ONLINE APPENDIX TO INFORMATION TRANSMISSION UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE: AN EXPERIMENT

ONLINE APPENDICES A–G

ALISTAIR J. WILSON AND EMANUEL VESPA

CONTENTS

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APPENDIX A. PROOFS

In this appendix we provide proofs for two theoretical claims in the manuscript. We start with a statement that concerns the lack of contagion equilibria in the Strangers treatment.

Proposition 1. *There are no efficient, fully revealing pure-strategy contagion equilibria for the Strangers supergame at* $\delta = \frac{3}{4}$.

Proof. Consider an extreme *Healthy/Infected* contagion state. To satisfy efficiency and full revelation on the path, in the *Healthy* state senders must reveal and receivers choose Full when the good state is signaled. We now show that there are no individually rational punishments that will stop a sender deviation in the bad state through the quickest spreading contagion, where the sender gets their best-possible payoff in an efficient pure strategy in the *Healthy* state: $1/3$ in the bad state and 1 in the good state (full investment in both states can be ruled out as it violates IR for receivers).

Let v_{I} capture the sender's expected payoff when matched to any partner in the *Infected* state. Our matching protocol makes sure that subjects cannot be rematched in two contiguous rounds.[1] Consider a session with 14 participants (sessions had 14 or 16 participants, so 14 is the best-case for the contagion construction) and a sender in the last supergame S within the session. For the purpose of constructing a deviation assume a bad-state realization (without loss of generality in period one). If the sender deviates she receives a payoff of 1 (by full revelation and efficiency). In the second round the sender is always matched to a received in the Healthy state, and can therefore guarantee herself a payoff of 1 in either state. In the third round, there are six receivers she can be matched (excluding the receiver from round two) where the sender that became infected in round two has not infected anyone else yet. Of the six possible round three receiver matches only one is *Infected*: the receiver she interacted with in round 1. So with probability $1/6$ she is punished in round three through the infected receiver (getting some punishment payoff v_0) and with probability $5/6$ she continues to get the certain deviation payoff of 1. The multi-round deviation by the sender in an initial bad-state therefore yields a payoff of:

$$1 + \tfrac{3}{4} \cdot 1 + \left(\tfrac{3}{4}\right)^2 \cdot \left[\tfrac{1}{6} \cdot v_{\mathrm{I}} + \tfrac{5}{6} \cdot 1\right] + \left(\tfrac{3}{4}\right)^3 V_{(4)},$$

where $V_{(4)}$ is the continuation payoff for round 4 onwards. Bounding this continuation payoff with $V_{(4)} > 4 \cdot v_{\mathrm{I}}$ (as there is still positive probability that some receivers are in the *Healthy* state) a necessary condition for the equilibrium construction is

$$\tfrac{1}{3} + \tfrac{3}{4} \cdot \tfrac{1}{2} \cdot 4(1 + \tfrac{1}{3}) > 1 + \tfrac{3}{4} \cdot 1 + \left(\tfrac{3}{4}\right)^2 \cdot \left[\tfrac{1}{6} \cdot v_{\mathrm{I}} + \tfrac{5}{6} \cdot 1\right] + \left(\tfrac{3}{4}\right)^3 4 \cdot v_{\mathrm{I}}$$

[1] If sender i has receiver partner j in round $t-1$, and the set of possible receiver matches is R, the experimental matching rule has i randomly rematched to a random partner in $k \in R \setminus \{j\}$ in round t.

This condition simplifies to $v_{\mathrm{I}} < {}^{11}/_{171}$. However, this *Infected* state punishment payoff is lower than the worst possible jointly IR sender payoff of ${}^{1}/_{12}$. □

Corollary 1. *If it is only possible to coordinate on either (i) efficient, fully revealing pure-strategy outcomes supported by contagion, or (ii) a babbling outcome; then there is no possibility of a contagion supported outcome at the session level.*

Proof. The Proposition shows that the contagion strategy cannot be used in the last supergame $S = 15$, so the outcome here will be babbling. If the outcome in supergames s onwards is babbling, the Proposition implies the contagion equilibrium cannot work in supergame $s - 1$. By induction, the unique outcome is therefore babbling in all fifteen supergames. □

The second result states that in our repeated sender-receiver environment under regular assumptions on preferences, full revelation cannot be supported with reversion to the babbling outcome.

Proposition 2. *Consider a sender-receiver game with state space, message space and action space given by $\Theta = M = \mathcal{A} = [0, 1]$. Let (i) the sender have a concave state-independent utility function $u(a)$ that is increasing in a, and (ii) the receiver has a utility function $v(\theta, a)$ maximized at $a = \theta$ for each state θ with an uninformed best response of $a_\emptyset \geq \mathbb{E}\theta$. Full extraction can not be supported by babbling reversion for any $\delta \in (0, 1)$.*

Proof. First, consider the sender payoffs under babbling. In the babbling outcome the receiver chooses $a_\emptyset \geq \mathbb{E}\theta$ with certainty, and the sender's payoff is $u_B = u(a_\emptyset) \geq u(\mathbb{E}\theta)$, where the inequality follows from u being increasing. Second, consider full extraction (FE), which requires $a^\star(\theta) = \theta$ along the path. Consider a strategy with full revelation and full extraction, with a babbling punishment on any deviation. We now we show that in any state $\theta < 1$ there exists a strict gain from a deviation for the sender. The sender's expected continuation payoff on the path is $u_{FE} = \mathbb{E}u(\theta)$. Consider a deviation to $\theta' > \theta$. This increases the current round sender payoff relative to full revelation as $(1 - \delta) \cdot (\theta' - \theta) > 0$. Moreover it also provides a weak benefit to the sender's continuation value, as $\delta \cdot (u_B - u_{FE}) \geq 0$ ($u_B \geq u(\mathbb{E}\theta)$ by assumption, and by Jensen's inequality we have that $u(\mathbb{E}\theta) \geq \mathbb{E}u(\theta) = u_{FE}$). □

The proposition shows that full extraction can not be supported by babbling reversion when the sender's payoff functino is concave. In our specific parameterization—and setting partial investment to be the exact intermediate between full and no investment—the sender's payoff is instead *convex* over the action, ${}^{1}/_{2} \cdot u_S(\text{Full}) + {}^{1}/_{2} \cdot u_S(\text{None}) > u_S(\text{Partial})$. However, the result holds in our parametrization at $\delta = \frac{3}{4}$.

APPENDIX B. SENDER'S STRATEGY TREATMENT

The *Sender's Strategy* Treatment (*SenStrat*) treatment is identical to Partners except that we use the strategy method for senders and extend the feedback to receivers, allowing them to see (at the end of the round) the strategy that was elicited from senders at the beginning of the round. In further detail, before the state is selected, senders are asked to indicate a message choice for each possible state realization. After senders submit their state-dependent choices ($\mu_t : \{\text{Good}, \text{Bad}\} \rightarrow \{\text{Invest}, \text{Don't}\}$), the state θ_t is drawn for the round and the interface sends the receiver the relevant message, $m_t = \mu_t(\theta_t)$. The receiver observes the message m_t realization as before and selects an action. A crucial difference is in the provided feedback: the receiver learns what message she would have received in the counterfactual state—that is the receiver's round feedback is effectively $(\theta_t, \mu_t(\text{Good}), \mu_t(\text{Bad}), a_t)$.

The manipulation does not to change the theoretical predictions, it simply allows senders to clearly signal their strategic intentions from the first round, regardless of the state realization. Senders who decide to reveal (not reveal) are now identifiable by all receivers in round one. In contrast, for the Partners treatment, senders revelation is effectively only revealed in if a bad state is realized.

Table B1 presents the main aggregate behavioral responses for the treatment (full results are provided in *Online Appendix* C, Tables C4 and C5), where we provide data from the Partners treatment for comparison. We present the last eight supergames of each treatment to examine the longer-run effects and make comparisons to the gains in the Chat treatment. As is readily observable from the table, the SenStrat treatment has little difference with Partners. Senders report the truth under the bad state approximately 30 percent of the time in the manipulation, slightly above the corresponding 26 percent for the Partners treatment. Moreover, the most-common receiver response to the messages Invest and Don't are, respectively, Partial and None. The majority of subjects in the treatment are again coordinated on the babbling equilibrium, with behavior quantitatively close to the Partners treatment across our measures.

The manipulation does produce a small efficiency gain: Full Investment is selected in the good state 35 percent of the time, relative to 28 percent in the Partners treatment, though this difference is not statistically significant. While allowing for the sender to reveal their strategy regardless of the realization of the state may lead to a slight increase in efficiency, the effect is not robust. The main finding in the SenStrat treatment is that providing senders with a device to signal their coordination on full revelation at the end of every round does not lead to a substantial efficiency gain and observed behavior is close to the Partners treatment.

TABLE B1. Average Behavioral Choices and Consistent Beliefs: Sender's Strategy treatment (last eight supergames)

Category	Empirical Freq	Partners		Senders' Strategy	
		Rd.1	All	Rd.1	All
Sender Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Don't |Bad)	0.404	0.259	0.455	0.320
		(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.035)
Consistent Belief	$\hat{\mu}$ (Good |Invest)	0.627	0.571	0.647	0.587
		(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Receiver Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Full |Invest)	0.375	0.251	0.367	0.304
		(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.027)
	$\hat{\beta}$ (None |Don't)	0.600	0.560	0.600	0.576
		(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.060)
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Partial |Don't)	0.350	0.388	0.356	0.377
		(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.056)
Efficiency	$\hat{\Pr}$ (Full |Good)	0.400	0.284	0.388	0.347
		(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.035)

Note: Standard-errors (in parentheses) are derived from a bootstrap (of size 5,000) with supergame-level resampling, stratified by treatment. Significance stars represent t-tests for equality of coefficients between the relevant *Partners* and *Strangers* entry against a two-sided hypothesis: *** -99 percent confidence; ** -95 percent confidence; * -90 percent confidence.



(A) Partners (no transfer)

(B) Partners (with transfer)

FIGURE C1 . Feasible and IR Discounted-Average Payoffs: Partners with and without transfer



(A) Partners-R_1

(B) Partners-R_2

FIGURE C2 . Feasible and IR Discounted-Average Payoffs: Partners-R_1 and Partners-R_2 Treatments

TABLE C1. Discounted-average Payoffs

Treatment	N_{SG}	Partners					N_{SG}	Strangers				
Senders:		$(1-\delta)\cdot\hat{u}_1$	+	$\delta\cdot\hat{U}_{2+}$	=	$\hat{U}$		$(1-\delta)\hat{u}$	+	$\delta\cdot\hat{U}_{2+}$	=	$\hat{U}$
$m_1 =$ Invest $\vert\theta_1 =$ Bad	133	0.430	+	0.880	=	1.294	166	0.422	+	0.964	=	1.386
		(0.022)		(0.087)		(0.091)		(0.019)		(0.086)		(0.087)
$m_1 =$ Don't $\vert\theta_1 =$ Bad	97	0.111	+	1.137	=	1.242	58	0.134	+	0.668	=	0.802
		(0.019)		(0.128)		(0.126)		(0.025)		(0.112)		(0.115)
Receivers		$(1-\delta)\cdot\hat{v}_1$	+	$\delta\cdot\hat{V}_{2+}$	=	$\hat{V}$		$(1-\delta)\hat{v}$	+	$\delta\cdot\hat{V}_{2+}$	=	$\hat{V}$
$a_1 =$ Full $\vert m_1 =$ Invest	149	0.498	+	1.262	=	1.760	144	0.438	+	1.233	=	1.670
		(0.030)		(0.122)		(0.122)		(0.031)		(0.115)		(0.120)
$a_1 =$ Partial $\vert m_1 =$ Invest	206	0.500	+	1.489	=	1.990	243	0.500	+	1.388	=	1.888
		(–)		(0.110)		(0.110)		(–)		(0.090)		(0.090)
$a_1 =$ None $\vert m_1 =$ Don't	66	0.750	+	1.583	=	2.333	34	0.728	+	1.243	=	1.971
		(–)		(0.195)		(0.195)		(0.022)		(0.276)		(0.268)
$a_1 =$ Partial $\vert m_1 =$ Don't	27	0.500	+	1.269	=	1.769	23	0.500	+	1.239	=	1.809
		(–)		(0.278)		(0.278)		(–)		(0.266)		(0.115)

Note: Standard-errors are in parentheses and are derived from a bootstrap (of size 5,000) with supergame-level resampling.

