we used (9). Hence,  $1-Q = \frac{r^*-1}{r^*s}$ . Next,

$$\begin{aligned} A &= \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{1}{k} \frac{(n-1)!}{(k-1)!(n-k)!} Q^{k-1} (1-Q)^{n-k} = \frac{1}{nQ} \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!} Q^k (1-Q)^{n-k} \\ &= \frac{1}{nQ} (1 - (1-Q)^n). \end{aligned}$$

Substituting (B2) into the above yields

$$A = \frac{r^*s}{n(1-r^*+r^*s)} \left( 1 - \frac{(r^*-1)^n}{(r^*s)^n} \right).$$

By (16), after some algebraic transformations,

$$A = \frac{r^*s}{n(1-r^*+r^*s)} \left( 1 - \frac{(r^*-1)^n}{(r^*s)^n} \right) = \frac{r^*}{n}.$$

Also, using (B2) and (16) we obtain

$$B = \frac{1}{n} (1-Q)^{n-1} = \frac{1}{n} \frac{(r^*-1)^{n-1}}{(r^*s)^{n-1}} = \frac{(1-s)r^*}{n}.$$

Substitute  $A$  and  $B$  into (B1):

$$n(qA + (1-q)B) = \frac{(s-c)nA + cnB}{s} = \frac{(s-c)r^* + c(1-s)r^*}{s} = (1-c)r^*$$

and  $nA = r^*$ . Hence,  $g(x) = g^*(x)$  for all  $x \in X$ .

It remains to show that, whenever  $n \geq \bar{n}$ , this shortlisting procedure is feasible and well defined, i.e.,  $h \geq s$  and the solution of (16) exists and is unique.

Let  $n \geq \bar{n}$ . Observe that  $F(z^*) < 1$ , as evident from (8) and the assumption that  $c > 0$ . Using the definition of  $r^*$ , we can rewrite (14) as

$$r^* \leq \frac{1 - F^n(z^*)}{1 - F(z^*)} = 1 + F(z^*) + F^2(z^*) + \dots + F^{n-1}(z^*) < n.$$

In addition,  $1/r^* = (1 - c)F(z^*) + 1 - F(z^*) < 1$ . Consequently,  $\frac{1}{n} < \frac{1}{r^*} < 1$ .

Observe that  $(1 - s)s^{n-1}$  unimodal on  $[0, 1]$  with zero at the endpoints and the maximum at  $s = \frac{n-1}{n}$ . Moreover, it is strictly decreasing on  $[\frac{n-1}{n}, 1]$ . Since the right-hand side of (16) is strictly between zero and the maximum, there exists a unique solution of (16) on  $[\frac{n-1}{n}, 1]$ .

Now we prove that  $c \leq s$ . It is immediate if  $c \leq \frac{n-1}{n}$  (since  $s \in [\frac{n-1}{n}, 1]$ ). Assume now that  $c > \frac{n-1}{n}$ . Because  $n \geq \bar{n}$ , condition (14) must hold, which can be written as

$$F^{n-1}(z^*) \leq (1 - c)r^*.$$

Thus, the right-hand side of (16) satisfies:

$$\frac{1}{r^*} \left(1 - \frac{1}{r^*}\right)^{n-1} = \frac{\left(cF(z^*)\right)^{n-1}}{r^*} \leq (1 - c)c^{n-1}.$$

That is,  $n \geq \bar{n}$  and (16) entail

$$(1 - s)s^{n-1} = \frac{1}{r^*} \left(1 - \frac{1}{r^*}\right)^{n-1} \leq (1 - c)c^{n-1}.$$

As  $(1 - s)s^{n-1}$  is decreasing on  $[\frac{n-1}{n}, 1]$  and we have assumed  $c > (n - 1)/n$ , it follows that  $c \leq s$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We have already established that the solution  $g$  must satisfy (21) for some  $r \in R = [1, \min\{n, 1/(1 - c)\}]$ . It remains to show that the optimal  $r$  is the unique solution of (22).

