Your Place in the World: Relative Income and Global Inequality

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A   Additional Results

A.1   Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1 and A.2 show the summary statistics for the baseline and follow-up survey, respectively. In Table A.3, we show that the treatment and control groups are balanced on observable characteristics. Since we will consider heterogeneity by left-of-center and center/right-of-center individuals, the table also shows the balance within each of those groups. We see in Table A.3 that the observable characteristics are in general balanced over our samples. Only for one pre-treatment characteristic, self-employed, we see a t-statistic slightly above 1.96. While this is well below what we would expect when conducting a total of 39 tests, we nevertheless are conservative in our analysis and include this characteristic in the set of control variables in the regression analysis (in addition to self-employed this set includes age and gender of the respondent, and indicator variables for education, disability, unemployment, retirement, party affiliation, and East Germany).

Next, we present the distribution of responses for some of the key variables used in the analysis. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of responses to the question on political views. The majority of respondents places themselves in the middle (about 41 percent), which is also the median response, and the rest is subdivided into left-of-center (about 35 percent) and right-to-center (about 24 percent). Thus, it is natural to categorize respondents into three groups: left-of-center respondents (responses 0-4), center respondents (5), and right-of-center respondents (6-10). Figure A.2 shows the distribution of responses for the belief on the role of effort vs. luck.

Next, we compare the distribution of responses in the baseline vs. the follow-up survey. Figure A.3 presents the distribution of prior beliefs on the income ranks at the national and global level in the baseline survey (A.3a.) and follow-up survey (A.3c.). Figures A.4a. and b. show the distribution of prior beliefs on national income ranks in the baseline and follow-up survey separated by treatment status, and analogously A.4c. and d. shows the same for prior beliefs on global income ranks. Figure A.5 presents the distribution of responses of all policy preferences in the baseline and follow-up survey using data from the control group in both surveys.

A.2 Test for Selective Attrition

In part of the analysis, we measure the effects of treatment on the outcomes from the follow-up survey. One potential concern is that the treatment may have affected the decision to participate in the follow-up survey. Tables A.4 and A.5 provide further assurances that the attrition was random. In Table A.4, we examine whether treatment status predicts participation in the follow-up survey. Column (1) shows that this is not the case. As it is possible that some household members are treated, while others are not, we also control for "peer" treatment. The results are displayed in Column (2) and indicates that neither affects participation in the follow-up survey. In Columns (3) and (4) we present a similar analysis investigating how direct treatment effects or peer treatment effects influence the follow-up survey response rate. Again, the coefficient estimates are small and all insignificant. In Table A.5 we repeat this exercise for treatment effects, but also look at left-of-center and center/right-of-center respondents. The results are very similar to what we have seen in Table A.4.

A.3 Correlation Between Giving and Preferences for Redistribution

Figure A.6 provides a less parametric view of the correlation between the real-stakes donations with preferences for redistribution, through a binned scatterplot. Figure A.6.a shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the demand for national redistribution and the donations to the German poor, and Figure A.6.b shows the significant positive correlation between the demand for global redistribution and the donations to the Kenyan poor.

A.4 Feedback Provided to Subjects

After conducting the survey, it is straightforward to compute the respondent's national income rank: it is the proportion of households who reported a lower household income in that same question. At the time of providing feedback and calculating the rewards for the belief elicitation task, however, that data was not available for us (i.e., because it was being collected). For those steps, then, we used an "ex-ante" estimate of the distribution of gross household income. Ideally, we would compute the individual's feedback using the distribution of responses to our question about gross household income from a previous year. However, this question on gross household income was not collected by SOEP-IS in any year prior to our baseline survey. Instead, we used a variable on gross household income computed by SOEP for the calendar years 2014 and then extrapolated to the year 2015 with a simple adjustment for the German inflation rate and the growth in GDP per capita. This income variable is not based on the same question about the gross household income we used in our module. Instead, it was constructed

by SOEP based on a battery of different questions.[42]

Figure A.7 gives a sense of how accurate our ex-ante feedback was (compared to the actual rank that we were able to compute after collecting all the survey responses about income). Given that this feedback is constructed with data from a different source, it is natural that there will be some discrepancies between our ex-ante feedback and our ex-post estimates. Additionally, we would expect our calculations to be somewhat off purely from sampling variation. Figure A.7 illustrates that our feedback was not perfect, but still quite accurate. In any case, note that for the analysis of the information-provision experiment, we do not need to assume that the feedback was perfectly accurate.

A.5   Correlates of Policy Preferences

In Table A.6 we show unconditional correlations (as in Table 2) alongside with conditional correlations. That is, odd-numbered columns in Table A.6 corresponds to bivariate regressions (i.e., with independent regressions with one right-hand-side variable each), whereas the even-numbered columns report multivariate correlations (i.e., with all correlates entering the right-hand-side of the equation jointly). As one can see, most of the patterns reported in Section 3 survive the inclusion of other socio-economic information. Notable differences emerge, for example, for the association between demand for national redistribution and age, and for the correlation of demand for global redistribution and global Effort vs. Luck Beliefs. Moreover, for giving at both the national and the global level political orientation does not survive the inclusion of other variables.

A.6   Correlates of Misperceptions

In Table A.7 we present correlations between misperceptions and a set of control variables using data from the baseline control group only (i.e., individuals who did not receive any feedback from us regarding their true income rank). In uneven-numbered columns each control variable enters a bivariate regression with national bias (defined as the difference of prior belief and true income rank) and global bias (defined analogously) as well as the absolute national and global bias as the dependent variable. In even-numbered columns all controls enter the regression simultaneously. National and global misperceptions are negatively related to income and there is some indication that left-of-center respondents are better calibrated as well. Higher education

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[42]This outcome represents the combined income before taxes and government transfers of all individuals in the household 16 years of age and older. This variable is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, asset flows, private retirement income and private transfers. Labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment including training, self-employment income, and bonuses, overtime, and profit-sharing. Asset flows include income from interest, dividends, and rent. Private transfers include payments from individuals outside of the household including alimony and child support payments.

in the form of a college degree is negatively related to national bias but positively relative to global bias.

In the follow-up survey, we also added some control questions at the end. Specifically, we asked respondents to what extent they trust the government, media, science, and official statistics, and whether they actively looked for information on the income distribution (and if so, where they looked). If a respondent was in the treatment group in the previous wave, we also asked them whether they shared information about their income rank within their household. Figure A.8 shows the correlation between misperceptions and respondents' trust in government, media, science, and official statistics using data from control group in the follow-up survey.

A.7 Income Ranks Over Time

In Figure A.9 we show that individuals' actual relative income often changes from one year to the other, which implies that whatever one learned about their relative income one year ago may not be directly relevant to assess ones current income rank. This pattern is more pronounced for national than global income ranks.

A.8 Information Diffusion within the Household

The baseline specification from equation (2) assumes that when the individual receives the treatment directly, it should not matter whether his or her peers received the treatment or not. We can provide a direct test of that assumption. For that, we estimate a modified version of equation (2):

$$
r_{i,nat}^{t+1} = \alpha_{nat} \cdot \left(r_{i,nat}^{signal} - r_{i,nat}^{prior} \right) \cdot T_i + \alpha_{nat}^{peer} \cdot \left(r_{i,nat}^{signal} - r_{i,nat}^{prior} \right) \cdot T_i^{peer}
$$
$$
+ \beta_1 \cdot \left(r_{i,nat}^{signal} - r_{i,nat}^{prior} \right) + X_i \beta_2 + \varepsilon_i
$$

First, we recode T_i^{peer} such that it takes the value 1 if one of the other household members received the information and 0 otherwise (i.e., it takes the value 1 even if the individual received the information directly, as long as one of the other household members received it too). Second, we estimate separate regressions for individuals in the treatment and control groups (i.e., for individuals who received the information directly and individuals who received the information indirectly). The results are presented in Table A.8. Columns (1) and (2) show that individuals who did not receive the information directly seem to be learning from their peers. The results from Columns (3) and (4) indicate that, for individuals who received the information directly, it does not matter whether their peers received the information or not. In other words, this is direct evidence in support for the baseline definition of T_i^{peer} in equation (2).