TABLE C2. Coded Chat Data

Question	Coder 1	Coder 2	Agreement
"Who initiates the conversation? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker"	1.39 (180)	1.39 (180)	1.39 (177)
We will call "a message" each time one party sends information to the other. How many messages does the Recommender send?	2.36 (180)	2.36 (180)	2.29 (171)
How many messages does the Decision-Maker send?	2.10 (180)	1.95 (180)	1.92 (180)
How many messages that the Recommender sends are related to discussing behavior in the game?	1.93 (180)	1.73 (180)	1.52 (129)
How many messages that the Decision-Maker send are related to discussing behavior in the game?	1.62 (180)	1.38 (180)	1.25 (129)
Does the chat mention Strategy X [the information rents strategy]?[2] Enter 1 for yes, 0 for no.	0.74 (180)	0.77 (180)	0.77(175)
Which party first makes a reference to Strategy X? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker.	1.49 (134)	1.47 (139)	1.47 (125)
Does the full discussion of Strategy X result in an exchange of messages or is simply proposed by one party? Enter 1 for exchange of messages, 2 for one party.	1.85 (134)	1.81 (139)	1.87 (118)
Who states that the Decision-Maker will pick Middle if the recommendation is Go Right? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision- Maker, 3 for both.	1.68 (134)	1.70 (139)	1.67 (132)
Does the conversation at some point clearly state that there are punishments for not satisfying the agreement?	0.07 (134)	0.07 (139)	0.07 (134)
Who first makes a statement about punishments? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker, 3 for both.	1.9 (10)	1.9 (10)	1.9 (10)
The punishments that subjects discuss correspond to those of Strategy X? Enter 1 if yes, 0 if no.	0.82 (11)	1.0 (10)	1.0 (9)
After subjects discuss Strategy X, is there a proposal for not using Strategy X?	0.11 (134)	0.7 (10)	0.0 (3)
Does the chat mention Strategy Y [full extraction]? Enter 1 for yes, 0 for no.	0.11 (180)	0.07 (180)	0.07(169)
Which party first makes a reference to Strategy Y? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker.	1.60 (20)	1.54 (13)	1.60 (10)
Does the full discussion of Strategy Y result of an exchange of messages or is simply proposed by one party? Enter 1 for exchange of messages, 2 for one party.	1.70 (20)	2.00 (13)	2.00 (9)
Does the conversation at some point clearly state that there are punishments for not satisfying the agreement?	0.00 (19)	0.00 (13)	0.00 (10)
Who first makes a statement about punishments? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker, 3 for both.			
Do the punishments subjects discuss correspond to those of Strategy Y? Enter 1 if yes, 0 if no.			
After subjects discuss Strategy Y, is there a proposal for not using Strategy Y?	0.10 (19)	(0)	(0)
Is there a discussion of a Strategy that does not correspond to either Strategy X or Strategy Y? Enter 1 if yes, 0 if no.	0.22 (180)	0.18 (180)	0.15 (153)
Is there a explicit reference to truthfulness or honesty in the chat?	0.46 (179)	0.38 (180)	0.41 (158)
If there is an explicit reference to truthfullness or honesty, who makes it? Enter 1 for Recommender, 2 for Decision-Maker, 3 for both.	1.64 (80)	1.61 (71)	1.56 (54)

[2] Defined for coders as: The Recommender tells the truth. The Decision-Maker picks Left when the message is Go Left and Middle when the recommendation is Go Right. If in any period either the Recommender or the Decision-Maker does something different, then from the next period onwards the Decision- Maker will always select middle.

TABLE C3. Tobit Regression on Supergame Efficiency

Variable	Coeff.		Std. Err	Marginal Effect		Std. Err
Mention Information Rents strategy	1.903	***	0.637	0.505	**	0.204
Mention Full Extraction strategy	0.206		0.683	0.067		0.219
Mention Other Strategy	0.790		0.624	0.256		0.200
Supergame Number	0.0127		0.084	0.002		0.027
Constant	0.705		0.544	0.404	**	0.179

Note: The Tobit regression examines the subsample of 192 chat supergames for 118 supergames with: i) One or more rounds in the good state, which eliminates 42 supergames); and ii) perfect agreement between the two chat coders, which eliminates 43 supergames, 11 overlapping with condition (i). The Tobit controls for censoring at an efficiency level of 100 percent, as 102 of the 118 supergames are perfectly efficient. Marginal effects are the change in probability (base probability for the constant) of achieving a perfectly efficient supergame (the censored region for the Tobit) as each variable shifts from 0 to 1. Standard errors for the marginal effects calculated using the delta method.

TABLE C4. Full Behavioral Response, Empirically Consistent Beliefs and Outcomes (Last Eight Supergames, $t = 1$)

Category	Emp. Frequency	Partners	SenStrat	Transfer		Chat		Partners-R$_1$		Partners-R$_2$	
Sender Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Invest |Good)	1.000	1.000	0.977		0.967	*	1.000		0.989	
		–	–	(0.016)		(0.019)		–		(0.012)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Don't |Bad)	0.404	0.455	0.687	***	0.812	***	0.687	***	0.626	***
		(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.046)		(0.038)		(0.047)		(0.050)	
Consistent Belief	$\hat{\mu}$ (Good |Invest)	0.627	0.647	0.757	***	0.837	***	0.762	***	0.726	***
		(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.026)	
	$\hat{\mu}$ (Bad |Don't)	1	1	0.967		0.961	*	1		0.982	
		–	–	(0.022)		(0.021)		–		(0.018)	
Receiver Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Full |Invest)	0.375	0.367	0.439		0.869	***	0.750	***	0.570	***
		(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.047)		(0.034)		(0.040)		(0.046)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Partial |Invest)	0.604	0.554	0.500	*	0.131	***	0.250	***	0.405	***
		(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.047)		(0.034)		(0.041)		(0.046)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (None |Don't)	0.600	0.600	0.900	***	0.232	***	0.808	**	0.905	***
		(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.039)		(0.047)		(0.048)		(0.037)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Partial |Don't)	0.350	0.356	0.100	***	0.744	***	0.176	*	0.095	***
		(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.036)		(0.049)		(0.047)		(0.037)	
Efficiency	$\hat{\Pr}$ (Full |Good)	0.400	0.388	0.447		0.878	***	0.800	***	0.553	**
		(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)		(0.035)		(0.043)		(0.054)	

Note: Standard-errors (in parentheses) are derived from a bootstrap (of size 5,000) with supergame-level resampling across the 460 supergames for each treatment. Significance stars represent two-sided t-tests for equality of coefficients with the relevant *Partners* coefficient: *** -99 percent confidence; ** -95 percent confidence; * -90 percent confidence.

TABLE C5. Full Behavioral Response, Empirically Consistent Beliefs and Outcomes (Last Eight Supergames, All t)

Category	Emp. Frequency	Partners	SenStrat		Transfer		Chat		Partners-R_1		Partners-R_2	
Sender Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Invest |Good)	0.987	0.965	*	0.980		0.988		0.973		0.975	
		(0.007)	(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.006)		(0.014)		(0.010)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Don't |Bad)	0.259	0.320		0.565	***	0.797	***	0.612	***	0.519	***
		(0.031)	(0.035)		(0.039)		(0.029)		(0.034)		(0.036)	
Consistent Belief	$\hat{\mu}$ (Good |Invest)	0.571	0.587		0.693	***	0.829	***	0.715	***	0.670	***
		(0.011)	(0.013)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.018)		(0.017)	
	$\hat{\mu}$ (Bad |Don't)	0.954	0.902		0.966		0.985		0.957		0.954	
		(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.015)		(0.008)		(0.021)		(0.018)	
Receiver Behavior	$\hat{\beta}$ (Full |Invest)	0.251	0.304		0.466	***	0.830	***	0.601	***	0.536	***
		(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.036)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Partial |Invest)	0.691	0.575	**	0.478	***	0.154	***	0.388	***	0.442	***
		(0.031)	(0.034)		(0.039)		(0.035)		(0.038)		(0.034)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (None |Don't)	0.560	0.576		0.872	***	0.225	***	0.802	***	0.832	***
		(0.066)	(0.060)		(0.029)		(0.035)		(0.036)		(0.035)	
	$\hat{\beta}$ (Partial |Don't)	0.388	0.377		0.124	***	0.729	***	0.179	***	0.151	***
		(0.067)	(0.056)		(0.028)		(0.039)		(0.036)		(0.034)	
Efficiency	$\hat{\Pr}$ (Full |Good)	0.284	0.347		0.521	***	0.861	***	0.621	***	0.586	***
		(0.036)	(0.035)		(0.043)		(0.035)		(0.042)		(0.040)	

Note: Standard-errors (in parentheses) are derived from a bootstrap (of size 5,000) with supergame-level resampling across the 460 supergames for each treatment. Significance stars represent t-tests for equality of coefficients between the relevant *Partners* and *Strangers* entry against one-side hypotheses justified by theory (information-rents strategy vs. babbling): *** -99 percent confidence; ** -95 percent confidence; * -90 percent confidence.

APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF TREATMENT EFFECTS

In this section we provide additional statistical support for the statements in Sections 3–4. We now describe the approach that we follow to compare across treatments. In the case of senders, the vast majority of messages are to Invest when the state is good, so the informative comparisons take place when the state is bad and we therefore focus our analysis on these cases. The dependent variable in the analysis is a dummy that takes value 1 if the subject sent the message Invest and 0 otherwise. On the right-hand side we have a treatment dummy (to be specified in each comparison) and a constant.

For receivers, we conduct two separate sets of regressions. First, we consider the case when the message is Invest. When such message is received, the informative comparison is to evaluate if the receiver decides to fully invest or not. Hence, we define the dependent variable in this case as 1 if the receiver fully invests and 0 otherwise. Second, consider the case when the message is Don't Invest. In this case, we want to evaluate if the receiver selects Partial or not. Consequently, our dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the receiver's action is Partial and 0 otherwise. In each case we report the estimates using a random-effects linear probability model.[3]

	Senders		**Receivers**			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners	-0.167	-0.110	0.054	0.043	-0.145	-0.066
	(0.103)	(0.075)	(0.103)	(0.072)	(0.120)	(0.103)
Constant	0.738***	0.788***	0.357***	0.284***	0.407***	0.380***
	(0.073)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.091)	(0.074)

TABLE D1. Linear Probability Models: Partners vs. Strangers Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners treatment and 0 if it is from the Strangers treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

Tables D1 and D2 report the results for a comparison of the Partners and the Strangers treatment, with the treatment dummy (Parters) taking value 1 (0) if the observation comes from the Partners

[3]We decided to report a linear probability model for ease of presentation. The results are qualitatively similar if we estimate a random effects probit model for the senders or an random effects ordered probit for receivers (given that receivers are deciding among three ordered options).

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners	-0.219*	-0.087	0.097	0.047	-0.033	-0.084
	(0.121)	(0.078)	(0.115)	(0.071)	(0.174)	(0.126)
Constant	0.811***	0.829***	0.273***	0.217***	0.341***	0.416***
	(0.085)	(0.055)	(0.081)	(0.050)	(0.142)	(0.093)

TABLE D2. Linear Probability Models: Partners vs. Strangers Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners treatment and 0 if it is from the Strangers treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Chat	0.058	0.020	0.028	0.027	0.062	-0.018
	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.108)	(0.072)	(0.121)	(0.100)
Constant	0.561***	0.619***	0.443***	0.384***	0.223***	0.303***
	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.051)	(0.086)	(0.071)

TABLE D3. Linear Probability Models: Chat vs. Partners Treatment Effects (First 12 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Chat is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Chat treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame; $S > 12$ regressions use only the last 8 supergames of the session.

(Strangers) treatment. We present the output including all supergames (Table D1) and also constrained to the last eight supergames (Table D2). The findings are in line with the test of proportion we report in the text: there are basically no statistical differences at the aggregate level between the Partners and the Strangers treatment either with respect to the behavior of senders or receivers. In the next appendix section we show, however, that there are small differences across these two treatments when we condition on past play.

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Chat	-0.438***	-0.555***	0.501***	0.574***	0.403***	0.378***
	(0.112)	(0.074)	(0.100)	(0.070)	(0.113)	(0.099)
Constant	0.592***	0.742***	0.370***	0.265***	0.322***	0.338***
	(0.080)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.087)	(0.075)

TABLE D4. Linear Probability Models: Chat vs. Partners Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For Receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. Chat is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Chat treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

Tables D3 and D4 present the comparison between the Chat and Partners treatments, with the treatment dummy (Chat) taking value 1 (0) if the observation comes from the Chat (Partners) treatment. Table D3 presents the output for supergames prior to the introduction of pre-play communication ($S \leq 12$) and Table D4 supergames with pre-play communication ($S > 12$). There is no statistical difference across treatments prior to the introduction of pre-play communication, but there are large and statistically significant treatment effects once chat is introduced in all cases. For senders, in the last eight supergames, we find a negative treatment effect, which means that subjects are less likely to dishonestly send the message Invest in the bad state. Meanwhile, we find that receivers are much more likely to follow the sender's recommendation when the message is Invest. In this case, subjects in the Chat treatment select Full significantly more often than in Partners. On the other hand, when the message is Don't Invest, receiver subjects in the Chat treatment are much more likely to select Partial investment, consistent with the information-rents strategy.

Tables D5 and D6 display the output for the comparison between the SenStrat and Partners treatments, with the treatment dummy (SenStrat) taking value 1 (0) if the observation comes from the SenStrat (Partners) treatment. We present results for all supergames and for the last eight supergames in each case. We basically find that there is no significant treatment effect relative to Partners. Moreover, the estimates for the treatment dummy are quantitatively small.

Tables D7 and D8 show the output for the comparison between the Transfer treatment (with the treatment dummy Transfer taking value 1) and the Partners treatment (with the treatment dummy taking value 0). In this case we do find differences in behavior for senders and receivers. In the case of senders we find that subjects are more likely to tell the truth in the Transfer treatment. The increase of truth-telling is between 20 and 30 percentage points. We find a significant effect for

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
SenStrat	0.017	-0.036	-0.018	0.026	-0.145	-0.066
	(0.113)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.066)	(0.120)	(0.103)
Constant	0.571***	0.677***	0.411***	0.326***	0.407***	0.380***
	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.047)	(0.091)	(0.074)

TABLE D5. Linear Probability Models: SenStrat vs. Partners Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For Receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. SenStrat is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Revelation treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
SenStrat	-0.019	-0.093	0.013	0.062	-0.033	-0.084
	(0.138)	(0.093)	(0.123)	(0.074)	(0.174)	(0.126)
Constant	0.592***	0.742***	0.369***	0.264***	0.341***	0.416***
	(0.098)	(0.065)	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.142)	(0.093)

TABLE D6. Linear Probability Models: SenStrat vs. Partners Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For Receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. SenStrat is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Revelation treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

receivers when the message is invest if we focus on all periods. The treatment effect involves an increase between 11 and 21 percentage points. Finally, in all cases we find a difference in choices when the message is Don't Invest. In this case, subjects are more less likely to choose Partial in the Transfer treatment. The reason for this is that receivers are choosing None much more often (but are instead opting to make an explicit transfer).

