Balanced Boards, Balanced Wages: When Female Directors Shrink the Gender Wage Gaps
Abstract
Gender board quotas have emerged as a policy of choice to tackle workplace gender inequalities in many countries. Introduced in 2010, the French quota mandates a 40% female representation on the boards of both publicly listed and large private companies by 2017. To assess its impact, we first construct and analyze a dataset on the board composition of all French firms from 2008 to 2021. Over this period, the average share of female board members increased from 11% to 42% for targeted listed firms, but only from 14% to 30% among targeted non-listed firms. Given the partial complianceobserved, we use difference-in-differences and IV strategies using the firms listed in 2009 as a treatment group. We show that a higher female board share leads to a greater likelihood of appointing a female CEO and increases the share of women among top executives and top earners. It also leads to
a significant reduction in gender wage gaps at all levels of the firm’s hierarchy. These improvements in gender equality outcomes are achieved mainly through external hires for top positions, while wage gap reductions benefit both new hires and incumbent employees. Our analysis further identifies factors contributing to the policy’s effectiveness. Post-quota female appointees are found to be more qualified than their pre-quota counterparts and gain access to key board committees. As the share of women
on the board increases, it also becomes more likely that CEO remuneration is linked to gender equity goals. These results underscore that gender quotas can help advance gender equality in the workplace.