American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 15,
no. 4, November 2023
(pp. 114–45)
Abstract
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams' decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.Citation
Cooper, David J., and John H. Kagel. 2023. "Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (4): 114–45. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210012Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
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