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta = $ Bad		$m = $ Invest		$m = $ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Transfer	-0.214**	-0.205**	0.129	0.167**	-0.168**	-0.186**
	(0.109)	(0.080)	(0.112)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.078)
Constant	0.571***	0.678***	0.411***	0.326***	0.264***	0.314***
	(0.077)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.056)

TABLE D7. Linear Probability Models: Transfer vs. Partners Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m = $ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m = $ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a = $ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m = $ Don't, takes value 1 if $a = $ Partial and 0 otherwise. Transfer is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Distribution treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta = $ Bad		$m = $ Invest		$m = $ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Transfer	-0.254*	-0.284***	0.114	0.214**	-0.230**	-0.213**
	(0.135)	(0.089)	(0.130)	(0.091)	(0.100)	(0.091)
Constant	0.592***	0.742***	0.369***	0.265***	0.316***	0.334***
	(0.096)	(0.065)	(0.091)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.066)

TABLE D8. Linear Probability Models: Transfer vs. Partners Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m = $ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m = $ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a = $ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m = $ Don't, takes value 1 if $a = $ Partial and 0 otherwise. Transfer is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Distribution treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

Finally, Tables D9, D10, D11 and D12 provide the comparisons between Partners, and Partners-R_1 and Partners-R_2. In each table, the treatment dummy takes value 1 in case the observation is from the corresponding Partners-R treatment. In both cases we find similar treatment effects. Senders are between 20 and 30 percentage points less likely to lie in Partners-R treatments relative to Partners. We also find that there are significant effects on receivers' behavior. In particular,

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners-R$_1$	-0.264**	-0.300***	0.297***	0.278***	-0.107	-0.129
	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.101)	(0.075)	(0.093)	(0.084)
Constant	0.571***	0.678***	0.411***	0.326***	0.261***	0.314***
	(0.075)	(0.544)	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.059)

TABLE D9. Linear Probability Models: Partners-R$_1$ vs. Partners Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For Receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners-R$_1$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners-R$_1$ treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners-R$_1$	-0.285**	-0.360***	0.374***	0.355***	-0.165	-0.160*
	(0.135)	(0.081)	(0.125)	(0.081)	(0.113)	(0.098)
Constant	0.592***	0.742***	0.369***	0.265***	0.312***	0.334***
	(0.090)	(0.057)	(0.088)	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.072)

TABLE D10. Linear Probability Models: Partners-R$_1$ vs. Partners Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For Receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners-R$_1$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners-R$_1$ treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

upon hearing the invest message, receivers are significantly more likely to follow the advice in both Partners-R treatments relative to Partners.

Finally, in Table D13 we present non-parametric tests using the three session-level observations. Consider a set of session-level observations from a treatment-pair, $\boldsymbol{X} = \{X_1, X_2, X_3\}$ and $\boldsymbol{Y} = \{Y_1, Y_2, Y_3\}$ where the X_i and Y_i are iid draws from the respective (continuous) treatment-level distribution. Under a null that X_i and Y_i have the same median value, the probability of the tail

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners-R_2	-0.230**	-0.231***	0.222***	0.257***	-0.102	-0.132
	(0.113)	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.088)
Constant	0.571***	0.678***	0.411***	0.326***	0.261***	0.314***
	(0.079)	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.062)

TABLE D11. Linear Probability Models: Partners-R_2 vs. Partners Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners-R_2 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners-R_2 treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

	Senders		Receivers			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t	$t = 1$	All t
Partners-R_2	-0.203	-0.267***	0.211*	0.262***	-0.189*	-0.170*
	(0.131)	(0.087)	(0.128)	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.101)
Constant	0.592***	0.742***	0.369***	0.264***	0.307***	0.334***
	(0.093)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.055)	(0.083)	(0.073)

TABLE D12. Linear Probability Models: Partners-R_2 vs. Partners Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For Senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For Receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners-R_2 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners-R_2 treatment and 0 if it is from the Partners treatment. Standard-Errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: $t = 1$ regressions only use the first period of each supergame.

event that all three X values are greater than the three Y values is:

$$\Pr\{\min \boldsymbol{X} > \max \boldsymbol{Y}\} = 0.0498.$$

A one-sided alternative hypothesis that the median of X_i is greater than the median of Y_i would allow us to reject the null with 95 percent confidenceso long as all three sessions have a higher average. We will write this directional rejection as $X \succ_z^{\star\star} Y$ for any metric z, where $\succ_z^{\star\star}$ is transitive by definition. For treatment X we can therefore define the lower contour treatment set

TABLE D13. Non-Parametric Session-Level Tests

Treatment	**Revealed Better On**		
	Honesty	**Credulity**	**Efficiency**
Chat	*All Others*	*All Others*	*All Others*
Partners-R_1	*Partners, Strangers*	*Partners, Strangers*	*Partners, Strangers*
Partners-R_2	*Partners, Strangers*	*Partners, Strangers*	*Partners, Strangers*
Transfer	*Partners, Strangers*	*Partners, Strangers*	*Strangers*

on metric z as:

$$L_{\succ^{\star\star}}(X;z) := \{Y \in \text{Treatments}\,|X \succ^{\star\star}_z Y\}$$

Table D13 presents the revealed better than set for each treatment across the three main metrics in our experiment: (i) Honesty, $\beta\,(\text{Don't}\,|\text{Bad})$; (ii) Credulity, $\beta\,(\text{Full}\,|\text{Invest})$; and (iii) Efficiency, $\Pr\{\text{Full}\,|\text{Good}\}$.

Appendix E. History dependence

Analysis at the aggregate level

Though the overall data indicates a modal response that exactly reflects the babbling outcome, we now show that subjects in our Partners treatment do react to history within the supergame. Tables E1 and E2 present aggregate evidence that subjects respond to history in the Partners treatment but not in Strangers. To define the dependent variables for senders and receivers we follow a similar approach as described in Online Appendix D: For senders we focus on cases when the state is bad and the dependent variable equals one if the subject recommends Invest. For receivers we distinguish based on the current message. If the message is Invest, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the subject chooses Full Investment and 0 otherwise. If the message is Don't Invest, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the subject chooses Partial and 0 otherwise. We present results for all supergames and for the the last eight. In addition, in each case we distinguish between a sample that includes only the second period (after there is a single period of previous history, we label these regressions as "$t = 2$") and all periods after the first ("$t \geq 2$").

	Senders		**Receivers**			
	$\theta =$ Bad		$m =$ Invest		$m =$ Don't Invest	
	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$
Partners	-0.095	-0.058	0.026	-0.030	-0.116	-0.022
	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.064)	(0.205)	(0.123)
Inf. Rent Feedback	-0.001	-0.025	0.192***	0.079***	-0.126	-0.114*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.124)	(0.066)
Partners × Inf.Rent	-0.168**	-0.135***	0.085***	0.108***	0.055	0.010
	(0.082)	(0.041)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.192)	(0.090)
Constant	0.785***	0.816***	0.152***	0.212***	0.527***	0.453***
	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.130)	(0.086)

TABLE E1. History Dependence: Partners vs. Strangers Treatment Effects (All Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For senders: takes value 1 if $m =$ Invest. For receivers: i) if $m =$ Invest, it takes value 1 if $a =$ Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if $m =$ Don't, takes value 1 if $a =$ Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners treatment and 0 if it is from the Strangers treatment. Inf. Rent Feedback takes value 1 if a) Senders: The receiver in $t = 1$ selected i) Full and the message was Invest, or ii) Partial and the message was Don't; b) Receivers: The sender told the truth in $t = 1$. Standard-errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: i) $t = 2$, the data set is constrained to the second period of each supergame, ii) $t \geq 2$ the data set is constrained to all periods after the first.

	Senders		Receivers			
	θ = Bad		m = Invest		m = Don't Invest	
	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$	$t = 2$	$t \geq 2$
Partners	0.013	0.008	-0.026	-0.062	-0.111	0.006
	(0.105)	(0.070)	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.396)	(0.171)
Inf. Rent Feedback	0.042	0.018	0.165**	0.049	-0.143	-0.033
	(0.099)	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.157)	(0.098)
Partners $\times$ Inf.Rent	-0.311**	-0.225***	0.190**	0.166***	0.004	-0.098
	(0.134)	(0.063)	(0.096)	(0.044)	(0.418)	(0.150)
Constant	0.778***	0.830***	0.101	0.168***	0.611***	0.454***
	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.047)	(0.167)	(0.114)

TABLE E2. History Dependence: Partners vs. Strangers Treatment Effects (Last 8 Supergames)

Notes: Dependent variables are dummy variables. For senders: takes value 1 if m = Invest. For receivers: i) if m = Invest, it takes value 1 if a = Full and 0 otherwise; ii) if m = Don't, takes value 1 if a = Partial and 0 otherwise. Partners is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is from the Partners treatment and 0 if it is from the Strangers treatment. Inf. Rent feedback takes value 1 if a) Senders: The receiver in $t = 1$ selected i) Full and the message was Invest, or ii) Partial and the message was Don't; b) Receivers: The sender told the truth in $t = 1$. Standard-errors between parentheses. (*), (**), (***), denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. In each case we estimate a linear probability model taking into account the panel structure (random effects). Other legends: i) $t = 2$, the data set is constrained to the second period of each supergame, ii) $t \geq 2$ the data set is constrained to all periods after the first.

On the right-hand side we include three control variables. A treatment dummy that takes value 1 if the observation is from Partners. An information-rent feedback dummy: i) for senders it takes value 1 if in the previous period the message was Invest and the receiver selected Full, or if the message was Don't Invest and the receiver selected Partial; ii) for receivers it takes value 1 if the sender's message was truthful in the previous period. In other words the dummy captures cases where the outcome last period was 'positive', and we would expect a reaction to past play after such positive events. Finally, we also include the interaction between the information-rent feedback and Partners treatment dummy.

The main finding in the table is that the interaction dummy is always significant for senders and it is significant for receivers after Invest messages. This indicates, that senders are significantly more likely to respond by telling the truth in the current period if the feedback last period was positive and they are participating in Partners. Meanwhile there is no effect on truth-telling after positive feedback to senders in the Strangers treatment.

In the case of receivers, we document no significant effect of past play on choices in a round with a Don't Invest message, receiver subjects in both Strangers and Partners react similarly. However, there is a treatment effect for receivers when the message is Invest. In this case, subjects are more likely to follow the advice in period t if the sender told the truth in the last period. The effect is significantly larger in the Partners treatment.

Analysis at the individual level

SFEM. To examine if choices at the individual level are consistent with the findings at the aggregate level we use the *Strategy Frequency Estimation Method* (SFEM, see Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011).[4] For a given set of strategies, the SFEM evaluates which of these strategies subjects' choices are consistent with. Specifically, the procedure uses choices at the individual level to recover ϕ_k, the frequency attributed to strategy k in the data. To illustrate how the SFEM works, consider a finite set of strategies $\mathcal{K}$ that subjects may follow. Let $d^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h})$ be the choice of subject i and $k^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h})$ the decision prescribed for that subject by strategy $k \in \Phi$ in period p of supergame g for a given history $\mathbf{h}$. Strategy k is a perfect fit for period p if $d^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h}) = k^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h})$. The procedure models the probability that the choice (d) corresponds to the prescription of strategy k as:

$$(1) \qquad \Pr\left(d^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h}) = k^i_{gp}(\mathbf{h})\right) = \frac{1}{1 + (|\mathcal{A}| - 1)\exp\left(\frac{-1}{\gamma}\right)} = \beta.$$

In (1), $|A|$ represents the number of available actions (2 in the case of senders, 3 in the case of receivers) and $\gamma > 0$ is a parameter to be estimated. One interpretation of equation (1) is that subjects can make mental errors in the implementation of a strategy, β captures the probability that the subject does not make such error. To provide some intuition it is useful to consider the limit values that β can take. On the one hand, as $\gamma \to 0$, $\beta \to 1$ and the fit is perfect. On the other hand, as $\gamma \to \infty$, $\beta \to \frac{1}{|\mathcal{A}|}$. In this case, the estimate of γ is so high that the prediction of the model is no better than a random draw.[5]

With the specification for the mental error in (1), the procedure uses maximum likelihood to estimate the frequency of strategy k in the data (ϕ_k) and parameter γ. Let y^i_{gp} be an indicator that takes value one if the subject's choice matches the decision prescribed by the strategy. Since Equation (1) specifies the probability that a choice in a specific period corresponds to strategy k, the likelihood of observing strategy k for subject i is given by:

$$(2) \qquad p_i(k) = \prod_g \prod_p \left(\frac{1}{1 + (|\mathcal{A}| - 1)\exp\left(\frac{-1}{\gamma}\right)}\right)^{y^i_{gp}} \left(\frac{1}{1 + (|\mathcal{A}| - 1)\exp\left(\frac{1}{\gamma}\right)}\right)^{1-y^i_{gp}}.$$

[4] We describe the procedure next but the reader is referred to Fudenberg et al. (2010) and Embrey et al. (2013) for further details.

[5] For example, with two choices ($|A| = 2$) if $\beta = 0.5$ the estimates are no better than a simple toss of a coin to determine the choice.