A.9 Alternative Definition of Political Orientation

For ease of presentation, we only distinguished between left-of-center respondents and center/right-of-center respondents in our main analysis. In this section, we show that our results are unaffected when we use the alternative categorization of political orientation suggested by the distribution of responses as outlined in Section A.1. That is, we categorize respondents into three groups: left-of-center respondents, center, and right-of-center respondents. Note that left-of-center is defined as in our main analysis and that we now only look at center (defined as the median response to the self-assessment on the political left-right spectrum) and right-of-center (defined as above median responses) separately. The results on the effects of information provision on policy preferences are displayed in Table A.9 and largely confirm our results presented in the main text (Table 6) with one notable exception. While we see only a weak effect of information about national income rank on giving for center/right-of-center respondents in panel (c) of Table 6, this effect is more pronounced if we look at right-of-center respondents separately (panel (c) of Table A.9). We observe that more conservative respondents increase their national *and* global giving upon learning that they are richer than thought at the national level, suggesting that other-regarding preferences play a role here.

A.10 Robustness of Effects of Information on Preferences and Opinions

First, we explore the robustness of our main specification from equation (3) of Section 5. The baseline specification is demanding in that it simultaneously includes in the regression two variables that are significantly correlated: perceptions of national and global relative income. In Table A.10, we present an alternative specification, which only includes perceptions of national *or* global ranks. The results from this less demanding specification are not only robust, but also more precisely estimated. This specification is, however, by construction biased, as it omits a variable that is correlated with the regressor of interest, and thus it is not our preferred specification.

Second, we verify that our results are not driven by outliers, and that assuming a linear relationship is reasonable. Using binned scatterplots and the same specification as before (with perception of national income rank only) confirms that this is case. Figure A.10.a depicts this relation for the left-of-center respondents and Figure A.10.b shows this for center/right-of-center respondents.

Third, we can also look at how our treatment affects demand for redistribution dependent on respondents' misperceptions. For some respondents learning their true income position is positive news (i.e., they learn they are richer than they previously thought), neutral news, or negative news (i.e., they learn they are poorer than they thought). Figure A.11 presents this exercise. Figure A.11.a focuses on left-leaning respondents and shows that for those who underestimated their relative income, the "news" that their income is higher than previously

thought decreased their preferences for redistribution (i.e., the whole distribution shifts to the left, non-parametric p-value = 0.023). Figure A.11.b shows that for those who had a roughly accurate prior belief (i.e., +/- 10 pp of the truth) the information provision was "no news" and, as expected, the preferences for redistribution does not change (i.e., the whole distribution looks the same in treatment and control, non-parametric p-value = 0.127). Figure A.11.c shows that for those who overestimated their relative income, the "news" that their income is lower than previously thought increased their preferences for redistribution (i.e., the whole distribution shifts to the right, non-parametric p-value = 0.173). Figure A.11.d-e shows the results for center/right-of-center individuals. It is clear that there are no significant effects for center/right-of-center individuals.

Finally, we provide a falsification test of our information intervention. Specifically, we test whether the treatment had an effect on a variable that is related to demand for redistribution and that we elicit before the treatment. For this purpose, we use the two questions about the respondent's belief in the importance of effort versus luck for individual economic success both at the national and the global level. Despite that these variables are related to demand for redistribution (see Table 2), we expect no treatment effect as they were measured before the information-provision. The results in Table A.11 confirm this expectation: none of the key coefficients are statistically significant, and furthermore the point estimates tend to be close to zero, and the statistical precision is comparable to that from Table 6.

A.11 Average Treatment Effects of Information

Table A.12 shows the average effect of providing information on the main outcomes. This may be relevant for policy-makers if they are considering disseminating unbiased information about the national and global relative income. We find that the provision of information had average effects close to zero, statistically insignificant, and precisely estimated. This is perfectly consistent with the reported evidence: We find that only feedback about national rank matters. However, we barely changed the beliefs of the individuals on average, because there was roughly as much underestimation as overestimation.

A.12 Treatment Effects on Follow-Up Outcomes

Because we reassessed all our outcome measures in the follow-up survey, we can examine the effect of the information-provision experiment on policy preferences a year later. Table A.13 presents the results from estimating equation (3). Although we have seen a quite remarkable belief persistence, most point estimates are small. This may be not surprising as the pass-through rates one year later are far from perfect (see discussion in Section 4.3). In addition, many things have changed in the year since the individual received the feedback, including

that an individual's position in the income distribution may have changed. As a result, we would expect the point estimates to be significantly smaller a year later. The results from Table A.13 indicate that the point estimates are not really stable, and mostly imprecisely estimated. We cannot rule out that there are no effects one year later, but we cannot rule out either that the effects one year later were substantial – indeed, we cannot even rule out that the long-term effects are as large as the short-term effects.

One concern with the baseline specification for this analysis is that the control group was contaminated due to the spillovers. In other words, while some of the respondents were randomly selected not to receive information, some of their household members may have received the information and thus respondents could have been exposed to the information anyways. This would create an attenuation bias in the results reported in Table A.13. We can control for those spillovers using an specification that includes the interactions between the peer-treatment and the gap in prior beliefs, as in equation (2). Recall that the indicator for "peer treatment" takes the value 1 if the respondent did not receive the information but another member of her household and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the respondent received the information or if none of the household members received the information). The results from this alternative specification are presented in Table A.14 and roughly similar to those reported in the baseline specification from Table A.13.

A.13 Additional Evidence on Support for Globalization and Immigration

In the follow-up survey, we also asked whether the poor (rich) will benefit from globalization and immigration. More precisely, after asking about the support for globalization, we asked the following two questions: "Do you think that poor (rich) people in Germany are disadvantaged by globalization or that they benefit from it?" with answers ranging from 1 (very disadvantaged) to 10 (benefit greatly). Similarly, after asking about support for more immigration from poor countries, we asked "Do you think that poor (rich) people in Germany will be disadvantaged by or that they will benefit from more immigration from people from poorer countries?" again on a scale from 1 (very disadvantaged) to 10 (benefit greatly). In Figure A.12.a, we show the distribution of responses to the questions about the beneficiaries of globalization. As one would expect, respondents believe that the poor are disadvantaged by more globalization while the rich profit from it. Figure A.12.b shows that responses are negatively correlated (ρ=-0.20). Those who think that the poor are disadvantaged by globalization also tend to think that the rich more likely benefit. Figure A.12.c shows distribution of responses to the questions about the beneficiaries of immigration. We observe a similar pattern as before: respondents think the poor are disadvantaged and the rich benefit. Figure A.12.b shows again that responses are negatively correlated, albeit only weakly (ρ=-0.08).

Next, we show how these questions correlate with respondents' support for globalization and immigration. Figure A.13.a shows a positive correlation between support for globalization

(ρ=0.42), i.e., respondents who believe that the poor are disadvantaged by globalization also tend to display less support for globalization, and vice versa. The picture is less clear on the relationship between support for globalization and the question whether the rich benefit from it (Figure A.13.b), as most respondents believe that the rich will benefit. We observe a similar picture for support for immigration and the questions who will benefit from more immigration. Figure A.13.c shows a strong association between support for immigration and the question whether the poor benefit from it (ρ=0.55), while the association is near zero for the support for immigration and the rich (Figure A.13.d). These correlations are consistent with a Stolper-Samuelson-effect that would predict that people at the lower end of the income distribution face more economic pressure due to more trade openness and immigration and thus would be disadvantaged by it.

## Figure A.1: Distribution of Political Orientation

Notes: Distribution of political orientation measured on a scale from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). Question asked in the baseline survey *before* the treatment and includes data from all respondents. Median response is 5.

Figure A.2: Effort vs. Luck

a. Distribution   **b.** Correlation National Vs. Global

Notes: Distribution of Effort vs. Luck Beliefs at national level (gray) and global level (red) in (a.) and their correlation in (b.) with darker areas indicating more responses in this area. Effort vs. Luck Beliefs were elicited *before* the treatment in the baseline survey. Data from all respondents in the baseline survey.

