Search

Showing 441-460 of 668 items.

Modeling Bond Yields in Finance and Macroeconomics

By Francis X. Diebold, Monika Piazzesi, and Glenn D. Rudebusch

American Economic Review, May 2005

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805774670194

CBO's Analysis of the Macroeconomic Effects of the President's Budget

By Benjamin R. Page

American Economic Review, May 2005

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805774670374

Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AER

American Economic Review, May 2005

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805774669682

Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games

By David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel

American Economic Review, June 2005

We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performanc...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828054201431

The Wrong Kind of Transparency

By Andrea Prat

American Economic Review, June 2005

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828054201297

Secrecy and Safety

By Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum

American Economic Review, September 2005

We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's r...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828054825673

Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market

By Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino

American Economic Review, December 2005

We study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market. Subjects receive private information on the fundamental value of an asset and trade it in sequence with a market maker. The market maker updates the asset price according to the history of trades. T...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805775014443

Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking

By Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White

American Economic Review, December 2005

We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impos...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805775014254

Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information

By Matthew F. Mitchell and Andrea Moro

American Economic Review, March 2006

Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer, and redistribut...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282806776157605

National Treatment in the GATT

By Henrik Horn

American Economic Review, March 2006

The National Treatment (NT) clause is the first-line defense in the GATT (and in most other trade agreements) against opportunistic exploitation of the inevitable incompleteness of the agreement. This paper examines the role of NT as it applies to interna...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282806776157768