Competitive Framing

By Ran Spiegler

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2014

I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is "frame-dependent", and firms use costless "marketing messages" to influence the consumer's frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the "behavioral ...

Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms

By Talia Bar and Sidartha Gordon

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2014

We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers' private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability, the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project's obser...

Taxation of Couples under Assortative Mating

By Alexander Frankel

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, August 2014

I present a simple and tractable model of the optimal taxation of married couples, working off of the multidimensional screening framework of Armstrong and Rochet (1999). In particular, I study how the tax code varies with the degree of assortative mating...

Man-Bites-Dog Business Cycles

By Kristoffer P. Nimark

American Economic Review, August 2014

The newsworthiness of an event is partly determined by how unusual it is and this paper investigates the business cycle implications of this fact. Signals that are more likely to be observed after unusual events may increase both uncertainty and disagreem...

Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

By Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz

American Economic Review, August 2014

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in bot...

The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement

By Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum

American Economic Review, August 2014

A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff type...

Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

By James Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman

American Economic Review, October 2014

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously ...

Team Incentives for Education in Developing Countries: A Randomized Field Experiment in Benin

By Moussa P. Blimpo

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, October 2014

I examine the impact of student incentives in Benin, using three different designs that can be implemented relatively cheaply and with administrative data. The first design is a standard incentive structure where students receive monetary rewards for reac...

Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

By David Autor, Mark Duggan, and Jonathan Gruber

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, October 2014

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting pe...

Claim Validation

By Nabil Al-Najjar, Luciano Pomatto, and Alvaro Sandroni

American Economic Review, November 2014

Hume (1748) challenged the idea that a general claim (e.g. "all swans are white") can be validated by empirical evidence, no matter how compelling. We examine this issue from the perspective of a tester who must accept or reject the forecasts of a potent...

Strategic Private Experimentation

By Mike Felgenhauer and Elisabeth Schulte

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if ...

The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy

By David Owens, Zachary Grossman, and Ryan Fackler

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We document individuals' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Experiment participants choose whether to bet on themselves or on a partner answering a quiz question correctly. Given participants' beliefs, which we elicit separately, expected-mo...

Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction in the Laboratory

By Ignacio Esponda and Emanuel Vespa

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

In several common-value environments (e.g., auctions or elections), players should make informational inferences from opponents' strategies under certain hypothetical events (e.g., winning the auction or being pivotal). We design a voting experiment that ...

Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling

By Ed Hopkins

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

One explanation of altruism is that it arises from "mentalizing", the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are s...

(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters

By Heski Bar-Isaac and Joyee Deb

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audie...

Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision

By David A. Miller and Kareen Rozen

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided ...

The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem

By John Kennes, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public daycare centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the schoo...

Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

By Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman

American Economic Review, December 2014

A principal allocates an object to one of I agents. Each agent values receiving the object and has private information regarding the value to the principal of giving it to him. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal can check an agent's inf...

Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

By Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi

American Economic Review, December 2014

Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illus...

Reputation and Persistence of Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets

By V. V. Chari, Ali Shourideh, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones

American Economic Review, December 2014

The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuates over time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the vol...