Figure A.3: Perceived National and Global Income Ranks

a. Distribution Baseline

b. Correlation National Vs. Global Baseline

c. Distribution Follow up

d. Correlation National Vs. Global Follow up

Notes: Distribution of prior beliefs about national income rank (gray) and global income rank (red) in the baseline survey in (a.) and their correlation in (b.) with darker areas indicating more responses in this area. Distribution of prior beliefs about national income rank (gray) and global income rank (red) in the follow-up survey *control group* in (c.) and their correlation in (d.) with darker areas indicating more responses in this area. In the baseline survey beliefs were elicited *before* the treatment and in the follow-up survey *one year after* the treatment.

Figure A.4: Perceived National and Global Income Ranks over Time

a. National Distribution Control

b. National Distribution Treatment

c. Global Distribution Control

d. Global Distribution Treatment

Notes: Distribution of prior beliefs about national income rank in the baseline control (gray) and follow-up control group (red) in (a.) and distribution of prior beliefs about national income rank in the baseline treatment (gray) and follow-up treatment group (red) in (b.). Distribution of prior beliefs about global income rank in the baseline control (gray) and follow-up control group (red) in (c.) and distribution of prior beliefs about global income rank in the baseline treatment (gray) and follow-up treatment group (red) in (d.).

Figure A.5: Policy Preferences – Baseline and Follow-up Survey

a. National Redistribution

b. Global Redistribution

c. Support International Organ.

d. Support Globalization

e. Support Immigration

Notes: Distribution of preferences for national redistribution (a.), of preferences for global redistribution (b.), of the support for an international organization with a mandate to redistribute globally (c.), of the support for globalization (d.), and of the support for immigration (e.) in the baseline control (gray) and follow-up control group (red).

Figure A.6: Preferences for Redistribution vs. Giving in Distributional Tasks

a. National Redistribution **b.** Global Redistribution

Notes: Binned scatterplots with 10 equally-sized bins showing the relationship between preference for national redistribution and share of giving to a poor German household (a.) and the relationship between preference for global redistribution and share of giving to a poor global household (b.). Data from baseline survey control group.

Figure A.7: Prior Beliefs about National Income Rank vs. Feedback

Notes: Distribution of prior beliefs about own income rank and the information provided (baseline survey). The feedback in the baseline survey was calculated prior to collecting the survey data using data for gross household income in the calendar year 2014 from the SOEP and "extrapolating" it to 2016 by adjusting for the inflation rate and the growth in GDP per capita. The green horizontal line indicates the true feedback, which should be uniform over the interval.

Figure A.8: Relationship Between Misperceptions of Income Rank and Trust in Institutions

a. Government

b. Media

c. Statistics

d. Research

Notes: Coefficient plots from OLS regressions of misperceptions about relative income on trust in government (a.), media (b.), statistics (c.), and research (d.) using data from the follow-up control group. Standard errors clustered at the household level.

Figure A.9: Persistence of Income Rank Year-Over-Year

a. National Income Rank

b. Global Income Rank

Notes: Correlation between true income rank in the year of the baseline survey and in the year of the fol-lowup survey for national income rank (a.) and global income rank (b.).

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Figure A.10: Effects of Information Provision on Preferences for Redistribution

a. Left-of-Center Respondents **b.** Center/Right-of-Center Respondents

Notes: Binned scatterplots with 20 equally-sized bins showing the effect of information on true national income rank on preferences for redistribution (defined as equally-weighted index of preferences for national and global redistribution) for left-of-center respondents (a.) and center/right-of-center respondents (b.). Left-of-center is defined as *below the median response of 5* on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents *at or above the median (5)* on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany. Data from baseline survey.

Figure A.11: Histogram-Version of the Effects of Information Provision

Notes: Histograms showing the effect of information on true income rank on preferences for redistribution (defined as equally-weighted index of preferences for national and global redistribution) broken down into positive, neutral, and negative "news." Positive (negative) news means that a respondent underestimated (overestimated) their true rank by more than 10 percentage points, while neutral means that a respondent misperceives their true rank by at most 10 percentage points. Results for left-of-center respondents are displayed in (a.)–(c.), and for center/right-of-center respondents in (d.)–(e.). Data from baseline survey.

Figure A.12: Beneficiaries of Globalization and Immigration

a. Distribution Globalization

b. Correlations

c. Distribution Immigration

d. Correlations

Notes: Distribution of beneficiaries of globalization: poor (gray) and rich (red) in (a.) and their correlation in (b.) with darker areas indicating more responses in this area. Distribution of beneficiaries of immigration: poor (gray) and rich (red) in (c.) and their correlation in (d.) with darker areas indicating more responses in this area. Data from the follow-up survey control group.

Figure A.13: Relationship Between Support for Globalization and Immigration and Beneficiaries

Notes: Correlations of support for globalization with opinion about beneficiaries of globalization: poor (a.) and rich (b.) and correlations of support for immigration with opinion about beneficiaries of immigration: poor (c.) and rich (d.). Darker areas indicate more responses in this area. Data from follow-up survey control group.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics – Baseline Survey

	Pre-Treatment									
	Control Group					Treatment Group				
	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75
Political Orientation	4.72	1.54	4	5	5	4.80	1.54	4	5	6
Effort vs. Luck Belief (National)	4.59	1.69	3	5	6	4.60	1.67	3	5	6
Effort vs. Luck Belief (Global)	5.20	1.97	4	5	6	5.17	1.92	4	5	6
HH Gross Income (EUR 1,000s)	43.64	50.78	18	35	58	43.54	59.66	17	35	55
No. of Household Members	2.34	1.19	2	2	3	2.28	1.25	1	2	3
Prior Belief National Rank	0.49	0.21	0	1	1	0.50	0.20	0	1	1
Prior Belief Global Rank	0.69	0.20	1	1	1	0.70	0.20	1	1	1
Observations	705					687				

	Post-Treatment									
	Control Group					Treatment Group				
	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75
National Redistribution	5.06	2.26	3	5	7	4.99	2.25	3	5	7
Global Redistribution	5.06	2.35	3	5	7	5.14	2.32	4	5	7
Support Internat. Organization	4.60	2.69	2	5	7	4.50	2.64	2	5	6
Giving Amount National	27.70	15.14	20	25	40	28.49	14.52	20	25	40
Giving Amount Global	31.88	16.04	20	30	50	31.79	15.77	20	30	50
Support Globalization	6.21	1.97	5	6	8	5.94	1.92	5	6	7
Support Immigration	4.38	2.16	3	5	6	4.36	2.05	3	5	6
Observations	705					687				

Notes: Summary statistics for pre-treatment and post-treatment variables separated by treatment status in the baseline survey. Political Orientation is respondents' self-placement on a scale from far left (0) to far right (10). Effort vs. Luck Belief (National/Global) indicates to what extend a respondent thinks that economic success is due to effort (1) or luck (10). Prior Belief National (Global) Rank is the perceived relative rank in the national (global) income distribution ranging from 0-100. National and Global Redistribution indicate respondents' preferences for national and global redistribution ranging from 1 (no redistribution) to 10 (complete redistribution). Support Internat. Organization is respondents' willingness to support introduction of an international organization with a mandate to redistribute resources between countries ranging from 1 (no support) to 10 (full support). Support Globalization measures support for globalization ranging from 1 (no globalization) to 10 (complete globalization) and Support Immigration measures support for immigration of more poor people ranging from 1 (much less people) to 10 (much more people). Giving National/Global indicates the sum of money (between €0 and €50) transferred to a poor German household and a poor Kenyan household.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics – Follow-up Survey