Agent	Abbreviation	Description	Comments for the Transfer treatment
	Truth	$Invest$ if $\theta = Good$, $Don't$ if $\theta = Bad$.	
	Always Invest	$Invest$ for $\theta = \{Good, Bad\}$	
	Always Don't	$Don't\ Invest$ for $\theta = \{Good, Bad\}$	
Sender	Inf. Rent	Truth if $t = 1$ or if outcome was $Full$ when $m = Invest$ and $Partial$ when $m = Don't$ in $t-1$. Always Invest otherwise.	Also Truth if previous outcome was $None$ when $m = Don't$ and there was a transfer
	Full Extraction	Truth if $t = 1$ or if outcome was $Full$ when $m = Invest$ and $None$ when $m = Don't$ in $t-1$. Always Invest otherwise.	We require that there is no transfer if the receiver chose $None$ when $m = Don't$.
	Follow	$Full$ if $m = Invest$, $None$ if $m = Don't$	
	Always Partial	$Partial$ if $m = Invest$, $Partial$ if $m = Don't$	
	Always Full	$Full$ if $m = Invest$, $Full$ if $m = Don't$	
	Always None	$None$ if $m = Invest$, $None$ if $m = Don't$	
	Partial/None	$Partial$ if $m = Invest$, $None$ if $m = Don't$	
Receiver	Inf. Rent	$Full$ if $m = Invest$ and $Partial$ if $m = Don't$ if $t = 1$ or if $\theta = Good$ when $m = Invest$ & $\theta = Bad$ when $m = Don't$ in $t-1$. Partial/None otherwise.	$Partial$ also includes $None$ plus transfer $None$ includes only $None$ plus no transfer
	Full Extraction	$Full$ if $m = Invest$ and$None$ if $m = Don't$ if $t = 1$ or if $\theta = Good$ when $m = Invest$ & $\theta = Bad$ when $m = Don't$ in $t-1$. Partial/None otherwise.	$Partial$ also includes $None$ plus transfer $None$ includes only $None$ plus no transfer

TABLE E3. Strategies included in the Estimation

Aggregating over subjects we get: $\sum_i \ln\left(\sum_k \phi_k p_i(k)\right)$. The procedure maximizes the likelihood function to obtain estimates for γ and the strategy frequencies ϕ_k.[6]

An example may serve to clarify some aspects of the approach. Consider the case of senders with two available actions (Invest and Don't Invest), and where only two strategies are included in set $\mathcal{K}$, to always say Invest (All I) and to always say Don't Invest (All D). The fit will be good (high β) if the population is composed of subjects who either almost-always select Invest or almost-always select Don't Invest. The estimated frequency $\phi_{\text{All Invest}}$ would be the maximum-likelihood estimate of the proportion of subjects who almost always select $Invest$.[7] If a large proportion of senders shifts between Invest and Don't Inves within the supergame, neither strategy would accommodate their choices well, which the procedure will measure with a low estimate for β.

[6]Notice that since $\sum_k \phi_k = 1$, the procedure will provides $|\mathcal{K}| - 1$ estimates and the estimate for the $|\mathcal{K}|$-th strategy is computed by difference.

[7]The procedure would estimate two parameters in this case. The first parameter is $\phi_{\text{All } I}$, that would capture the frequency of All I. (The frequency of All D would be computed as $1 - \phi_{\text{All } I}$.) The second parameter is the estimate of γ. Following Equation (1) there is a one-to-one mapping between γ and β, so we will refer to the estimate of γ directly as an estimate of β.

Included Strategies and the One-Period-Ahead Strategy Method. Clearly, the estimated frequencies depend on the set of included strategies. However, our goal with the estimation is not in identifying all strategies that subjects may be using but rather to check if for a small set of strategies that are consistent with aggregate behavior, the overall fit is good (high β). When the fit is good, the data can be rationalized with the included strategies and we will evaluate the strategies with higher frequencies as corresponding to aggregate behavior. We find positive answers in both cases in our estimates: the overall fit is good with just a few strategies, and the estimated frequencies are consistent with the findings at the aggregate level.

Table E3 presents all strategies considered, indicating if they refer to the Sender or Receiver. For Senders we include three strategies that do not condition on past play (*Truth*, *Always Inves*t, *Always Don't*) and two strategies that condition honesty on past play triggers (*Information Rent*, *Full Extraction*). For Receivers, we include five strategies that do not condition on past play (*Follow Message*, *Always Full*, *Always Partial*, *Always None*) and two that do (*Information Rent*, *Full Extraction*) which we define with babbling triggers.

Notice that, in principle, the identification of strategies that condition on past play is only possible if punishments path are reached. To see why, consider a sender-receiver pair that are using the complementary *Information Rent* strategies. If they never deviate from full revelation, the observed part of the strategy for senders is observational equivalent to a strategy pair that does not condition on past play (*Truth*, *Follow Message*). More generally, the problem is that strategies are infinite-dimensional objects (prescribing an action at every possible decision node), but in the laboratory we only observe part of the path.

At the design stage, we anticipated that it may be challenging to identify strategies and to procure more data we used a one-period-ahead strategy method (Vespa, 2019). In the last five supergames of the Partners and Strangers treatment we asked subjects in an incentivize compatible manner to provide information about counterfactual choices that were not eventually implemented.[8] The supergame starts in period one just as any other supergame: senders observe θ and send a message m, then receivers observe m and select an action a. The feedback stage is modified: senders are not informed of the receiver's choice of a and receivers are not informed of the actual state of the world θ. The supergame moves on to period $t \geq 2$. Senders observe θ_t but are asked to make three choices: select a message they'd like to send for each possible receiver choice in the previous period. That is, they select $m_t(a_{t-1})$, a message to send for each possible choice a_{t-1} that the receiver could have made in the previous period. When they submit their three choices senders

[8]We did not implement the one-period-ahead strategy method in the Chat, SenStrat or Transfer treatments. In the Chat treatment we are already introducing a modification in the later part of the session (pre-play communication). The other two manipulations involve a more complex environment than the Partners or the Strangers treatment.

do not know the actual a_{t-1}, so all choices are incentivized. The interface sends then sends the receiver the message corresponding to the actual action a_{t-1} selected last period.

For the receiver in period $t \geq 2$, we show them the current message m_t, but ask them to make action choices contingent on the two possible true states last round. That is, receivers submit $a_t(\theta_{t-1})$. Since they do not know the realized value of θ_{t-1} yet, both choices are incentivized. In the feedback stage for periods $t \geq 2$, senders are informed of the actual a_{t-1} and receivers are informed of the actual θ_{t-1}, but not of the corresponding values for the current period. Periods from the second onwards therefore proceed in an identical manner.

The one-period-ahead strategy method allows us to partially observe choices that are off path. This extra information can aid in distinguishing between strategies. For example, we are able to distinguish between senders using the strategy Truth and another succeeding with the history-dependent strategy Information Rent, because we get to observe counterfactual choices given receiver deviations. The extra information is particularly useful when there is a lot of heterogeneity in the data as it helps understand which strategies best rationalize subjects' choices.

However, the aggregate analysis for the Strangers and Partners treatments does not show large levels of heterogeneity: most choices are consistent with history-independent babbling. This suggests that information from the unimplemented parts of the strategy is not crucial for identification here. Indeed we find that this is the case. For the purpose of comparing with and without the one-period-ahead strategy method we would ideally present estimates using the first fifteen supergames and the last five. However, to make the estimates comparable to the Chat treatment, where pre-play communication is introduced after twelve supergames, we show estimates using data from the first twelve ($S \leq 12$) and last eight supergames ($S > 12$).[9]

Outcomes: Senders. Tables E4 and E5 present the output for the case of senders for the last eight and first twelve supergames, respectively. Notice first that the goodness of fit -as measured by β- is in all cases far from $\frac{1}{2}$, the random-choice benchmark.

We start by describing the frequency output for the Partners treatment that will serve as a baseline to compare other treatments against. Two strategies show statistically significant coefficients and concentrate almost all the mass: Always Invest and Information Rent. That the frequency of Always Invest is close to 60 percent towards the end of the session (Table E4) is consistent with modal behavior being coordinated at the babbling equilibrium. There is, however, between 20-25 percent of the estimated mass attributed to the Information Rent strategy which truthfully reveals until the receiver chooses either *None* in response to Don't Invest (no rent paid) or chooses Partial after an Invest message. After this trigger the strategy becomes identical to Always Invest.

[9]There are no qualitative differences between estimates using the last five or the last eight supergames (first 12 or first 15 supergames) in the *Strangers* and *Partners* treatments.

TABLE E4. SFEM Output: Senders (Last 8 Supergames)

Strategies	**Partners**	**Strangers**	**Chat**	**SenStrat**	**Transfer**	**Partners-R$_1$**	**Partners-R$_2$**
Truth	0.087	0.082	0.577***	0.251*	0.172	0.324**	0.372***
	(0.096)	(0.050)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.121)	(0.154)	(0.126)
Always Invest	0.573***	0.826***	0.047	0.622***	0.346***	0.304**	0.370***
	(0.101)	(0.143)	(0.068)	(0.149)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.103)
Always Don't	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)
Inf. Rent	0.237**	0.000	0.331**	0.061	0.483***	0.119	0.257*
	(0.093)	(0.011)	(0.132)	(0.093)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Full Extraction	0.103	0.092	0.044	0.066	0.000	0.254	0.000
γ	0.434***	0.459***	0.396***	0.423***	0.407***	0.502***	0.480***
	(0.061)	(0.075)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.082)
β	0.909	0.898	0.926	0.914	0.921	0.880	0.889

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Level of Significance: ***-1 percent; **-5percent; *-10 percent.

TABLE E5. SFEM Output: Senders (First 12 Supergames)

Strategies	**Partners**	**Strangers**	**Chat**	**SenStrat**	**Transfer**	**Partners-R$_1$**	**Partners-R$_2$**
Truth	0.218	0.046	0.078	0.152	0.069	0.555***	0.432***
	(0.140)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.120)
Always Invest	0.561***	0.758***	0.650***	0.609***	0.330***	0.268***	0.383***
	(0.157)	(0.110)	(0.126)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.110)
Always Don't	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.032)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Inf. Rent	0.221**	0.069	0.272**	0.149*	0.601***	0.176*	0.185*
	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.107)	(0.086)	(0.116)	(0.105)	(0.111)
Full Extraction	0.000	0.127	0.000	0.091	0.000	0.000	0.000
γ	0.524***	0.384***	0.587***	0.506***	0.500***	0.507***	0.450***
	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.060)
β	0.871	0.931	0.846	0.878	0.881	0.878	0.902

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Level of Significance: ***-1 percent; **-5percent; *-10 percent.

The estimated mass attributed to the Information-Rent trigger suggests that there is a proportion of senders who start the supergames trying to coordinate on more-efficient outcomes. However, were these of senders trying to implement the Information Rents path successful, we would observe treatment effects at the aggregate level in Table D1. Instead, the evidence suggest that most subjects who try to implement the information-rent outcome path do not succeed for long as they are not matched with receivers who follow suit.

The main difference between the Partners and Strangers treatments is that in the latter babbling captures between 75-80 percent, approximately 20 percentage points more than in the former. There is almost no mass attributable to strategies that condition the sender's response on past play, suggesting that (consistent with theory) history does not play a role in this treatment. This analysis suggests that as a measure of subject's intentions as senders, focusing on data at the aggregate level may be misleading. There does appear to be a proportion of senders in Partners capable of sustaining efficient play if rewarded by a rent.

While the SFEM estimates for the first twelve supergames of the Chat treatment (Table E5) is clearly in line with the Partners estimates, there is a sharp change in the last eight supergames (Table E4). About a third of the mass corresponds to the information-rent strategy and close to 60 percent to Truth-telling. Note that in the Chat treatment we do not have implement a one-period-ahead strategy method, which means that we cannot know if subjects who are selecting Truth would punish if there were deviations. If we assume that these subjects would combine the estimated from Truth and the Information Rent strategy, then the total proportion of subjects using truthful strategies is at approximately 90 percent.

The output for the SenStrat treatment is similar to Partners. First, Always Invest is still the modal strategy with approximately 60 percent of the estimated mass. Second, outcomes are again partially consistent with some sender attempting to reveal information. Here we find that subjects are more-likely to respond truthfully (in a history independent manner). Note that in this treatment, truth-telling is done in an ex-ante manner. While there does seem to be a growing rate of truth-telling within the SenStrat sessions, the modal behavior is still mostly consistent with babbling.

In the Transfer treatment the highest estimated frequency corresponds to the Information Rent strategy. However, the second-most-popular strategy, capturing about a third of the data, is Always Invest.

In the Partners-R treatments a large portion of the frequencies is consistent with truthful revelation. In both treatments more than 30 percent of the estimated mass directly corresponds to truthtelling in the last eight supergames, and the frequency is higher for the first twelve. Recall that in these treatments we do not have implement a one-period-ahead strategy method, which means that we cannot know if subjects who are selecting Truth would punish if there were deviations. But telling the truth is consistent with full extraction. In Partners-R_1, adding Truth and Full Extraction the mass is close to sixty percent in the last eight supergames, while in Partners-R_2 the mass is close to forty percent. As we will verify with the estimation for receivers these percentages are in line with strategies consistent with Full Extraction on the receivers' side.

Finally, notice that the estimated mass for Always Don't is always small and never significant, across all treatments.

TABLE E6. SFEM Output: Receivers (Last 8 Supergames)

Strategies	**Partners**	**Strangers**	**Chat**	**SenStrat**	**Transfer**	**Partners-R$_1$**	**Partners-R$_2$**
Follow	0.081	0.107	0.066	0.068	0.072	0.202	0.170
	(0.054)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.126)	(0.124)
Always Partial	0.216*	0.378***	0.000	0.133	0.204**	0.047	0.044
	(0.110)	(0.143)	(0.048)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Always Full	0.043	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.056)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Always None	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.040)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.068)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Partial/None	0.446***	0.409***	0.042	0.351**	0.302*	0.131	0.297**
	(0.121)	(0.152)	(0.061)	(0.163)	(0.174)	(0.080)	(0.121)
Inf. Rent	0.077	0.056	0.893***	0.173**	0.353**	0.038*	0.085
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.156)	(0.023)	(0.055)
Full Extraction	0.137	0.049	0.000	0.188	0.070	0.582	0.404
γ	0.544***	0.524***	0.482***	0.590***	0.519***	0.457***	0.522***
	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.094)
β	0.863	0.871	0.888	0.845	0.873	0.899	0.872

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Level of Significance: ***-1 percent; **-5percent; *-10 percent.