Let us first derive how  $\bar{x}_r$  and  $\underline{x}_r$  change w.r.t.  $r$ . From (19) we have

$$(1 - F(\bar{x}_r))dr - rf(\bar{x}_r)d\bar{x}_r = -nF^{n-1}(\bar{x}_r)f(\bar{x}_r)d\bar{x}_r.$$

Hence,

$$\frac{d\bar{x}_r}{dr} = \frac{1 - F(\bar{x}_r)}{(r - nF^{n-1}(\bar{x}_r))f(\bar{x}_r)},$$

and thus

$$(B3) \quad \bar{x}_r(nF^{n-1}(\bar{x}_r) - r)f(\bar{x}_r)\frac{d\bar{x}_r}{dr} = -\bar{x}_r(1 - F(\bar{x}_r)).$$

Next, if  $\underline{x}_r = 0$ , then  $\frac{d\underline{x}_r}{dr} = 0$ . Suppose that  $\underline{x}_r > 0$ . By (20) it satisfies  $(1 - c)rF(\underline{x}_r) + 1 - F^n(\underline{x}_r) = 1$ . Hence,

$$(1 - c)F(\underline{x}_r)dr + (1 - c)rf(\underline{x}_r)d\underline{x}_r - nF^{n-1}(\underline{x}_r)f(\underline{x}_r)d\underline{x}_r = 0.$$

Hence,

$$\frac{d\underline{x}_r}{dr} = \begin{cases} \frac{F(\bar{x}_r)}{(nF^{n-1}(\underline{x}_r) - (1-c)r)f(\underline{x}_r)}, & \text{if } \underline{x}_r > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } \underline{x}_r = 0. \end{cases}$$

Thus we obtain

$$(B4) \quad \underline{x}_r((1 - c)r - nF^{n-1}(\underline{x}_r))f(\underline{x}_r)\frac{d\underline{x}_r}{dr} = -\underline{x}_rF(\underline{x}_r).$$

Finally, with  $g = g_r$ , the principal's objective function is

$$W(r) = \int_a^{\underline{x}_r} x(1 - c)r dF(x) + \int_{\underline{x}_r}^{\bar{x}_r} xnF^{n-1}(x)dF(x) + \int_{\bar{x}_r}^b xrdF(x).$$

Taking the derivative w.r.t.  $r$  and using (B3) and (B4) we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dW(r)}{dr} &= \int_a^{\underline{x}_r} x(1 - c)dF(x) + \int_{\bar{x}_r}^b xdF(x) + \underline{x}_r((1 - c)r - nF^{n-1}(\underline{x}_r))f(\underline{x}_r)\frac{d\underline{x}_r}{dr} \\ &\quad + \bar{x}_r(nF^{n-1}(\bar{x}_r) - r)f(\bar{x}_r)\frac{d\bar{x}_r}{dr} \\ &= \int_a^{\underline{x}_r} x(1 - c)dF(x) + \int_{\bar{x}_r}^b xdF(x) - \underline{x}_rF(\underline{x}_r) - \bar{x}_r(1 - F(\bar{x}_r)) \\ &= \int_a^{\underline{x}_r} (x - \underline{x}_r)(1 - c)dF(x) + \int_{\bar{x}_r}^b (x - \bar{x}_r)dF(x). \end{aligned}$$

The equation  $\frac{dW(r)}{dr} = 0$  is exactly (22). To show that it has a unique solution, observe that  $\frac{d\underline{x}_r}{dr} \geq 0$  and  $\frac{d\bar{x}_r}{dr} > 0$  (since  $g_r(\underline{x}_r) = nF^{n-1}(\underline{x}_r) \geq (1 - c)r$  and  $g_r(\bar{x}_r) = nF^{n-1}(\bar{x}_r) \leq r$  by (IC)). Consequently,  $\frac{dW(r)}{dr}$  is strictly decreasing in  $r$ . Moreover, for  $r$  sufficiently close to 0, we have both  $\underline{x}_r$  and  $\bar{x}_r$  close to  $a$ , in which case  $W(r) > 0$ , and similarly, for  $r = 1/(1 - c)$ , we have  $\bar{x}_r = \underline{x}_r = b$ , in which case  $W(r) < 0$ . ■

**Proof of Propositions 5a, 5b, 5c.** The points of interest are the optimal principal's payoff  $z^*$  and the structure of the optimal allocation mechanism.

First, let us deal with the optimal principal's payoff  $z^*$ .

5a: Increasing  $c$  affects only the incentive constraint (IC) by making it looser. Optimization on a larger set yields a weakly higher optimal payoff.

5b: Increasing  $n$  affects only the feasibility constraint (F) by making it looser. Optimization on a larger set yields a weakly higher optimal payoff. When  $n \geq \bar{n}$ , the feasibility constraint is not binding and hence has no effect on the optimal payoff.

