American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Assignment of Arrival Slots
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5,
no. 2, May 2013
(pp. 164–85)
Abstract
Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots. (JEL D45, D82, L93, L98, P14, R41)Citation
Schummer, James, and Rakesh V. Vohra. 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2): 164–85. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.164JEL Classification
- D45 Rationing; Licensing
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L93 Air Transportation
- L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
- P14 Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
- R41 Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
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