American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14,
no. 4, November 2022
(pp. 58–77)
Abstract
Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings.Citation
Ghidoni, Riccardo, and Sigrid Suetens. 2022. "The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (4): 58–77. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200268Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
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