This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments

  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexander Westkamp
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 214–19)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.

Citation

Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. 2017. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 214–19. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171050

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory