Managerial Attention and Worker Performance

By Marina Halac and Andrea Prat

American Economic Review, October 2016

We present a novel theory of the employment relationship. A manager can invest in attention technology to recognize good worker performance. The technology may break and is costly to replace. We show that as time passes without recognition, the worker's b...

An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and Substitution

By Matthew Levy and Balázs Szentes

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

This paper analyzes a labor market, where: workers can acquire an observable skill at no cost, firms differ in unobserved productivity, workers' skill and firms' productivity are substitutes, and firms' search is directed. The main result is that, if the ...

Delegating Multiple Decisions

By Alex Frankel

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

This paper shows how to extend the heuristic of capping an agent against her bias to delegation problems over multiple decisions. Caps may be exactly optimal when the agent has constant biases, in which case a cap corresponds to a ceiling on the weighted ...

The (Human) Sampler's Curses

By Mark Thordal-Le Quement

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We fi...

Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome

By Nicola Lacetera, Bradley J. Larsen, Devin G. Pope, and Justin R. Sydnor

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We an...

Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games

By Jakša Cvitanić and George Georgiadis

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize...

Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts

By Malin Arve and David Martimort

American Economic Review, November 2016

We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelat...

Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values

By Daniel F. Garrett

American Economic Review, November 2016

We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with c...