American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9,
no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 226–62)
Abstract
To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).Citation
Goto, Masahiro, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, and Makoto Yokoo. 2017. "Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 226–62. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160124Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 Market Design
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I20 Education and Research Institutions: General
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