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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2013
  5. Strategic Tournaments

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Strategic Tournaments

  • Ayala Arad
  • Ariel Rubinstein
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5, no. 4, November 2013
(pp. 31–54)
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Abstract

A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior

Citation

Arad, Ayala, and Ariel Rubinstein. 2013. "Strategic Tournaments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (4): 31–54. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.31

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
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