American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 16,
no. 3, August 2024
(pp. 259–83)
Abstract
We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, beliefs respond to the return to cooperation, most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, and beliefs change with experience while becoming more accurate over time. Finally, we uncover a novel mechanism whereby trusting subjects learn to cooperate through their interaction with experience.Citation
Gill, David, and Yaroslav Rosokha. 2024. "Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16 (3): 259–83. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210336Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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