5c: Let  $\tilde{F}(x) \leq F(x)$  for all  $x$ . This affects the feasibility constraint (F) by making it looser for all  $x$ . Optimization on a larger set yields a weakly higher optimal payoff.

Next, we deal with the structure of the optimal allocation mechanism: threshold  $\bar{x}$  of the high pooling interval and threshold  $\underline{x}$  of the low pooling interval for the case of  $n < \bar{n}$ . The interval  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$  is the separating interval. There are three cases to consider.

**Case 1:**  $n \geq \bar{n}$ . By Proposition 2, the optimal allocation has to satisfy the equation

$$(1 - c) \int_a^{z^*} (z^* - x) dF(x) = \int_{z^*}^b (x - z^*) dF(x).$$

Integrating by parts, we obtain

$$(B5) \quad (1 - c) \int_a^{z^*} F(x) dx = \int_{z^*}^b (1 - F(x)) dx.$$

In this case, the threshold of the high pooling interval and the principal's payoff are the same,  $\bar{x} = z^*$ . The separating interval is empty.

5a: From (B5) it is immediate that  $\frac{dz^*}{dc} > 0$ . That is, the size of the high pooling interval is decreasing in  $c$ .

5b: Equation (B5) is independent of  $n$ , so a change in  $n$  has no effect (so long as  $n \geq \bar{n}$ ).

5c: Let  $\tilde{F}(x) \leq F(x)$  for all  $x$ . From (B5) it is immediate that replacing  $F$  with  $\tilde{F}$  yields a greater solution  $z^*$ . That is, the high pooling interval shrinks.

**Case 2:**  $n < \bar{n}$  and  $\underline{x} = 0$ . By Proposition 3, the optimal allocation has to satisfy equation (22) where we use  $\underline{x} = 0$ :

$$\int_a^0 (-x)(1 - c) dF(x) = \int_{\bar{x}}^b (x - \bar{x}) dF(x).$$

Integrating by parts, we obtain

$$(B6) \quad (1 - c) \int_a^0 F(x) dx = \int_{\bar{x}}^b (1 - F(x)) dx.$$

Note that (19) is satisfied, as it has a free variable  $r$  that does not appear in (B6).

Assuming that variations of the parameters are marginal and  $\underline{x}$  remains equal

to zero, the value of interest is the threshold  $\bar{x}$  of the high pooling interval. The change in the length of the separating interval  $t = \bar{x} - \underline{x}$  is the same as the change in  $\bar{x}$ .

5a: From (B6) it is immediate that  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dc} > 0$ . That is, the high pooling interval is decreasing and the separating interval is increasing in  $c$ .

5b: Equation (B6) is independent of  $n$ . Hence, a change in  $n$  has no effect, so long as  $\underline{x} = 0$ .

5c: Let  $\tilde{F}(x) \leq F(x)$  for all  $x$ . From (B6) it is immediate that replacing  $F$  by  $\tilde{F}$  yields a greater solution  $\bar{x}$ . That is, the high pooling interval shrinks and the separating interval expands.

**Case 3:**  $n < \bar{n}$  and  $\underline{x} > 0$ . By Proposition 3, the optimal allocation is described by three variables,  $\bar{x}$ ,  $\underline{x}$ , and  $r$ , that must satisfy (19), (20), and (22). Combining (19) and (20) to eliminate  $r$ , we obtain

$$(B7) \quad (1-c) \frac{1-F^n(\bar{x})}{1-F(\bar{x})} = F^{n-1}(\underline{x}).$$

Also, integrating (22) by parts, we obtain

$$(B8) \quad (1-c) \int_a^{\underline{x}} F(x)dx = \int_{\bar{x}}^b (1-F(x))dx.$$

Thus, the structure of the optimal allocation is characterized by  $\bar{x}$  and  $\underline{x}$  that satisfy (B7) and (B8).