	Control Group					Treatment Group				
	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75
HH Gross Income (EUR 1,000s)	46.66	36.48	23	39	60	47.03	52.59	22	36	60
No. of Household Members	2.25	1.08	2	2	3	2.24	1.20	1	2	3
Prior Belief National Rank	0.51	0.21	0	1	1	0.53	0.23	0	1	1
Prior Belief Global Rank	0.71	0.21	1	1	1	0.73	0.21	1	1	1
Certainty Prior Nat. Rank	4.94	2.30	3	5	7	5.41	2.46	4	5	7
Certainty Prior Glob. Rank	5.21	2.52	3	5	7	5.81	2.53	5	6	8
National Redistribution	5.15	2.33	3	5	7	5.09	2.34	3	5	7
Global Redistribution	5.01	2.37	3	5	7	5.04	2.35	3	5	7
Support Internat. Organization	4.66	2.91	2	5	7	4.68	2.85	2	5	7
Support Globalization	6.11	2.06	5	6	8	5.86	2.04	5	6	7
Poor benefit Globaliz.	4.64	2.21	3	5	6	4.64	2.28	3	5	6
Rich benefit Globaliz.	7.58	2.07	7	8	9	7.41	2.17	6	8	9
Support Immigration	4.43	2.31	2	5	6	4.38	2.14	3	4	6
Poor benefit Immigrat.	3.96	2.02	2	4	5	3.93	2.02	2	4	5
Rich benefit Immigrat.	6.69	2.17	5	7	8	6.70	2.04	5	7	8
Observations	585					559				

Notes: Summary statistics for variables in the follow-up survey separated by treatment status. Prior Belief National (Global) Rank is the perceived relative rank in the national (global) income distribution ranging from 0-100. Certainty Prior Nat. (Glob.) Rank indicates respondents' confidence with their prior-belief statement measured in 10 percent steps (from 0 to 100 percent). National and Global Redistribution indicate respondents' preferences for national and global redistribution ranging from 1 (no redistribution) to 10 (complete redistribution). Support Internat. Organization is respondents' willingness to support introduction of an international organization with a mandate to redistribute resources between countries ranging from 1 (no support) to 10 (full support). Support Globalization measures support for globalization ranging from 1 (no globalization) to 10 (complete globalization) and Poor/Rich benefit Globaliz. indicates whether respondents think that poor/rich are disadvantaged by (1) or benefit from globalization (10). Support Immigration measures support for immigration of more poor people ranging from 1 (much less people) to 10 (much more people). Poor/Rich benefit Immigrat. indicates whether respondents think that poor/rich are disadvantaged by (1) or benefit from immigration (10).

Table A.3: Randomization Balance

	All			Left-of-center			Center/Right-of-center		
	(1) Treat	(2) Control	(3) P-value	(4) Treat	(5) Control	(6) P-value	(7) Treat	(8) Control	(9) P-value
HH Gross Income (EUR 1,000s)	43.64 (1.91)	43.54 (2.28)	0.97	52.40 (3.45)	45.61 (2.52)	0.12	39.09 (2.26)	42.54 (3.14)	0.37
No. of Household Members	2.34 (0.04)	2.28 (0.05)	0.35	2.37 (0.07)	2.35 (0.09)	0.90	2.32 (0.06)	2.24 (0.06)	0.31
Female (=1)	0.54 (0.02)	0.55 (0.02)	0.79	0.54 (0.03)	0.58 (0.03)	0.42	0.55 (0.02)	0.54 (0.02)	0.82
Age	54.58 (0.71)	56.44 (0.69)	0.06	52.67 (1.20)	55.51 (1.20)	0.09	55.58 (0.87)	56.88 (0.84)	0.28
Education: upper secondary (=1)	0.63 (0.02)	0.60 (0.02)	0.23	0.56 (0.03)	0.54 (0.03)	0.67	0.66 (0.02)	0.62 (0.02)	0.20
Education: college (=1)	0.22 (0.02)	0.23 (0.02)	0.61	0.33 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)	0.70	0.16 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.24
Disabled (=1)	0.13 (0.01)	0.15 (0.01)	0.18	0.12 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.90	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.02)	0.11
Unemployed (=1)	0.03 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.50	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.65	0.04 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.64
Self employed (=1)	0.07 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.21	0.08 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	0.05	0.06 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)	0.88
Retired (=1)	0.34 (0.02)	0.35 (0.02)	0.72	0.32 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)	0.92	0.36 (0.02)	0.37 (0.02)	0.65
SPD Supporter (=1)	0.13 (0.01)	0.16 (0.01)	0.14	0.22 (0.03)	0.25 (0.03)	0.35	0.09 (0.01)	0.11 (0.01)	0.16
CDU/CSU Supporter (=1)	0.22 (0.02)	0.24 (0.02)	0.30	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.71	0.28 (0.02)	0.31 (0.02)	0.26
East Germany (=1)	0.23 (0.02)	0.23 (0.02)	0.99	0.25 (0.03)	0.27 (0.03)	0.76	0.22 (0.02)	0.22 (0.02)	0.86
Joint F-Test			0.22			0.15			0.58
Observations	705	687		241	222		464	465	

Notes: Control variables: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses), separated for treatment and control in the baseline survey. P-value is from testing for difference between treatment and control. Joint F-test reports the p-value from an F-test based on regressing treatment status on all controls. Columns 1–3 includes data for all respondents, Columns 4–6 includes data for left-of-center, and Columns 7–9 includes data for center/right-of-center respondents. All control variables are defined as binary variables except household income, number of household members, and age.

Table A.4: Effects of Information Provision on Response Rate to the Follow-Up Survey (Selective Attrition)

	Responded to Follow-Up Survey			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.018	-0.008		
	(0.020)	(0.026)		
Peer Treatment		0.029		
		(0.032)		
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)			-0.029	-0.082
			(0.097)	(0.113)
National Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)				-0.153
				(0.146)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)			-0.146	-0.091
			(0.099)	(0.120)
Global Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)				0.152
				(0.134)
Observations	1,392	1,392	1,364	1,364

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses using data from both surveys. The dependent variable is an indicator whether a respondent took part in the follow-up survey one year later. Analysis conditional on number of household members and HH gross income.

Table A.5: Effects of Information Provision on Response Rate to the Follow-Up Survey (Treatment Effect on Attrition)

	All	Left-of-center	Center/Right-of-center
	(1)	(2)	(3)
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.019	-0.287	0.107
	(0.096)	(0.181)	(0.114)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.131	0.032	-0.196*
	(0.100)	(0.213)	(0.110)
P-value (i)=(ii)	0.541	0.391	0.140
Observations	1,364	458	906

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of treatment status on participation in the follow-up survey using data from baseline survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator whether a respondent took part in the follow-up survey one year later. Left-of-center is defined as below the median response of 5 on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.6: Correlates of Policy Preferences