TABLE E7. SFEM Output: Receivers (First 12 Supergames)

Strategies	**Partners**	**Strangers**	**Chat**	**SenStrat**	**Transfer**	**Partners-R$_1$**	**Partners-R$_2$**
Follow	0.189	0.217**	0.174*	0.024	0.044	0.130	0.231**
	(0.122)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Always Partial	0.217*	0.210	0.136	0.167	0.000	0.000	0.044
	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.093)	(0.115)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Always Full	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Always None	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.087	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.064)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Partial/None	0.310**	0.460***	0.370***	0.315*	0.296**	0.130*	0.000
	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.184)	(0.134)	(0.077)	(0.040)
Inf. Rent	0.000	0.114	0.075	0.134	0.568***	0.138**	0.128*
	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.126)	(0.163)	(0.056)	(0.074)
Full Extraction	0.284	0.000	0.204	0.237	0.092	0.602	0.597
γ	0.655***	0.605***	0.647***	0.876***	0.591***	0.579***	0.647***
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.119)	(0.194)	(0.115)	(0.095)	(0.103)
β	0.822	0.839	0.824	0.758	0.844	0.849	0.824

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Level of Significance: ***-1 percent; **-5percent; *-10 percent.

Outcomes: Receivers. Tables E6 and E7 show the SFEM output for receivers for the last eight and first twelve supergames, respectively. In the case of receivers subjects are choosing between three possible actions, which means that the random choice benchmark for goodness of fit is $\frac{1}{3}$. In all cases the estimate of β is high and far from such value.

In the Partners and Strangers treatment we find that the vast majority of choices are consistent with babbling. Adding Always Partial and Partial/None we capture between 70-75 percent of the mass in both treatments. In the Partners treatment the history-dependent strategy with largest mass is Full Extraction, which uses a babbling trigger to support full extraction. Though capable of efficient choices after an Invest message, this strategy chooses None after Don't Invest. That this history-dependent strategy has the largest mass suggests that those receivers coordinating on efficient play are not paying for information. The history-dependent behavior in the Partners treatment is therefore consistent with senders who require an information rent, and receivers who do not pay it.

The SFEM estimates from the Chat treatment are consistent with the Partners treatment for the first twelve supergames. Again, there is a substantial change in behavior once pre-play communication is introduced. The frequency of the Information Rent strategy at 90 percent is consistent with the corresponding behavior documented for senders (where the chats provide for the correlation in strategies).

Behavior of receivers in the SenStrat treatment is similar to the Partners treatment. The majority of choices are consistent with babbling and where there is evidence of history-dependent behavior, most subjects do not seem to compensate senders for information. In contrast to SenStrat (although lower than the levels estimated for Chat) modal behavior in the Transfer treatment is consistent with the Information Rent strategy being selected by receivers. Though there is still substantial heterogeneity, and the rates do decrease across the session, when paying for information is possible with an explicit transfer there is a significant portion of receivers who pay the rent.

In the case of the Partners-R treatments, Full Extraction is the strategy that captures modal behavior in both treatments. The total mass consistent with Full Extraction is close to sixty percent in the case of Partners-R_1 and around forty percent in Partners-R_2. These percentages are consistent with the previously documented findings on the senders' side. In Partners-R_2, there is relatively more mass on strategies consistent with babbling, such as Partial/None.

Finally, the Always Full and Always None strategies receive very little mass and are never statistically significant.

Session-14, Supergame-14

S(14): I will not cheat you
R(176): If you do I'll just go with the middle!

Session-14, Supergame-14

R(212): hello
S(50): I'll always give you the correct recommendation if you choose middle when I say right

Session-14, Supergame-14

R(248): if you go right, I'll go middle. If you go left, I'll go left
S(86): dont choose middle ;;)
R(248): best outcome for both of us that way
S(86): ok good

Session-14, Supergame-14

S(122): goal profit–what we thinking
R(276): i'll trust your recommendations
R(276): also want you to make money too
S(122): sounds good. If its 5 rounds, ill only swindle you once
S(122): fair?
R(276): yup
S(122): $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

Session-14, Supergame-14

S(158): recommender always loses this.
S(158): Right, go middle,
S(158): left go left
S(158): thats the best way for us both to succeed
R(32): agreed

Session-14, Supergame-14

R(68): no funny business/ :D
S(194): I'll tell you the actuall direction
S(194): i know
R(68): great
R(68): ill take middle if right
S(194): You're welcome

Session-14, Supergame-14

R(104): lets make equal profits
S(230): suounds good to me!
S(230): sounds*

Session-14, Supergame-14

S(262): I will pick the same number as the computer
R(140): Okay. I will pick left if you recommend left and middle if you recommend right.
S(262): perfect

Session-14, Supergame-15

R(212): hello
S(14): I will not cheat you
R(212): if you choose left i will choose left. if you choose right i will choose middle
R(212): this will make us the best off i think
S(14): okay awesome!
R(212): =]

Session-14, Supergame-15

S(122): wassup fam
S(122): if i swindle you 25-30% of the time, is that good?
R(32): always agree with the computer, if you pick right, ill take middle 3x then left the 4th, we break even
S(122): break even works for me boss
R(32): cool
S(122): $$$$$$$$$$

Session-14, Supergame-15

R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left
S(50): I will always give you the right answer if you choose middle when I recommend right
S(50): perfect
R(248): best payout for each of us

Session-14, Supergame-15

S(158): recommender always loses this
S(158): Left go left,
S(158): Right go middle
S(158): its the only way we both win
R(68): sounds grest to me
R(68): *great

Session-14, Supergame-15

S(86): domt go middle
S(86): *DONT
R(276): in order to get highest profit - i'll trust your recommendations. for every 'right' the computer chooses, i'll let you trick me once so that we make equal profit.
R(276): sound ok?
S(86): sounds good

Session-14, Supergame-15

R(104): any strategies?
S(194): I'll tell you the actual direction
R(104): kk
S(194): great

Session-14, Supergame-15

S(230): lets make equal profits
R(140): What do you mean
S(230): like bot make the same amount
R(140): How would we do that? I was going to recommend that you pick the same as the computer, and I'll pick left if you do, and middle if you pick right.
R(140): It wouldn't be equal, but it would ensure that we each make something each round
S(230): That sounsd good to me

Session-14, Supergame-15

S(262):
S(262): i will pick the same number as the computer. if i pick left, pick left. if i pick right, pick middle
R(176): Okay. If you cheat, I'll always pick middle
S(262): ok
R(176):

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(14): I will not cheat you
R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left
R(248): best payout for each of us
S(14): okay awesome!

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(50): I'll always be honest if you choose middle when I choose right, okay?
R(276): that works for me - OR - in order for us to get highest profit and be even - i'll trust your recommendations and for every 'right' the computer chooses i'll let you trick me once

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(86): dont go to the middle
R(32): always agree with the computer, first 3x ill pick middle , 4th ill pick left, we break even and maximize collective earnings
S(86): ok good

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(122): alright so if I swindle you 20% of the time, is that fair?
S(122): we should attempt to break even
S(122): So if its 6 rounds, 4 left and 2 right, you bite the bullet once, and I will too
S(122): As the saying goes–'You scratch my back, and I'll scratch urs'

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(158): Recommendor always loses
R(104): strategies?
S(158): Left, go left
S(158): Right, go middle
S(158): its the only way we both win
R(104): true. igotvhu

Session-14, Supergame-16

S(194): I'll tell you the actual direction
R(140): Okay. I'll pick L for L, and M for R
S(194): k

Session-14, Supergame-16

R(176): If you are honest, I'll pick middle when you say right
S(230): Okay... and when I pick left pick left
S(230): That way we both make something each round
R(176): Yup!

Session-14, Supergame-16

R(212): hi
S(262): hi. i will pick the same number as the computer
R(212): if you say left i will choose left. if you say right i will pick middle
S(262): if i pick left, pick left. if i pick right, pick middle
S(262): great!
R(212): nice

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(14): I will not cheat you
R(276): i'll trust you - for every 'right' the computer chooses i'll let you trick me once so the profits are even
R(276): sound fair?
S(14): ok

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(50): I'll always be honest if you choose middle when I recommend right, okay?
R(32): always agree with the computer, first 3x ill pick right, 4th time ill pick left, we break even

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(86): dont go middle
R(68): ok

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(122): so lets try to be even
R(104): left-left-left
S(122): srsly?
R(104): right-right-middle
S(122): if there are 6
S(122): 4 left
R(104): im trying to be even too
S(122): 2 right
S(122): I'm gonna give you right once
S(122): so that we both make 15
S(122): deal?
R(104): ok fair enough
S(122): perfecto

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(158): Recommender always loses.
S(158): Left, go left
S(158): Right, go middle
S(158): its the only way we both win
R(140): That's what I was going to suggest

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(194): I'll tell you the actual direction
R(176): Okay. If you dont I will always pick middle

Session-14, Supergame-17

S(230): i'll be honest... pick middle when i pick right
R(212): ok fair enough

Session-14, Supergame-17

R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left
R(248): best payout for each of us
S(262): exactly

Session-14, Supergame-18

S(14): I will not cheat you
R(32): if you always agree with computer, ill alternate picking left and right when you tell me right, then we break even and maximize profits
S(14): okay sounds good!
R(32): yep

Session-14, Supergame-18

S(50): I'll always be honest if you choose middle when I recommend right.
R(68): how about I wont go middle. you swindle me every other R?
R(68): more money for both of us that way?
R(68): your call
S(50): Sure that works. I'll start by being honest and then every other one.
R(68): great

Session-14, Supergame-18

R(104): even?
R(104): right-right-middle
R(104): left-left-left
S(86): ok good
R(104): cool

Session-14, Supergame-18

S(122): so lets try to be even
S(122): say there are 4 left, and 2 right
S(122): i choose left for 1 right, and then right for the other

S(122): fair?
S(122): but you gotta trust me or we're both gonna make less than we should
R(140): If you tell me what the computer picks, I'll make sure it evens out. If you pick left, I'll pick left, and were even
R(140): If you pick right, I'll pick middle. after 3 of those, ill give you a left even if its right
S(122): sounds good

Session-14, Supergame-18

S(158): Recommender always loses
S(158): Left, go left
S(158): right, go middle
S(158): its the only way we both win
R(176): Fair, I'll do that. If you lie I'll screw you

Session-14, Supergame-18

R(212): hello
S(194): I'll tell the actual direction
R(212): ill click middle when you say right
S(194): k
R(212): split da $
S(194): yes

Session-14, Supergame-18

R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left
S(230): I'll be honest... pck middle when I pick right
S(230): Sounds good

Session-14, Supergame-18

S(262): i will pick the same as the computer
R(276): i'll trust you - for every 'right' the computer chooses i'll let you trick me once so the profits are equal
R(276): sounds fair?
S(262): yep! just one

Session-14, Supergame-19

S(14): I will not cheat you
R(68): then ill go middle when you say right
S(14): okay sounds good!

Session-14, Supergame-19

R(104): even?
R(104): right-right-middle
R(104): left-left-left
S(50): I'll be honest every round if you choose middle when I choose right
R(104): sounds good
R(104): sucks to be a recommender

Session-14, Supergame-19

S(86): dont choose middle
R(140): Why not
S(86): it wont be an even payout
R(140): Tell me what the computer picked. If you pick left, I'll pick left. Even payout there. If it's right, I'll pick middle 3 times, and then the fourth time I'll pick left so you get 3 and I get none.
R(140): Thats the closest it will get to even
S(86): ill take it
S(86): cool

Session-14, Supergame-19

S(122): alright so lets try to be even
S(122): say there are 6 rounds, and 4 r left and 2 r right
S(122): ill choose left on 1 right, and then right on the other one
S(122): we gucci?
R(176): No way, thats too chancey for me. Just be honest and i'll pick middle when you say right
S(122): fair enough
S(122): i respect that
R(176): Solid

Session-14, Supergame-19

R(212): are you having fun
S(158): Recommender always loses
R(212): its true
S(158): Left, go left
S(158): Right, go middle
S(158): its the only way we both win
R(212): i hear you
R(212): let's do it

Session-14, Supergame-19

R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left
S(194): I'll tell the actual direction
S(194): yeah

Session-14, Supergame-19

S(230): i'll be honest... pick middle when i pick right
R(276): ok sounds good

Session-14, Supergame-19

R(32): always agree with computer, when you say right ill alternate left and right so we both break even and maximize profits

S(262): i will pick the same number as the computer. if you let me trick you once (i pick left and its actually right) the profits are equal. after that, if i pick right pick middle

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(14): I will not cheat you

R(104): nor will i

R(104): ill go middle every time you right

S(14): okay cool

R(104): go

Session-14, Supergame-20

R(140): Pick what the computer does. I'll pick left for left and middle for right.

S(50): Perfect

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(86): dont choose middle

R(176): Are you going to be honest?

