Search

Showing 461-480 of 668 items.

Paying Not to Go to the Gym

By Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier

American Economic Review, June 2006

How do consumers choose from a menu of contracts? We analyze a novel dataset from three U.S. health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,752 members over three years. The observed consumer b...

The Determinants of Mortality

[Symposium: Disease and Development]

By David Cutler, Angus Deaton, and Adriana Lleras-Muney

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2006

The pleasures of life are worth nothing if one is not alive to experience them. Through the twentieth century in the United States and other high-income countries, growth in real incomes was accompanied by a historically unprecedented decline in mortality...

A Model of Forum Shopping

By Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole

American Economic Review, September 2006

Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors of standards) resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users (buyers or adopters) of the worth of their property or idea. W...

The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer

[Symposium: Macroeconomic Lessons]

By N. Gregory Mankiw

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2006

The subfield of macroeconomics was born, not as a science, but more as a type of engineering. The problem that gave birth to our field was the Great Depression. God put macroeconomists on earth not to propose and test elegant theories but to solve practic...

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole

American Economic Review, December 2006

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive fo...

The Hidden Costs of Control

By Armin Falk and Michael Kosfeld

American Economic Review, December 2006

We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show th...