	National Redistribution		Global redistribution		Support Int. Org.		Giving National		Giving Global		Support Globalization		Support Immigration	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Age	-0.008*	-0.003	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.014**	-0.009	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.013***	-0.008*	-0.018***	-0.011**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female (=1)	-0.047	0.047	-0.065	-0.111	-0.090	-0.047	0.028	0.045**	0.072***	0.084***	-0.383**	-0.357**	-0.036	0.069
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.183)	(0.207)	(0.212)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.165)	(0.160)
Education: Upper Secondary (=1)	-0.085	-0.210	-0.239	-0.408	-0.370*	-0.130	-0.057**	0.039	-0.076***	0.030	-0.125	-0.122	-0.580***	-0.171
	(0.177)	(0.265)	(0.185)	(0.278)	(0.216)	(0.300)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.153)	(0.227)	(0.169)	(0.250)
Education: College & More (=1)	-0.076	-0.423	-0.075	-0.617*	0.325	-0.077	0.129***	0.116***	0.138***	0.119***	0.196	-0.050	0.704***	0.282
	(0.198)	(0.311)	(0.213)	(0.334)	(0.262)	(0.365)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.169)	(0.268)	(0.194)	(0.298)
Equivalized Monthly Net HH Income (log)	-0.374*	-0.529**	0.046	-0.102	0.451**	0.192	0.198***	0.139***	0.213***	0.148***	0.709***	0.557***	0.787***	0.308
	(0.198)	(0.216)	(0.200)	(0.216)	(0.227)	(0.245)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.156)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.194)
Unemployed (=1)	0.456	0.102	0.522	0.641	-0.099	0.240	-0.114*	0.030	-0.142**	-0.007	-0.401	-0.341	-0.078	0.537
	(0.453)	(0.428)	(0.423)	(0.437)	(0.559)	(0.566)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.322)	(0.332)	(0.432)	(0.446)
East Germany (=1)	0.527***	0.395**	-0.028	0.016	-0.843***	-0.727***	-0.114***	-0.102***	-0.119***	-0.102***	-0.465**	-0.354*	-1.184***	-1.160***
	(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.208)	(0.216)	(0.241)	(0.259)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.198)
German Citizenship (=1)	-0.574	-0.483	-0.600	-0.519	-1.145**	-1.089**	0.001	-0.034	0.027	-0.011	-0.547	-0.677*	-0.930***	-0.773**
	(0.456)	(0.478)	(0.469)	(0.519)	(0.487)	(0.473)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.350)	(0.353)	(0.342)	(0.338)
Political Orientation: Left-of-Center (=1)	1.014***	0.967***	1.117***	1.057***	1.260***	1.159***	0.059**	0.025	0.070***	0.029	0.295*	0.053	1.039***	0.921***
	(0.170)	(0.173)	(0.181)	(0.194)	(0.215)	(0.226)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.170)
Effort vs. Luck Belief (National)	0.174***	0.086	0.086	0.030	0.100	0.073	0.012*	-0.001	0.011	-0.004	-0.030	-0.097*	0.031	-0.052
	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.062)
Effort vs. Luck Belief (Global)	0.174***	0.117**	0.121**	0.041	0.128**	0.023	0.026***	0.017**	0.025***	0.014**	0.075**	0.085*	0.138***	0.100*
	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.052)
Risk Aversion	-0.041	-0.019	-0.079*	-0.092**	-0.050	-0.052	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006	-0.004	0.011	-0.003	-0.037	-0.038
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Observations	638		636		628		644		643		638		643	

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses using data from the baseline control group. Uneven-numbered columns display coefficients from separate regressions for each control, while even-numbered columns report multivariate regressions including all listed controls at once. All dependent variables are measured on a 1–10 scale with 1 indicating "no redistribution/no support" and 10 indicating "full redistribution/support," except "Giving National/Global," which is the share of giving and thus measured on a scale from 0 to 1. All controls are defined as binary variables (except Age, Monthly Net HH Income, Effort vs. Luck Belief, and Risk Aversion). "Effort vs. Luck Belief (National/Global)" is measured on a 1–10 scale with higher numbers indicating a stronger belief that luck determines economic success and "Risk Aversion" is measured on a 0-10 scale with higher numbers indicating less risk aversion.

Table A.7: Correlates of Misperceptions about Income Rank

	National bias		National absolute bias		Global bias		Global absolute bias	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female (=1)	0.001	-0.012	-0.002	-0.001	-0.042***	-0.038***	0.040***	0.032***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education: Upper Secondary (=1)	0.007	-0.038*	0.007	0.010	-0.035**	-0.005	0.045***	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Education: College & More (=1)	-0.083***	-0.050*	0.000	-0.003	0.044***	0.060**	-0.080***	-0.061***
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Equivalized Monthly Net HH Income (log)	-0.182***	-0.172***	0.037***	0.044***	-0.039**	-0.060***	-0.049***	-0.025*
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Unemployed (=1)	0.149***	0.005	-0.009	0.014	0.063	0.040	0.037	0.006
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Political Orientation: Left-of-Center (=1)	-0.046***	-0.023	-0.018*	-0.022**	-0.005	-0.003	-0.028***	-0.019*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
East Germany (=1)	0.017	-0.011	-0.010	-0.000	-0.019	-0.035**	0.017	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
German Citizenship (=1)	-0.106***	-0.060	-0.005	-0.014	-0.040	-0.011	0.045*	0.044*
	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	1,348	1,348	1,348	1,348	1,338	1,338	1,338	1,338

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses using data from baseline survey. The dependent variable is national bias (defined as the difference of prior belief and true income rank, Columns 1–2), national absolute bias (Columns 3–4), global bias (defined analogously, Columns 5–6), and global absolute bias (Columns 7–8). Uneven-numbered columns display coefficients from separate regressions for each control, while even-numbered columns report multivariate regressions including all controls at once. All controls are defined as binary variables (except age and monthly net hh income).

Table A.8: Alternative Specification: Effects of Information Provision on Beliefs about Income Rank One Year Later

	Control		Treatment	
	(1) National	(2) Global	(3) National	(4) Global
National Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)	0.124** (0.060)		-0.024 (0.062)	
Global Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)		0.106 (0.067)		-0.080 (0.072)
Observations	582	579	555	543

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on beliefs about income rank one year later. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the prior belief on relative national income rank and relative global income rank in the follow-up survey. Peer Treatment takes the value 1 if one of the other household members received the information and 0 otherwise (i.e., it takes the value 1 even if the individual received the information directly, as long as one of the other household members received it too). We estimate separate regressions for individuals in the control group (Columns 1–2) and treatment group (Columns 3–4). The control variables used in the analysis are the prior beliefs about the national and global income rank, misperceptions, and the change in income rank between surveys, hh gross income, a set of dummies for the number of household members, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.9: Robustness: Effects of Information Provision on Policy Preferences by Political Orientation

(a)

	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Giving Nat.	(5) Giving Glob.	(6) Sup. Global.	(7) Sup. Immig.
				Left-of-center			
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.774* (0.457)	-0.932** (0.392)	-1.047** (0.459)	-0.065 (0.451)	-0.268 (0.457)	-0.487 (0.470)	-0.430 (0.411)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	0.152 (0.492)	0.125 (0.443)	0.552 (0.468)	0.541 (0.450)	0.411 (0.467)	-0.071 (0.512)	0.669 (0.459)
Observations	454	452	447	458	457	454	454

(b)

	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Giving Nat.	(5) Giving Glob.	(6) Sup. Global.	(7) Sup. Immig.
				Center			
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.276 (0.436)	-0.246 (0.406)	-0.017 (0.367)	0.352 (0.367)	0.084 (0.381)	-0.108 (0.377)	-0.022 (0.364)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	0.476 (0.451)	0.556 (0.397)	0.208 (0.361)	-0.467 (0.379)	-0.136 (0.394)	-0.436 (0.374)	-0.153 (0.346)
Observations	539	536	531	538	539	538	542

(c)

	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Giving Nat.	(5) Giving Glob.	(6) Sup. Global.	(7) Sup. Immig.
				Right-of-center			
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	0.569 (0.425)	0.638 (0.489)	0.309 (0.484)	0.810* (0.434)	1.052** (0.474)	0.741 (0.557)	0.067 (0.474)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.571 (0.375)	-0.341 (0.437)	-0.171 (0.430)	0.219 (0.409)	-0.246 (0.429)	-0.112 (0.439)	0.046 (0.404)
Observations	357	353	347	361	361	353	362

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on policy preferences using data from the baseline survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Panel (a) uses data for all respondents, panel (b) displays results for left-of-center respondents, and panel (c) displays results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center is defined as *below the median response of 5* on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents *at or above the median (5)* on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.10: Robustness: Effects of Information Provision on Policy Preferences

	All		Left-of-center		Center/Right-of-center	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.169	-0.137	-0.657**	-0.810***	0.138	0.266
	(0.179)	(0.185)	(0.322)	(0.308)	(0.213)	(0.225)
Observations	1360	1350	458	455	902	895

	All		Left-of-center		Center/Right-of-center	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.	Nat. Redist.	Glob. Redist.
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.109	-0.033	-0.411	-0.547	0.080	0.268
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.350)	(0.344)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Observations	1350	1341	454	452	896	889

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on preferences for national and global redistribution using data from the baseline survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. (a.) displays the results from a specification that only considers national rank information and (b.) presents the results only considering global rank information. Columns 1–2 use data for all respondents, Columns 3–4 display results for left-of-center respondents, and Columns 5–6 display results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center is defined as below the median response of 5 on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national (in a.) and global income rank (in b.), and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.11: Falsification Test: Effects of Information Provision on Pre-Treatment Outcomes