Let us now evaluate  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dn}$ ,  $\frac{d\underline{x}}{dn}$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dc}$ , and  $\frac{d(\bar{x}-\underline{x})}{dc}$ . After taking the full differential of (B7) and (B8) w.r.t.  $\bar{x}$ ,  $\underline{x}$ ,  $c$ , and  $n$ , we obtain

$$(B9) \quad \begin{aligned} 0 &= L_{\bar{x}}d\bar{x} - L_{\underline{x}}d\underline{x} - L_cdc + L_n dn, \\ 0 &= M_{\bar{x}}d\bar{x} + M_{\underline{x}}d\underline{x} - M_cdc, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} L_{\bar{x}} &= (1-c) \frac{d}{d\bar{x}} (1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x})) > 0, \\ L_{\underline{x}} &= \frac{d}{d\underline{x}} F^{n-1}(\underline{x}) > 0, \\ L_c &= 1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x}) > 0, \\ L_n &= - \left( (1-c) \frac{F^n(\bar{x})}{1-F(\bar{x})} \ln F(\bar{x}) + F^{n-1}(\underline{x}) \ln F(\underline{x}) \right) > 0, \\ M_{\bar{x}} &= 1 - F(\bar{x}) > 0, \\ M_{\underline{x}} &= (1-c)F(\underline{x}) > 0, \\ M_c &= \int_a^{\underline{x}} F(x)dx > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where we used  $c > 0$ ,  $\underline{x} > a$  and  $\bar{x} < b$  (i.e., the best payoff is better than random allocation) and that  $f(x)$  is everywhere positive.

To evaluate  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dn}$  and  $\frac{d\underline{x}}{dn}$ , we set  $dc = 0$  and solve the system of equations (B9),

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\bar{x}}{dn} &= -\frac{L_n M_{\underline{x}}}{L_{\bar{x}} M_{\underline{x}} + L_{\underline{x}} M_{\bar{x}}} < 0, \\ \frac{d\underline{x}}{dn} &= \frac{L_n M_{\bar{x}}}{L_{\bar{x}} M_{\underline{x}} + L_{\underline{x}} M_{\bar{x}}} > 0,\end{aligned}$$

and hence  $\frac{d(\bar{x}-\underline{x})}{dn} < 0$ .

To evaluate  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dc}$  and  $\frac{d\underline{x}}{dc}$ , we set  $dn = 0$  and solve the system of equations (B9),

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\bar{x}}{dc} &= \frac{L_{\underline{x}} M_c + L_c M_{\underline{x}}}{L_{\bar{x}} M_{\underline{x}} + L_{\underline{x}} M_{\bar{x}}} > 0, \\ \frac{d\underline{x}}{dc} &= \frac{L_{\bar{x}} M_c - L_c M_{\bar{x}}}{L_{\bar{x}} M_{\underline{x}} + L_{\underline{x}} M_{\bar{x}}}.\end{aligned}$$

To prove  $\frac{d(\bar{x}-\underline{x})}{dc} > 0$ , it is sufficient to check that  $\frac{L_{\underline{x}} - L_{\bar{x}}}{(1-c)L_c} > 0$ . By (B7) we have

$$L_c = 1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x}) = \frac{1}{1-c} F^{n-1}(\underline{x}).$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{L_{\underline{x}} - L_{\bar{x}}}{(1-c)L_c} &= \frac{\frac{d}{d\underline{x}} F^{n-1}(\underline{x})}{F^{n-1}(\underline{x})} - \frac{\frac{d}{d\bar{x}} (1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x}))}{1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x})} \\ &= \frac{(n-1)f(\underline{x})}{F(\underline{x})} - \frac{(1 + 2F(\bar{x}) + \dots + (n-1)F^{n-2}(\bar{x}))f(\bar{x})}{1 + F(\bar{x}) + F^2(\bar{x}) + \dots + F^{n-1}(\bar{x})} \\ &> (n-1) \left( \frac{f(\underline{x})}{F(\underline{x})} - \frac{f(\bar{x})}{F(\bar{x})} \right) \geq 0,\end{aligned}$$

where we use

$$\frac{(1 + 2x + 3x^2 \dots + (n-1)x^{n-2})}{1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^{n-1}} < \frac{n-1}{x}, \quad x \in (0, 1),$$

and the hazard rate condition,  $F(x)/f(x)$  is increasing.

Lastly, we cannot conclude anything from (B7)-(B8) about how the thresholds change if  $F$  is f.o.s.d. improved.

To summarize:

5a: The high pooling interval decreases and, under the hazard rate condition, the separating interval increases in  $c$ ;

5b: The high pooling interval increases and the separating interval decreases in

*n.*

5c: The result is ambiguous. If  $\tilde{F}(x) \leq F(x)$  for all  $x$ , we are unable to make any conclusions about how thresholds  $\bar{x}$  and  $\underline{x}$  change if  $F$  is replaced by  $\tilde{F}$ . ■