S(86): yes i am

R(176): Okay. I'll choose middle if you arent

S(86): ok cool

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(122): ayyyy last one

R(212): what if we were paid for every round

S(122): so lets be even

S(122): that would be awesome

R(212): ill go left when you say left

R(212): ill go middle when you say right

S(122): how about we switch for every right

R(212): how do you mean

S(122): say tehre are 2 rights

S(122): i give u one

S(122): and I get one

R(212): ok

S(122): i alternate back and forth

R(212): tell the truth the first time

S(122): will do

R(212): then you can lie the second

R(212): cool

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(158): Recommender always loses

S(158): Left, go left

S(158): Right, go middle

R(248): be honest. if its right i'll go middle. if its left i'll go left

S(158): its the only way we both win

R(248): yea best outcome

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(194): I'll tell you the actual direction

R(276): i'll trust you - for every 'right' the computer chooses i'll let you trick me once so the profits are even

R(276): sound fair?

S(194): yea

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(17): When it is L, I will pick L. When it is R, I will pick R, but I want you to pick M. I will pick only L if you pick something else

R(71): wait i didnt get the last part

R(71): i will only pick L if you pick something else?

S(17): When I suggest L, I want you to select L. When I suggest R, I want you to suggest M. We will each be guaranteed earnings each round

R(71): alright gotcha

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(230): I'll be honest... pick middle when I pick right

R(32): if youre honest, ill alternate between left and right when you say right, so we both max profits

S(230): Ok!

Session-14, Supergame-20

S(262): i will pick same as the computer. let me trick you once, and after that pick middle if i pick right. we'll end up with the same profit

R(68): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-13

R(143): hi

S(89): Hey! so basically it makes the most economic sense for me to tell you exzactly what the computer reccomends and it is mutually beneficial that way agreed?

R(143): ok

S(89): okay awesome!

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(125): I will tell you everything accurately

S(125): as long as you select middle when i say right

S(125): does that sound good?

R(179): what if you pick left?

R(179): then what do i do

S(125): pick left

R(179): ok

R(179): sounds good

S(125): that way we both get 3 bucks

S(125): if not, you still get two dollars

R(179): sounds good

S(125): alright lets start

R(179): kk

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(161): i'm just going to be honest and we'll both try to get as much money as possible

R(215): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(197): i dont make any $$ when its to the right

R(251): so what do you do when the computer recommends right

S(197): ill say right and you make $$

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(233): ill be honest just dont pick middle every time

R(279): okay coool

Session-17, Supergame-13

S(265): Hi

S(265): Sweet

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(17): When the computer's direction is L, I will recommend L. When it is R, I will recommend R, but I want you to select M

R(107): deal

S(17): That way each of us are guaranteed earnings every round

Session-17, Supergame-14

R(143): Hi

S(53): Hi

R(143): Will I beable to trust you

S(53): Yes

R(143): Awesome!

S(53): Do you have a method of choosing?

R(143): well I was hoping to just trust ur decision

S(53): ok yeah that works

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(89): Hey! So basically it makes the most economic sense for me to tell you exzactly what the computer reccomends and it is mutually beneficial that way agreed?

R(179): i guess...so i just agree with what you do? or do i click opposite

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(125): i will tell you everything accurately

R(215): promise?

S(125): so when i say left, choose left. when i chose right choose middle

S(125): lol

R(215): haha ok sounds good

S(125): that way both of us get money

S(125): alright lets start

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(161): I'm going to be honest everytime

R(251): ok

S(161): don't waste our time going middle everytime

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(197): ill be honest, try to go middle if it gets uneven

R(279): so... can we agree to just be honest

S(197): yes unless its uneven

Session-17, Supergame-14

S(265): hi

R(71): hi

R(71): so if you pick L, ill pick L

S(265): okay, I wont lie then

R(71): and if you pick R, ill pick M

R(71): hahaha

S(265): Sounds good

S(265): Good doing business with you

R(71): the pleasure is all mine

S(265): Lets make some money

R(71): yupp

Session-17, Supergame-15

R(143): Hi, what's your methods

S(17): When the direction is L, I will pick L. When the direction is R, I will pick R, but I would like for you to pick M

S(17): That guarantees you either \$3 or \$2 each round

R(143): ok

S(17): and results in no \$0 earnings for either of us

R(143): perfect!

Session-17, Supergame-15

R(179): when copmuter says left, you click left then i will too. if the computer says right, i will click middle. that way we both get paid no matter what
R(179): ok?
S(53): ok that a good idea
R(179): ok lets do it

Session-17, Supergame-15

S(89): Hey! So basically it makes the most economic sense for both of us if I tell you exactly what the computer reccomends and it is mutually beneficial that way agreed?
R(215): sounds good to me
R(215): so if you say left i'll go left and if you say right i'll go middle
S(89): That would be really cool of you to do thanks!

Session-17, Supergame-15

R(251): its better for both of us if youre honest every time
S(125): i will tell you everything accurately. When i say left, choose left. WHen i say right, choose middle
R(251): ok
S(125): sweet

Session-17, Supergame-15

S(161): just follow my lead, and we'll each leave with the same amount
R(279): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-15

S(197): ill be honest, dont screw me over
S(197): either go with my recomendation or choose middle
R(35): next time for the experiment dont have the grad students come in and pound on the keyboards, i think it makes it pretty obvious that we aren't really talking to the other participants

Session-17, Supergame-15

S(233): ill be honest just follow me
R(71): hi
R(71): okay
S(233): please just dont pick middle everytime
R(71): so if you pick L, ill pick L
R(71): okay

S(233): thanks
R(71): and if you pick R, ill pick M
R(71): that way we booth will get earnings
S(233): thats perfect
R(71): nice doing business with you

Session-17, Supergame-15

S(265): Hi
R(107): if you answer truthfully i will put middle for every R
S(265): Alright I wont lie

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(17): I will always pick the computer's direction; however, when I suggest R I want you to pick M. That guarantees neither of us will get $0 earnings
R(179): when computer says left, click left. i will too. that way we both get 3$. if it says right, click right and i will press middle. that way we both get paid
S(17): Looks like our methods match
R(179): good lets do it

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(53): when the computer says left, ill click left and you should too. When it says right, ill click right and you choose middle. that way we both get paid
R(215): sounds good to me

Session-17, Supergame-16

R(251): if you choose R Ill choose middle to make it fair
R(251): And choose L when its L so we both get 3
S(89): That works for me!
R(251): cool
S(89): fuck yeah

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(125): i will be honest
S(125): when i say left, choose left. when i say rihgt, choose middle
S(125): does that sound good?

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(161): follow my lead

Session-17, Supergame-16

R(71): hi
S(197): ill be honest
S(197): dont screw me over
R(71): so if you pick L, ill pick L
S(197): ye homie
R(71): and if you pick R, ill pick M
S(197): naw pick r
R(71): that way we both some money
S(197): if one shows up too often then choose middle
S(197): but ill give the right recommendation
R(71): oh alright

R(71): gotcha

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(233): If i pick left go left and we both get 3
S(233): if i pick right go in the middle and you get 2 and i get one
R(107): perfect

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(89): Hey! So basically it makes the most economic sense for me to tell you exactly what the computer reccomends and it is mutually beneficial that way agreed?
R(279): agrred.

Session-17, Supergame-16

S(265): Alright I'll tell the truth if you put middle for when I say right
R(143): perfect!
S(265): Sweet!

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(125): wtf...
S(125): alright...

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(17): I will always recommend the computer's direction; however, when I recommend 'R' I would like for you to select 'M'
S(17): That guarantees neither of us will receive $0
R(215): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(161): follow my lead and we'll leave with equal payouts
R(71): so if you pick L, ill pick L
R(71): and if you pick R, ill pick M
R(71): right?
S(161): i guess that works
R(71): that way we both make some money
S(161): okay sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(53): when i choose left, you choose left and we both get 3$, when i press right you pick middle and we will both get paid
R(251): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(197): ill be honest
R(107): if its right i will go to the middle
S(197): alright youre the best

Session-17, Supergame-17

R(143): hi what's your method
S(233): if i go left then you geo left and we both get 3
S(233): if i pick right then you pick middle and we both win
R(143): when u go righ ill go middle
S(233): yea that way we both get something
R(143): awesome

Session-17, Supergame-17

S(265): Alright I'll be truthful if you put middle for when i say right
R(179): when computer says left, click left. i will too so that way we both get 3. if it says rightt, click right then i will press middle so we both we paid
R(179): yes perfect
S(265): Perfect, we're on the same page
R(179): lets do it

Session-17, Supergame-18

R(251): ill choose M when you choose R
S(17): I will always recommend the computer's direction; however, when I recommend 'R' I would like for you to choose 'M'
R(251): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-18

S(53): when i choose left, you choose left and we both get $3. when i choose right, you choose middle and that way we both get paid

R(279): sounds gucci

Session-17, Supergame-18

S(125): im going to be honest
R(71): so if you pick L, i pick L
S(125): lol i was about to say that
S(125): i pick R you pick M
R(71): and if you pick R, i will pick M, that way we bith get paid
S(125): sweet
R(71): lol alright

Session-17, Supergame-18

R(107): be honest and ill go middle when it is right
S(161): that works for me

Session-17, Supergame-18

S(197): ill be honest, choose middle if its right
R(143): awssome same thought
S(197): so we both make $$:)
R(143): $$$$$$$

Session-17, Supergame-18

S(233): if i go left then go left
S(233): if i go right then go middle
R(179): yep perfect

Session-17, Supergame-18

S(265): Alright I'll be truthful if you put middle for when i say right
R(215): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(17): I will always recommend the computer's direction; however, when I recommend 'R' I would like for you to pick 'M'
S(17): That guarantees neither of us will receive $0
R(279): works for me

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(53): when i choose left, you choose left and we both get $3. when i choose r

Session-17, Supergame-19

R(71): so if you pick L, i pick L
R(71): and if you pick R, i pick M
S(89): yup!
R(71): that way we both get paid
S(89): thats perfect
R(71): that alright?
S(89):

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(125): i say left, you pick left
R(107): be honest and ill go middle when it is right
S(125): lol i was just about to say that
S(125): sweet
S(125): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-19

R(143): u right i middle
S(161): when i say L, go L. when i say R, go middle
R(143): Awesome same thought

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(197): ill be honest, if its right choose middle
R(179): ok
S(197): that way we both make $$$$$

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(233): if i go left then go left
S(233): if i go right go middle
R(215): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-19

S(265): Alright I'll be truthful if you put middle for when i say right
R(251): Ill choose M
S(265): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-20

R(71): so if you pick L, i pick L
R(71): and if you pick R, i pick M
R(71): that way we both get piad
S(53): sounds good
R(71): sound good?
R(71): cool

Session-17, Supergame-20

S(197): yo ill be honest whether its l/r
S(197): but go middle when its right sometimes
S(197): so we both make some cash
R(215): sounds good

Session-17, Supergame-20

R(107): if you go right ill go middle
S(89): thats perfect

Session-17, Supergame-20

S(233): how you wanna do this
R(251): Ill put M for R
S(233): if i do left you go left
R(251): OK
S(233): if i do r do middle

Session-17, Supergame-20

S(125): ill be honest
S(125): when i say left pick left
S(125): when i say right, pick middle
S(125): so we both get something
R(143): that fine with me
S(125): sweet

Session-17, Supergame-20

S(161): when i say L, go L. when i say R, go M
R(179): you gonna be honest or not
S(161): yes, then we both make money everytime
R(179): ok im in

Session-17, Supergame-20

S(265): Alright I'll be truthful if you put middle for when i say right
R(279): sounds gucci
S(265): nice

Session-18, Supergame-13

R(180): I'll trust you until you lie and then it's m,iddles the whole way out.

S(18): Hey want to work together on this?

R(180): If you click right, I'll go middle so we both get something

S(18): I will tell you all the honest computer decsions if you never click right

S(18): instead when i mark right click middle

S(18): deal?

R(180): no problem

R(180): deal

Session-18, Supergame-13

S(54): hi

R(216):

R(216): hi

R(216): do you want to create a plan

S(54): sure

S(54): what do you want to do

R(216): you click the correct one the whole time

R(216): if it is right ill click the middle so we both get something

R(216): ?

S(54): okay sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-13

R(252): Hello

R(252): you there?

S(90): yes

R(252): wow

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252):

R(252): We didn't even agree on anything

R(252): How can I trust you

Session-18, Supergame-13

R(280): hi

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time, but if i choose right choose middle so i still get $1 too pleaseeeeeeee

R(280): okay

S(126): swaguu

R(280): fair enough

S(126): hope its not all rights tho haha

R(280): you ready

Session-18, Supergame-13

S(162): hi, I am going to always click L. do you want to work together to make a plan or what

R(36): I was going to say to tell the truth on each one, and when it's right I'll alternate between picking right and left so we'll switch off between getting 3 dollars

Session-18, Supergame-13

R(72): how do we go about this

S(198): I will give honest reccomendations

R(72): okay

S(198): if you can press middle hen i reccomend RIGHt

Session-18, Supergame-13

S(234): aaaa

Session-18, Supergame-13

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle fair enough?

R(144): It is in both our best interest because there would have to be three rights in a row for it not to be worth it to you

S(266): yes

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(216): hi

S(18): hey want to work together?

R(216): yes, plan?

S(18): I can tell you all the honest computer directions if when i say right you only do middle

R(216): sounds good with me

S(18): ok so just dont press right

S(18): lets make $$

Session-18, Supergame-14

S(54): hi

S(54): so what do we want to do

R(252): Could you just tell me what direction the computer is going

S(54): but then you would get more than i do

S(54): i would get nothing when its right

R(252): Oh, then only tell me when its really left

R(252): and when its right ill pick middle

S(54): what?

S(54): okay

R(252): cool

S(54): or half the time its right you could pick left and the other half right?

