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Designing Dynamic Research Contests

By Jean-Michel Benkert and Igor Letina

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2020

This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the ...

Missing Events in Event Studies: Identifying the Effects of Partially Measured News Surprises

By Refet S. Gürkaynak, Burçin Kisacikoğlu, and Jonathan H. Wright

American Economic Review, December 2020

Macroeconomic news announcements are elaborate and multi-dimensional. We consider a framework in which jumps in asset prices around announcements reflect both the response to observed surprises in headline numbers and to latent factors, reflecting other n...

Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search

By Dominic Coey, Bradley J. Larsen, and Brennan C. Platt

American Economic Review, December 2020

We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and ra...

A Model of Competing Narratives

By Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

American Economic Review, December 2020

We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives." Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other ra...

Screening and Selection: The Case of Mammograms

By Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Tamar Oostrom, Abigail Ostriker, and Heidi Williams

American Economic Review, December 2020

We analyze selection into screening in the context of recommendations that breast cancer screening start at age 40. Combining medical claims with a clinical oncology model, we document that compliers with the recommendation are less likely to have cancer ...

What Makes a Rule Complex?

By Ryan Oprea

American Economic Review, December 2020

We study the complexity of rules by paying experimental subjects to implement a series of algorithms and then eliciting their willingness-to-pay to avoid implementing them again in the future. The design allows us to examine hypotheses from the theoretica...

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

By Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Olivier Tercieux

American Economic Review: Insights, December 2020

Top trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in o...