	All		Left-of-center		Center/Right-of-center	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Eff./Luck Nat.	Eff./Luck Glob.	Eff./Luck Nat.	Eff./Luck Glob.	Eff./Luck Nat.	Eff./Luck Glob.
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.098	0.061	-0.580	0.006	0.075	0.091
	(0.248)	(0.244)	(0.475)	(0.459)	(0.289)	(0.290)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	0.065	-0.100	0.558	-0.184	-0.123	-0.056
	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.462)	(0.460)	(0.290)	(0.301)
Observations	1,364	1,354	458	456	906	898

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on national Effort vs. Luck Beliefs (Eff./Luck Nat.) and global Effort vs. Luck Beliefs (Eff./Luck Glob.) using data from the baseline survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. The dependent variables "Eff./Luck Nat." and Eff./Luck Glob." are measured pre-treatment in the baseline survey and are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Columns 1–2 use data for all respondents, Columns 3–4 display results for left-of-center respondents and Columns 5–6 display results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center is defined as below the median response of 5 on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.12: Average Effects of Information Provision on Policy Preferences

	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Giving Nat.	(5) Giving Glob.	(6) Sup. Global.	(7) Sup. Immig.
				All			
Treatment	-0.024 (0.053)	0.044 (0.054)	-0.030 (0.053)	0.047 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.051)	-0.131** (0.054)	-0.020 (0.049)
Observations	1,376	1,366	1,348	1,384	1,384	1,369	1,386
				Left-of-center			
Treatment	-0.097 (0.088)	-0.034 (0.087)	-0.044 (0.096)	0.101 (0.085)	-0.023 (0.088)	-0.150 (0.093)	0.009 (0.079)
Observations	459	456	451	463	462	458	459
				Center/Right-of-center			
Treatment	0.036 (0.064)	0.107 (0.066)	0.001 (0.064)	0.039 (0.063)	0.020 (0.063)	-0.114* (0.067)	-0.004 (0.059)
Observations	917	910	897	921	922	911	927

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on policy preferences using data from the baseline survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Treatment is an indicator variable for receiving information about the true income rank. (a.) uses data for all respondents, (b.) displays results for left-of-center respondents, and (c.) displays results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center is defined as below the median response of 5 on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.13: Effects of Information Provision on Policy Preferences One Year Later

	Left-of-center					Center/Right-of-center				
	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Sup. Global.	(5) Sup. Immig.	(6) Nat. Redist.	(7) Glob. Redist.	(8) Sup. Int. Org.	(9) Sup. Global.	(10) Sup. Immig.
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.079 (0.498)	-0.613 (0.519)	-1.446*** (0.513)	-0.866* (0.507)	-0.690 (0.439)	-0.331 (0.341)	-0.206 (0.330)	0.700** (0.322)	0.244 (0.334)	0.011 (0.316)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.015 (0.516)	0.416 (0.525)	0.754 (0.535)	0.277 (0.550)	0.648 (0.489)	0.725** (0.342)	0.489 (0.314)	-0.306 (0.330)	-0.397 (0.287)	0.122 (0.277)
Observations	386	380	383	386	389	767	754	747	758	778

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on policy preferences using data from the follow-up survey. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Columns 1–5 display results for left-of-center respondents and Columns 6–10 display results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center is defined as below the median response of 5 on the self-assessment scale (0-10) for political orientation from left to right, whereas center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

Table A.14: Alternative Specification: Effects of Information Provision on Policy Preferences One Year Later

	Left-of-center					Center/Right-of-center				
	(1) Nat. Redist.	(2) Glob. Redist.	(3) Sup. Int. Org.	(4) Sup. Global.	(5) Sup. Immig.	(6) Nat. Redist.	(7) Glob. Redist.	(8) Sup. Int. Org.	(9) Sup. Global.	(10) Sup. Immig.
National Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.209 (0.581)	-0.111 (0.528)	-1.230** (0.594)	-0.337 (0.565)	-0.447 (0.483)	-0.213 (0.387)	-0.250 (0.389)	0.842** (0.377)	0.181 (0.385)	-0.279 (0.354)
National Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)	-0.929 (0.706)	0.575 (0.711)	0.207 (0.705)	1.732*** (0.610)	0.813 (0.546)	0.578 (0.503)	0.028 (0.477)	0.372 (0.476)	0.044 (0.463)	-0.602 (0.475)
Global Rank: Treat*(Feedback - Prior)	0.012 (0.658)	-0.298 (0.581)	0.481 (0.636)	-0.039 (0.608)	0.539 (0.570)	0.614* (0.372)	0.548 (0.371)	-0.601 (0.405)	-0.438 (0.349)	0.240 (0.350)
Global Rank: Peer Treatment*(Feedback - Prior)	0.619 (0.702)	-1.129 (0.705)	-0.465 (0.742)	-0.886 (0.717)	-0.117 (0.580)	-0.285 (0.501)	0.179 (0.500)	-0.685 (0.494)	-0.127 (0.451)	0.288 (0.415)
Observations	386	380	383	386	389	767	754	747	758	778

Notes: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. OLS regressions estimating the effect of information provision on policy preferences using data from the follow-up survey. The regressions control for information spillovers between the baseline and follow-up survey. Peer Treatment takes the value 1 if the respondent did not receive the information but another member of her household and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the respondent received the information or if none of the household members received the information). Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Columns 1–5 display results for left-of-center respondents and Columns 6–10 display results for center/right-of-center respondents. Left-of-center/right-of-center subsumes respondents at or above the median (5) on this scale. The control variables used in the analysis are the prior misperceptions about the national and global income rank, a set of dummies for the number of household members, and the following demographic characteristics: age and dummies for gender, education, disability, unemployment, retirement, self-employment, political party and East Germany.

B Survey Instrument: Baseline

<div style="background-color:red; color:white; text-align:center;">

BASELINE SURVEY

</div>

The documentation of the SOEP-IS can be found here: https://doi.org/10.5684/soep.is.2018

The full survey instruments are publicly available and can be found through the link above or directly here:

https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.789423.de/diw_ssp0866.pdf

The following questions should only be heard by the participant and no other household members.

Q132 - ISP1: Earning Money: Luck vs Effort - Intro　　　**Text**

How well an individual succeeds economically in life can depend both on things that are within a person's control, such as personal effort, and on things that are not within a person's control, such as luck.

Q133 - ISP2A: Luck vs. Effort - Germany　　　`Left-right matrix`

Number of rows: 1

Would you say that it is mostly luck or effort that matters for how well an individual in Germany does economically in life?

Please answer according to the following scale.
1 means only luck matters.
10 means only effort matters.
With the steps in between, you can rate your opinion.

Normal

	1 Only luck matters	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Only effort matters
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q134 - ISP2B: Luck vs. Effort - World `Left-right matrix`

Number of rows: 1

Would you say that it is mostly luck or effort that matters for how well an individual in the world does economically in life?

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> 1 means only luck matters.
> 10 means only effort matters.
> With the steps in between, you can rate your opinion.

Normal

	1 Only luck matters	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Only effort matters
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q135 - ISP3: Gross Income `Numeric`

Max = 99999999

As a basis for our next module "Income distribution", I would now like to know from you, how high the gross income, ie the income before tax deductions, of your household in 2016 was. Income includes wages or salaries, self-employment income, capital income, pension payments, and other private payments such as alimonies. If you are not sure, please estimate as accurately as possible.

Q136 - ISP4: How many household members `Numeric`

Max = 30

How many people (adults and children under 18), including you, lived in your household in 2016?

Q137 - ISP5: Income Rank - Intro `Text`

You indicated before that your gross household income in 2016 was EUR [XX] and your household had [Y] members. This means that the per-capita gross income in your household in 2016 was EUR [XXX]. We will now ask a few more questions about this per-capita gross household income.

We are interested in your assessment of how your per capita gross household income relates to the income of other people. Please give the most accurate and truthful assessment. You can earn money for the accuracy of your assessment. For each of the following two questions you will receive 20 Euros at the end of the survey if you are correct with your assessment. If you are not correct with your assessment, you will not receive any money.