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(280): okay heres how we make the money
S(90): how
R(280): be honest with me every round, but if the direction is right, i will choose middle so that you still get a dollar
S(90): sounds good
R(280): perfect lets go

Session-18, Supergame-14

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time, but if i choose right, can you choose middle so i still get $1 pleaseeeee
R(36): Perfect
S(126): awesome
S(126): lets make some dough

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(72): if it's left say left, if it's right say right and I will choose middle in order to maximize both of our payouts
R(72): with this strategy we will avoid zeros no matter what
S(162):
S(162): sounds good
S(162): idk if this would work, but if i
S(162): 'take a long time' on one of them, its L
S(162): but i will choose L regardless

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(108): are you going to click honestly?
S(198): I will give honest recomendations if you choose middle when i tell you RIGHT so we both benefit. That wil be my incentive to be honst
R(108): cool

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle fair enough? It is in both our best interest because there would have to be three rights in a row for it not to be worth i
S(234): ok. just follow my recommendations and i will have you make money

Session-18, Supergame-14

R(180): If you're honets with me, I'll go middle when you click right.
S(266): ok sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(252): So i'm supposed to pick left when its right half the time?
S(18): huh?
S(18): you can do that if thats what you've been doing
R(252): okay, peace

Session-18, Supergame-15

S(54): hey so whats our plan
R(280): okay heres how we make the money
R(280): be honest with me every time, but if the direction is right, i will choose middle so that you still make a dollar
S(54): okay i'll be honest every time but what about if you pick left half the time its right and right the other half?
S(54): then I'd get $3 half the time and you'd get $3 the other half
R(280): im not going to lol
S(54): thats more even
S(54): otherwise you get $1 more than me every time its right
R(280): okay that makes sense
S(54): okay sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(72): if it's left say left, if it's right say middle and I will select middle
S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time, but i choose right, can you choose middle so i still get $1 pleaseeeee
R(72): yes
S(126): i cant say middle
S(126): i can only say left or right haha
R(72): jsut tell me what it is and if its right ill select middle
S(126): so if i choose right just choose middle
R(72): gotchu
S(126): awesome

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(36): If you tell the truth I'll switch off between picking right and left when it's right
R(36): So we alternate getting $3
S(90): okay

Session-18, Supergame-15

S(162): i recommend you choose middle for all of them, i will choose either right or left correctly
R(108): ok

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? It is in both our best interest because there would have to be three rights in a row for it not to be worth it to you?
S(198): I will be honest as long as you press M when I reccomend R so that we both benefit
R(144): that works
S(198): cool

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(180): If you're honest with me, I'll go middle when you click right
S(234): as long as you will follow my recommendation, you will make money
R(180): sounds sketch but okay

Session-18, Supergame-15

R(216): you do the correct one, if it is right then ill hit the middle??
S(266): i'll do the correct one so just follow me
R(216): if i hit the middle than you'll get a dollar too
S(266): yeah but not as much
R(216): for the right button only

Session-18, Supergame-16

R(280): okay heres how we make the money
S(18): im ready
S(18): whats the paln?
R(280): be honest with me every time, but whenever the direction is right, ill choose middle so that you still make a dollar
S(18): *plan
R(280): ^
R(280): when its left, we will both make 3
S(18): how about when i say right you pick right half the time and left the other half
S(18): tried it last time
R(280): okay yeah that works

Session-18, Supergame-16

S(54): okay so ill be honest every time and you choose middle when i say right?
R(36): Sounds good
S(54): okay

Session-18, Supergame-16

R(72): tell me what it is and if it's right I'll choose middle
S(90): if i click right, click middle
S(90): perfect
R(72): sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-16

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time but if i choose right, can you choose middle so i still get a dollar pleaseeeee
R(108): cool
S(126): swaguu

Session-18, Supergame-16

S(162): what is your plan
R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? When you reccommend right I will hit middle so we both get money
R(144): so just be honest and if its left i will go left and if you recommend right i will go middle so we both get something
S(162): sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-16

S(198): I will be honsest if you select
S(198): M when i reccomend R
S(198): so we bith benefit
R(180): Okay. Please don't lie to me, this experiment is making me lose faith in humanity.
S(198): Haha okay. I understand how you feel

Session-18, Supergame-16

R(216): plan?
S(234): what is the plan
R(216): you do the correct one and if it is right side then i will hit middle so we both get money?
S(234): ok
R(216):

Session-18, Supergame-16

S(266): i'll recommend the correct one and if its right go middle?
R(252): thats the gameplan

Session-18, Supergame-17

S(18): what do you want to do?
R(36): If you be honest i'll switch off between picking right and left when it's right, so we alternate gettijng $3
S(18): sounds good!

Session-18, Supergame-17

S(54): so ill be honest and then you pick middle if i say right and left if i say left?
R(72): yeah

Session-18, Supergame-17

S(90): if it is right click middle
R(108): cool

Session-18, Supergame-17

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? When you reccommend right I will hit middle so we both get money

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time, but if i choose right, can you choose middle? so i still get a dollar

S(126): pleasssseeeeee

R(144): yeah thats what i said too

S(126): oh okay yea it goes off the page

Session-18, Supergame-17

S(162): i will answer correctly. if i choose R, will you choose middle so that we both get paid?

R(180): Works for me.

Session-18, Supergame-17

R(216): hi

S(198): I will be honest as long as you press M when i say R so that we both benefit

R(216): sounds good

S(198): cool

Session-18, Supergame-17

S(234): do you have a plan?

R(252): yeah right

R(252): I'll go with the flow

S(234): if you trust my recommendations then you'll make money

S(234): hello

R(252): that sounds nice, its not all about the money though...I'm in it for the journey

S(234): then why are you even here

Session-18, Supergame-17

R(280): hola

S(266): hi

R(280): got a plan?

S(266): ill recommend the correct one if you go middle on rights?

R(280): sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-18

S(18): ill be honest if when i say right you alternate between right and left

R(72): yeah sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(108): if it is right i will click middle

S(54): ill be honest and you pick left when i say left and middle when i say right

S(54): yeah sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? When you reccommend right I will hit middle so we both get money

Session-18, Supergame-18

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time but if i choose right can you choose middle so i still make a dollar pleaaassseeee

R(180): you got it! please don't lie, I'm losing faith in humanity over here.

S(126): they call me honest abe

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(216): be honest and if the correct is right then ill choose the middle?

S(162): i will answer correctly, if i choose R, will you choose M so that we both get paid?

R(216): sounds good

S(162): awesome

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(252): wow

S(198): I will be honest as long as you select M when I reccomend R so we both get max benefit

R(252): But you werent that time...

S(198): That could not have been me

S(198): we are with different people each cycle

R(252): Oh lol my bad

R(252): Okay

S(198): its cool

R(252): Alright thanks

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(280): hola

S(234): hi

R(280): como estas?

S(234): me llamo @#!%^$#@^

S(234): muy bien

R(280): okay so be honest and on rights i will choose middle

S(234): ok good plan

Session-18, Supergame-18

R(36): I'm good with either picking middle when it's right or switching off between picking right and left when it's right

S(266): ok works for me

R(36): Ok I'll switch off with right and left so we alternate getting $3

Session-18, Supergame-19

R(108): i'll click middle when it is right

S(18): ill be honest if when i say right you switch back and forth from picking right and left

S(18): or that

S(18): up to you

R(108): we both benefit that way

Session-18, Supergame-19

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? When you reccommend right I will hit middle so we both get money

S(54): okay sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-19

S(90): i will give the correct directions but if it is right, click middle

R(180): Absolutely. Just PLEASE be truthful, I'm losing faith in humanity over here.

Session-18, Supergame-19

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time but if i choose right can you choose middle so i still make a dollar pleaaassseeee

R(216): sounds good lol

S(126): swag

Session-18, Supergame-19

S(162): i am going to choose correctly every time, if i choose R will you choose M so that we both get paid?

R(252): yup

S(162): cool

Session-18, Supergame-19

R(280): hi

R(280): whats the plan

S(198): I will be honest as long as you select M when I reccomend R so that we both benefit

R(280): sounds good

S(198): cool

Session-18, Supergame-19

R(36): I'll click middle when it's right if you tell the truth

S(234): ok i'll be honest

Session-18, Supergame-19

R(72): tell me what it is and if its right ill click middle

S(266): ok

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(144): I will follow your recomendations but the first time that you send me an incorrect recommendation, I will just hit middle? When you reccommend right I will hit middle so we both get money

S(18): sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-20

S(54): so left when i say left and middle when i say right?

R(180): I know the drill by now.

S(54): figured

R(180): PLEASE don't lie?

R(180): thannkssss

S(54): i wont

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(216): so you choose the correct one and if it is right ill hit middle?

S(90): sounds good

Session-18, Supergame-20

S(126): im gonna tell you what it is every time but if i choose right can you choose middle so i still make a dollar pleaaassseeee

R(252): I got you

S(126): awesome you da bomb

R(252): Nah I'm just a regular decision-maker, nothing special :)

S(126): hahaha lets make some money

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(280): hi

R(280): whats the plan

S(162): hey i will choose correctly every time. if i choose R, will you choose M so that we both get paid?

R(280): sounds good

S(162): cool

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(36): If you're honest i'

R(36): I'll click middle when it's right

S(198): I will be honest as long as you select M when I reccomend R so we both benefit

S(198): cool

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(72): tell me what it is if its right ill click middle

S(234): okay

Session-18, Supergame-20

R(108): i'll hit middle when its right

S(266): ok

APPENDIX G. REPRESENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTNERS TREATMENT

Instructions-Script: Treatment- 2 States-2 Messages

[Start Slide:] Welcome. You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. Please turn off cell phones and similar devices now. Please do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants. We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be given a description of the main features of the experiment. If you have any questions during this period, raise your hand and your question will be answered in private by the experimenter.

[New Slide 2] In this experiment you will take on one of two **Roles** for the entire experiment: either a **Recommender** or a **Decision-Maker**. Whichever role you are assigned at the start of the experiment will be your role for the entirety of this session.

[New Slide 3] There will be many rounds in this experiment and in each round you will will be matched in a Recommender-Decision Maker pair. Every round of this experiment will be identical.

First, the computer randomly selects a **Direction**, either **Left** or **Right**, with equal probability So both outcomes are equally likely to be selected.

Second, the Recommender participant observes which Computer Direction was selected, and chooses a Recommendation to send: Either "Go Left" or "Go Right".

Third, the Decision Maker (who will not know which Computer Direction was selected until the end of the round) sees the Recommendation sent by the Recommender, and chooses a Decision. Either Left, Middle or Right.

Finally, both participants are given feedback.

[New Slide 4] Your payoffs for each round will depend on the outcomes selected.

The Recommender's round payoff depends only on the Decision. The recommender earns $3.00 when the decision maker chooses Left, $1 when they choose Middle, and $0 when they choose Right.

The Decision-Maker's round payoff depends on both the Computer Direction and their Decision. If their decision matches the Computer Direction, so choosing Left when the Direction is Left or Right when the Direction is Right, they earn $3.00. If they choose Middle they earn $2.00 for either Computer Directions, Left or Right. If they choose the opposite of the Computer

Direction, so left when the Direction is Right, or Right when the Direction is Left, they earn $0.00.

A summary of these round payoffs for each role are given in tables on the back of your Reference Sheet.

[New Slide 5] An example of the screens you will face is projected above. This first slide shows what you will see in the round if you are a Recommender. At the top of the screen and in the table in the center it is clearly indicated that the randomly selected Computer Direction in this example is Left, which is highlighted in Red.

The recommenders must choose a recommendation to send. The place where you have to make a choice is highlighted with an orange background and orange buttons. You are free to choose either recommendation regardless of the selected Direction, and do so by clicking your desired option.

[New Slide 6] As an example, the projected slide shows what happens if they were to recommend "Go Left." The selection is now highlighted in blue. Once you have made a choice a Submit button appears in the bottom right of the screen. You can change your selection by clicking on either orange button, as long as you haven't clicked submit. However, once you click on the submit button your selection is final.

[New Slide 7] This next slide shows the Decision-Maker receiving the recommendation. In this example, the recommendation for the round was Go Left, which is indicated in blue at the top, and in the corresponding row of the table. As the Decision-Maker you will not know the selected Computer Direction when you make a Decision. Again, the Decision you will make is highlighted in orange.

[New Slide 8] The projected slide shows the Decision-Maker chosing Left, highlighted in Green. You can change your selection as long as you haven't clicked on the submit button. But once you click submit your selection is final.

[New Slide 9] At the end of the round you are given feedback, which is identical for both the Recommender and the Decision-Maker. If you are the Recommender, you will learn the chosen Decision. If you are the Decision-Maker, you will learn the selected Direction for this Round.

The last two rows indicate the corresponding payoff to the Recommender and Decision-Maker. The reported payoffs match the Reference Sheet tables for the case when the Computer Direction is Left and the Decision is Left.

[New Slide 10] Your round decisions in this session will be grouped into Cycles. A cycle here is a sequence of rounds of random length. To implement a cycle, the computer rolls a fair 100-sided die after each completed round, common to all the participants. If the number is larger than 75, the current cycle ends, and a new one will begin. If the number is 75 or less, the current cycle continues into another round.

Because of this procedure the length of each Cycle is random. It could be that a cycle is just one round, or it could go on for several rounds. Because of the die-rolling procedure there is always a 25% probability that the current round is the cycle's last, and a 75% probability that there will be at least another round.

In total you will participate in 20 cycles. Fifteen in part 1, and a further 5 cycles in part 2, before which we will give you additional instructions.

Your final payment for this session will consist of 3 randomly selected Cycles from the 20 in the experiment, in addition to your $6 show-up fee. For each selected cycle we will pay you the sum of your earnings across all rounds within that cycle.

[New Slide 11] The projected slide illustrates examples of three cycles. As you can see, these cycle ends whenever the die roll is greater than 75 (in the example a 98, a 76 and a 100).

