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  3. American Economic Review
  4. December 2005
  5. The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation

  • Matthias Doepke
  • Fabrizio Zilibotti
American Economic Review
vol. 95, no. 5, December 2005
(pp. 1492–1524)
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Abstract

We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.

Citation

Doepke, Matthias, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2005. "The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation." American Economic Review, 95 (5): 1492–1524. DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014425

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J82 Labor Standards: Labor Force Composition