> *Please click "Continue" and give the laptop to the participant.*

Q139 - ISP6A: Income Rank - Germany `Numeric`

Max = 100

What is the proportion of people in **Germany** who had a lower per-capita gross household income in 2016 than you?

> --> Please enter your answer in percent. 0 percent means that you are the poorest person in Germany. 100 percent means that you are the richest person in Germany. With the values in between, you can scale your assessment.

Q140 - ISP6B: Income Rank - World　　　　　　　　　　`Numeric`

Max = 100

What is the proportion of people **in the World** who had a lower per-capita gross household income in 2016 than you?

> --> Please enter your answer in percent. 0 percent means that you are the poorest person in the World. 100 percent means that you are the richest person in the World. With the values in between, you can scale your assessment.

> *Please give the laptop back to the interviewer.*

PB Q147 - PPOL6: Left-Right　　　　　　　　　　`Matrix`

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 11

In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right" when it comes to identifying different political attitudes. When you think of your own political views, where would you classify these views?

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> The value 0 means: far left, the value 10 means: far right.
> The values between 0 and 10 allow you to rate your opinion.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	0 Far left	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Far right
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix – 35

Q269 - ISP8: Rank Information - Intro	**Text**

We would now like to give you information about the distribution of per-capita gross household income in Germany and worldwide. This information is based on representative and independently collected data from scientifically well-recognized institutions, such as the Panel Study ``*Living in Germany*", the *World Bank*, and the *Luxembourg Income Study Center*.

Q270 - ISP9A: Rank Information Germany	**Text**

In Germany, X% of people are poorer than you, which means they have a lower per capita gross household income than you.

Graphical Illustration

Q271 - ISP9B: Rank Information World	**Text**

Worldwide, X% of people are poorer than you, which means they have a lower per capita gross household income than you.

Graphical Illustration

Q272 - ISP10: Redistribution – Intro	**Text**

Now we will talk about redistribution. **Redistribution of income** means that the state reduces the income gap between citizens through taxes and transfers.

Q273 - ISP11A: Redistribution - Germany	Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

How much redistribution of income do you want between citizens in Germany?

No redistribution means that the state does not intervene in the distribution of income. Complete redistribution means that everyone earns the same amount after redistribution has been done.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> The value 1 means: no redistribution,
> the value 10 means: complete redistribution.
> With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 No redistribution	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete redistribution
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q274 - ISP11B: Redistribution - World　　　　　　　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Now imagine that it would be possible to redistribute income around the world in a similar way as a state can redistribute income within a country.

How much redistribution of income do you want between citizens in the world?

No redistribution means that the global distribution of income is not affected. Complete redistribution means that everyone in the world earns the same income after redistribution has taken place.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> The value 1 means: no redistribution,
> the value 10 means: complete redistribution.
> With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 No redistribution	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete redistribution
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q275 - ISP12: International Redistribution　　　　　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Would you support the creation of an international organization (similar to the United Nations) that can redistribute income or resources between countries?

> 1 means: definitely not support.
> 10 means: definitely support.
> With the values in between, you can rate your opinion.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 definitely not support	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 definitely support
.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q276 - ISP13: Experiment - Intro   **Text**

We now want to set you two tasks where you can again earn money. In each of the two tasks you have to decide how you want to divide a certain amount of money between yourself and another household. At the end, every 7th respondent is selected and actually paid in one of the two tasks according to their decision. The determination of whether your decision will be paid will be made at the end of this module. The actual payment will be made at the end of the survey.

Q277 - ISP14A: Intro Distribution 50 Euro Germany   **Text**

You are paired with another household in Germany, which also participates in the "Life in Germany Innovation Survey" (but does not participate in these interviews). This household is one of the poorest 10 percent of households in Germany. You now have 50 euros available and can divide this amount in any way between you and the other household.

If this task is selected for payment, you will receive the amount you keep after the interview. The amount that you allocated to the other household will be transferred in full (without transaction costs) by Kantar Public at the end of the field time. In full means that your allocated amount arrives 1:1 at the other household.

Please make your decision in private.

Please hand over the laptop to the respondent.

Q278 - ISP14AX: Decision 50 Euro Germany   Numeric

Max = 50

How much of the 50 euros do you keep for yourself and how much do you give the other household?

I keep __€ ISP14A1 -1	I give __€ ISP14A2 -1

Q279 - ISP14A3: Message   **Text**

Thank you for your decision. Please click on "Next" and hand over the laptop again to the interviewer.

Q280 - ISP14B: Intro Distribution World   **Text**

You are paired with another household in Kenya or Uganda. This is one of the poorest 10 percent households worldwide. You now have 50 euros available and can divide this amount in any way between you and the other household.

If this task is selected for payment, you will receive the amount you keep at the end of the survey. The amount that you allocate to the other household will be forwarded to the selected household directly and completely (without transaction costs) by the University of Heidelberg at the end of field time via a non-profit organization. In full means that your allocated amount arrives 1:1 at the other household.

Please make your decision in private.

Please hand over the laptop to the respondent. On Demand: Please hand over the information sheet for GiveDirectly.

Q281 - ISP14BX: Decision 50 Euro World   Numeric

Max = 50

How much of the 50 euros do you keep for yourself and how much do you give the other household?

I keep __€ ISP14B1	-1	I give __€ - ISP14B2	-1

Q282 - ISP14B3: Message   Text

Thank you for your decision. Please click on "Next" and hand over the laptop again to the interviewer.

Q283 - ISP15: Globalization   Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Now, I want to talk with you about "globalization." Globalization means that local, regional and national economies are growing closer together. This happens, among other things, through technological progress, but also through the removal of trade barriers.

What level of globalization do you want?

No globalization means that countries are completely isolated and no trade with other countries takes place. Complete globalization means that there are no barriers to trade and barriers to the movement of persons, goods and capital.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> A 1 means no globalization,
> a 10 means complete globalization.
> With the steps in between you can graduate your judgment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 no globalization	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete globalization
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q284 - ISP16: Immigration   Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Should Germany, in your opinion, allow more or less people from poorer countries to come to Germany and work and live here?

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> A 1 means: much less people,
> a 10 means: many more people.
> With the steps in between, you can rate your opinion.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Much less people	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Much more people
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

C Survey Instrument: Follow-Up

<div style="background:red;color:white;text-align:center">**FOLLOW-UP SURVEY**</div>

The documentation of the SOEP-IS can be found here: https://doi.org/10.5684/soep.is.2018

The full survey instruments are publicly available and can be found through the link above or directly here:

https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.798098.de/diw_ssp0890.pdf

> *The following questions should only be heard by the participant and no other household members.*

Q253 - ISP3: Gross Income | Numeric

Max = 99999999

As a basis for our next module "Income distribution", I would now like to know from you, how high the gross income, ie the income before tax deductions, of your household in 2017 was. Income includes wages or salaries, self-employment income, capital income, pension payments, and other private payments such as alimonies. If you are not sure, please estimate as accurately as possible.

Q254 - ISP4: How many household members | Numeric

Max = 30

How many people (adults and children under 18), including you, lived in your household in 2017?

Q255 - ISP5: Income Rank – Intro | Text

You indicated before that your gross household income in 2017 was EUR [XX] and your household had [Y] members. This means that the per-capita gross income in your household in 2017 was EUR [XXX]. We will now ask a few more questions about this per-capita gross household income.

We are interested in your assessment of the relationship between your per-capita gross household income and the incomes of other people's households. Please give the most accurate and truthful assessment. You can earn money for the accuracy of your assessment. For each of the following two questions, you will receive 20 euros at the end of the survey if you are correct in your assessment. If you are wrong in your assessment, you will not receive any money.

> *Please click "Continue" and give the laptop to the participant.*

Q257 - ISP6A: Income Rank - Germany | Numeric

Max = 100

What is the proportion of people in **Germany** who had a lower per-capita gross household income in 2017 than you?

> --> Please enter your answer in percent.
> 0 percent means that you are the poorest person in Germany.
> 100 percent means that you are the richest person in Germany.
> With the values in between, you can scale your assessment.

Q258 - ISP6A_1: Income Rank – Germany Certainty `Left-right matrix`

Answer not required | Not back | Number of rows: 1

How sure are you with your answer?

> Please answer according to the following scale, where the value 0% means "not certain" and the value 100% means "very certain". With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	0% Not certain	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100% Very certain
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q259 - ISP6B: Income Rank - World `Numeric`

Max = 100

What is the proportion of people **in the World** who had a lower per-capita gross household income in 2017 than you?

> --> Please enter your answer in percent. 0 percent means that you are the poorest person in the World. 100 percent means that you are the richest person in the World. With the values in between, you can scale your assessment.

Q260 - ISP6A_1: Income Rank – World Certainty `Left-right matrix`

Answer not required | Not back | Number of rows: 1

How sure are you with your answer?

> Please answer according to the following scale, where the value 0% means "not certain" and the value 100% means "very certain". With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	0% Not certain	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100% Very certain
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

> Thank you for your information! Please return the laptop to your interviewer.

[…QUESTIONS FROM A DIFFERENT MODULE…]

Q414 - ISP10: Redistribution – Intro　　　　　　　　　**Text**

Now we will talk about redistribution. **Redistribution of income** means that the state reduces the income gap between citizens through taxes and transfers.

Q415 - ISP11A: Redistribution – Germany　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

How much redistribution of income do you want between citizens in Germany?

No redistribution means that the state does not intervene in the distribution of income. Complete redistribution means that everyone earns the same amount after redistribution has been done.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> The value 1 means: no redistribution,
> the value 10 means: complete redistribution.
> With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 No redistribution	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete redistribution
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q416 - ISP11B: Redistribution - World　　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Now imagine that it would be possible to redistribute income around the world in a similar way as a state can redistribute income within a country.

How much redistribution of income do you want between citizens in the world?

No redistribution means that the global distribution of income is not affected. Complete redistribution means that everyone in the world earns the same income after redistribution has taken place.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> The value 1 means: no redistribution,
> the value 10 means: complete redistribution.
> With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 No redistribution	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete redistribution
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q417 - ISP12: International Redistribution　　　　　　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Would you support the creation of an international organization (similar to the United Nations) that can redistribute income or resources between countries?

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> 1 means: definitely not support.
> 10 means: definitely support.
> With the values in between, you can rate your opinion.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 definitely not support	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 definitely support
.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q283 - ISP15: Globalization　　　　　　　　　　　Matrix

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Now, I want to talk with you about "globalization." Globalization means that local, regional and national economies are growing together more globally. This happens, among other things, through technological progress, but also through the removal of trade barriers.

What level of globalization do you want?

No globalization means that countries are completely isolated and no trade with other countries takes place. Complete globalization means that there are no barriers to trade and barriers to the movement of persons, goods and capital.

> Please answer according to the following scale.
> A 1 means no globalization,
> a 10 means complete globalization.
> With the steps in between you can graduate your judgment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 No globalization	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Complete globalization
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q420 - ISP15a: Globalization Poor People   `Matrix`

Not back | Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 11

Do you think that **poor people** in Germany are disadvantaged by globalization or that they benefit from it?

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Very disadvantaged	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Benefit greatly
…	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q420 - ISP15b: Globalization Rich People   `Matrix`

Not back | Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 11

Do you think that **rich people** in Germany are disadvantaged by globalization or that they benefit from it?

Please answer according to the following scale:
1 means "very disadvantaged",
10 means "benefit greatly".
With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Very disadvantaged	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Benefit greatly
…	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q421 - ISP16: Immigration   `Matrix`

Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 10

Should Germany, in your opinion, allow more or less people from poorer countries to come to Germany and work and live here?

Please answer according to the following scale.
A 1 means: much less people,
a 10 means: many more people.
With the steps in between, you can rate your opinion.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Much less people	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Much more people
X	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Q422 - ISP16a: Immigration Poor People   `Matrix`

Not back | Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 11

Do you think that **poor people** in Germany will be disadvantaged or that they will benefit from more immigration from people from poorer countries?

<div style="border: 2px solid green; color: green; text-align: center;">
Please answer according to the following scale:
1 means "very disadvantaged",
10 means "benefit greatly".
With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.
</div>

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Very disadvantaged	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Benefit greatly
...	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q422 - ISP16a: Immigration Rich People   `Matrix`

Not back | Number of rows: 1 | Number of columns: 11

Do you think that **rich people** in Germany will be disadvantaged or that they will benefit from more immigration from people from poorer countries?

<div style="border: 2px solid green; color: green; text-align: center;">
Please answer according to the following scale:
1 means "very disadvantaged",
10 means "benefit greatly".
With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.
</div>

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Very disadvantaged	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Benefit greatly
...	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Q424 - ISPEXP00: Intro WTP   **Text**

Not back

Based on your per-capita gross income in the amount of [XX], you have estimated before that [X% of the German population] and [Y% of the world population] have a lower per-capita gross household income than you. We have now calculated how many Germans and how many people in the world actually have a lower per-capita gross household income than you, using the latest official data. That is, we have calculated what rank you actually occupy in the respective distribution of income. We now want to know how much this information is worth to you.

Below we present you with 10 situations. In every situation you can choose between the information about your rank in the distribution of income OR receiving extra money at the end of the survey. The amount of money that you will be offered in these scenarios is predetermined, and goes from 0.1 euro to 10 euros. For instance, in Scenario 1, you will need to choose between seeing information about your income rank or receiving 0.1 euro.

In the end, the computer will randomly pick one of the 10 situations and your decision in this situation will be implemented. In other words, if you have chosen the information in the chosen situation, you will receive information about how many Germans or how many people in the world actually have a lower per-capita gross household income than you. If you have chosen the amount of money, you will receive this amount at the end of the questionnaire.

> INTERVIEWER: Please read the introductory text and then hand over the laptop to the respondent.

Q425 - ISPEXP01: WTP Germany   Matrix

Not back | Number of rows: 5 | Number of columns: 3

In the following five situations, you will have the opportunity to buy information about your income rank in **Germany**.

Would you like to …

> In the end, the computer randomly selects one situation and your decision in this situation will be implemented. If you have decided on the information, you will then receive this information afterwards and if you have decided on the amount of money, you will receive it at the end of this survey.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Money	Information	n/a *Position fixed* *Exclusive*
receive 10 cent OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 1 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 2.5 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 5 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 10 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○

Q426 - ISPEXP02: WTP World Matrix

Not back | Number of rows: 5 | Number of columns: 3

In the following five situations, you will have the opportunity to buy information about your income rank in the **world**.

Would you like to …

<div style="border:2px solid green; color:green; text-align:center;">
In the end, the computer randomly selects one situation and your decision in this situation will be implemented. If you have decided on the information, you will then receive this information afterwards and if you have decided on the amount of money, you will receive it at the end of this survey.
</div>

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Money	Information	n/a *Position fixed* *Exclusive*
receive 10 cent OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 1 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 2.5 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 5 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○
receive 10 euro OR the information about your income rank?	○	○	○

Q427 - ISPEXPBefr: Message **Text**

Thank you for your decision. Please click on "Next" and hand over the laptop again to the interviewer.

[…QUESTIONS FROM A DIFFERENT MODULE…]

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Q727 - ISP31_234: Trust   **Matrix**

Not back | Number of rows: 4 | Number of columns: 7

We have just talked about different assessments and until when you think they are still acceptable or not. Now we are concerned with the extent to which you generally trust certain institutions or other things that are important for our society.

Please answer according to the following scale: 1 means "very little", 5 means "very much". With the steps in between, you can scale your assessment.

Rows: Normal | Columns: Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	1 Very little	2	3	4	5 Very much	Don't know *Position fixed *Exclusive	n/a *Position fixed *Exclusive
How much trust do you have that the government is doing the right things?	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
How much trust do you have that the media (e.g., newspapers, TV, radio) will report completely, accurately and fairly on news?	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
How much trust do you have in government official statistics, such as unemployment, crime, immigration, economic growth, or inflation?	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
How much trust do you have that research produces knowledge that advances our society?	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