If Cycle 1 were selected for payment in this example, the participant would earn the sum of their payoffs in the five rounds. If Cycle 2 were selected, the participant would earn the sum of their payoffs over the two rounds. You should note that the cycles in the experiment will likely be of different lengths to this example.

Within each cycle the computer will keep you matched with the same other participant. That is, within each cycle you interact with the same Recommender/Decision-Maker participant. However, in each new cycle the computer will make sure to randomly re-match you to a different participant that the person you interacted with in the previous cycle.

This is illustrated in the projected figure with different colors representing other participants. So in the cycle 1 example they interact with the same recommender/decision maker for the entire cycle (here five rounds). In the cycle 2 example they match with a new participant who they interact with for next cycle (here two rounds)

The matching is anonymous and random, and you will never know which other participants you have engaged with, nor in what order. The only thing you will know is that you are always matched to the same participant within each cycle, and that each new cycle rematches you to a different participant than the last.

[New Slide 12] In each new round of a cycle, you will be reminded of what happened in the previous round. The projected slide shows the first screen of Round 2 for the Decision-Maker while they wait for the Recommendation. The interface shows the (so far blank) table for this round, and the filled-in table for the previous round to remind you of what happened.

Moreover, the entire history of choices in the current cycle is displayed in a table on the left side of the screen. In the table you can see the computer direction, the recommendation, the decision and your payoff.

[New Slide 13] A Reference Sheet on your desk provides a summary of these experimental instructions.

Now that we have familiarized you with the task, the experiment will begin. The first screen will tell you your randomly determined role: Recommender or Decision Maker. After that the first random-length cycle will begin.

Good luck!

[Scripts Ends. Start z-tree]

Instructions: Part 2-Script:

Before we start the last 5 cycles in Part 2, we will now familiarize you with the changes to the task and interface.

The main task will be nearly identical to Part 1. The only difference is that we will now ask you to make choice before observing all of the feedback from the previous round. In order for us to collect more information on your choices, we will instead ask you to make recommendations/decisions across each possible scenario in the previous round .

[New Slide 14] In the first round of each Payment Cycle you will make your choices as before. The Recommender sees the Computer Direction and chooses a Recommendation. The decision maker then sees the recommendation and makes a decision.

[New Slide 15] In the example above the recommender submits the recommendation Go Left.

[New Slide 16] The Decision-Maker observes "Go Left" and chooses a decision.

[New Slide 17] In the example, the Decision-Maker chooses Left.

Up until this point there are no differences with part 1 of the experiment. The changes begin from the end of round one onward.

[New Slide 18] This slide shows the feedback you will receive for round 1 if you are the recommender. As you can see, the Decision in the previous round is not revealed. In part two we will ask you to make recommendations for each possible decision the Decision Maker might have chosen.

[New Slide 19] Similarly, if you are the decision maker, the computer direction last round is not revealed. In part two you will make decisions for each possible Computer Direction in the previous round.

[New Slide 20] Moving into any round after the first, if you are a Recommender, you will observe the projected slide. This reminds you of what you chose last round and reminds you that you will now make three choices. A recommendation to send this round if the decision maker you are matched with for the cycle chose left last round. A recommendation which will be sent if the previous round's decision was Middle. And one to send if the previous round's decision was Right.

[New Slide 21] The projected slide shows where Recommenders make their three choices. At the top you can see the Computer Direction for the current round. Below this are three tables, one for each scenario. The text at the top left of each table (in green) indicates the scenario for that choice.

For example, the first of the three table's Recommendations is sent if the matched decision maker chose Left as the decision in the previous round. This Left Decision scenario is presented in the previous round. If you are the recommender, you will choose a recommendation to send if this scenario is what actually happened.

Below this, are two more scenarios, where you will choose the recommendation to send if the previous round's decision was Middle or Right. After you have made all three choices the submit button appears. Once you submit your recommendations the interface will reveal what the the matched decision maker actually chose in the previous round, and will send the recommendation you selected for the true scenario.

[New Slide 22] If you are the Decision-Maker, in each round after the first the interface will first remind you of the tasks for the round. Before you learn the Computer Direction selected in the previous round you will make your decision in the next. You will make two decisions for two scenarios. One decision to be implemented in the current round if the computer direction in the previous round was left, and one decision to be implemented if the computer direction in the previous round was right.

[New Slide 23] The projected slide shows where the Decision-Maker will make their two choices. At the top you can see the Recommendation sent for the current round by the Recommender. Below this are two tables, one for each Direction scenario from the previous round .

The Computer Direction at the top right of each table (in red) indicates the scenario. For example, the Decision-Maker's top-table will be used if the Computer Direction in the previous round was LEFT. If you are a Decision Maker you will make your choice for this scenario.

In the table below you will make a choice in the scenario where the Computer Direction in the previous round was Right. After you have made both choices the submit button will appear, and once you are happy with your choices click the button. The interface will then reveal the Computer Direction from the previous round and will implement the decision you chose for that scenario.

[New Slide 24] The projected screenshot displays the kind of feedback that you will receive after round 1 if you are a recommender. Here you can see the actual Decision of the matched decision maker in the previous round, , and the resulting payoffs.

At the top of the screen you are reminded of the recommendation you selected for the scenario. The other's decision and payoffs for the present round will be revealed to you after you make your choices in the next round or the payment cycle ends.

[New Slide 25] Similarly, here is the Decision-Maker's feedback. Here you can see the actual Computer Direction from the previous round, and the payoffs.

At the top of the screen you are reminded of the Decision that you selected for that scenario.

The Computer Direction andpayoffs for the present round will be revealed to you after you make your choices in the next round or the payment cycle ends.

Good luck!

Reference Sheet

Rounds:

- Every round a **Recommender** and a **Decision Maker** interact as follows:

  1. The computer randomly selects a **Direction**: **Left** or **Right**, with equal probability.
  2. The **Recommender** sees the selected **Direction**, and chooses a **Recommendation** to send to the **Decision-Maker**: either **Go Left** or **Go Right** .
  3. The **Decision-Maker** (who does not know the selected **Direction**) receives the recommendation and makes a **Decision**: either **Left**, **Middle** or **Right**.
  4. Round feedback is given.

Cycles:

You will be paid at the end of the experiment based on 3 randomly selected **Cycles**.

- The number of rounds in a **Cycle** is random. After each completed round there is a
  - 25% probability the Cycle ends and a new Cycle begins.
  - 75% probability that the Cycle will continue for **at least** another round.
- Within each Cycle you will be in fixed **Recommender–Decision-Maker** pairs.
  - If you are a **Recommender** you will send Recommendations to the same **Decision-Maker** participant within the **Cycle**.
  - If you are a **Decision-Maker** you will receive Recommendations from the same **Recommender** participant within the **Cycle**.
- At the end of each Cycle, you are randomly rematched to a different participant for the next Cycle.
  - Within a Cycle, you interact with the same participant for all of its rounds
  - In each new Cycle you are guaranteed to be matched to a different participant from the last Cycle.

Round Payoff Tables

Recommender's Payoff:

		Decision		
		Left	**Middle**	**Right**
Computer	**Left**	\$3.00	\$1.00	\$0.00
Direction	**Right**	\$3.00	\$1.00	\$0.00

Decision-Maker's Payoff:

		Decision		
		Left	**Middle**	**Right**
Computer	**Left**	\$3.00	\$2.00	\$0.00
Direction	**Right**	\$0.00	\$2.00	\$3.00

Welcome to the Experiment

- Please turn off cell phones now
- From this point on please do not talk to other participants
- We will now begin the instruction period
- If you have any questions, raise your hand, and your question will be answered in private

Main Task

- There are two roles in this experiment:
  - A Recommender
  - A Decision Maker
- Whichever role you are assigned at the start of the experiment will be your role for the entirety of this session.

Main Task

- Session comprised of many rounds of a single task
- Each round works as follows:
  1. Computer selects a direction, **LEFT** or **RIGHT**
  2. The Recommender sees the Computer's Direction and chooses a Recommendation to send, **GO LEFT** or **GO RIGHT**.
  3. The Decision Maker sees the Recommendation and makes a Decision, **LEFT**, **MIDDLE** or **RIGHT**
  4. Feedback on the round.

Round Payoffs

- Recommender's round payoffs are determined only on the Decision:
  - If the decision maker chooses LEFT their payoff is $3
  - If the decision maker chooses MIDDLE their payoff is $1
  - If the decision maker chooses RIGHT their payoff is $0
- The Decision Maker's payoff is determined by both the Computer Direction and the Decision
  - If the Computer Direction is the same as the Decision their payoff is $3
  - If the decision maker choose MIDDLE their payoff is $2, regardless of the Computer Direction
  - If the Computer Direction is the opposite of their Decision their payoff is $0


The Computer Direction this Round is Left
Please Make your Recommendation
You are the Recommender
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
This Round
Computer Direction
L R
Recommendation
L R
Decision
L M R


The Computer Direction this Round is Left
Please Make your Recommendation
You are the Recommender
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
This Round
Computer Direction
L R
Recommendation
L R
Decision
L M R
Submit


The Recommendation this Round is Go Left
Please Make your Decision
You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
This Round
Computer Direction
L R
Recommendation
L R
Decision
L M R


The Recommendation this Round is Go Left
Please Make your Decision
You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
This Round
Computer Direction
L R
Recommendation
L R
Decision
L M R
Submit



Payment Cycles

- The number of rounds within each Cycle is random
  - After each completed round the computer rolls a fair 100-sided die for the entire session
  - The Cycle ends whenever the die roll is greater than 75
  - In any round there is a:
    - 25% probability that the Cycle will end
    - 75% probability that the Cycle will continue
- The experiment will consist of 15 Cycles for Part 1 and 5 Cycles for Part 2.
- You will be paid at the end of the experiment for **3** randomly selected Cycles plus your $6 show-up

Payment Cycles



- The first die roll above 75 ends the cycle
- Selected cycles pay the sum of the round payoffs
- You will be matched to the same other participant within each payment cycle
- In each new cycle you will be matched to a different participant than the previous cycle



Payment Cycles

- A Reference Sheet has been provided that summarizes these instructions
- After informing you of your Role (Recommender or Decision Maker) the first cycle will being

Good Luck!



Part 2




You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
The Recommendation this Round is Go Left
Please Make your Decision
This Round
Computer Direction L R
Recommendation L R
Decision L M R


You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
The Recommendation this Round is Go Left
Please Make your Decision
This Round
Computer Direction L R
Recommendation L R
Decision L M R
Submit


You are the Recommender
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
Feedback
You will learn the other's Decision and your Payoffs after you make your choices next Round
This Round
Computer Direction L R
Recommendation L R
Decision L M R
Recommender Payoff Not known yet
Decision-Maker Payoff Not known yet
Move On


You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 1
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
Feedback
You will learn the Computer Direction and your Payoffs after you make your choices next Round
This Round
Computer Direction L R
Recommendation L R
Decision L M R
Recommender Payoff Not known yet
Decision-Maker Payoff Not known yet
Move On


In Round 1 you sent the recommendation: Go Left
Before you learn what the Decision-Maker chose in Round 1
You will make your recommendation for Round 2
You will make THREE decisions for Round 2
In case the Decision-Maker chose Left in Round 1
In case the Decision-Maker chose Middle in Round 1
In case the Decision-Maker chose Right in Round 1
MoveOn


You are the Recommender
Cycle: 1
Round: 2
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
The Computer Direction this Round is Left
Please Make your Recommendation
In case the other selected LEFT in the previous round
This Round
Previous Round
Computer Direction
Recommendation
Decision
L
R
M
In case the other selected MIDDLE in the previous round
In case the other selected RIGHT in the previous round


In Round 1 you chose Left
Before you learn the Computer Direction for Round 1
You will make your Decision for Round 2
You will make TWO decisions for Round 2.
In case the Computer Direction was Left in Round 1
In case the Computer Direction was Right in Round 1
MoveOn


You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 2
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
The Recommendation this Round is Go Left
Please Make your Decision
In case the Computer Direction was LEFT in the previous round
This Round
Previous Round
Computer Direction
Recommendation
Decision
L
R
M
In case the Computer Direction was RIGHT in the previous round


You are the Recommender
Cycle: 1
Round: 2
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
Feedback
The other's decision in the Previous Round was Left
You indicated that for that decision, your message this Round is Go Left
You will learn the other's Decision and your Payoffs for this Round after you make your choices next Round
This Round
Previous Round
Computer Direction
L R
L R
Recommendation
L R
L R
Decision
L M R
L M R
Recommender Payoff
Not known yet
$3.0
Decision-Maker Payoff
Not known yet
$3.0
Move On


You are the Decision-Maker
Cycle: 1
Round: 2
History for this Cycle
Round
Computer Direction
Recomm
Decision
Your Payoff
Feedback
The Computer Direction in the Previous Round was Left
You indicated that for that Computer Direction, your Decision this Round is Left
You will learn the other's Decision and your Payoffs for this Round after you make your choices next Round
This Round
Previous Round
Computer Direction
L R
L R
Recommendation
L R
L R
Decision
L M R
L M R
Recommender Payoff
Not known yet
$3.0
Decision-Maker Payoff
Not known yet
$3.0
Move On

References

Dal Bó, P. and G. R. Fréchette (2011): "The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence," *American Economic Review*, 101, 411–429.

Embrey, M., G. Fréchette, and E. Stacchetti (2013): "An Experimental Study of Imperfect Public Monitoring: Efficiency versus Renegotiation-Proofness," .

Fudenberg, D., D. Rand, and A. Dreber (2010): "Slow to anger and fast to forgive: Cooperation in an uncertain world," *American Economic Review*.

Vespa, E. (2019): "An Experimental Investigation of Strategies in the Dynamic Common Pool Game," UCSB working paper.