The persistently large number of uninsured, roughly 40 million per year since 1993, continues to elicit bipartisan policy interest. Coverage-expansion proposals without mandates, by far the most common since the defeat of the Clinton plan, must address ri...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947191

Thanatology and Economics: The Behavioral Economics of Death

By Joel Slemrod

American Economic Review, May 2003

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947371

Average Debt and Equity Returns: Puzzling?

By Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott

American Economic Review, May 2003

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947407

The Impact of Bankruptcy on Airline Service Levels

By Severin Borenstein and Nancy L. Rose

American Economic Review, May 2003

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947443

The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing

By Lori D. Snyder, Nolan H. Miller, and Robert N. Stavins

American Economic Review, May 2003

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947470

Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession

American Economic Review, May 2003

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321947641

Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand

By Ilya Segal

American Economic Review, June 2003

The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers' valuations are drawn. However, when this distribution is unkno...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322156963

What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game

By James Andreoni, Marco Castillo, and Ragan Petrie

American Economic Review, June 2003

The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions, allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while ...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157034

A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased Innovation and Globalization

By Mathias Thoenig and Thierry Verdier

American Economic Review, June 2003

This paper considers a dynamic model of innovations in which firms can endogenously bias the direction of technological change. Both in a North-North and North-South context, we show that, when globalization triggers an increased threat of technological l...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157052

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

By Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez

American Economic Review, June 2003

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appe...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157061

Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?

By James Andreoni and A. Abigail Payne

American Economic Review, June 2003

Economists have long observed that crowding out of government grants to private charities is incomplete. The accepted belief is that givers treat the grants as imperfect substitutes for private giving. We theoretically and empirically investigate a second...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157098

Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?

By Antonio Rangel

American Economic Review, June 2003

This paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs), such as education and the environment, when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism. We show that backward intergeneration...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157106

Relational Incentive Contracts

By Jonathan Levin

American Economic Review, June 2003

Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157115