American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Belief Elicitation with a Synchronized Lottery Choice Menu That Is Invariant to Risk Attitudes
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8,
no. 1, February 2016
(pp. 110–39)
Abstract
This paper uses a Bayesian information processing task to compare belief elicitation mechanisms including a quadratic scoring rule, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak pricing procedure, and a two-stage menu of lottery choices that is structured to identify a precise point of probability indifference. The choice menu yields a higher incidence of correct Bayesian responses and lower belief error averages. Unlike the quadratic scoring rule, the binary payoffs for the lottery choice mechanism are synchronized to provide theoretical incentive-compatibility regardless of risk attitudes. In addition, the choice menu structure is more transparent and intuitive than the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure. (JEL C91, D44, D81, D83)Citation
Holt, Charles A., and Angela M. Smith. 2016. "Belief Elicitation with a Synchronized Lottery Choice Menu That Is Invariant to Risk Attitudes." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (1): 110–39. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130274Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- D44 Auctions
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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