American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 16,
no. 3, August 2024
(pp. 199–231)
Abstract
How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher-intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, with higher payoff inequality, behavior changes and higher-intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior.Citation
Lambrecht, Marco, Eugenio Proto, Aldo Rustichini, and Andis Sofianos. 2024. "Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16 (3): 199–231. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220245Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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