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  4. August 2020
  5. Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum

  • John William Hatfield
  • Ravi Jagadeesan
  • Scott Duke Kominers
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 12, no. 3, August 2020
(pp. 277–85)
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Abstract

Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in their setting, full substitutability is equivalent to the assumption that all indirect utility representations of each firm's preferences are quasisubmodular; we show here that this claimed equivalence result does not hold in general. We show instead that full substitutability is equivalent to weak quasisubmodularity of all indirect utility representations.

Citation

Hatfield, John William, Ravi Jagadeesan, and Scott Duke Kominers. 2020. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12 (3): 277–85. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190204

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
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